■ 


~D3835 
♦ 69  5 


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Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016 


https://archive.org/details/makingofmodernjaOOgubb 


BT  THE  SAME  AUTHOR 


A DICTIONARY  OF  CHINESE-JAPANESE  WORDS 
IN  THE  JAPANESE  LANGUAGE.  (3  Vols.) 

THE  CIVIL  CODE  OF  JAPAN.  (2  Vols.) 

With  an  Introduction  on  the  Japanese  Family  System. 

THE  PROGRESS  OF  JAPAN  (1853-71). 

THE  JAPAN  HANDBOOK 
(Published  by  Foreign  Office.) 

REPORT  ON  TAXATION  AND  LAND  TENURE 
(Parliamentary  Papers  Series).  Etc. 


THE  MAKING  OF  MODERN  JAPAN 


Prince  Iwakura. 

Descended  from  an  ancient  family  of  Court  Nobles  ; he  was  a leading  figure 
in  the  Restoration  Movement,  and  in  the  Government  subsequently  formed. 


THE  MAKING  OF 

MODERN  JAPAN 

AN  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  PROGRESS  OF  JAPAN 
FROM  PRE-FEUDAL  DAYS  TO  CONSTITUTIONAL 
GOVERNMENT  y THE  POSITION  OF  A GREAT 
POWER,  WITH  CHAPTERS  ON  RELIGION,  THE 
COMPLEX  FAMILY  SYSTEM,  EDUCATION,  tfc. 


v BY 

J.  H.  GUBBINS,  C.M.G.,  HON.  M.A.(Oxon.) 

LATE  FIRST  SECRETARY  & JAPANESE  SECRETARY  OF  BRITISH  EMBASSY,  TOKIO, 
AUTHOR  OF  “A  DICTIONARY  OF  CHINESE-JAPANESE  WORDS  IN  THE  JAPANESE 
LANGUAGE,"  “THE  PROGRESS  OF  JAPAN,"  “ THE  CIVIL  CODE  OP  JAPAN," 
<S-C.,  <S-C.,  &C. 


WITH  ILLUSTRATIONS 


PHILADELPHIA 

J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY 

LONDON  : SEELEY,  SERVICE  & CO.,  Ltd. 
1922 


Printed  in  Great  Britain. 


TO 

THE  MEMORY 
OF 


MY  WIFE 


PREFACE 


THE  Author’s  thanks  are  due  to  His  Excellency- 
Baron  G.  Hayashi,  H.I.J.M.’s  Ambassador  in 
London,  for  most  kindly  referring  to  a competent 
authority  in  Japan,  for  confirmation,  a doubtful  point  in 
feudal  land  tenure ; to  Prince  Iwakura,  Marquis  Okubo, 
and  Marquis  Kido  for  photographs  of  three  of  the 
eminent  statesmen  whose  portraits  appear ; to  the  Right 
Honorable  Sir  Ernest  Satow  for  the  trouble  he  took  in 
reading  the  MS.  of  the  book;  to  Sir  E.  F.  Crowe,  c.m.g., 
Commercial  Counsellor  of  the  British  Embassy  in  Tokio, 
for  very  useful  help  given  in  various  ways ; and  to  Miss 
Maud  Oxenden  for  valuable  assistance  in  proof-correcting. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  I 

PAGE 

Early^History — The  Great  Reform — Adoption  of  Chinese  Culture  . 17 

CHAPTER  II 

Establishment  of  Feudalism  and  Duarchy — The  Shogunate  and  the 
Throne — Early  Foreign  Relations — Christian  Persecution  and 
Closure  of  Country  ........  24 


CHAPTER  III 

The  Tokugawa  Shoguns — Consolidation  of  Duarchy  ...  32 

CHAPTER  IV 

Political  Conditions — Reopening  of  Japan  to  Foreign  Intercourse — 

Conclusion  of  Treaties — Decay  of  Shogunate  ....  42 

CHAPTER  V 

Anti-Foreign  Feeling — Choshiu  Rebellion — Mikado’s  Ratification 
of  Treaties — Prince  Kciki — Restoration  Movement — Civil  War 
— Fall  of  Shogunate  ........  53 


CHAPTER  VI 

Japanese  Chronology — Satsuma  and  Choshiu  Clans — The  “ Charter 

Oath  ” 68 


CHAPTER  VII 

New  Government — Clan  Feeling  in  Satsuma — Administrative  Changes 

— Reformers  and  Reactionaries  ......  77 

CHAPTER  VIII 

Abolition  of  Feudal  System — Reconstitution  of  Classes — Effects  of 

Abolition  of  Feudalism  . *87 


11 


12 


Contents 


CHAPTER  IX 

PAGE 

Effects  of  Abolition  of  Feudalism  on  Agricultural  Class — Changes  in 

Land  Tenure — Land-Tax  Revision  .....  97 

CHAPTER  X 

Missions  to  Foreign  Governments — Hindrances  to  Reform — Language 

Difficulties — Attitude  of  Foreign  Powers  ....  107 

CHAPTER  XI 

Changes  and  Reforms — Relations  with  China  and  Korea — Rupture 
in  Ministry — Secession  of  Tosa  and  Hizen  Leaders — Progress  of 
Reforms — Annexation  of  Loochoo — Discontent  of  Former 
Military  Class  . . . . . . . . . 117 


CHAPTER  XII 

Local  Risings — Satsuma  Rebellion — Two-Clan  Government  . .129 

CHAPTER  XIII 

Japanese  Religions  before  Restoration  : Shinto  and  Buddhism  . . 139 

CHAPTER  XIV 

Japanese  Religions  after  Restoration  : Christianity — Bushido — 

Religious  Observances  . . . . . . . . 145 


CHAPTER  XV 

Political  Unrest — The  Press — Press  Laws — Conciliation  and  Re- 
pression— Legal  Reforms — Failure  of  Yezo  Colonization  Scheme 
— Okuma’s  Withdrawal — Increased  Political  Agitation  . . 152 

CHAPTER  XVI 

Promise  of  Representative  Government — Political  Parties — Re- 
newed Unrest — Local  Outbreaks  ......  162 

CHAPTER  XVII 

Framing  of  Constitution — New  Peerage — Reorganization  of  Ministry 
— English  Influence — Financial  Reform — Failure  of  Conferences 
for  Treaty  Revision  . . . . . . • .172 


Contents 


*3 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

PAGE 

Imperial  Authority — Privy  Council — Local  Self-Government — Pro- 
mulgation of  Constitution — Imperial  Prerogatives — The  Two 
Houses  of  Parliament — Features  of  Constitution  and  First 
Parliamentary  Elections  . 181 


CHAPTER  XIX 

Working  of  Representative  Government — Stormy  Proceedings  in 
Diet — Legal  and  Judicial  Reform — Political  Rowdyism — Fusion 
of  Classes  ..........  192 

CHAPTER  XX 

Working  of  Parliamentary  Government — Grouping  of  Parties — 
Government  and  Opposition — Formation  of  Seiyukai — Increasing 
Intervention  of  Throne — Decrease  of  Party  Rancour — Attitude 
of  Upper  House  .........  197 

CHAPTER  XXI 

Treaty  Revision — Great  Britain  takes  Initiative — Difficulties  with 

China  ..........  204 


CHAPTER  XXII 

China  and  Korea — War  with  China — Naval  Reform — Defeat  of 

China — Treaty  of  Shimonoseki — Peace  Terms  . . . 214 

CHAPTER  XXIII 

Militarist  Policy — Liaotung  Peninsula — Intervention  of  Three  Powers 
— Leases  of  Chinese  Territory  by  Germany,  Russia,  Great  Britain 
and  France — Spheres  of  Interest  ......  223 

CHAPTER  XXIV 

American  Protest  against  Foreign  Aggression  in  China — Principle  of 
“ Open  Door  and  Equal  Opportunity  ” — Financial  Reform — 
Operation  of  Revised  Treaties — The  Boxer  Outbreak — Russia 
and  Manchuria  .........  234 


CHAPTER  XXV 

Agreement  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany — The  Anglo- 

Japanese  Alliance 245 


14 


Contents 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

PAGE 

War  with  Russia — Success  of  Japan — President  Roosevelt’s  Mediation 

— Treaty  of  Portsmouth — Peace  Terms 254 

CHAPTER  XXVII 

Weakening  of  Cordiality  with  America — Causes  of  Friction — Ex- 
pansion and  Emigration — Annexation  of  Korea — New  Treaties  . 265 

CHAPTER  XXVIII 

Rise  of  Japan  and  Germany  Compared — Renewal  of  Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance — Japan  and  the  Great  War — Military  and  Naval  Ex- 
pansion— Japan  and  China — The  Twenty-one  Demands — Agree- 
ment with  Russia  regarding  China — Lansing-Ishii  Agreement — 


Effects  of  Great  War  on  Situation  in  Far  East  ....  274 

CHAPTER  XXIX 

The  Japanese  Family  System  283 

CHAPTER  XXX 

Education  ..........  292 

CHAPTER  XXXI 

The  Makers  of  Modern  Japan — How  Japan  is  Governed  . . . 300 

Index 307 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


Prince  Iwakura  .... 

. Frontispiece 

Okubo  Ichizo  .... 

PAGE 

. 72 

Kido  Junichiro  .... 

80 

Marquis  Inouye  .... 

IO4 

Marquis  Okuma  .... 

IO4 

Prince  Ito 

. I76 

Marquis  Matsugata 

184 

Field-Marshal  Prince  Oyama 

184 

Field-Marshal  Prince  Yamagata  . 

. 2l6 

Marquis  Saionji  .... 

. 248 

General  Prince  Katsura 

. 248 

/ 


The  Making  of  Modern  Japan 


CHAPTER  I 

Early  History — The  Great  Reform — Adoption  of  Chinese  Culture. 

THERE  is  much  speculation,  but  no  certainty,  regarding  the 
origin  of  the  Japanese  people.  It  is,  however,  generally 
held  that  the  Japanese  race  is  made  up  of  two  main  elements 
— one  Mongolian,  which  came  to  Japan  from  Northern  Asia  by  way 
of  Korea,  and  the  other  Malayan ; a third  strain  being  possibly  supplied 
to  some  small  extent  by  the  Ainu  aborigines,  whom  the  invaders 
found  in  occupation  of  the  country.  The  prevailing  type  of  feature 
is  Mongolian,  though  scientific  research  claims  to  have  discovered 
traces  of  the  physical  characteristics  of  other  Asiatic  races. 

If  the  earliest  Japanese  records  provide  little  trustworthy  material 
for  the  historian,  they  show  how  the  legendary  heroes  of  oral  tradi- 
tion became  in  the  hands  of  successive  chroniclers  the  deified 
ancestors  of  the  reigning  dynasty,  and  indicate  the  process  of  tran- 
sition by  which  the  feelings  of  respect  and  admiration  they  inspired 
developed  into  a popular  belief  in  the  quasi-divinity  of  Japanese 
Sovereigns.  It  is  in  this  no-man’s-land,  where  no  clear  boundaries 
divide  fable  from  history,  that  we  are  from  the  first  confronted  with 
the  primitive  native  religion,  and  realize  its  weakness  as  a civilizing 
influence.  From  these  same  records,  nevertheless,  as  well  as  from 
scanty  Chinese  sources,  we  glean  certain  general  facts  bearing  on  the 
early  development  of  Japan.  Chinese  culture  is  seen  trickling  in  at 
a very  early  date  ; we  hear  of  the  adoption  at  some  time  in  the  fifth 
century  of  Chinese  ideographs,  the  Japanese  following  in  this  respect 
the  example  of  their  Korean  neighbours,  who,  like  themselves,  had 
originally  no  written  language  of  their  own  ; and  we  learn  of  the 
introduction  of  Buddhism  a century  later.  The  advent  of  Buddhism 

17 


B 


1 8 


The  Great  Reform 

was  a notable  factor  in  Japan’s  progress.  Its  missionaries  assisted 
the  spread  of  the  Chinese  written  language,  and  thus  paved  the 
way  for  the  introduction  in  a.d.  645  of  what  is  known  as  the  Great 
Reform. 

The  Great  Reform  gave  its  name  to  the  first  year-period  of 
Japanese  chronology,  and  to  Japanese  history  its  first  certain  date. 
It  was  the  outcome  of  a movement  having  for  its  object  the  repair 
of  the  authority  of  the  Throne,  which  had  been  weakened  by  the 
separatist  tendencies  of  the  Soga  family.  The  new  form  of  govern- 
ment then  established,  in  imitation  of  changes  made  under  the  T’ang 
dynasty  in  China,  was  a centralized  bureaucracy.  The  supreme 
control  of  affairs  was  vested  in  the  Council  of  State.  In  this  Council 
the  Prime  Minister  presided,  and  with  him  were  associated  the  two 
assistant  Ministers  of  State  and  the  President  of  the  Privy  Council. 
Of  the  eight  Boards,  or  Departments  of  State,  five  dealt  mainly,  but 
by  no  means  exclusively,  with  matters  relating  to  Ceremonial, 
Religion,  the  Army,  Finance  and  Taxation  respectively  ; the  other 
three  having  the  direction  of  business  connected  more  immediately 
with  the  Imperial  Court.  There  seems,  however,  to  have  been  no 
very  clear-cut  division  of  business,  Court  interests  being  apparently 
mixed  up  with  the  affairs  of  every  department.  This  change  in  the 
form  of  government  was  only  one  of  many  results  caused  by  the 
inrush  of  Chinese  ideas  at  this  time.  The  influence  of  the  wave  of 
Chinese  culture  which  swept  over  the  country  permeated  every  part 
of  the  national  fabric,  remodelling  the  social  system,  and  laying  the 
foundations  of  Japanese  law,  education,  industries  and  art. 

Later  on  provision  was  made  for  the  establishment  of  a regency 
during  the  minority  of  a reigning  Sovereign,  the  regent  ( Sessho ) by 
virtue  of  his  office  ranking  at  the  head  of  the  official  hierarchy. 
When  the  regency  expired,  the  ex-regent  assumed  the  title  of 
Kwambaku  (or  Sessho-Kwambaku),  retaining  his  official  precedence. 
The  two  posts  were  subsequently  separated,  and,  like  all  othet  Court 
offices,  became,  as  the  authority  of  the  Court  declined,  mere  honorary 
titles.  Both  posts  and  honorary  titles  were  hereditary  in  certain 
branches  of  the  Fujiwara  family,  the  only  exception  to  this  rule 
occurring  in  the  sixteenth  century. 

It  was  not  till  the  eighth  century  that  the  Japanese  elaborated  a 
written  language  of  their  own.  The  Koreans  had  done  so  already, 
but  the  two  written  languages  thus  superadded  to  what  was  borrowed 


Adoption  of  Chinese  Culture  19 

from  China  have  nothing  in  common.  That  of  the  Japanese  consists 
of  two  different  scripts,  each  adapted  from  Chinese  characters.  The 
Korean  script  bears  no  resemblance  to  Chinese.  Both  countries  have 
good  reason  to  regard  as  a very  doubtful  blessing  the  possession  of 
two  spoken  and  two  written  languages. 

At  this  early  stage  in  Japanese  history  three  things  stand  out 
prominently : the  welcome  given  to  foreign  ideas  ; the  duality  of 
religion  and  language  ; and  the  curious  atmosphere  of  divinity  sur- 
rounding the  Throne,  which  by  an  easy  process  of  transition  came 
to  be  regarded  by  the  people  as  a natural  attribute  of  their  country 
and  of  themselves.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  to  find  in  the 
development  of  Japan  two  opposite  tendencies  constantly  at  work — 
the  assimilation  of  new  ideas  from  abroad,  and  reaction  in  favour  of 
native  institutions.  Together  with  the  readiness  to  adopt  foreign 
ideas,  to  which  the  seventh  century  bears  such  striking  witness,  there 
existed  an  intense  national  pride — a belief  in  the  superiority  of  Japan, 
“ the  country  of  the  Gods,”  to  all  other  lands.  The  existence  of 
these  two  contrary  currents  of  popular  feeling,  in  which  religion, 
politics  and  language  all  play  their  part,  may  be  traced  through  the 
whole  course  of  Japanese  history. 

The  strengthening  of  the  Throne’s  authority,  which  wfas  effected 
by  the  Great  Reform,  lasted  but  a short  time,  the  ruling  power  soon 
passing  again  into  the  hands  of  another  powerful  family,  the  House 
of  Fujiwara.  But  the  centralized  bureaucratic  form  of  government 
borrowed  from  China  survived,  and  with  it  the  fiction  of  direct 
Imperial  rule. 

During  the  long  ascendancy,  covering  more  than  three  centuries, 
of  the  House  of  Fujiwara  the  Sovereigns,  despite  their  assumption 
of  the  recognized  titles  of  Chinese  Emperors,  sank  into  the  position 
of  mere  puppets,  removable  at  the  will  of  the  patrician  rulers.  It 
is  important  to  note,  however,  that  neither  the  nominal  authority 
of  the  occupant  of  the  Throne  nor  the  power  of  the  de  jacto  Govern- 
ment during  this  period,  and  for  many  years  after,  extended  much 
beyond  the  centre  of  Japan.  The  loyalty  of  district  governors  in  the 
south  and  west  was  regulated  by  their  distance  from  the  seat  of 
administration.  To  the  north  and  east,  again,  the  country  was  in 
the  possession  of  the  Ainu  aborigines,  with  whom  a desultory  warfare 
was  carried  on  until  their  eventual  expulsion  to  the  northern  island 
of  Yezo. 


20  Adoption  of  Chinese  Culture 

Early  in  the  twelfth  century  the  Fujiwara  regime  came  to  an  end. 
The  succeeding  administrators  were  members  of  the  Taira  family, 
which  had  gradually  risen  to  importance,  and  wielded  the  predomi- 
nant influence  in  the  country.  Fifty  years  later  their  position  was 
successfully  challenged  by  the  rival  House  of  Minamoto,  which,  like 
its  two  predecessors,  could  claim  royal  descent.  The  long  struggle 
between  these  two  houses  ended  in  the  final  overthrow  of  the  Taira 
family  in  the  sea  battle  of  Dan-no-Ura  (a.d.  1155)  and  the  establish- 
ment of  the  feudal  system,  in  other  words,  of  a military  government. 

Yoritomo,  the  Minamoto  leader,  who  then  rose  to  power,  received 
from  the  Court  the  title  of  Shogun  (or  General),  a contraction  of  the 
fuller  appellation  Sei-i-T ai-Shogun.  This  may  be  rendered  Barbarian- 
quelling  Generalissimo,  and  was  the  term  originally  applied  to  generals 
employed  in  fighting  the  Ainu  aborigines  in  the  North-Eastern 
marches.  With  the  assumption  of  this  title  the  term  itself  developed 
a new  meaning,  for  it  was  not  as  the  general  of  an  army  that  he 
thenceforth  figured,  but  as  the  virtual  ruler  of  Japan.  His  advent 
to  power  marks  a new  phase  in  Japanese  history,  the  inception  of  a 
dual  system  of  government  based  on  feudalism,  which  lasted,  except 
for  a short  period  in  the  sixteenth  century,  until  modern  times. 

With  the  establishment  of  a military  government  the  classification 
of  society  was  changed.  Thenceforth  there  were  three  recognized 
divisions  of  the  people — the  Kuge,  or  Court  aristocracy,  constituting 
the  former  official  hierarchy,  which,  becoming  more  and  more  im- 
poverished as  the  connection  of  its  members  with  the  land  ceased, 
gradually  sank  into  the  position  of  a negligible  factor  in  the  nation  ; 
the  Buke , or  military  class,  which  included  both  daimios  and  their 
retainers,  and  out  of  which  the  new  official  hierarchy  was  formed  ; 
and  the  Minke,  or  general  public,  which  comprised  farmers,  artizans 
and  tradesmen,  or  merchants,  ranking  in  the  order  named. 

Feudalism  was  no  sudden  apparition.  It  was  no  mushroom  growth 
of  a night.  The  importance  of  the  military  class  had  been  growing 
steadily  during  the  prolonged  civil  strife  from  which  the  Minamoto 
family  had  emerged  victorious.  This  and  the  increasing  weakness  of 
the  Government  had  brought  about  a change  in  provincial  adminis- 
tration. Civil  governors,  dependent  on  the  Capital,  had  gradually 
given  place  to  military  officials,  with  hereditary  rights,  who  looked 
elsewhere  for  orders ; manorial  estates  were  expanding  into  terri- 
tories with  castles  to  protect  them  ; and  local  revenues  no  longer 


Adoption  of  Chinese  Culture  21 

flowed  with  regularity  into  State  coffers.  Thus  in  more  than  one 
manner  the  way  had  been  prepared  for  feudalism. 

The  same  may  be  said  of  the  dual  system  of  administration,  though 
here  the  question  is  less  simple.  From  all  that  history  tells  us,  and 
from  its  even  more  eloquent  silence,  there  is  good  reason  to  question 
the  existence  at  any  time  of  direct  Imperial  rule.  We  hear  of  no 
Mikado  ever  leading  an  army  in  the  field,  making  laws  or  dispensing 
justice,  or  fulfilling,  in  fact,  any  of  the  various  functions  associated 
with  sovereignty,  save  those  connected  with  public  worship.  This 
absence  of  personal  rule,  this  tendency  to  act  by  proxy,  is  in  keeping 
with  the  atmosphere  of  impersonality  which  pervades  everything 
Japanese,  and  is  reflected  in  the  language  of  the  people.  Everything 
tends  to  confirm  the  impression  that  the  prestige  of  sovereignty  in 
Japan  thus  lay  rather  in  the  institution  itself  than  in  the  personality 
of  the  rulers.  The  casual  manner  in  which  succession  was  regulated  ; 
the  appearance  on  the  Throne  of  Empresses  in  a country  where  little 
deference  was  paid  to  women  ; the  preference  repeatedly  shown  for 
the  reign  of  minors  ; the  laisser-aller  methods  of  adoption  and 
abdication  ; the  easy  philosophy  which  saw  nothing  unusual  in  the 
association  of  three  abdicated,  or  cloistered,  monarchs  with  a reign- 
ing sovereign  ; and  the  general  indifference  of  the  public  to  the  mis- 
fortunes which  from  time  to  time  befel  the  occupant  of  the  Throne, 
all  point  in  the  same  direction — the  withdrawal  of  the  Sovereign  at 
an  early  date  from  all  active  participation  in  the  work  of  government. 
In  so  far,  therefore,  as  the  personal  rule  of  the  Sovereign  was  con- 
cerned it  seems  not  unreasonable  to  regard  the  dual  system  of 
government  established  at  this  time  as  the  formal  recognition  of 
what  already  existed.  Its  association  with  feudalism,  however, 
brought  about  an  entirely  new  departure.  Kioto,  indeed,  continued 
to  be  the  national  capital.  There  the  former  Ministers  of  State 
remained  with  all  the  empty  paraphernalia  of  an  officialdom  which 
had  ceased  to  govern.  But  a new  seat  of  administration  was  set  up 
at  Kamakura,  to  which  all  men  of  ability  were  gradually  attracted. 
Thenceforth  the  country  was  administered  by  a military  government 
directed  by  the  Shogun  at  Kamakura,  while  the  Sovereign  lived  in 
seclusion  in  the  Capital,  surrounded  by  a phantom  Court,  and  an 
idle  official  hierarchy. 

In  this  question  of  government  there  is  still  something  further  to 
be  explained.  It  should  be  understood  that  the  Shogun  did  not 


22 


Adoption  of  Chinese  Culture 

personally  rule  any  more  than  the  Mikado.  What  for  want  of  a 
better  name  may  be  termed  the  figurehead  system  of  government 
is  noticeable  throughout  the  whole  course  of  Japanese  history.  Real 
and  nominal  power  are  rarely  seen  combined  either  socially  or  politi- 
cally. The  family,  which  is  the  unit  of  society,  is  nominally  controlled 
by  the  individual  who  is  its  head.  But  practically  the  latter  is  in 
most  cases  a figurehead,  the  real  power  being  vested  in  the  group  of 
relatives  who  form  the  family  council.  The  same  principle  applied 
to  the  administration  of  feudal  territories.  These  were  not  adminis- 
tered by  the  feudal  proprietors  themselves.  The  control  was  en- 
trusted to  a special  class  of  hereditary  retainers.  Here  again,  however, 
the  authority  was  more  nominal  than  real,  the  direction  of  affairs 
being  left,  as  a rule,  to  the  more  active  intelligence  of  retainers  of 
inferior  rank.  Similarly  the  Shogun  was  usually  a mere  puppet  in 
the  hands  of  his  Council,  the  members  of  which  were  in  turn  con- 
trolled by  subordinate  office-holders.  This  predilection  for  rule  by 
proxy  was  encouraged  by  the  customs  of  adoption  and  abdication, 
the  effects  of  which,  as  regards  Mikado  and  Shogun  alike,  were  seen 
in  shortness  of  reign,  or  administration,  and  the  frequency  of  the 
rule  of  minors. 

The  highly  artificial  and,  indeed,  contradictory  character  which 
distinguished  all  Japanese  administration  had  certain  advantages. 
Abdication  was  found  to  be  not  incompatible  in  practice  with  an 
active,  though  unacknowledged,  supervision  of  affairs.  It  also  pro- 
vided a convenient  method  of  getting  rid  of  persons  whose  presence 
in  office  was  for  any  reason  inconvenient.  In  a society,  too,  where 
adoption  was  the  rule  rather  than  the  exception  the  failure  of  a direct 
heir  to  the  Throne,  or  Shogunate,  presented  little  difficulty.  It  was 
a thing  to  be  arranged  by  the  Council  of  State,  just  as  in  less  exalted 
spheres  such  matters  were  referred  to  the  family  council.  Questions 
of  succession  were  thus  greatly  simplified.  In  this  contradiction, 
moreover,  between  appearance  and  reality,  in  the  retention  of  the 
shadow  without  the  substance  of  power,  lay  the  strength  of  both 
monarchy  and  Shogunate.  It  was,  in  fact,  the  secret  of  their  stability, 
and  explains  the  unbroken  continuity  of  the  dynasty  on  which  the 
nation  prides  itself.  Under  such  a system  the  weakness  or  incompe- 
tence of  nominal  rulers  produced  no  violent  convulsions  in  the  body 
politic.  The  machinery  of  government  worked  smoothly  on,  un- 
affected by  the  personality  of  those  theoretically  responsible  for  its 


Adoption  of  Chinese  Culture  23 

control ; and  as  time  went  by  the  tendency  of  office  to  divorce  itself 
from  the  discharge  of  the  duties  nominally  associated  with  it  in- 
creased everywhere,  with  the  result  that  in  the  last  days  of  the 
Shogunate  administrative  policy  was  largely  inspired  at  the  seat  of 
government  by  subordinate  officials,  and  in  the  clans  by  retainers  of 
inferior  standing. 

The  question  of  dual  government,  which  has  led  to  this  long 
digression,  was  more  or  less  of  a puzzle  to  foreigners  from  the  time 
when  Jesuit  missionaries  first  mistook  Shoguns  for  Mikados  ; and  it 
was  not  until  after  the  negotiation  of  the  first  treaties  with  Western 
Powers  that  it  was  discovered  that  the  title  of  Tycoon  given  to  the 
Japanese  ruler  in  these  documents  had  been  adopted  for  the  occasion, 
in  accordance  with  a precedent  created  many  years  before,  in  order 
to  conceal  the  fact  that  the  Shogun,  though  rulei,  was  not  the 
Sovereign. 


CHAPTER  II 


Establishment  of  Feudalism  and  Duarchy — The  Shogunate  and  the  Throne 
— Early  Foreign  Relations — Christian  Persecution  and  Closure  of  Country. 

THE  fortunes  of  the  first  line  of  Kamakura  Shoguns,  so  called 
from  the  seat  of  government  being  at  that  place,  gave  no 
indication  of  the  permanence  of  duarchy,  though  it  may 
have  encouraged  belief  in  the  truth  of  the  Japanese  proverb  that 
great  men  have  no  heirs.  Neither  of  Yoritomo’s  sons  who  succeeded 
him  as  Shogun  showing  any  capacity  for  government,  the  direction 
of  affairs  fell  into  the  hands  of  members  of  the  Hojo  family,  who,  by 
a further  extension  of  the  principle  of  ruling  by  proxy,  were  content 
to  allow  others  to  figure  as  Shoguns,  while  they  held  the  real  power 
with  the  title  of  regents  ( Shikken ).  Some  of  these  puppet  Shoguns 
were  chosen  from  the  Fujiwara  family,  which  had  governed  the 
country  for  more  than  three  centuries.  Others  were  scions  of  the 
Imperial  House.  This  connection  of  the  Shogunate  with  the  Imperial 
dynasty,  though  only  temporary,  is  a point  to  be  noted,  since  under 
other  circumstances  it  would  suggest  a devolution  rather  than  a 
usurpation  of  sovereign  rights. 

It  was  in  the  thirteenth  century,  during  the  rule  of  the  Hojo 
regent  Tokimune,  that  the  Mongol  invasions  took  place.  The  reign- 
ing Mikado  was  a youth  of  nineteen  ; the  Shogun  an  infant  of  four. 
The  six  centuries  which  had  elapsed  since  the  Great  Reform  had 
witnessed  notable  changes  in  the  countries  which  were  Japan’s  nearest 
neighbours.  In  China  the  Mongol  dynasty  was  established.  In 
Korea  the  four  states  into  which  the  peninsula  had  originally  been 
divided  had  disappeared  one  after  the  other.  In  their  place  was  a 
new  kingdom,  then  called  for  the  first  time  by  its  modern  name.  The 
new  kingdom  did  not  retain  its  independence  long.  It  was  attacked 
and  overthrown  by  the  armies  of  Kublai  Khan,  the  third  Mongol 
Emperor.  By  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth  century  the  King  of 

24 


Establishment  of  Feudalism  §P  Duarchy  25 

Korea  had  acknowledged  the  suzerainty  of  China.  Kublai  Khan  then 
turned  his  attention  to  Japan. 

It  was  customary  in  those  times  for  congratulatory  missions  to  be 
sent  by  one  country  to  another  when  a new  dynasty  was  established 
or  a new  reign  began,  the  presents  exchanged  on  these  occasions  being 
usually  termed  gifts  by  the  country  offering  them,  and  tribute  by 
that  which  received  them.  The  relations  between  Japan  and  the 
new  Kingdom  of  Korea  had  been  on  the  whole  friendly,  though  dis- 
turbed from  time  to  time  by  the  piratical  forays  which  seem  to  have 
been  of  frequent  occurrence.  But  after  Korea  had  lost  her  inde- 
pendence she  was  obliged  to  throw  in  her  lot  with  China.  When, 
therefore,  in  1268,  Kublai  Khan  sent  an  envoy  to  Japan  to  ask  why 
since  the  beginning  of  his  reign  no  congratulatory  mission  had  reached 
Peking  from  the  Japanese  Court,  the  messenger  naturally  went  by 
way  of  Korea,  and  was  escorted  by  a suite  of  Koreans.  The  ports  in 
the  province  of  Chikuzen,  on  the  north  of  Kiushiu,  the  southernmost 
of  the  Japanese  islands,  were  the  places  through  which  communica- 
tions between  Japan  and  the  mainland  were  then  carried  on  ; and  it 
was  at  Dazaifu  in  that  province,  the  centre  of  local  administration, 
that  the  envoy  delivered  his  letter.  This  was  in  effect  a demand  for 
tribute,  and  the  Regent’s  refusal  even  to  answer  the  communication 
was  met  by  the  despatch  in  the  summer  of  1275  of  a Mongol  force, 
accompanied  by  a Korean  contingent.  Having  first  occupied  the 
islands  of  Tsushima  and  Iki,  which  form  convenient  stepping-stones 
between  Korea  and  Japan,  the  invaders  landed  in  Kiushiu  in  the 
north-west  of  the  province  already  mentioned.  After  a few  days’ 
fighting  they  were  forced  to  re-embark.  In  their  retreat  they  en- 
countered a violent  storm,  and  only  the  shattered  remnants  of  the 
Armada  returned  to  tell  the  tale.  A second  invasion,  six  years  later, 
planned  on  a far  larger  scale,  and  supported,  as  before,  by  Korean 
auxiliaries,  met  with  a similar  fate.  On  this  occasion  severer  fighting 
occurred.  The  positions  captured  at  the  place  of  landing  in  the 
province  of  Hizen  were  held  by  the  invaders  for  some  weeks.  Thence, 
however,  they  could  make  no  headway.  When  they  at  length  with- 
drew in  disorder  a violent  storm  again  came  to  the  aid  of  the  de- 
fenders and  overwhelmed  the  hostile  fleets.  The  preparations  begun 
by  Kublai  Khan  for  a third  invasion  were  abandoned  at  his  death  a 
few  years  later.  From  that  time  Japan  was  left  undisturbed. 

The  circumstances  attending  the  fall  of  the  Hojo  regents  in  1333, 


26  The  Shogunate  the  Throne 

and  their  replacement  by  the  Ashikaga  line  of  Shoguns,  are  note- 
worthy for  the  light  they  throw  on  the  state  of  the  country,  and  the 
unstable  and,  indeed,  ludicrous  conditions  under  which  the  govern- 
ment was  carried  on.  It  seemed  for  a moment  as  if  the  authority 
of  the  Court  was  about  to  be  revived.  But  with  the  overthrow  of 
the  regents  the  movement  in  this  direction  stopped.  The  military 
class  was  naturally  reluctant  to  surrender  the  power  which  had  come 
into  its  hands ; the  position  of  the  Mikado  was  also  weakened  by  a 
dispute  regarding  his  rights  to  the  Throne.  He  had  just  returned 
from  banishment,  and  had  been  at  once  reinstated  as  Emperor.  But 
during  his  absence  another  Emperor  had  been  placed  on  the  Throne, 
and  there  were  those  who  thought  the  latter  had  a right  to  remain. 
In  the  previous  century  it  had  been  arranged,  in  accordance  with  the 
will  of  a deceased  Emperor,  that  the  Throne  should  be  occupied 
alternately  by  descendants  of  the  senior  and  junior  branches  of  the 
Imperial  House.  This  rule  had  been  followed  in  filling  the  vacancy 
caused  by  the  banishment  of  the  previous  Mikado,  and  the  branch 
of  the  Imperial  House  which  suffered  by  his  reinstatement  refused 
to  accept  the  decision.  Each  claimant  to  the  Throne  found  partizans 
amongst  the  feudal  chieftains.  Thus  were  formed  two  rival  Courts, 
the  Northern  and  the  Southern,  which  disputed  the  Crown  for  nearly 
sixty  years.  The  contest  ended  in  the  triumph  in  1393  of  the 
Northern  Court.  Having  the  support  of  the  powerful  Ashikaga 
family,  it  had  early  in  the  course  of  the  struggle  asserted  its  superi- 
ority, the  Ashikaga  leader  becoming  Shogun  in  1338. 

The  rule  of  the  Ashikaga  Shoguns  lasted  until  the  middle  of  the 
sixteenth  century,  though  for  several  years  before  it  ended  the  con- 
trol of  affairs  was  exercised  by  others  in  their  name.  During  this 
period,  which  was  favourable  to  the  growth  of  art  and  literature,  the 
seat  of  government  kept  changing  from  Kamakura  to  the  Capital  and 
back  again.  The  former  city  shared  the  fate  of  the  dynasty,  and 
after  its  destruction  was  never  rebuilt. 

A break  then  occurred  in  the  sequence  of  Shoguns.  The  chief 
power  passed  into  the  hands  of  two  military  leaders,  Nobunaga  and 
Hideyoshi,  neither  of  whom  founded  a dynasty  or  bore  the  title  of 
Shogun.  By  their  efforts  the  country  was  gradually  freed  from  the 
anarchy  which  had  ensued  during  the  last  years  of  Ashikaga  adminis- 
tration. Though  here  and  there  throughout  the  country  there 
remained  districts  whose  feudal  lords  insisted  on  settling  their  quarrels 


Early  Foreign  Relations  27 

themselves,  a more  stable  condition  of  things  was  introduced,  and 
the  work  of  the  founder  of  the  next  and  last  line  of  Shoguns  was 
greatly  facilitated. 

Europe  had  long  before  heard  of  Japan  through  the  writings  of  the 
Venetian  traveller,  Marco  Polo,  who  had  visited  the  Court  of  Kublai 
Khan  and  there  learned  the  failure  of  the  Mongol  invasions.  It  was 
not,  however,  till  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century,  during  the 
ascendancy  of  the  first  of  the  two  military  leaders  above  mentioned, 
that  intercourse  with  European  countries  was  established.  The 
Portuguese  were  the  first  to  come,  and  for  this  reason.  Portugal  was 
then  at  the  height  of  her  greatness  as  a maritime  powrer  ; and  by  the 
Bulls  of  Pope  Alexander  VI,  which  divided  the  new  lands  discovered 
in  Asia  and  America  between  her  and  Spain,  those  in  Asia  had  fallen 
to  her  share.  Some  uncertainty  exists  as  to  the  exact  date  at  which 
the  new  Western  intercourse  began,  and  as  to  the  identity  of  the 
first  arrivals.  Most  authorities,  however,  agree  in  thinking  that  the 
first  European  discoverers  of  Japan  were  three  Portuguese  adven- 
turers who,  in  the  course  of  a voyage  from  Siam  to  China  in  the 
summer  or  autumn  of  1542,  were  driven  by  a storm  on  the  coast  of 
Tanegashima,  a small  island  lying  midway  between  the  southern  point 
of  the  province  of  Satsuma  and  Loochoo.  The  adventurers  who 
landed  were  successful  in  disposing  of  the  cargo  of  their  vessel, 
destined  originally  for  Chinese  ports.  Their  knowledge  of  firearms 
made  a favourable  impression,  and  the  beginnings  were  thus  laid  of 
a trade  with  the  Portuguese  possessions  and  settlements  in  the  East 
and  with  the  mother  country  in  Europe.  Of  greater  interest  and 
importance,  however,  than  this  early  trade  is  the  fact  that  to  Portu- 
guese enterprise  Christianity  owed  its  first  introduction  into  Japan. 

Seven  years  after  the  arrival  of  these  involuntary  traders,  who  had 
spread  the  new's  of  the  strange  country  they  had  discovered,  one  of 
the  numerous  Portuguese  trading  vessels  which  were  thus  attracted 
to  Japan  landed  at  Kagoshima,  the  capital  of  the  Satsuma  province, 
three  missionaries — Xavier,  Torres  and  Fernandez.  Thenceforth, 
until  the  closing  of  the  country  to  all  but  the  Chinese  and  Dutch, 
it  was  the  propagation  of  the  Christian  faith,  not  the  progress  of 
trade,  which  was  the  important  factor  in  Japan’s  foreign  relations. 

The  coming  of  the  first  missionaries  took  place  at  a time  when  the 
widespread  disorder  which  marked  the  closing  years  of  the  Ashikaga 


28 


Early  Foreign  Relations 

administration  was  at  its  height.  Though  Nobunaga  was  rapidly 
acquiring  for  himself  a commanding  position,  the  nation  had  not  yet 
felt  the  full  weight  of  the  hand  which  twenty  years  later  was  to  take 
the  first  steps  towards  the  pacification  of  the  country.  The  confusion 
of  affairs  assisted  the  spread  of  the  new  religion,  the  opposition 
offered  by  some  of  the  leading  daimios,  such  as  the  princes  of  Satsuma 
and  Choshiu,  being  counterbalanced  by  the  eagerness  of  others  to 
profit  by  the  foreign  trade  which  came  with  the  missionaries  ; while 
Buddhist  hostility  lost  much  of  its  sting  after  the  power  of  the 
militant  priesthood  had  been  crippled  by  Nobunaga. 

The  latter’s  successor,  Hideyoshi,  wrhom  the  Japanese  regard  as 
their  greatest  military  genius,  shared  neither  his  sympathy  with 
Christianity  nor  his  dislike  of  Buddhism.  To  matters  of  religion  he 
seemed  to  be  indifferent,  his  one  aim  being  apparently  to  make  him- 
self master  of  Japan.  In  a series  of  campaigns  conducted  in  different 
parts  of  the  country  he  overcame  the  resistance  of  one  feudal  chief 
after  another,  the  last  to  submit  to  his  authority  being  the  Daimio 
of  Satsuma.  His  ascendancy  deprived  Christianity  of  the  advantage 
it  had  previously  derived  from  the  unsettled  condition  of  the  country. 
His  aim  accomplished,  Hideyoshi  changed  his  attitude  suddenly,  and 
in  1587  issued  an  edict  against  Christianity.  As  a result  of  this  edict 
the  missionaries  were  expelled  from  the  Capital  and  the  Christian 
church  there  was  pulled  down.  Though  the  Christian  persecution 
dates  from  that  time,  it  was  not  prosecuted  at  first  with  much  energy. 
Doubtless  Hideyoshi  was  aware  of  the  connection  between  Christi- 
anity and  foreign  trade,  and  in  his  desire  to  profit  by  the  latter  was 
content  not  to  push  matters  to  extremities.  There  may  also  be  some 
truth  in  the  suggestion  of  the  joint  authors  of  A History  of  Japan 
(1542-61)  that  he  was  unwilling  to  incur  the  resentment  of  the 
numerous  daimios  in  the  south  of  Japan  who  had  welcomed  the  new 
religion.  Be  this  as  it  may,  the  initial  stages  of  the  persecution  did 
not  apparently  affect  missionary  activity  very  seriously.  We  do  not 
hear  of  any  falling  off  in  the  number  of  converts,  which  is  said  to 
have  attained  about  this  time  a total  little  short  of  a million. 

For  nearly  half  a century  the  Jesuits  had  the  field  of  missionary 
enterprise  in  Japan  to  themselves.  To  this  fact  was  largely  due  the 
spread  of  the  new  religion.  In  1591,  however,  the  state  of  things 
was  altered  by  the  arrival  of  members  of  other  religious  orders,  who 
came  in  the  train  of  a Spanish  ambassador  from  the  Philippines. 


Christian  Persecution  29 

This  intrusion — which  later  on  received  the  formal  sanction  of  the 
Pope — was  resented  by  the  Jesuits ; and  the  position  of  the  Christian 
Church,  already  weakened  by  persecution,  was  not  improved  by  the 
quarrels  which  soon  broke  out  between  them  and  the  new-comers. 
What  would  have  been  the  outcome  of  this  change  in  the  situation, 
if  Hid6yoshi’s  attention  had  not  been  directed  elsewhere,  it  is 
impossible  to  say.  At  this  moment,  however,  his  ambition  found  a 
new  outlet.  Supreme  now  at  home,  he  conceived  the  idea  of  gaining 
fresh  glory  by  conquests  abroad.  With  this  object,  he  embarked  on 
an  invasion  of  Korea,  intending  ultimately  to  extend  his  operations 
to  China.  His  pretext,  it  is  said,  for  invading  the  neighbouring 
peninsula,  like  that  of  Kublai  Khan  in  the  case  of  Japan,  was  that 
Korea  had  refused  or  neglected  to  send  the  usual  periodical  missions. 
According  to  another,  and  perhaps  more  correct  account,  he  de- 
manded that  Korea  should  assist  him  in  the  invasion  of  China  in  the 
same  way  as  she  had  two  centuries  before  aided  the  Mongols  in  their 
invasion  of  Japan,  a request  which,  it  is  said,  was  scornfully  refused. 

The  Korean  campaign,  in  the  course  of  which  a Christian  daimio 
— Konishi,  the  owner  of  an  extensive  fief  in  the  province  of  Higo — 
greatly  distinguished  himself,  began  in  the  spring  of  1592,  the  last 
land  engagement  being  fought  in  the  autumn  of  1598.  The  war  thus 
lasted  nearly  seven  years.  The  preparations  made  by  Hideyoshi  were 
on  an  extensive  scale.  The  army  of  invasion  numbered,  if  the 
statistics  of  that  time  can  be  trusted,  nearly  200,000  fighting  men. 
As  reinforcements  were  sent  from  time  to  time  from  Japan,  the 
number  of  troops  employed  from  first  to  last  in  the  course  of  the  war 
must  have  reached  a very  high  total.  Hideyoshi  did  not  lead  his 
army  in  person,  but  directed  the  general  plan  of  operations  from 
Japan.  The  Japanese  were  at  first  successful  on  land  everywhere, 
though  at  sea  they  met  with  some  serious  reverses.  The  Koreans 
were  driven  out  of  their  capital,  and  the  invaders  overran  more  than 
half  of  the  country.  Then,  however,  the  Emperor  of  China  inter- 
vened in  the  struggle.  Chinese  armies  entered  Korea,  and  the  tide 
of  victory  turned  against  Japan.  The  retreat  of  the  invaders  towards 
the  coast  was  followed  by  overtures  of  peace,  which  resulted  in  the 
suspension  of  hostilities  in  1594.  But  the  negotiations,  in  which 
China  took  a leading  part,  broke  down,  and  three  years  later  a second 
Japanese  army  landed  in  Korea.  On  this  occasion  the  Japanese  forces 


30  Christian  Persecution 

met  with  more  stubborn  resistance.  Chinese  armies  again  came  to 
the  help  of  Korea,  and  when  Hideyoshi  died  in  1598  the  Japanese 
Government  was  only  too  willing  to  make  peace.  The  results  of  the 
war  for  Korea  were  disastrous.  The  complete  devastation  wrought 
wherever  the  Japanese  armies  had  penetrated  left  traces  which  have 
never  been  entirely  effaced.  Nor  did  Japan  come  out  of  the  struggle 
with  any  profit.  When  the  final  accounts  were  balanced  all  she  had 
to  show  for  her  lavish  expenditure  in  lives  and  money  was  the  estab- 
lishment in  Japan  of  a colony  of  Korean  potters,  who  were  the  first 
to  make  the  well-known  Satsuma  faience,  and  the  doubtful  privilege 
of  keeping  a small  trading  post  at  the  southern  end  of  the  Korean 
peninsula. 

For  some  years  after  the  Korean  war  had  been  brought  to  an  end 
by  the  death  of  Hideyoshi  the  position  of  the  Christian  Church 
showed  little  change.  It  was  not  until  1614,  by  which  time  a new 
line  of  Shoguns  was  ruling  the  country,  that  rigorous  measures  were 
adopted  against  the  new  religion.  The  edict  which  then  appeared 
ordered  the  immediate  expulsion  of  all  missionaries,  and  its  issue  was 
followed  by  a fierce  outbreak  of  persecution  in  all  parts  of  Japan 
where  converts  or  missionaries  were  to  be  found. 

Evidence  of  the  contradictory  state  of  things  then  existing  is  fur- 
nished by  the  fact  that  in  that  very  year  an  Embassy  to  the  Pope 
and  to  the  King  of  Spain  was  sent  by  the  Japanese  Daimio  of  Sendai, 
whose  fief  was  in  the  north-east  of  Japan. 

Meanwhile,  in  1609,  Dutch  traders  had  established  themselves  in 
the  island  of  Hirado,  where  they  were  joined  four  years  later  by 
English  traders  representing  the  East  India  Company.  The  latter 
had  not  the  resources  necessary  for  so  distant  an  undertaking,  nor  was 
the  English  navy  strong  enough  to  support  the  Company’s  enterprise 
against  the  Dutch,  who  were  then  wresting  from  the  Portuguese  the 
supremacy  in  Eastern  waters.  At  the  end  of  ten  years,  therefore,  the 
trading  station  was  abandoned. 

The  Christian  persecution  continued  with  varying  intensity  for 
more  than  twenty  years,  culminating  in  the  insurrection  of  Shimabara 
in  1638.  With  the  bloody  suppression  of  that  rising,  due  as  much  to 
local  misgovernment  as  to  religious  causes,  the  curtain  falls  on  the 
early  history  of  Christianity  in  Japan.  Two  years  earlier,  in  1636, 
an  edict  issued  by  the  third  Shogun,  Iy£mitsu,  forbade  all  Japanese 


Closure  of  Country  31 

to  go  abroad,  reduced  the  tonnage  of  native  vessels  so  as  to  render 
them  unfit  for  ocean  voyages,  and  closed  the  country  to  all  foreigners 
except  the  Chinese  and  Dutch.  The  Portuguese  were  chiefly  affected 
by  this  measure,  for  the  English  had  abandoned  their  trading  enter- 
prise in  Hirado  in  1623,  and  in  the  following  year  the  rupture  of 
relations  with  Spain  had  put  an  end  to  the  residence  of  Spanish 
subjects,  thus  justifying  Xavier’s  warning  that  the  King  of  Spain 
should  be  careful  how  he  interfered  with  Japan,  in  case  he  burnt  his 
fingers.  The  Dutch  owed  their  escape  from  expulsion  to  the  fact 
that  the  Japanese  did  not  regard  them  as  being  Christians  at  all, 
because  of  their  openly  expressed  hostility  to  the  form  of  Christianity 
professed  by  the  missionaries.  In  neither  case  was  the  lot  of  the  two 
favoured  nationalities  at  all  enviable.  In  1641  the  Dutch  were  re- 
moved from  Hirado  and  interned  in  Deshima,  an  artificial  island 
quarter  of  the  town  of  Nagasaki  ; and  some  fifty  years  later  the 
Chinese,  who  had  traded  at  that  port  in  comparative  liberty  from  a 
date  which  is  uncertain,  were  confined  in  an  enclosure  close  to  the 
Dutch  settlement.  Here,  paying  dearly  as  State  prisoners  for  the 
commercial  privileges  they  enjoyed,  these  traders  carried  on  a pre- 
carious and  gradually  dwindling  commerce  until  Japan  was  opened 
for  the  second  time  to  foreign  intercourse  in  the  middle  of  the  nine- 
teenth century. 


CHAPTER  III 


The  Tokugawa  Shoguns — Consolidation  of  Duarchy. 

THE  rule  of  Hideyoshi  was  followed  by  that  of  a new  line  of 
Shoguns.  The  circumstances  under  which  it  was  estab- 
lished are  well  known.  At  the  death  of  Hideyoshi  in  1598 
the  government  of  the  country  was,  during  the  minority  of  his  son 
Hideyori,  entrusted  to  five  feudal  nobles  who  acted  as  regents.  Of 
these,  the  most  prominent  was  Tokugawa  Iyeyasu,  who  had  married 
Hideyoshi’s  daughter,  and  whose  feudal  territories  consisted  of  the 
eight  provinces  in  the  east  of  the  main  island  known  as  the  Kwanto. 
Disputes  soon  arose  between  the  regents,  and  an  appeal  to  arms 
resulted  in  the  decisive  victory  of  Iyeyasu  at  Seki-ga-hara,  near  Lake 
Biwa.  This  was  in  October,  1600.  In  1603  he  was  appointed  Shogun, 
and  twelve  years  later  the  death,  in  what  is  known  as  the  Osaka 
summer  campaign,  of  Hideyori,  the  only  personage  who  could 
challenge  his  supremacy,  left  him  without  any  dangerous  rival.  Now 
for  the  first  time  in  Japanese  history  the  authority  of  the  ShSgunate 
extended  throughout  the  whole  of  Japan.  The  prestige  of  the 
previous  ruler  had  been  as  great,  and  his  reputation  in  the  field  higher, 
but  he  was  not,  like  his  successor,  of  Minamoto  stock,  nor  could  he 
trace  his  descent  from  an  Emperor  ; there  were  remote  districts  in 
the  country  where  his  influence  had  not  penetrated,  out-of-the-way 
places  where  his  writ  had  never  run.  In  founding  a fresh  line  of 
Shoguns  the  new  ruler  had  other  circumstances  in  his  favour.  The 
country  was  tired  of  civil  war  and  exhausted  ; the  fighting  power  and 
resources  of  turbulent  chiefs  had  been  weakened  by  long-continued 
hostilities  ; and  much  of  the  work  of  pacification  had  been  already 
done. 

Although  the  Tokugawa  Shogunate  was,  in  its  main  outlines,  the 
repetition  of  a government  which  had  existed  before,  it  differed  in 
some  important  respects  from  previous  administrations. 

The  third  Shogun,  the  ruler  responsible  for  the  closing  of  the 

32 


The  Tokugawa  Shoguns  33 

country,  put  the  finishing  touches  to  the  new  system  of  government  ; 
but  it  owed  more  to  the  genius  of  his  grandfather,  the  founder  of  the 
line,  who  framed  it,  supervised  its  operation  and  left  posthumous 
instructions,  known  as  “ The  Hundred  Articles,”  to  ensure  its  obser- 
vance by  his  successors.  Japanese  writers  agree  in  stating  that  “The 
Hundred  Articles  ” give  a general  idea  of  the  system  of  govern- 
ment established  by  Iy6yasu.  But  it  is  a very  general  idea,  a mere 
outline  of  things,  that  we  are  thus  enabled  to  glean.  To  fill  in  the 
details  of  the  picture  it  is  necessary  to  draw  on  other  sources  ot 
information. 

The  difference  between  the  rule  of  Iyeyasu  and  that  of  previous 
Shoguns  lay  in  the  more  complete  subjection  of  the  Imperial  Court, 
in  the  wider  range  of  his  authority,  which  surpassed  that  of  his  two 
immediate  predecessors,  and  in  the  highly  organized  and  stable 
character  of  the  administration  he  established.  The  changes  he 
effected  in  the  government  of  the  country  may  be  conveniently  con- 
sidered under  the  following  heads,  it  being  borne  in  mind  that  they 
were  the  work  of  several  years,  and  that  many  were  made  after  his 
early  abdication  in  1605,  when  he  was  governing  the  country,  in  the 
name  of  his  son,  the  second  Shogun  : — 

1.  Redistribution  of  feudal  territories. 

2.  Position  of  feudal  nobility. 

3.  Reorganization  of  central  administration. 

4.  Relations  between  the  Court  and  Shogunate,  and  between  the 

Court  and  Court  nobles  and  the  feudal  nobility. 

1.  The  new  Shogun  in  establishing  his  rule  followed  the  example 
of  his  predecessors.  Maps  which  give  the  distribution  of  feudal  terri- 
tories before  and  after  the  year  1600,  and  again  after  the  fall  of  Osaka 
in  1615,  show  the  sweeping  character  of  the  changes  he  carried  out 
on  both  occasions.  As  a result  of  these  changes,  the  most  extensive 
fiefs  at  the  outset  of  Tokugawa  rule  were  those  held  by  the  three 
Tokugawa  Houses  in  the  provinces  of  Kii,  Owari  and  Hitachi  (Mito), 
to  which  may  be  added  those  in  the  possession  of  the  Daimios  of 
Satsuma,  Hizen,  Choshiu,  Aki,  Tosa,  Kaga,  Echizen,  Sendai  and 
Mutsu. 

2.  Before  the  establishment  of  the  Tokugawa  ShSgunate  the  feudal 
nobles  were  divided  into  three  classes — lords  of  provinces,  lords  01 
territories  and  lords  of  castles.  In  the  organization  of  the  feudal 

c 


34  The  Tokugawa  Shoguns 

nobility,  as  remodelled  by  Iyeyasu,  this  old  division  was  retained,  but 
he  created  the  three  princely  Houses  of  Owari,  Kii  and  Mito  (Hitachi), 
called  collectively  the  Gosanke , and  placed  them  at  the  head  of  the 
new  order  of  precedence.  It  was  from  the  two  first-mentioned 
Houses,  together  with  the  Gosankio,  a family  group  of  later  institu- 
tion, that,  failing  a direct  heir,  subsequent  Shoguns  were  chosen. 
To  the  representative  of  the  third  House — that  of  Mito — the  position 
of  Adviser  to  the  Shogunate  was  assigned,  and  he  was  supposed  to 
have  a determining  voice  in  the  selection  of  a new  Shogun  when  this 
became  necessary.  Another  important  change  was  the  separation  of 
the  feudal  nobility  into  two  broad  classes — the  Fudai  daimios,  or 
hereditary  vassals,  who  had  submitted  to  the  new  ruler  before  the 
fall  of  Osaka,  and  the  Tozama  daimios,  who  had  acknowledged  his 
supremacy  later.  The  former  class  alone  had  the  privilege  of  being 
employed  in  the  Councils  of  State  and  the  higher  administrative 
posts.  Two  new  feudal  groups  also  made  their  appearance — the 
Hatamoto,  or  Bannermen,  who  filled  the  less  important  administra- 
tive posts,  besides  supplying  the  personnel  of  the  various  departments 
of  State,  and  whose  fiefs  in  some  cases  rivalled  in  extent  those  of  the 
smaller  daimios ; and  the  Gokenin,  a kind  of  landed  gentry. 

Full  use,  too,  was  made  by  the  new  ruler  of  the  custom  of  retain- 
ing hostages  from  the  feudatories  as  a guarantee  of  loyalty,  a practice 
expanded  under  the  second  and  third  Shoguns  into  the  system  known 
as  San-kin  Ko-tai.  This  provided  for  the  residence  of  daimios  in 
alternate  years  at  Yedo  and  in  their  fiefs,  some  members  of  theii 
families  being  permanently  detained  in  the  Tokugawa  capital,  which 
owed  its  selection  as  the  seat  of  government  to  its  favourable  location 
for  the  commerce  of  that  day  at  the  head  of  the  bay  of  the  same 
name.  The  system  of  State  services  ( Kokuyiki ),  moreover,  to  which 
all  daimios  were  liable,  was  a rich  source  of  revenue  to  the  Shogunate, 
while  at  the  same  time  it  strengthened  the  authority  of  the  Yedo 
Government.  By  these  expedients,  and  by  the  encouragement  of 
ostentation  in  every  form,  the  feudal  nobles  were  kept  in  strict  sub- 
jection, the  steady  drain  on  their  finances  making  it  difficult  for  them 
to  escape  from  a condition  of  impecuniosity.  The  expense  of  their 
annual  journeys  to  and  from  the  Capital  alone  constituted  a severe 
tax  on  their  resources,  and  was  the  main  cause  of  the  financial  dis- 
tress which  existed  at  a later  date  in  many  of  the  daimiates.  Further 
and  quite  independent  proof  of  the  unquestioned  supremacy  of  the 


The  Tokugawa  Shoguns  35 

new  Shogun  is  supplied  by  the  bestowal  of  his  early  family  name  of 
Matsudaira  not  only  on  all  the  heads  of  feudal  families  connected 
with  his  own,  but  on  many  of  the  leading  lords  of  provinces.  Amongst 
other  recipients  of  this  questionable  privilege — which  set  the  seal  on 
the  submission  of  the  feudal  nobility — were  the  daimios  of  Satsuma, 
Choshiu,  Hizen,  Tosa  and  Awa,  whose  retainers  took  a prominent 
part  in  the  Restoration  of  1868-69.  In  these  latter  cases,  however, 
the  old  surnames  were  used  alternately  with  the  new  designations. 

3.  The  main  features  of  Tokugawa  administration,  as  established 
by  its  founder  and  modified  by  his  immediate  successors,  remained 
practically  unchanged  for  two  and  a half  centuries.  Its  form  was  a 
centralized  bureaucracy  based  on  feudalism.  The  general  direction 
of  affairs  was  in  the  hands  of  an  upper  and  a lower  Council  of  State, 
the  members  of  which  were  chosen  from  Fudai  daimios  of  varying 
distinction.  There  was  usually  an  inner  circle  of  statesmen,  with 
whom  both  initiative  and  decision  rested,  while  the  lesser  ranks  of 
officials  were  recruited  chiefly  from  the  Hatamoto.  Decisions  on  grave 
matters  of  State  in  times  of  emergency  were  referred,  when  necessary, 
to  the  Gosanke,  and  other  leading  daimios,  whose  participation  in 
these  deliberations  was,  however,  often  more  nominal  than  real.  A 
leading  part  in  administration  was  also  played  by  the  Jisha-bugid,  or 
Superintendents  of  Buddhist  and  Shinto  temples.  In  spite  of  the 
religious  sound  of  their  titles,  these  executive  officers  had  an  im- 
portant voice  in  State  business  of  all  kinds.  There  was  also  the 
Hid-jo-sho.  This  was  an  institution  resembling  that  originally  created 
by  the  Kamakura  Shoguns.  Established  at  a time  when  no  clear 
distinction  existed  between  executive  and  judicial  matters,  it  seems 
to  have  combined  the  functions  of  a Supreme  Administrative  Board 
and  a Superior  Court  of  Justice.  It  took  cognizance  of  all  sorts  of 
questions,  both  executive  and  judicial,  and,  under  the  latter  head,  of 
both  civil  and  criminal  cases,  which  were  decided  by  a special  office 
known  as  the  Ketsudan-sho , or  Court  of  Decisions.  The  matters 
which  came  before  this  Board  ranged  from  disputes  regarding  land, 
agriculture  and  taxation  to  questions  concerning  the  boundaries  of 
fiefs  and  provinces ; from  complaints  of  the  conduct  of  the  feudal 
nobility  and  ShSgunate  officials  to  appeals  from  the  decisions  of  local 
authorities.  The  members  of  the  Council  of  State  had  the  right  to 
attend  the  sittings  of  the  Board,  being  encouraged  to  make  surprise 
visits  in  order  to  ensure  the  rendering  of  impartial  justice  ; and  for 


36  The  Tokugawa  Shoguns 

the  same  reason,  apparently,  in  the  earlier  days  of  the  Shogunate,  the 
attendance  of  the  Shogun  himself  was  not  unusual.  A similar  Board 
at  Osaka  dealt  with  questions  referred  to  it  from  the  provinces  west 
of  Kioto,  and  with  appeals  from  the  decisions  of  local  authorities  in 
the  districts  in  question. 

Provincial  administration  varied  according  to  the  locality  con- 
cerned. What  were  known  as  the  Shogun’s  domains — amounting  in 
extent  to  nearly  one-third  of  the  total  area  of  the  country — were 
administered  by  Governors  ( Daikwan ) appointed  by  the  Shogunate, 
this  system  prevailing  also  in  many  of  the  Fudai  daimiates  and  in 
certain  coast  towns.  The  feudal  territories  in  the  rest  of  the  country, 
with  the  exception  named,  were  governed  by  the  clan  rulers.  A 
general  supervision  of  affairs  throughout  the  country  was  also  exer- 
cised by  a special  class  of  officials  called  Metsuke.  Their  varied 
functions  comprised  those  of  travelling  inspectors  and  circuit  judges ; 
they  were  appointed  to  enquire  into  the  administration  of  feudal 
territories ; and  they  were  frequently  employed  as  deputies  or 
assistants  to  governors,  delegates  and  commissioners,  when  their  duty 
was  to  watch  and  report  on  the  conduct  of  their  superiors.  Hence 
the  description  of  them  as  spies  by  foreign  writers  on  Japan — a de- 
scription which  was  often  correct.  The  system  of  local  government 
was  based  on  groups  of  five  households,  or  families,  each  under  the 
direction  of  a headman,  and  was  the  development  of  an  earlier  form 
of  tribal,  or  patriarchal,  government  introduced  from  China  at  the 
time  of  the  Great  Reform.  The  headman  of  each  group  was  subject, 
in  towns,  to  the  control  of  the  senior  alderman  of  the  ward,  and, 
in  villages,  to  that  of  the  mayor.  The  duties  of  these  local  officials, 
whose  posts  were  often  hereditary,  were  to  make  known  the  orders 
of  the  Central  Government,  or  feudal  authorities,  as  the  case  might 
be,  to  administer  justice  and  to  collect  taxes. 

A noticeable  feature  of  Tokugawa  administration  was  the  duplica- 
tion of  offices.  In  this  a resemblance  may  be  traced  to  similar 
customs  in  other  Oriental  countries  such  as  Thibet,  Siam  and  Nepal, 
the  tendency  which  inspired  the  practice  being  possibly  one  of  the 
causes  of  the  partiality  of  the  nation  for  dual  government.  The 
employment  of  Metsuke  in  many  cases  as  supplementary  officials  has 
already  been  mentioned.  The  custom  was  widespread,  extending 
through  all  grades  of  the  official  class,  and  survived  in  Loochoo  until 
the  annexation  of  that  principality  in  1879.  A curious  proof  of  its 


Consolidation  of  the  Duarchy  37 

prevalence  was  furnished  at  the  time  of  the  negotiation  by  Great 
Britain  of  the  Treaty  of  1858.  Struck  by  the  double  title  of  the 
British  negotiator,  Lord  Elgin  and  Kincardine,  and  arguing  from 
their  own  methods  of  procedure,  the  Japanese  officials  concluded 
that  two  envoys  had  been  sent,  and  when,  in  the  course  of  the 
negotiations,  no  second  envoy  appeared,  they  took  occasion  to 
enquire  after  the  missing  Kincardine. 

4.  In  his  dealings  with  the  Imperial  Court  at  Kioto  the  new 
Shogun  was  content,  so  far  as  outward  formalities  were  concerned, 
to  follow  the  example  of  previous  administrations,  introducing, 
nevertheless,  under  cover  of  conformity  with  ancient  usage,  many 
important  changes.  The  empty  dignities  of  the  Court  were  main- 
tained with  some  increase  of  ceremonial  etiquette,  though  without 
the  lavish  display  which  had  reconciled  the  Throne  to  the  rule  of 
his  predecessor.  He  was  at  the  same  time  careful  to  curtail  whatever 
vestiges  of  Imperial  authority  still  remained.  The  measures  taken 
for  this  purpose  included  the  appointment  of  a Resident  ( Shoshidai ) 
in  Kioto,  and  a Governor  ( Jodai ) in  Osaka  ; the  confinement  of  the 
reigning  Emperor  and  cloistered  ex-monarch  (or  ex-monarchs,  for 
there  were  not  infrequently  several  abdicated  sovereigns  at  the  same 
time)  to  their  palaces  ; and  the  cessation  of  Imperial  “ progresses  ” — 
the  name  given  to  Imperial  visits  to  shrines  ; the  isolation  of  the 
Court  by  the  interdict  placed  on  the  visits  of  feudal  nobles  to  the 
Capital,  even  sight-seeing  being  only  permitted  to  them  within  certain 
specified  limits,  and  on  condition  of  applying  for  permission  for  this 
purpose  ; the  isolation  of  the  Kuge,  or  Court  nobility,  by  the  pro- 
hibition of  marriages  and  all  monetary  transactions  between  them 
and  feudal  families  ; and  the  reorganization  of  the  official  establish- 
ment of  the  Court,  so  as  to  bring  it  more  completely  under  the 
control  of  the  Shogunate.  Iyeyasu  also  arranged  the  betrothal  of 
his  granddaughter  to  the  heir-apparent,  an  alliance  not  without 
precedent  in  the  past,  and  he  enforced  a stricter  supervision  over  the 
Imperial  Household,  the  movements  of  Court  ladies,  and  the  daily 
routine  of  the  palace. 

Some  idea  of  the  condition  of  subservience  to  which  the  Throne 
was  reduced,  and  of  the  arrogant  position  assumed  by  the  new  ruler, 
may  be  gathered  from  a perusal  of  the  “ Law  of  the  Court  and 
Shogunate,”  which,  taken  in  conjunction  with  the  “ Law  of  the 
Imperial  Court  ” and  the  “ Hundred  Articles,”  throws  some  light 


38  Consolidation  of  the  Duarchy 

on  the  new  order  of  things.  One  of  the  provisions  of  the  law  in 
question  transferred  from  the  Court  to  the  Shogunate  the  protec- 
tion of  the  Throne  against  evil  spirits  by  abolishing  the  long-estab- 
lished Ridbu-Shinto  processions  in  the  Capital,  and  by  formally 
recognizing  the  Shinto  deity,  from  whom  this  protection  was 
supposed  to  emanate,  as  the  tutelary  deity  of  the  Tokugawa  family. 
The  Shogun  was  thus  made  responsible  for  the  spiritual  guardianship 
of  the  Throne,  the  material  protection  over  which  he  already  exer- 
cised in  his  capacity  of  supreme  military  ruler. 

Though  nothing  of  the  substance  of  power  was  left  to  the  Crown, 
the  mere  fact  that  authority  was  exercised  in  its  name  led  to  much 
friction  in  the  relations  between  Kioto  and  Yedo,  and  created  an 
atmosphere  of  make-believe  in  which  everything  moved.  The  Crown 
still  retained  the  nominal  privilege  of  conferring  the  much-coveted 
Court  titles.  Its  nominal  approval  was  also  necessary  to  the  investi- 
ture of  a new  Shogun,  as  well  as  to  other  important  measures  of  State. 
It  claimed  the  right,  moreover,  to  be  consulted  in  regard  to  cere- 
monial observances  of  all  kinds,  to  questions  of  marriage,  adoption, 
abdication  and  succession.  Naturally,  therefore,  the  large  number 
of  questions  calling  for  discussion  between  the  Court  of  the  Mikado 
in  the  Capital  and  the  Yedo  Government  gave  rise  to  a voluminous 
correspondence,  the  official  importance  of  which,  however,  was 
diminished  by  the  presence  of  the  Shogun’s  Resident  at  Kioto.  In 
the  singular  official  relations  recorded  in  this  correspondence  there  is 
evidence  of  a settled  policy  on  the  part  of  the  Shogunate  to  divert 
the  attention  of  the  Throne  from  serious  affairs  and  keep  it  occupied 
with  the  details  of  complicated  ceremonial,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
of  constant,  though  fruitless,  attempts  on  the  part  of  the  Court  to 
encroach  on  what  had  become  the  prerogatives  of  the  Shogun. 

One  or  two  instances,  taken  at  random  from  the  history  of  the 
Tokugawa  period,  will  illustrate  how  the  dual  system  of  government 
worked  in  practice  ; what  little  latitude  was  left  to  the  Throne  even 
in  matters  which  might  be  regarded  as  lying  within  its  direct  control ; 
and  how,  whenever  friction  arose,  the  Shogunate  invariably  had  its 
own  way. 

The  first  trial  of  strength  between  Ki6to  and  Yedo  occurred  soon 
after  Iyeyasu’s  death,  when  his  son  Hidetada  was  Shogun.  The 
trouble  arose  out  of  some  irregularities  which  had  occurred  in  the 
Imperial  Household.  The  Tokugawa  administration  was  still  in  its 


Consolidation  of  the  Duarchy  39 

infancy,  and  the  Court  nobles  showed  a disposition  to  dispute  its 
authority,  some  of  them  being  indiscreet  enough  to  speak  of  the  Yedo 
authorities  as  being  Eastern  barbarians.  The  Shogun  adopted  a high- 
handed attitude.  He  threatened  to  break  off  the  match  between  his 
daughter  and  the  Emperor,  which  had  already  received  the  Imperial 
sanction,  and  he  went  so  far  as  to  intimate  that  the  Emperor  might 
be  required  to  abdicate.  His  attitude  had  the  desired  effect.  The 
Court  hastened  to  admit  itself  in  the  wrong,  and  the  affair  ended  in 
the  banishment  of  three  of  the  Court  nobles. 

Another  and  more  serious  quarrel  occurred  not  long  afterwards  in 
the  reign  of  the  same  Emperor  and  during  the  rule  of  the  third 
Shogun,  to  whom  many  of  the  later  interpolations  in  the  early 
Tokugawa  laws  are  generally  ascribed.  The  cause  of  the  dispute  was 
a trivial  matter — the  promotion  by  the  Emperor,  irregularly  as  the 
Shogunate  claimed,  of  certain  members  of  the  Buddhist  clergy  con- 
nected with  the  Court.  This  time  it  had  a serious  ending.  The 
Emperor,  mortified  by  what  he  regarded  as  vexatious  interference 
with  his  authority,  resigned  the  Imperial  dignity,  being  succeeded  on 
the  Throne  by  his  daughter,  the  child  of  the  Tokugawa  princess 
already  mentioned. 

A third  instance,  convenient  for  our  purpose,  is  typical  of  the 
complications  caused  both  in  the  matter  of  succession  to  the  Throne, 
and  in  appointments  to  the  office  of  Shogun,  by  the  difficulty  of 
reconciling  the  custom  of  adoption  with  the  dictates  of  filial  piety, 
as  laid  down  in  Confucian  doctrine.  The  time  was  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  There  were  then  a boy-Emperor  eight  years  of 
age  and  a boy-Shogun  a few  years  older.  Each  had  been  adopted 
by  his  predecessor,  who  in  each  case  had  died  shortly  afterwards,  the 
young  Emperor’s  succession  to  the  Throne  antedating  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  young  Shogun  by  some  six  years.  It  was  necessary  to 
appoint  a guardian  for  the  young  Shogun,  and  some  members  of  the 
Yedo  ministry  wished  to  appoint  to  this  post  the  father,  who  be- 
longed to  the  Hitotsubashi  branch  of  the  Tokugawa  family.  This 
course  received  the  support  of  the  boy-Shogun,  who,  to  show  his 
filial  respect,  desired  to  instal  his  father  with  the  title  of  ex-Shbgun 
( Taigiosho ) in  the  palace  at  Yedo  set  apart  for  the  Shogun’s  heir. 
The  proposal  was  resisted  by  the  other  Ministers  on  the  ground  that 
it  was  against  precedent  and  would  disturb  public  morals,  in  which 
ceremonial  propriety  played,  as  we  know,  so  important  a part.  In 


40  Consolidation  of  the  Duarchy 

the  event  of  the  adoptive  parent  dying  in  the  lifetime  of  the  real 
father — which  in  this  case  actually  happened — the  latter  might,  it 
was  said,  claim  to  be  received  in  the  former’s  place  into  the  adoptive 
family,  a contingency  which  would  lead  to  inconvenience  and  con- 
fusion. While  the  dispute  was  going  on  matters  were  complicated 
by  the  receipt  of  a similar  request  from  the  boy-Emperor  in  Kioto, 
who  desired  that  his  father  might  be  honoured  by  being  given  the 
title  of  ex-Emperor.  There  were  precedents  for  the  favour  requested 
in  the  latter  instance,  and  it  would  probably  have  been  granted  had 
the  Government  not  felt  that  the  concession  would  weaken  their 
position  in  regard  to  the  young  Shogun.  Both  requests  were  conse- 
quently refused  ; whereupon  stormy  scenes,  we  are  told,  occurred  at 
the  Yedo  palace,  in  the  course  of  which  the  Shogun  drew  his  sword 
on  one  of  the  offending  Councillors,  and  an  angry  correspondence 
continued  for  two  or  three  years  between  Kioto  and  Yedo.  In  the 
end  neither  request  was  granted,  and  the  Ministers  whose  counsel 
prevailed  had  at  least  the  satisfaction  of  feeling  that  the  apprehended 
danger  to  public  morals  had  been  averted. 

Before  closing  this  chapter  it  may  be  convenient  to  dwell  for  a 
moment  on  two  points — the  terms  used  to  designate  the  Sovereign 
in  Japan  and  the  titles  of  daimios. 

That  the  impersonality  shrouding  everything  Japanese,  to  which 
reference  has  already  been  made,  should  show  itself  in  the  terms 
used  to  designate  the  Sovereign  is  not  surprising.  Nor  is  it  in  any 
way  strange  that  these  should  include  such  expressions  as  “ The 
Palace,”  “ The  Palace  Interior  ” and  “ The  Household,”  for  sove- 
reigns are  commonly  spoken  of  in  this  way,  the  habit  having  its  origin 
in  respect.  What  is  curious  is  that  in  the  case  of  a sovereign  vene- 
rated from  the  first  as  a God,  and  so  closely  associated  with  the 
native  faith,  the  terms  by  which  he  is  known  to  his  subjects  should, 
with  one  exception,  be  borrowed  from  China,  and  that  this  one 
exception,  the  name  “ Mikado,”  which  means  “ Honourable  Gate,” 
should  be  the  term  least  used. 

The  titles  borne  by  the  feudal  nobility  were  of  two  kinds — terri- 
torial titles,  and  the  official  titles  conferred  by  the  Court.  The 
territorial  title  of  a daimio  consisted  originally  of  the  word  Kami 
joined  to  the  name  of  the  province  in  which  his  territories  lay.  The 
title  of  a daimio,  therefore,  in  early  days  had  direct  reference  to  the 
province  in  which  his  fief  was  situated.  In  the  course  of  time,  how- 


Consolidation  of  the  Duarchy  41 

ever,  though  this  territorial  title  remained  in  general  use,  it  by  no 
means  followed  that  there  was  any  connection  between  the  particular 
province  mentioned  and  the  territory  actually  possessed  by  a daimio. 
This  change  in  the  significance  of  the  title  was  due  to  several  causes  : 
to  the  partition  amongst  several  daimios  of  lands  originally  held  by 
a single  individual,  to  the  removal  of  a daimio  to  another  fief,  to 
which  he  often  carried  his  old  title,  and  to  the  formation  of  cadet 
houses,  which  sometimes  retained  the  title  of  the  senior  branch. 
The  multiplication  of  similar  titles  led  to  much  confusion,  and  in 
the  later  days  of  the  Shogunate,  by  way  of  remedying  this  incon- 
venience, a daimio  on  appointment  to  the  Council  of  State  was 
obliged  to  change  his  title,  if  it  were  one  already  borne  by  an  older 
member. 

The  history  of  the  other,  or  official,  titles  is  this.  When  the 
government  of  the  country  passed  out  of  the  hands  of  the  Kuge,  or 
Court  nobles,  into  those  of  the  military  class,  the  official  posts  pre- 
viously held  by  the  former  were  filled  by  members  of  the  feudal 
nobility,  who  accordingly  assumed  the  official  titles  attached  to  those 
posts.  In  the  course  of  time,  as  successive  changes  in  the  details  of 
administration  occurred,  the  duties  of  these  posts  became  merely 
nominal,  until  at  last  the  titles,  some  of  which  had  become  hereditary, 
came  to  be  merely  honourable  distinctions,  having  no  connection 
with  the  discharge  of  official  duties.  There  were  in  Iyeyasu’s  time 
about  sixty  of  these  official  titles,  which  were,  nominally,  in  the  gift 
of  the  Crown.  Until  the  end  of  the  Shogunate  there  was  much 
competition  for  these  titles,  which  were  the  cause  of  constant  intrigue 
between  the  Imperial  Court  and  the  Yedo  Government. 


CHAPTER  IV 


Political  Conditions — Reopening  of  Japan  to  Foreign  Intercourse — Con- 
clusion of  Treaties — Decay  of  Shogunate. 

MUCH  space  has  been  given  in  the  preceding  chapter  to  the 
Tokugawa  period  of  administration.  For  this  no  apology 
is  due  to  the  reader.  The  period  in  question,  held  in 
grateful  remembrance  by  the  nation  as  the  Era  of  Great  Peace,  is 
the  most  important  in  Japanese  history.  This  importance  it  owes 
to  its  long  duration  ; to  the  singular  character  of  its  government — 
a centralized  and  autocratic  bureaucracy  flavoured  with  feudalism  ; 
to  the  progress  which  took  place  in  literature,  art  and  industry  ; to 
its  being  the  immediate  predecessor  of  what  is  known  as  the  Meiji 
Era — the  reign  of  the  late  Emperor,  which  began  in  1868;  and, 
consequently,  to  the  fact  that  the  Japanese  people,  as  we  see  them 
to-day,  are  the  product  of  that  period  more  than  of  any  other. 
Before  leaving  the  subject,  therefore,  it  may  perhaps  be  convenient 
to  explain  very  briefly  what  kind  of  feudal  system  it  was  which 
formed,  as  it  were,  the  basis  of  Tokugawa  government,  for  one 
feature  of  it  still  survives. 

In  his  History  oj  the  Civilization  oj  Europe,  Guizot  puts  forward 
on  behalf  of  feudalism  the  claim  that  it  constitutes  an  essential  stage 
in  the  evolution  of  nations.  It  certainly  played  a very  noticeable 
part  in  the  development  of  Japan,  lasting  as  it  did  from  the  close 
of  the  twelfth  century  down  to  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth,  a 
period  of  more  than  seven  hundred  years.  The  French  author  and 
statesman  in  question,  however,  might  have  been  surprised  had  he 
known  that  one  feature  of  Japanese  feudalism  would  survive  its 
abolition,  and  that  feature  one  not  known  on  the  continent  of 
Europe. 

Though  in  its  general  character  Japanese  feudalism  resembled  the 
feudal  systems  prevailing  at  various  times  in  the  continental  countries 

42 


Political  Conditions  43 

of  Europe,  in  one  respect — the  position  of  the  population  inhabiting 
the  fiefs — it  came  closer  to  the  clan  type  of  Scottish  feudalism  ; with 
this  important  distinction,  however,  that,  whereas  the  Scottish  clan 
was  a family,  or  tribal,  organization,  the  basis  of  the  Japanese  clan 
was  purely  territorial,  the  clansmen  being  held  together  by  no  family 
link.  The  Japanese  word  Han  (borrowed  from  China),  the  usual 
English  rendering  of  which  is  “ clan,”  does  not,  in  its  feudal  sense, 
refer  to  the  territory  included  in  a fief,  but  to  the  people  inhabiting 
it.  In  unsettled  times,  which  were  the  rule  and  not  the  exception 
before  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century,  the  map  of  feudal  Japan 
was  constantly  changing.  The  area  of  a fief  expanded,  or  contracted, 
according  to  the  military  fortunes  of  the  daimio  concerned  ; and  at 
times  both  fief  and  feudal  owner  disappeared  altogether.  Nor  in 
the  alterations  thus  occurring  from  time  to  time  in  the  feudal  map 
was  any  consideration  paid  to  natural  boundaries.  A daimio’s  fief, 
or,  in  other  words,  the  territories  of  a clan,  might  consist  of  the 
whole  or  only  part  of  a province,  of  portions  of  two  or  three  provinces, 
or  even  of  several  whole  provinces,  as  in  the  case  of  the  founder  of 
the  Tokugawa  line  of  Shoguns,  and,  at  one  time,  of  Mori,  “ the  lord 
of  ten  provinces.”  In  earlier  days  the  word  “ clan  ” {Han)  was  not 
much  used,  the  personality  of  the  daimio  of  the  fief  being  the  chief 
consideration.  As  conditions  became  more  settled,  however,  under 
the  peaceful  sway  of  the  Tokugawa  Shoguns,  the  boundaries  of  fiefs 
became  more  fixed  and  permanent.  As  a result,  too,  of  these  un- 
warlike conditions,  and  of  the  spread  to  feudal  circles  of  the  corrupt 
and  effeminate  atmosphere  of  the  Imperial  Court,  the  personality  of 
a daimio  counted  for  less,  while  the  term  “ clan  ” gradually  came  to 
be  more  commonly  employed  to  express  the  idea  of  a distinct  feudal 
community,  united  solely  by  territorial  associations.  These  acted  as 
provincial  ties  do  everywhere,  but  where  feudal  and  provincial  boun- 
daries were  the  same,  the  tie  uniting  the  population  of  a fief  was 
naturally  stronger  than  elsewhere.  Some  idea  of  what  the  clan  really 
was  in  Japan  is  necessary  in  order  to  understand  how  it  was  that  clan 
spirit  should  have  survived  when  feudalism  died,  and  how  it  is  that 
Japan  to-day,  more  than  half  a century  after  its  abolition,  should  be 
ruled  by  what  the  Japanese  themselves  speak  of  as  a clan  government 
(Hambatsu  Seiju). 


44  Reopening  to  Foreign  Intercourse 

We  row  come  to  a new  chapter  in  the  history  of  Japan — the  re- 
opening of  the  country  to  foreign  intercourse.  At  the  close  of  the 
drama  which  ended  in  the  expulsion,  or  death,  of  all  missionaries  and 
their  converts  the  Dutch  and  Chinese  were,  as  we  have  seen,  the  only 
foreigners  allowed  to  trade  with  Japan,  the  reason  being  that  neither, 
so  far  as  the  Japanese  could  judge,  had  any  connection  with  Chris- 
tianity, or  missionaries.  This  was  about  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth 
century.  Things  remained  in  this  state  until  the  beginning  of  the 
nineteenth,  by  which  time  the  commerce  carried  on  by  the  traders 
of  the  two  favoured  nationalities  had  dwindled  to  very  small  pro- 
portions. During  the  last  fifty  years  of  this  trade  changes  full  of 
meaning  for  Japan,  for  the  continent  of  Asia  and  for  the  world  at 
large  were  taking  place.  Russia  was  extending  her  sphere  of  activity 
in  Siberia,  and  threatening  to  become  an  intrusive  neighbour  in 
Saghalin  and  the  Kuriles.  American  whalers  had  discovered  a profit- 
able field  of  enterprise  in  the  Sea  of  Okhotsk,  while,  further  south, 
landing  parties  from  these  vessels  were  making  use  of  the  Bonin 
islands  to  obtain  water  and  fresh  provisions.  The  development  of 
America’s  seaboard  on  the  Pacific  had  led  to  the  opening  of  a new 
trade  route  with  the  mainland  of  Asia,  for  which  the  Japanese  islands 
offered  convenient  ports  of  call.  And,  finally,  the  governments  of 
Great  Britain  and  France  were  busily  engaged  in  demolishing  the 
barriers  of  conservative  prejudice  behind  which  China  had  for  so  long 
entrenched  herself.  These  changes,  due  partly  to  the  introduction 
of  steam  navigation,  caused  a sudden  and  rapidly  growing  increase 
in  the  visits  of  foreign  vessels  to  Japan.  The  trend  of  affairs  was 
perceived  by  the  Dutch,  who  warned  the  Japanese  authorities  that 
the  moment  was  approaching  when  the  policy  of  isolation  could  no 
longer  be  pursued  without  danger  to  the  country.  It  needed  little 
to  arouse  Japanese  apprehensions.  A system  of  coast  defence  was  at 
once  organized.  The  Bay  of  Yedo,  and  its  vicinity,  the  inland  sea, 
and  the  harbours  in  Kiushiu,  including  the  immediate  neighbourhood 
of  Nagasaki,  were  places  to  which  special  attention  was  given.  It  is 
clear  from  the  experience  of  foreign  ships  which  accident  or  enter- 
prise carried  into  Japanese  waters,  from  the  detailed  instructions 
issued  periodically  from  Yedo,  and  from  the  reports  of  movements 
of  foreign  vessels  received  by  the  authorities,  that  there  was  no  lack 
of  vigilance  in  the  working  of  the  system.  Yet  it  was  singularly  in- 
effective ; a result,  under  the  circumstances,  not  surprising,  since  the 


Reopening  to  Foreign  Intercourse  45 

policy  of  the  Yedo  Government  varied  according  to  the  degree  of 
apprehension  existing  at  the  moment  in  official  circles,  and  there  was 
a general  desire  to  evade  responsibility. 

Three  reasons  inspired  these  visits  of  foreign  vessels : the  need  of 
provisions,  looking  for  shipwrecked  crews,  or  repatriating  shipwrecked 
Japanese,  and  a desire  to  engage  in  trade,  or  to  establish  friendly 
relations  which  would  lead  to  that  result.  In  no  case  was  the  recep- 
tion accorded  encouraging,  though  a clear  discrimination  was 
exercised  between  merchant  vessels  and  warships.  To  the  former 
scant  mercy  was  shown  ; but  warships  were  treated  with  more 
respect.  They  were  towed  into  and  out  of  harbour  free  of  charge, 
and  were  supplied  with  provisions  for  which  no  money  was  accepted. 

America  was  the  country  most  interested  at  that  time  in  the 
opening  of  Japan  to  foreign  intercourse  on  account  of  the  operations 
of  her  whalers  in  the  Pacific  and  her  trade  route  to  China.  The 
United  States  Government,  therefore,  decided  to  take  the  initiative 
in  endeavouring  to  put  an  end  to  the  Japanese  policy  of  isolation. 
Accordingly,  in  the  year  1845,  Commodore  Biddle  arrived  in  Yedo 
with  two  men-of-war  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  trade  relations 
between  the  two  countries.  He  failed,  however,  to  induce  the 
Japanese  Government  to  enter  into  any  negotiations  on  the  subject. 
Seven  years  later  the  matter  was  again  taken  up  by  the  Government 
at  Washington,  Commodore  Perry  receiving  orders  to  proceed  to 
Japan  on  a mission  to  arrange  for  the  more  humane  treatment  of 
American  sailors  shipwrecked  on  the  coasts  of  Japan  ; to  obtain  the 
opening  of  one  or  more  harbours  as  ports  of  call  for  American  vessels 
and  the  establishment  of  a coal  depot ; and  to  secure  permission  for 
trade  at  such  ports  as  might  be  opened.  No  secrecy  surrounded  the 
intentions  of  the  United  States.  They  were  known  in  Europe  as 
well  as  in  America,  as  Macfarlane,  writing  in  1852,  mentions,  and 
the  Dutch  promptly  told  the  Japanese. 

On  July  8th,  1853,  Perry  arrived  in  the  harbour  of  Uraga,  a small 
cove  in  the  Bay  of  Yedo,  some  thirty  miles  from  the  present  capital. 
His  instructions  were  to  obtain  the  facilities  desired  by  persuasion, 
if  possible,  but,  if  necessary,  by  force.  He  succeeded  after  some 
difficulty  in  prevailing  upon  the  Japanese  authorities  to  receive  the 
President’s  letter  at  a formal  interview  on  shore.  At  the  same  time 
he  presented  a letter  from  himself  demanding  more  humane  treat- 
ment for  shipwrecked  sailors,  and  pointed  out  the  folly  of  persistence 


46  Conclusion  of  Treaties 

in  the  policy  of  seclusion.  He  would  return  next  spring,  he  added, 
with  more  ships  to  receive  the  answer  to  the  President’s  letter. 

With  Perry’s  arrival  the  Shogun  figures  under  a new  title,  that  of 
Tycoon  (Taikun),  or  Great  Lord,  a term  first  used  in  correspondence 
with  Korea  in  order  to  conceal  the  fact  that  the  Shogun  was  not  the 
sovereign  of  Japan.  This  was  the  word  chosen  to  designate  the 
Shogun  in  the  earlier  treaties  concluded  with  foreign  Powers,  and  is 
the  name  by  which  he  was  commonly  known  to  foreigners  until  the 
Restoration  put  an  end  to  the  government  he  represented. 

On  Perry’s  return  in  the  following  year,  1854,  he  insisted  on 
anchoring  further  up  the  Bay  of  Yedo,  off  what  was  then  the  post 
town  and  afterwards  the  open  port  of  Kanagawa.  It  was  at  a village 
close  to  this  spot,  now  known  as  the  town  of  Yokohama,  that  on  the 
31st  March  he  signed  the  Treaty  opening  the  ports  of  Shimoda  (in 
Cape  Idzu)  and  Hakodate  (in  Yezo)  to  American  vessels — the  former 
at  once,  the  latter  at  the  end  of  a year.  This  Treaty,  which  was 
ratified  in  the  following  year,  was  the  first  step  in  the  reopening  of 
Japan  to  foreign  intercourse. 

Perry’s  Treaty  was  succeeded  by  similar  arrangements  with  other 
Powers — with  the  British  in  October  of  the  same  year  (1854),  and 
in  the  year  following  with  the  Russians  and  Dutch. 

The  Dutch  benefited  greatly  by  the  new  direction  given  to  foreign 
relations.  By  the  provisional  arrangement  made  in  1855  most  of  the 
humiliating  restrictions  accompanying  the  privilege  of  trade  were 
removed  ; and  two  years  later  they  were  allowed  “ to  practise  their 
own  or  the  Christian  religion,”  a provision  which  seems  to  suggest 
that  the  Japanese  idea  as  to  their  not  being  Christians  was  inspired 
by  the  Dutch.  The  orders,  moreover,  with  regard  to  trampling  on 
Christian  emblems  were  also  at  the  same  time  rescinded.  There  was 
still  some  difference  between  their  position  and  that  of  other  foreign- 
ers. This,  however,  only  lasted  a year  or  two.  With  the  operation 
of  the  later  more  elaborate  treaties  the  nation  which  had  prided  itself 
on  its  exclusive  trading  privileges  with  Japan  was  glad  to  come  in  on 
the  same  footing  as  other  Western  Powers. 

None  of  the  arrangements  above  described  were  regular  com- 
mercial treaties.  The  first,  concluded  with  America,  was  simply  an 
agreement  for  the  granting  of  certain  limited  facilities  for  naviga- 
tion and  trade,  the  latter  being  a secondary  consideration.  The 
object  of  the  British  Treaty,  made  by  Admiral  Stirling  during  the 


Conclusion  of  Treaties  47 

Crimean  war,  was  to  assist  operations  against  Russia  in  Siberian 
waters.  The  Russians,  for  their  part,  merely  wished  for  political 
reasons  to  gain  a footing  in  Japan  ; while  the  Dutch  were  chiefly 
anxious  to  escape  from  the  undignified  position  they  occupied. 

It  was  not  until  1858  that  regular  commercial  treaties  were  con- 
cluded. Perry’s  Treaty  had  stipulated  for  the  appointment  of  an 
American  Consul-General  to  reside  at  Shimoda.  Mr.  Townsend 
Harris  was  selected  for  the  post.  His  arrival  was  unwelcome  to  the 
Japanese,  who  had  not  expected  the  enforcement  of  the  stipulation. 
They  accordingly  boycotted  him.  He  could  get  no  trustworthy 
information.  If  he  asked  for  anything,  it  was  withheld  as  being 
“ contrary  to  the  honourable  country’s  law  ” ; and  his  letters  were 
not  answered  because  “ it  was  not  customary  to  reply  to  the  letters 
of  foreigners.”  Harris,  nevertheless,  persevered  in  spite  of  Japanese 
obstruction  with  his  task  of  developing  American  relations  with 
Japan.  In  June,  1857,  he  was  able  to  report  the  signature  of  a con- 
vention which  extended  considerably  the  facilities  conceded  to 
Perry  ; in  the  autumn  of  the  same  year  he  was  received  in  audience 
by  the  Shogun  as  the  first  duly  accredited  representative  of  a 
Western  Power  ; by  the  following  February  negotiations  for  the 
new  Treaty  were  practically  completed ; and  in  July  of  that  year 
(1858)  the  Treaty  was  signed  in  Yedo  Bay  on  board  an  American 
man-of-war. 

The  delay  of  five  months  was  caused  by  the  Shogunate’s  decision 
to  refer  the  Treaty  before  signature  to  Kioto  for  the  approval  of 
the  Throne.  This  reference  was  not  necessary.  The  right  of  the 
Shogun  to  act  independently  in  such  matters  had  been  recorded  in 
the  “ Hundred  Articles,”  and  long  custom  had  confirmed  the  rule 
thus  recorded.  But  in  the  embarrassment  and  trepidation  caused  by 
Perry’s  unexpected  visit,  and  still  less  expected  demands,  the 
Shogunate  had  departed  from  this  rule,  and  revived  the  obsolete 
formality  of  Imperial  sanction,  extending  at  the  same  time  its 
application.  The  Court  refused  its  consent  to  the  proposed  Treaty, 
but  in  spite  of  this  refusal  the  Japanese  negotiators  signed  it  ; the 
Shogun’s  ministers  being  influenced  by  the  news  of  the  termination 
of  the  war  in  China,  and  the  impending  arrival  of  British  and 
French  ambassadors,  as  well  as  by  the  representations  of  the  American 
negotiator. 

Treaties  with  Great  Britain,  with  Holland,  with  Russia,  and  with 


48  Conclusion  of  Treaties 

France  followed  in  rapid  succession,  the  first  three  being  signed  in 
August,  the  last-named  in  October.  All  four  reproduced  more  or 
less  closely  the  substance  of  the  American  convention.  The  choice 
of  open  ports  in  Perry’s  Treaty — due  to  solicitude  for  American 
whalers,  and  considerations  connected  with  America’s  new  trade 
route  to  China — had  in  the  interests  of  general  commerce  been 
unfortunate.  This  defect  was  remedied  in  the  new  treaties  by  pro- 
visions for  the  opening  of  additional  ports.  A tariff  and  a system  of 
tonnage  dues  were  also  established.  In  other  respects  the  new 
treaties  merely  confirmed,  or  amplified,  the  provisions  of  earlier 
arrangements.  They  were  useful,  however,  as  the  forerunners  of  a 
whole  series  of  practically  uniform  agreements,  which  simplified 
Japan’s  position,  while  enlarging  the  scope  of  foreign  relations. 
One  of  the  last  to  be  concluded  was  the  Austro-Hungarian  Treaty 
of  1869,  the  English  version  of  which  was  made  the  “original,”  or 
authoritative,  text.  By  virtue  of  the  most-favoured-nation  clause, 
which  figured  in  all  these  conventions,  it  was  this  instrument  which 
governed  the  relations  of  Japan  with  Treaty  Powers,  until  the  new 
revised  treaties  came  into  force  in  1 899.  When  the  Japanese  people 
became  aware  that  the  character  of  these  treaties  was  different  from 
those  made  by  Western  governments  with  each  other,  an  early 
opportunity  was  taken  to  protest  against  the  provisions  conceding 
ex-territoriality  and  fixing  a low  customs  tariff,  and  against  the 
obstacle  to  revision  presented  by  the  absence  in  the  agreements  of 
any  fixed  period  of  duration.  The  irritation  thus  caused  led  later  on 
to  an  agitation  for  treaty  revision,  which  did  much  to  embitter 
Japanese  feeling  towards  foreigners.  The  complaint  was  not  un- 
natural, but  in  making  it  there  was  a tendency  to  overlook  the  fact 
that  the  position  of  foreigners  in  Japan  under  these  treaties  was  also 
very  different  from  their  position  under  other  treaties  elsewhere. 
The  residential  and  commercial  rights  of  the  foreigner  in  Japan 
applied  only  to  the  “ open  ports,”  while  his  right  of  travel,  except 
by  special  permission,  not  readily  granted,  did  not  extend  beyond  a 
narrow  area  at  the  same  ports  known  as  “ treaty  limits.”  The  rest 
of  the  country  remained  closed.  This  limitation  of  facilities  for 
commercial  intercourse  was,  moreover,  accentuated  by  the  fact 
that  the  choice  of  “ open  ” or  “ treaty  ports  ” was  not,  as  has  been 
pointed  out,  the  best  that  could  have  been  made.  Compelled 
against  their  will  to  consent  to  foreign  intercourse,  it  was  only  to 


Decay  of  Shogunate  49 

be  expected  that  the  Japanese  should  seek  to  render  the  concession 
worthless  by  selecting  harbours  neither  suitable  nor  safe  for  shipping, 
and  places  far  from  markets,  and  that  a similar  spirit  should  dictate 
the  choice  of  sites  for  foreign  settlements.  That  the  early  negotiators 
who  represented  Japan  were  handicapped  by  ignorance  of  the  prin- 
ciples regulating  international  relations  is  undeniable.  But  the 
injustice,  as  they  considered  it,  of  the  conditions  against  which 
protest  was  made  was  really  a blessing  in  disguise  ; for,  on  the 
admission  of  the  Japanese  themselves,  it  served  as  a powerful  stimulus 
to  progress  on  the  lines  of  Western  civilization. 

In  the  course  of  five  years  from  the  date  of  Perry’s  Treaty  no  less 
than  thirteen  elaborate  agreements,  besides  other  arrangements  of  a 
less  formal  character,  had  been  concluded  by  Japan.  So  rapid  an 
extension  of  foreign  intercourse  might  seem  to  point  to  a subsidence 
of  anti-foreign  feeling,  and  a decrease  of  opposition  to  the  establish- 
ment of  friendly  relations  with  foreign  countries.  Such,  however, 
was  not  the  case.  The  negotiations  of  these  various  covenants  were 
carried  on  in  the  face  of  growing  anti-foreign  clamour,  and  in  the 
midst  of  political  confusion  and  agitation, — the  precursors  of  a 
movement  which  was  to  end  in  the  collapse  of  Tokugawa  govern- 
ment. 

In  order  that  the  subsequent  course  of  events  may  be  understood, 
some  reference,  however  brief,  to  the  political  situation  which 
existed  at  this  time  is  necessary.  It  will  be  seen  what  complications 
— quite  apart  from  the  embarrassments  arising  out  of  the  reopening 
of  foreign  intercourse — were  caused  by  the  inconsequence  and 
ambition  of  the  Court,  the  weakness  of  the  Shogunate,  and  the 
jealousies  of  rival  statesmen.  Some  idea  may  also  thus  be  formed  of 
the  ignorance  of  foreign  matters  which  then  prevailed,  except  in  a 
few  official  quarters,  and  of  the  clumsy  timidity  of  a policy  which 
consisted  chiefly  of  shutting  the  eyes  to  facts  patent  to  everyone. 

Ever  since  the  establishment  of  Tokugawa  rule  there  had  been  a 
party  at  the  Kidto  Court,  consisting  of  Court  nobles,  which  cham- 
pioned the  pretensions  of  the  Throne,  mourned  over  its  lost  glories, 
conducted  its  intrigues,  and  felt  a common  resentment  against  what 
in  its  eyes  was  an  administration  of  usurpers.  The  fatal  mistake  of 
the  Shogunate  in  referring  to  Kioto  Perry’s  demands  for  the  reopen- 
ing of  foreign  intercourse  on  new  and  strange  conditions — a matter 
which,  in  accordance  with  established  precedent,  was  within  its  own 

D 


50  Decay  of  Shogunate 

competency — gave  an  opportunity  to  this  party  to  revive  the  long 
obsolete  pretensions  of  the  Court.  The  opportunity  was  at  once 
seized.  The  party  had  at  this  time  powerful  adherents.  Amongst 
them  the  chief  figure  was  the  ex-Prince  of  Mito.  Early  in  the 
previous  century  his  grandfather,  the  second  of  his  line,  had  founded 
a school  of  literature  and  politics,  which  espoused  the  Imperial  cause, 
and  encouraged  the  native  religion  and  language  in  opposition  to 
what  was  borrowed  from  China, — a profession  of  principles  which 
sat  curiously  on  a leading  member  of  the  Tokugawa  House.  Holding 
the  same  views  himself,  the  ex-Prince  had  been  forced  to  abdicate 
some  years  before  in  favour  of  his  eldest  son  for  having  destroyed  the 
Buddhist  temples  in  his  fief,  and  made  their  bells  into  cannon,  for 
the  alleged  purpose  of  repelling  a foreign  invasion.  With  the  ex- 
Prince  were  ranged  the  Tokugawa  Prince  of  Owari  and  the  influential 
daimios  of  Choshiu,  fichizen,  Tosa  and  Uwajima,  whilst  a large 
measure  of  sympathy  with  Imperial  aims  existed  among  the  promi- 
nent clans  of  the  south  and  west.  The  anti-Shogunate  movement 
also  derived  help  from  the  turbulent  class  of  clanless  samurai,  known 
as  ronin,  which  at  this  time  was  rapidly  increasing  in  numbers  owing 
to  economic  distress  in  feudal  territories,  and  the  growing  weakness 
of  the  Shogunate.  The  latter’s  supporters,  on  the  other  hand,  were 
mostly  to  be  found  in  the  centre,  the  north  and  the  east,  all  of 
which  were  old  Tokugawa  strongholds.  Its  chief  strength,  however, 
lay  in  its  being  beatus  -possidetis, — having,  that  is  to  say,  the  command 
of  State  resources,  and  being  in  a position  to  speak  for  the  Throne  ; 
and  in  the  fact  that  Tokugawa  government,  by  its  long  duration  and 
the  completeness  of  its  bureaucratic  organization,  had  taken  so  firm 
a hold  of  the  country,  that  whatever  sympathy  might  possibly  be 
evoked  on  behalf  of  revived  Imperial  pretensions  might  not  un- 
reasonably be  expected  to  fall  short  of  material  support. 

One  other  advantage  the  Shogunate  possessed  was  the  presence  in 
the  Government  of  a minister  of  distinguished  ancestry,  and  of  great 
ability  and  courage,  combined  with,  what  was  rare  in  those  days, 
independence  of  character.  This  was  the  famous  Ii  Kamon  no 
Kami,  generally  known  as  the  Tairo,  or  Regent,  whose  castle-town, 
Hikon6,  near  Kioto,  overlooked  Lake  Biwa.  The  early  associations 
of  his  family  made  him  a staunch  upholder  of  Tokugawa  rule.  He 
quickly  became  the  leading  spirit  of  the  Ministry,  and  the  liberal 
views  he  apparently  held  on  the  subject  of  treaty-making  and  foreign 


Decay  of  Shogunate  5 1 

intercourse  brought  him  at  once  into  collision  with  the  boldest  and 
most  uncompromising  member  of  the  Court  party — the  ex-Prince 
of  Mito.  The  disagreement  between  them  first  showed  itself  in  the 
advice  called  for  by  the  Throne  from  the  Council  of  State  and  the 
leading  feudal  nobles  on  the  question  of  the  signature  of  the  American 
Treaty  of  1858.  In  the  controversy  which  arose  on  this  point  they 
figured  as  the  chief  protagonists.  The  policy  of  the  Court  in  1853 
had  been  non-committal.  In  1855  ^ had  formally  approved  of  the 
treaties,  the  Shogun’s  resident  at  Kioto  reporting  that  “ the  Impel ial 
mind  was  now  at  ease.”  Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  this  approval,  and 
notwithstanding  the  signature  of  fresh  treaties,  the  crusade  of  the 
Court  party  against  foreign  intercourse  went  on  unabated.  On  the 
present  occasion  the  ex-Prince  of  Mito  argued  strongly  against  the 
Treaty,  while  the  Council  of  State,  adopting  the  views  of  Ii  Kamon 
no  Kami,  who  was  not  yet  Regent,  recommended  the  signature  of 
the  Treaty  as  being  the  proper  course  to  follow.  But  the  question 
which  provoked  the  keenest  rivalry  and  the  bitterest  antagonism 
between  the  two  statesmen  concerned  the  succession  to  the  Shogunate. 

The  Shogun  Iyesada,  appointed  in  1853,  was  childless,  and,  in 
accordance  with  custom  in  such  cases,  it  was  incumbent  on  him  to 
choose  and  adopt  a successor.  The  ex-Prince  of  Mito  wished  the 
choice  to  fall  on  one  of  his  younger  sons,  Keiki,  then  fifteen  years  of 
age,  who  having  been  adopted  into  the  Hitotsubashi  family,  was 
eligible  for  the  appointment.  But  the  new  Shogun  was  only  twenty- 
nine,  and  in  no  hurry  to  choose  a successor  from  another  family. 
His  relations,  moreover,  with  the  ex-Prince  of  Mito  were  not  cordial ; 
and  there  were  other  objections.  If  he  were  constrained  to  adopt  a 
successor,  his  own  choice  would,  it  was  known,  fall  on  a nearer 
kinsman,  the  young  Prince  of  Kishiu,  a boy  of  ten.  The  heir  pre- 
ferred by  the  Shogun  was  also  the  choice  of  Ii.  The  parties  support- 
ing the  rival  candidates  were  not  unequally  matched.  Though  the 
weight  of  clan  influence  was  on  the  side  of  Keiki,  fated  a few  years 
later  to  be  the  last  of  the  Tokugawa  Shoguns,  a section  of  the  Court 
nobles  joined  with  the  Council  of  State  in  favouring  the  candidature 
of  the  young  Kishiu  prince,  behind  whom  stood  also  the  Shogun. 

The  two  questions  in  dispute  were  thus  quite  distinct,  the  one 
being  a matter  of  foreign,  the  other  of  domestic  policy.  But  the 
two  protagonists  in  each  being  the  same,  it  looked  as  if  the  side  that 
was  successful  in  one  issue  would  gain  the  day  in  both.  And  this  in 


52  Decay  of  Shogunate 

fact  is  what  happened.  In  June,  1858,  in  the  interval  between  the 
second  and  third  missions  to  Kioto  in  connection  with  the  signature 
of  the  American  Treaty,  li  became  Regent — an  appointment 
tenable  in  times  of  emergency  as  well  as  during  a Shogun’s  minority. 
The  end  of  the  conflict,  which  had  lasted  nearly  five  years,  was  then 
in  sight.  In  July,  as  already  stated,  the  American  Treaty  was  signed. 
Before  another  week  had  elapsed  the  young  Kishiu  prince  was  pro- 
claimed heir  to  the  Shogunate.  Ten  days  later  the  Shogun  Iyesada 
died. 


CHAPTER  V 


Anti-Foreign  Feeling — ChOshiQ  Rebellion — Mikado’s  Ratification  of  Treaties 
— Prince  Keiki — Restoration  Movement — Civil  War — Fall  of  Shogunate. 

THE  signature  of  the  Treaty  was  loudly  condemned  by  the 
Court  party,  the  ez-Prince  of  Mito  being  conspicuous 
amongst  those  who  protested.  He  addressed  a violently 
worded  remonstrance  to  the  Council  of  State,  impugning  the  action 
of  the  Government,  which  was  accused  of  disrespect  to  the  Throne, 
and  disobedience  to  the  Imperial  commands.  The  Regent  retorted 
by  striking  at  once  at  his  enemies  with  all  the  force  of  his  newly 
acquired  position,  and  the  prestige  of  his  success  in  the  matter  of  the 
succession.  The  ez-Prince  of  Mito  and  the  Prince  of  Owaxi  were 
confined  to  their  yashikis  (a  term  applied  to  the  feudal  residences 
occupied  by  daimids  during  their  period  of  service  in  Yedo)  ; while 
the  latter,  together  with  the  daimios  of  fichizen,  Tosa  and  Uwajima, 
was  forced  to  abdicate.  And  wrhen  the  Court,  growing  uneasy  at 
this  sudden  reassertion  of  authority  on  the  part  of  the  Shogunate, 
summoned  the  Regent,  or  one  of  the  Gosanke,  to  Kioto  to  report  on 
the  situation,  a reply  was  sent  to  the  effect  that  the  Regent  was 
detained  by  State  affairs,  and  that  the  ez-Prince  of  Mito  and  the 
Prince  of  Owari  were  confined  to  their  clan  yashikis.  A mission, 
however — the  third  in  succession — proceeded  to  Kidto  from  Yedo. 
This  submitted  a report  on  the  subject  of  the  Treaty,  which  ex- 
plained the  reasons  for  its  signature  in  advance  of  Imperial  sanction 
as  being  the  arrival  of  more  Russian  and  American  ships  ; the  defeat 
of  China  by  the  English  and  French  ; the  news  that  these  two 
countries  were  sending  to  Japan  special  envoys  instructed  to  carry 
matters  with  a high  hand  ; and  the  advice  to  sign  at  once  given  by 
the  American  minister.  The  Court’s  eventual  pronouncement  in 
favour  of  the  Treaty  displayed  in  a striking  manner  the  perverseness 
and  inconsequence  which  characterized  Japanese  official  procedure 

53 


54  Anti-Foreign  Feeling 

at  that  time.  The  decree  conveying  the  Imperial  approval  expressed 
the  satisfaction  with  which  the  Throne  had  received  the  assurance 
that  the  Shogun,  the  Regent  and  the  Council  of  State,  were  all  in 
favour  of  keeping  foreigners  at  a distance  ; and  urged  on  the  atten- 
tion of  the  Shogun  “ the  Throne’s  deep  concern  in  regard  to  the 
sea  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Imperial  shrines  and  Kioto,  as  well 
as  the  safety  of  the  Imperial  insignia,”  which,  put  into  plainer  lan- 
guage, meant  that  no  port  should  be  opened  near  Ise,  or  the  capital. 
Two  suggestions  have  been  made  on  good  authority  regarding  this 
decree  : (i)  that  the  Shogun’s  agents  in  Kioto  were  directed  to 
accept  anything  which  established  the  fact  of  an  understanding  with 
the  Court  having  been  effected  ; and  (2)  that  the  agents  in  question 
succeeded  in  persuading  the  Court  that,  though  the  signature  of 
this  particular  Treaty  was  unavoidable,  the  Yedo  Government  was 
not  really  in  favour  of  foreign  intercourse.  Both  suggestions  are 
probably  correct.  In  any  case  the  Court’s  action  in  ignoring  the 
Throne’s  previous  approval  of  earlier  treaties  was  calculated  to  stiffen 
opposition  to  the  Shogun’s  diplomacy,  and  was  thus  doubtless  re- 
sponsible for  some  of  the  subsequent  difficulties  attending  foreign 
intercourse,  notably  in  connection  with  the  opening  of  the  port  of 
Hiogo,  which,  with  the  consent  of  the  Treaty  Powers,  was  postponed 
until  January,  1868. 

As  showing  how  meaningless  the  Imperial  approval,  in  reality,  was  it 
may  be  well  to  note  that  the  English  text  of  the  Treaty  in  question 
provided  for  the  exchange  of  ratifications  at  Washington  on  or 
before  the  4th  July,  1859,  failing  which,  however,  the  Treaty  was, 
nevertheless,  to  come  into  force  on  the  date  in  question.  The 
Treaty  went  into  operation  on  the  date  fixed,  but  the  exchange  of 
ratifications  did  not  take  place  until  i860.  The  ratification  on  the 
part  of  Japan  is  described  as  the  verification  of  “ the  name  and  seal 
of  His  Majesty  the  Tycoon.” 

Hostility  to  foreigners  at  this  time,  however,  was  a feeling  common 
to  most  Japanese,  even  Shogunate  officials  being  no  exception  to 
the  rule.  Writers  on  Japan  mention  as  one  cause  which  served  to 
increase  this  feeling  the  drain  of  gold  from  Japan,  which  began  as 
early  as  the  operations  of  the  first  Portuguese  traders.  Another — 
adduced  by  the  Japanese  Government  itself — was  the  great  rise  in 
prices  which  followed  upon  the  opening  of  Treaty  ports.  Sir 
Rutherford  Alcock,  in  the  Capital  of  the  Tycoon , adds  a third — the 


Anti-Foreign  Feeling  55 

memory  of  the  troubles  connected  with  the  Christian  persecution 
in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries,  and  of  the  serious  alarm 
then  entertained  by  the  Japanese  authorities  at  the  undisguised 
pretensions  of  the  Pope.  The  understanding  regarding  the  Treaty 
question  arrived  at  by  the  Regent  with  the  Court  did  little  to  check 
the  growth  of  anti-foreign  feeling,  for  the  Court  continued  its 
intrigues  as  before,  and  the  Regent’s  death,  in  the  spring  of  i860  at 
the  hands  of  assassins  instigated  by  the  ex-Prince  of  Mito,  provided 
a further  opportunity.  The  effects  of  the  fierce  anti-foreign  crusade 
upon  which  it  then  embarked  were  seen  in  the  murder  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  American  Legation,  in  the  successive  attacks  made 
on  the  British  Legation,  and  in  other  violent  acts  by  which  foreigners 
were  not  the  only  sufferers.  Yielding  to  the  pressure  of  public 
opinion,  the  Government  itself  became  almost  openly  hostile. 
Placed  in  this  difficult  position,  the  representatives  of  the  Treaty 
Powers  found  both  dignity  and  safety  compromised.  What,  they 
might  well  ask,  was  to  be  gained  by  protests  to  the  Japanese  authori- 
ties in  regard  to  acts  with  which  the  latter’s  sympathy  was  barely 
concealed,  of  which  they  not  infrequently  gave  warning  themselves, 
but  against  which  they  were  unable,  or  unwilling,  to  afford  pro- 
tection ? Under  these  circumstances  it  is  not  surprising  that  the 
representatives  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Germany  and  Holland 
should  in  1862  have  retired  temporarily  from  the  capital  to  Yoko- 
hama— an  example  not  followed  by  the  American  representative  ; 
nor  that  the  British  Legation  on  its  return,  at  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment’s request,  four  weeks  later,  should  have  been  immediately 
attacked  in  spite  of  a formal  guarantee  of  protection.  In  respect  of 
this  attack,  in  the  course  of  which  two  sentries  were  murdered,  an 
indemnity  was  afterwards  paid.  Matters  were  further  aggravated 
by  the  murder  in  September  of  the  same  year  (1862)  of  Mr.  Richard- 
son, a British  subject,  on  the  high  road  near  Yokohama  by  the  body- 
guard of  a Satsuma  noble,  Shimadzu  Saburo,  who  was  on  his  way 
back  to  Kioto  from  the  Shogun’s  Court  in  Yedo.  A formal  apology 
for  this  outrage  was  demanded  by  the  British,  together  with  the 
payment  of  an  indemnity. 

The  growing  power  of  the  Court  and  the  anti-foreign  party,  for 
the  two  were  one,  showed  itself  also  in  its  behaviour  to  the  Shogunate 
after  the  Regent’s  death. 

The  adherents  of  the  ex-Prince  of  Mito — who  survived  his  adver- 


56  Anti-Foreign  Feeling 

sary  by  only  a few  months — held  up  their  heads  again,  while  the 
late  Regent’s  friends  were,  in  their  turn,  dismissed  from  office,  fined, 
imprisoned  or  banished.  Nor  did  the  Shogun’s  marriage  to  the 
Mikado’s  sister  in  the  spring  of  1862  materially  improve  the  relations 
between  Kioto  and  Yedo,  or  moderate  the  high-handed  attitude  of 
the  Court.  In  the  summer  of  the  same  year  the  Shogun  was  peremp- 
torily summoned  to  Kioto,  which  had  not  seen  a Shogun  for  two 
hundred  and  fifty  years,  to  confer  with  the  Court  regarding  the 
expulsion  of  foreigners ; Prince  Keiki,  the  unsuccessful  candidate 
for  the  office  of  Shogun  in  1858,  was  made  Regent,  and  appointed 
guardian  to  his  rival  on  that  occasion,  the  young  Shogun  Iyemochi, 
in  the  place  of  a nearer  and  older  relative  ; while  the  ex-Prince  of 
fichizen,  one  of  the  late  Regent’s  enemies,  was  made  President  of  the 
Council  of  State.  That  nothing  should  be  wanting  to  indicate  its 
displeasure  at  the  position  taken  up  by  the  Shogunate  in  regard  to 
foreign  affairs,  the  Court  went  so  far  as  to  order  the  Shogun’s 
consort,  who  in  accordance  with  custom  had,  on  her  marriage, 
assumed  the  title  usual  in  those  circumstances,  to  revert  to  her 
previous  designation  of  princess.  Other  signs  of  the  times,  showing 
not  only  the  anti-foreign  spirit  of  the  Court,  but  its  determination 
to  strike  at  the  root  of  Tokugawa  authority,  could  be  noted  in  such 
incidents  as  the  relaxation  of  the  conditions  of  the  residence  of 
feudal  nobles  in  Yedo,  and  the  release  of  the  hostages  formerly 
exacted  for  their  good  conduct  whilst  in  their  fiefs  ; the  solemn 
fixing  at  a Council  of  princes,  attended  by  the  Shogun  and  his 
guardians,  of  a date  for  the  cessation  of  all  foreign  intercourse  ; the 
revival  of  the  State  processions  of  the  Mikado  to  shrines,  which  had 
been  discontinued  at  the  beginning  of  the  Tokugawa  rule  ; and  the 
residence  for  long  periods  at  Kioto  of  feudal  nobles,  in  defiance  of 
the  Tokugawa  regulation  which  forbade  them  even  to  visit  the 
Capital  without  permission — a step  which  showed  that  they  were 
not  afraid  of  its  being  known  that  they  sided  openly  with  the  Court 
against  the  Shogunate.  The  same  spirit  accounted  for  the  attempt 
to  associate  the  Shogun  and  his  Regent-guardian  with  the  taking  of 
a religious  oath  to  expel  foreigners,  and,  finally,  for  the  fact  that 
while  so  much  that  was  incompatible  with  friendly  relations  with 
Treaty  Powers  was  taking  place,  a mission  sent  to  those  very  powers 
was  engaged  in  persuading  them  to  consent  to  the  postponement 
for  five  years  of  the  dates  fixed  for  the  opening  of  certain  ports  and 


Anti-Foreign  Feeling  57 

places  to  foreign  trade  and  residence.  This  consent  was  given,  and 
was  recorded,  in  so  far  as  Great  Britain  was  concerned,  in  the  London 
Protocol  of  June  6th,  1862. 

The  communication  to  the  foreign  representatives  of  the  decision 
to  close  the  country  duly  took  place  on  the  24th  June,  as  arranged. 
But  nothing  came  of  it.  The  foreign  governments  refused  to  take 
the  matter  seriously,  merely  intimating  that  steps  would  be  taken  to 
protect  foreign  interests,  and  five  months  later  the  Shogunate  asked 
for  the  return  of  the  Note. 

Sir  Rutherford  Alcock  in  the  course  of  a lengthy  review  of  the 
situation,  in  which  he  seems  to  have  foiesecn  clearly  that  the  re- 
opening of  the  country  would  eventually  lead  to  civil  war,  came, 
though  unwillingly,  to  the  conclusion  that  foreign  governments,  if 
they  wished  to  ensure  the  observance  of  the  treaties,  must  be  pre- 
pared to  use  force,  and  make  reprisals  ; in  fact,  that  opposition  to 
foreign  intercourse  would  not  cease  until  the  nation  should,  by 
drastic  measures,  have  been  persuaded  of  the  ability  of  foreign 
Powers  to  make  their  Treaty  rights  respected.  The  effect  of  the 
reprisals  made  by  the  British  Government  in  the  Richardson  case,  in 
the  course  of  which  the  town  of  Kagoshima  was  bombarded,  and 
partly  destroyed,  besides  the  exaction  of  an  indemnity,  went  some 
way  to  prove  the  correctness  of  this  view.  Its  truth  was  further 
demonstrated  when  a second  and  graver  incident  occurred.  This 
was  the  firing  upon  foreign  vessels  in  the  Straits  of  Shimonoseki  by 
Choshiu  forts  on  June  24th,  1863.  The  date  on  which  the  outrage 
occurred  was  that  fixed  at  the  Council  of  feudal  nobles,  attended  by 
the  Shogun  and  the  Regent,  his  guardian,  in  Kioto  for  the  opening 
of  negotiations  with  the  foreign  representatives  for  the  closing  of 
the  country.  It  was  also  that  on  which,  in  accordance  with  the 
decision  then  taken,  a communication  had  been  made  to  them  by 
the  Council  of  State.  The  coincidence  of  dates  gave  a more  serious 
aspect  to  the  affair,  though  the  complicity  of  the  Shogunate  was 
never  whole-hearted.  In  this  case,  also,  it  became  necessary  to  take 
the  drastic  measures  which  to  the  British  Minister  in  question  had 
seemed  to  be  inevitable  sooner  or  later.  Neither  the  first  reprisals, 
however,  instituted  at  once  by  the  French  and  American  naval 
authorities,  nor  the  lengthy  negotiations  with  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment which  followed,  were  of  any  effect  in  obtaining  redress.  For 
more  than  a year  the  straits  remained  closed  to  navigation.  Eventu- 


58  Anti-Foreign  Feeling 

ally  joint  operations  against  the  hostile  forts  conducted  in  August, 
1864,  by  a combined  squadron  of  the  four  Powers  immediately 
concerned,  accomplished  the  desired  result.  The  forts  were  attacked 
and  destroyed,  an  undertaking  that  they  should  be  left  in  a dis- 
mantled condition  was  extorted,  and  an  indemnity  of  $3,000,000 
exacted.  The  lessons  thus  administered  lost  none  of  their  force 
from  the  fact  that  the  clans  punished  were  the  two  most  powerful, 
and  those  in  which  hostility  to  foreigners  was  perhaps  most  openly 
displayed.  Both  this  and  the  Kagoshima  indemnity  were  paid  by 
the  Yedo  Government,  and  not  by  the  offending  clans.  Were  further 
proof  needed  of  the  strange  condition  of  affairs  at  this  time  in  Japan 
it  is  supplied  by  the  fact  that  in  both  cases  the  drastic  measures 
taken  resulted  in  the  establishment  of  quite  amicable  relations  with 
the  clans  in  question.  This  unlooked-for  result  points  to  the  exist- 
ence, both  in  the  nation  at  large,  and  in  individual  clans,  of  a small 
minority  which  did  not  share  the  prevailing  hostility  to  foreigners. 

Towards  the  end  of  1863  the  British  and  French  Governments 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  unsettled  state  of  things  in  Japan, 
and  the  anti-foreign  feeling,  which  showed  no  signs  of  decreasing, 
made  it  advisable  to  station  troops  in  Yokohama  for  the  protection 
of  foreign  interests.  Accordingly  contingents  of  British  and  French 
troops  were  landed,  and  established  in  quarters  on  shore,  by  arrange- 
ment with  the  Japanese  authorities.  Their  presence  served  admirably 
the  purpose  intended  ; no  collision  or  friction  occurred  between  these 
garrisons  and  the  Japanese,  and  in  1875,  when  their  presence  was  no 
longer  needed,  they  were  withdrawn. 

The  Shogun  had  been  very  reluctant  to  comply  with  the  Imperial 
summons  to  KiSto.  His  ministers  had  endeavoured  to  arrange  for 
the  visit  to  be  limited  to  ten  days.  Once  there,  however,  he  was 
detained  on  various  pretexts  until  June  in  the  following  year,  by 
which  time  the  Court  had  already  embarked  on  its  anti-foreign 
policy,  and  the  Shimonoseki  incident  had  occurred.  His  return  to 
Yedo  was  the  signal  for  the  outbreak  of  further  bickering  between 
the  Court  and  the  Shogunate,  which  revealed  the  same  disposition 
on  both  sides  to  shut  the  eyes  to  facts,  and  change  position  with 
startling  inconsistency.  Ignoring  its  recent  co-operation  with  the 
Imperial  Court  and  feudal  nobles  in  the  anti-foreign  policy  initiated 
at  the  Capital,  the  fixing  of  a date  for  the  expulsion  of  the  foreigner, 
and  the  communication  of  its  decision  to  the  foreign  representatives, 


Choshiu  Rebellion  59 

the  Shogunate  presented  a memorial  to  the  Throne  pointing  out 
how  unfavourable  was  the  present  moment  for  pushing  matters  to 
extremity  in  the  matter  of  foreign  intercourse.  The  Court,  for  its 
part,  while  testifying  its  pleasure  at  the  revival  of  the  ancient  practice 
of  visits  to  the  Capital,  rebuked  the  Shogun  for  not  keeping  the 
Throne  more  fully  informed  of  his  movements,  for  having  gone 
back  to  Yedo  in  a steamer , and  for  his  unsatisfactory  behaviour  in 
regard  to  foreign  relations.  Further  indications  of  the  general 
confusion  of  ideas  and  vacillation  of  purpose  which  characterized 
the  proceedings  of  persons  in  authority  appear  in  the  expulsion  of 
Choshiu  clansmen  from  Kioto  as  a mark  of  the  Court’s  strong  dis- 
approval of  the  action  of  the  Choshiu  clan  in  the  Shimonoseki  affair, 
as  well  as  in  the  startling  pronouncement  made  by  the  lichizen  clan 
— whose  chief’s  enforced  abdication  has  already  been  mentioned — 
in  favour  of  foreign  intercourse,  and  of  the  “ new  Christian  religion,” 
and  condemning  alike  both  the  policy  pursued  by  the  Court,  and 
that  of  the  ShSgunate. 

That  a definite  rupture  of  foreign  relations  did  not  take  place  at 
this  juncture  was  due  to  the  promptness  of  the  Shogunate  to  repu- 
diate its  own  acts  and  to  the  patience  and  good-humour  of  foreign 
governments  ; possibly  also  to  the  division  of  opinion  in  the  country 
itself,  where  the  centre  of  authority  was  beginning  to  shift,  though 
the  process  was  still  incomplete.  In  its  place  there  occurred  the  first 
threatenings,  the  beginnings,  in  fact,  of  the  civil  war  which  an 
attentive  observer  had  prophesied.  Conscious  of  the  Government’s 
weakness,  while  piqued  by  the  Court’s  inconsistency,  the  Choshiu 
clan  brought  matters  to  an  issue  in  the  summer  of  1864  by  making 
a sudden  raid  on  Kioto  with  the  object  of  abducting  the  Mikado  and 
raising  the  Imperial  standard.  The  attempt  was  defeated  ; nor  did 
the  clan  fare  better  in  its  efforts  to  repel  the  invasion  of  its  territory 
by  the  Government  forces.  The  resistance  offered  wras  soon  over- 
come. Early  in  the  following  year  (1865)  the  rebellion  was  sup- 
pressed, the  severity  of  the  terms  imposed  on  the  clan  exciting 
widespread  dissatisfaction.  When,  shortly  afterwards,  the  same  clan 
again  rebelled,  owing,  it  is  said,  to  the  excessive  character  of  the 
punishment  imposed,  it  was  perceived  that  the  success  of  the  Toku- 
gawa  troops  on  the  previous  occasion  was  due,  not  to  the  Shogunate’s 
military  strength,  but  to  the  co-operation  of  other  clans — notably 
that  of  Satsuma — in  the  punitive  measures  directed  against  the  rebels. 


60  Mikado’s  Ratification  of  Treaties 

On  this  latter  occasion  the  support  of  the  other  clans  was  withheld, 
with  the  result  that  the  second  campaign,  though  conducted  under 
the  eye  of  the  Shogun,  who  made  Kioto  his  headquarters  for  the 
purpose,  was  a complete  failure.  By  the  end  of  the  year  1866  a 
compromise,  designed  to  save  the  faces  of  both  parties,  had  been 
effected.  Hostilities  then  ceased.  In  the  course  of  the  negotiations 
by  which  this  conclusion  was  reached  the  weakness  of  the  Shogunate 
was  still  further  exposed.  The  prominent  part  taken  by  ronin,  both 
in  the  raid  on  the  Capital  and  in  the  subsequent  proceedings  of  the 
clan,  as  well  as  the  incapacity  of  the  feudal  prince  and  his  son,  came 
also  to  light,  together  with  the  fact  that  the  affairs  of  the  fief  were 
controlled  by  clan  retainers,  who  were  divided  into  two  mutually 
hostile  factions,  each  of  which  in  turn  gained  the  ascendancy. 

The  ignominy  of  defeat  at  the  hands  of  a rebellious  clan,  added  to 
a bankrupt  exchequer,  not  to  speak  of  the  acceptance  of  a com- 
promise which  in  itself  was  a confession  of  impotence,  hastened  the 
crumbling  away  of  what  was  left  of  Tokugawa  prestige.  Fresh 
energy,  at  the  same  time,  was  instilled  into  the  Court  party.  The 
situation  became  increasingly  troubled  and  confused.  While  the 
Imperialists,  as  they  now  came  to  be  called,  clamoured  more  loudly 
than  ever  for  the  expulsion  of  foreigners,  the  ministers  of  the  young 
Shogun — soon  to  be  succeeded  very  unwillingly  by  his  cousin  and 
guardian,  the  regent  Prince  Keiki — busied  themselves  with  explana- 
tions to  the  Court  on  the  subject  of  the  treaties,  and  to  the  foreign 
representatives  on  the  political  situation  and  the  bearing  of  the  Court. 

In  the  meantime,  in  the  summer  of  1865,  while  the  Choshiu 
imbroglio  was  at  its  height,  Sir  Harry  Parkes  had  arrived  in  Japan  as 
British  Minister.  Soon  after  his  arrival  his  attention  had  been  drawn 
to  the  anomalous  position  of  the  Shogun  (or  Tycoon),  who  was  not 
the  Sovereign  of  Japan,  as  described  in  the  treaties,  to  the  difficult 
situation  created  by  the  revival  of  Imperial  pretensions,  and  to  the 
encouragement  afforded  to  the  anti-foreign  party  by  the  fact  that 
the  Mikado  had  not  yet  given  his  formal  sanction  to  the  treaties  of 
1858,  though  they  had  been  ratified  by  the  Shogun’s  Government. 
The  foreign  representatives,  who  had  already  received  instructions 
from  their  Governments  to  ask  for  a modification  of  the  tariff  of 
import  and  export  duties  annexed  to  the  treaties  of  1858,  decided 
to  press  both  questions  together  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  com- 
municate to  the  Shogunate,  on  behalf  of  their  Governments,  an  offer 


Mikado’s  Ratification  of  Treaties  61 

to  remit  two-thirds  of  the  Shimonos6ki  indemnity  in  return  for 
(i)  the  immediate  opening  of  the  port  of  Hiogo  and  the  city  of 
Osaka,  and  (2)  the  revision  of  the  Customs  tariff  on  a basis  of  5 per 
cent  ad  valorem.  Accordingly,  in  November,  1865,  a combined 
squadron  visited  Osaka  for  that  purpose. 

Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  constant  anxiety  of  the 
Court  to  keep  foreigners  away  from  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Capital. 
The  sensation  created,  therefore,  by  the  appearance  of  foreign  ships 
of  war  in  the  Bay  of  Osaka  can  readily  be  imagined.  It  was  a repe- 
tition of  what  had  occurred  when  Perry  came.  The  action  taken  by 
the  Court  was  the  same.  The  demands  of  the  foreign  representa- 
tives were  referred,  as  in  Perry’s  case,  to  a council  of  feudal  nobles. 
These  having  concurred  in  the  view  already  put  forward  by  the 
Shogun,  and  strengthened  by  his  offer  to  resign,  should  this  be 
desired,  the  Court  intimated  its  intention  to  accept  the  advice. 
When,  however,  the  necessary  decree  was  issued,  it  was  found  to 
contain  a clause  making  the  sanction  dependent  on  the  alteration  of 
certain  points  in  the  treaties  which  did  not  harmonize  with  the 
Imperial  views,  and  insisting  on  the  abandonment  of  the  stipulation 
for  the  opening  of  Hiogo.  The  decree  was  duly  communicated  to 
the  foreign  representatives.  But  the  Shogunate  in  doing  so,  baffled 
it  may  be  by  the  task  of  endeavouring  to  reconcile  Imperial  instruc- 
tions with  the  fulfilment  of  Treaty  obligations,  or  using,  perhaps 
unconsciously,  the  disingenuous  methods  of  the  time,  concealed  the 
clause  which  robbed  the  sanction  of  much  of  its  force.  The  treaties 
were  sanctioned,  it  explained,  but  the  question  of  the  port  of  Hiogo 
could  not  be  discussed  for  the  moment.  As  for  the  tariff,  instructions 
would  be  sent  to  Yedo  to  negotiate  the  amendment  desired.  This 
omission  on  the  part  of  the  Shogunate  to  represent  things  as  they 
really  were  misled  foreign  governments,  and  caused  serious  misunder- 
standing in  the  sequel. 

The  promise  regarding  the  tariff  was  duly  kept.  It  was  fulfilled 
in  the  following  year  (1866)  by  the  signature  in  Yedo  of  the  Tariff 
Convention.  A point  to  be  noted  in  this  instrument  is  the  declaration 
regarding  the  right  of  individual  Japanese  merchants,  and  of  daimios 
and  persons  in  their  employ,  to  trade  at  the  Treaty  Ports  and  go 
abroad,  and  trade  there,  without  being  subject  to  any  hindrances,  or 
undue  fiscal  restrictions,  on  the  part  of  the  Japanese  Government  or 
its  officials.  Its  insertion  was  due  to  the  determination  of  foreign 


6 2 


Prince  Keiki 


governments  to  put  an  end  to  official  interference  with  trade — a relic 
of  the  past,  when  all  foreign  commerce  was  controlled  by  the 
Shogunate — and  to  their  wish,  in  view  of  the  reactionary  measures 
threatened  by  the  Court,  to  place  on  record  their  resolve  to  maintain 
the  new  order  of  things  established  by  the  treaties.  Owing  to  the 
Shogunate’s  monopoly  of  foreign  trade,  which  was  what  its  control 
had  virtually  amounted  to,  the  profits  of  commerce  had  swelled  the 
coffers  of  the  Government  to  the  detriment  of  clan  exchequers — a 
feudal  grievance  which  was  not  the  least  of  the  causes  responsible  for 
hostility  to  the  Yedo  Government,  and,  indirectly,  for  anti-foreign 
feeling. 

The  course  of  affairs  during  the  fifteen  years  which  followed  the 
conclusion  of  Perry’s  Treaty  has  been  described  with  some  minute- 
ness. This  has  been  necessary  owing  to  the  complex  character  of  the 
political  situation,  both  foreign  and  domestic,  during  this  time,  and 
also  because  an  acquaintance  with  certain  details  is  essential  to  the 
comprehension  of  subsequent  events.  One  of  the  features  of  the 
struggle  between  the  Court  and  Shogunate,  to  which  attention  has 
been  called,  was  the  gradual  movement  of  several  of  the  leading  clans 
to  the  side  of  the  Court.  The  stay  of  the  chiefs  of  these  clans  in 
Kioto,  in  defiance  of  Tokugawa  regulations,  led  to  the  gradual 
loosening  of  the  ties  which  bound  the  territorial  nobility  to  Yedo, 
and  to  the  shifting  of  the  centre  of  action  to  the  Capital,  where  the 
final  scene  of  the  drama  was  to  be  enacted. 

At  the  end  of  the  year  1866  both  the  Shogun  and  his  guardian, 
Prince  Keiki,  were  in  Kioto.  There  the  Emperor  Komei  died  early 
in  the  ensuing  spring,  his  death  being  followed  within  a few  days  by 
that  of  the  young  Shogun.  The  Emperor  Mutsuhito,  who  was  only 
fifteen  years  of  age,  succeeded  to  the  Throne,  and  Prince  Keiki 
became  Shogun  much  against  his  will.  Far  from  inheriting  the 
forceful  character  of  his  father,  the  ex-Prince  of  Mito,  the  new 
Shogun  was  of  a retiring  disposition.  Though  possessed  of  great 
intelligence  and  no  small  literary  ability,  he  had  a distaste  for  public 
affairs.  Well  aware  of  the  difficulties  of  the  time,  and  of  the  trend 
of  tendencies  unfavourable  to  the  continuance  of  dual  government, 
he  was  reluctant  to  undertake  the  responsibilities  of  the  high  office 
to  which  he  was  appointed.  Not  improbably,  too,  he  may  have 
inherited  some  portion  at  least  of  his  father’s  political  doctrines. 
When,  therefore,  in  October  of  that  year  (1867)  the  ex-daimio  of 


Restoration  Movement 


63 

Tosa  (whose  abdication  had  been  enforced  eight  years  before  by  the 
Regent  Ii)  presented  a memorial  to  the  Government,  advising  “ the 
restoration  of  the  ancient  form  of  direct  Imperial  government,”  the 
Shogun  took  the  advice  tendered,  and  resigned.  His  decision  was 
communicated  in  writing  by  the  Council  of  State  to  the  foreign 
representatives.  In  this  document,  which  explains  briefly  the  origin 
of  feudal  duarchy  and  of  Tokugawa  rule,  the  Shogun  dwells  on  the 
inconvenience  attending  the  conduct  of  foreign  relations  under  a 
system  of  dual  government  involving  the  existence  of  what  were 
virtually  two  Courts,  and  announces  his  decision  to  restore  the  direct 
rule  of  the  Mikado  ; adding,  however,  the  assurance  that  the  change 
will  not  disturb  the  harmonious  relations  of  Japan  with  foreign 
countries.  The  statement  also,  it  should  be  noted,  contains  an 
explicit  declaration  of  the  liberal  views  of  the  retiring  ruler,  who  does 
not  hesitate  to  express  his  conviction  that  the  moment  has  come  to 
make  a new  departure  in  national  policy,  and  introduce  constitutional 
changes  of  a progressive  character. 

Very  possibly  the  retirement  of  the  Shogun  might  have  been 
arranged  in  a peaceable  manner,  for  his  views  were  no  secret  to  his 
supporters,  though  few  shared  them.  Unfortunately,  the  Court, 
acting  under  the  influence  of  leading  clans  hostile  to  the  Yedo 
Government,  and  bent  on  a rupture,  suddenly  issued  a decree 
abolishing  the  office  of  Shogun,  and  making  a change  in  the  guardian- 
ship of  the  palace,  which  was  transferred  from  Tokugawa  hands  to 
those  of  the  opposition.  This  decree  was  followed  by  others  pro- 
claiming the  restoration  of  direct  Imperial  rule ; establishing  a pro- 
visional government  of  Court  nobles,  daimios  and  the  latter’s 
retainers ; remitting  the  punishment  imposed  on  the  Choshiu  clan  ; 
and  revoking  the  order  expelling  it  from  the  Capital.  The  action  of 
the  Court  made  compromise  impossible.  The  Shogun  withdrew  to 
Osaka,  whence,  after  a half-hearted  effort  to  reassert  his  authority 
by  force  of  arms,  he  returned  to  Yedo.  The  civil  war  that  ensued 
was  of  short  duration.  The  Tokugawa  forces  were  no  match  for  the 
Imperial  troops,  who  were  superior  both  in  numbers  and  discipline. 
Although  a small  remnant  of  the  ex-Shogun’s  adherents  held  out  for 
some  months  in  certain  northern  districts  of  the  main  island,  and 
still  longer  in  the  island  of  Yezo,  by  the  spring  of  1869  peace  was 
everywhere  restored. 

It  has  been  said  by  a leading  authority  on  Japan,  as  one  reason  for 


64  Civil  War 

the  fall  of  the  Shogunate,  that  dual  government  was  an  anachronism. 
This  in  itself  presented  no  insuperable  obstacle  to  its  continuance  ; 
for  the  figure-head  system  of  government,  which  flourished  in  an 
atmosphere  of  make-believe,  was  one  which  had  grown  up  with  the 
nation  and  was  regarded  as  the  normal  condition  of  things.  To  its 
inconvenience,  however,  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  relations  the  use 
of  the  title  of  laikun  (Tycoon)  in  the  eighteenth  century,  and  a 
resort  to  the  same  device  in  the  nineteenth,  bear  witness.  And  it  is 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  a system  of  administration  so  cumbrous 
would  have  failed  to  satisfy  for  long  the  practical  exigencies  of 
modern  international  intercourse.  In  no  case,  however,  could  the 
Tokugawa  Government  have  lasted  much  longer.  It  carried  within 
itself  the  seeds  of  its  dissolution.  It  was  almost  moribund  when 
Perry  came.  The  reopening  of  the  country  simply  hastened  the  end. 
It  fell,  as  other  governments  have  done,  because  it  had  ceased  to 
govern. 

Before  its  rule  ceased  the  Tokugawa  House  had  abandoned  its 
dynasty.  The  three  main  branches — Mito,  Owari  and  Kishiu — each 
in  turn  deserted  the  Tokugawa  cause  ; their  example  being  followed 
by  leading  feudal  families,  such  as  the  Echizen  clan,  which  were  con- 
nected with  the  ruling  House. 

When  the  long  line  of  Tokugawa  rulers  came  to  an  end,  it  had  been 
in  power  for  more  than  two  and  a half  centuries.  Of  the  fifteen 
Shoguns  of  the  line,  only  the  founder  and  his  grandson,  the  third 
Shogun,  showed  any  real  capacity.  The  former  was  brilliant,  both 
as  soldier  and  statesman  ; the  latter  had  administrative  talent.  None 
of  the  others  was  in  any  way  distinguished.  Nor  was  this  surprising. 
The  enervating  Court  life  of  Kioto  had  been  copied  in  Yedo. 
Brought  up  in  Eastern  fashion  from  childhood  in  the  corrupt  atmo- 
sphere of  the  women’s  apartments,  Mikado  and  Shogun  alike  grew 
up  without  volition  of  their  own  or  knowledge  of  the  outside  world, 
ready  for  the  role  of  puppets  assigned  to  them.  The  last  of  the 
Shoguns  was  no  exception  to  the  rule.  Had  it  been  otherwise,  there 
might  have  been  another  and  quite  different  story  to  tell. 

On  the  short  but  decisive  struggle  which  ended  in  the  Restoration 
nothing  in  the  nature  of  foreign  official  influence  was  brought  to  bear. 
The  foreign  Powers  concerned  preserved  an  attitude  of  strict 
neutrality,  which  was  reflected  in  the  action  of  their  representatives. 
The  task  of  maintaining  neutrality  was  rendered  easier  by  the  fact 


Civil  War  65 

that  the  interests  of  all  the  Powers,  with  one  exception,  were  com- 
mercial rather  than  political.  The  two  leading  Powers  in  the  Far 
East  at  that  time  were  Great  Britain  and  France,  the  former’s 
commercial  interests  far  outweighing  those  of  her  neighbour  on  the 
Asiatic  continent.  Germany  had  not  yet  attained  the  position  of  an 
empire  which  she  was  to  reach  as  the  result  of  the  war  of  1870,  the 
responsibilities  connected  with  her  slowly  growing  trade  being  under- 
taken by  the  North  German  Confederation,  which  was  then  being 
formed  under  the  hegemony  of  Prussia.  America,  inclined  from  the 
first  to  regard  Japan  as  her  protege,  had  not  yet  fully  recovered  from 
the  effects  of  the  Civil  War  ; and  though  she  had  opened  up  a new 
avenue  of  trade  with  the  Far  East,  the  development  of  her  Pacific 
seaboard  was  in  its  infancy.  She  prided  herself  on  having  no  foreign 

I policy  to  hamper  her  independence,  nor  had  she  any  organized 
diplomatic  and  consular  service.  The  interests  of  Russia,  the  excep- 
tion referred  to,  were  merely  political,  and  of  small  importance  ; for 
neither  the  Amur  Railway  nor  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  had  been 
even  projected,  and  the  development  of  Eastern  Siberia  had  hardly 
begun.  The  interests  of  other  Treaty  Powers  were  negligible.  While, 
how'ever,  under  these  circumstances  the  conflict  between  the  Toku- 
gawa  Government  and  the  Imperialists  lay  beyond  the  sphere  of 
foreign  official  influence,  there  were  certain  unavoidable  tendencies 
w-hich  manifested  themselves  before  the  Civil  War  broke  out.  The 
presence  of  French  military  instructors  engaged  by  the  Shogun’s 
Government  was  regarded  as  possibly  attracting  a certain  extent  of 
French  sympathy  with  the  Tokugawa  cause — an  idea  which  was 
strengthened  by  the  attitude  of  the  French  representative  and  the 
conduct  of  one  or  tw-o  of  these  officers,  who  accompanied  the  Toku- 
gawa naval  expedition  to  Yezo,  where  a last  stand  was  made.  There 
was,  moreover,  quite  apart  from  their  official  action,  a natural  bias 
on  the  part  of  most  of  the  foreign  representatives  in  favour  of  the 
Shogunate  as  being  the  de  jacto  government,  a position  it  had  occupied 
for  two  and  a half  centuries.  On  the  other  hand,  the  formal  sanction 
given  in  1865  by  the  Mikado  at  the  demand  of  the  foreign  repre- 
sentatives to  the  treaties  of  1858  had  undoubtedly  encouraged 
the  Imperialist  party  in  proportion  as  it  had  impaired  the  prestige 
of  the  Tokugawa  Government.  This  demand  had  arisen  out  of  the 
gradual  realization  of  the  fact  that  the  Shogun  was  not,  as  repre- 
sented in  the  treaties  in  question,  the  real  sovereign  of  Japan.  But 

E 


66 


Fall  of  Shogunate 

there  was  a further  reason.  From  the  moment  that  the  Tokugawa 
Government  had  at  the  time  of  Commodore  Perry’s  arrival  referred 
the  question  of  reopening  the  country  to  the  Throne,  instead  of 
using  the  full  power  of  dealing  with  foreign  affairs  vested  in  the 
Shogun,  there  had  grown  up  two  centres  of  authority,  one  in  Kioto, 
which  was  steadily  increasing  in  influence,  the  other  in  Yedo.  As 
was  pointed  out  in  the  letters  addressed  by  the  foreign  representatives 
in  the  autumn  of  1864  to  the  Tycoon  (the  title  given  to  the  Shogun 
in  the  official  correspondence  of  the  time),  the  existence  of  these  two 
different  centres  of  authority  had  been  at  the  bottom  of  most  of  the 
complications  which  had  arisen  in  respect  of  foreign  relations.  The 
representatives  were,  therefore,  it  was  said,  obliged  to  insist  upon  the 
Mikado’s  recognition  of  the  treaties,  “ in  order  that  future  difficulties 
might  be  avoided,  and  that  relations  with  foreigners  might  be  placed 
upon  a more  satisfactory  and  durable  basis.”  In  other  words,  the 
recognition  of  the  treaties  by  the  Mikado  was  sought  in  order  to 
put  a stop  to  the  anti-foreign  agitation  which  was  paralyzing  the 
Shogunate’s  conduct  of  affairs  and  creating  a highly  dangerous 
situation.  The  reluctance  of  the  Shogunate  to  comply  with  this 
demand  did  not  tend  to  improve  its  position  with  the  foreign  repre- 
sentatives, while  this  position  was  further  weakened  by  its  persistence 
in  adhering  to  the  false  status  given  to  the  Shogun.  The  continued 
use  of  the  term  “ His  Majesty  ” in  official  correspondence  between 
the  Shogun’s  Ministers  and  the  diplomatic  body  long  after  doubts 
had  arisen  as  to  its  correctness  was  productive  of  mistrust  ; and  their 
confidence  in  the  Government’s  sincerity  was  shaken  by  its  strenuous 
efforts  for  various  reasons  to  isolate  foreigners  as  much  as  possible, 
and  by  proof  of  its  complicity  in  the  matter  of  the  Court’s  order  for 
the  expulsion  of  foreigners,  as  well  as  in  the  Shimonoseki  affair. 

Under  these  circumstances — and  as  a result,  also,  of  the  friendly 
communications  established  with  the  two  leading  clans  after  the 
carrying  out  of  reprisals — it  is  not  surprising  that  some  time  before 
an  appeal  to  arms  took  place  a tendency  to  sympathize  with  the  cause 
of  the  Sovereign  de  jure  should  have  shown  itself  in  certain  diplomatic 
quarters.  The  busy  intrigues  carried  on  by  both  contending  parties, 
which  were  by  no  means  confined  to  domestic  circles,  may  have  led,  and 
probably  did  lead,  those  whose  acquaintance  with  Japanese  history, 
though  imperfect,  far  exceeded  that  of  others,  to  attach  undue  weight 
to  the  doctrine  of  active  and  unimpaired  Imperial  supremacy  sedu- 


Fall  of  Shogunate  67 

lously  inculcated  by  the  Court  party,  and  thus  to  arrive  at  the  not 
illogical  conclusion  that  the  Tokugawa  Shoguns  were  the  wrongful 
usurpers  they  were  described  as  being  by  Imperialist  historians. 
That  this  pronounced  sympathy,  before  hostilities  began,  in  favour 
of  what  proved  to  be  the  winning  side  was  a material  factor  in  the 
issue  of  the  struggle  there  is  some  reason  to  believe. 

Another  point  claims  passing  attention.  When  the  Shogunate 
ceased  to  rule,  the  wide  territory  known  as  the  Shogun’s  domains 
came  under  the  control  of  the  new  Government.  The  classification 
of  lands  throughout  the  country  for  administrative  purposes  thus  fell 
temporarily  into  four  divisions — the  small  area  known  under  the 
Shogunate  as  the  Imperial  domains,  the  feudal  revenue  of  which  had 
been  quite  inadequate  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Court  ; the  former 
Shogun’s  domains,  the  final  disposition  of  which  was  in  abeyance  ; 
the  territories  of  the  clans,  as  modified  by  the  measures  taken  in 
respect  of  those  which,  having  espoused  the  Tokugawa  cause,  had 
held  out  to  the  last  against  the  Imperialist  forces  ; and  the  large 
cities  of  Yedo,  Kioto  and  Osaka,  which  formed  a group  by  themselves. 


CHAPTER  VI 


Japanese  Chronology — Satsuma  and  ChoshiQ  Clans — The  “ Charter  Oath.” 

IN  the  movement  which  swept  away  the  Tokugawa  Shoguns 
two  cries  were  raised  by  the  Imperialists  : “ Honour  the 
Sovereign  ” and  “ Expel  the  foreigner.”  They  constituted  the 
programme  of  the  party.  No  sooner  had  the  revolution  been 
crowned  with  success  than  the  second  part  of  the  programme  was 
abandoned.  The  bulk  of  the  military  class  had  been  led  to  believe 
that  the  downfall  of  the  ShSgunate  would  carry  with  it  the  with- 
drawal of  foreigners  and  the  closure  of  the  country.  But  the  wiser 
heads  among  the  revolutionary  leaders  recognized  that  this  plan  wras 
unrealizable.  They  had  at  one  time,  regardless  of  consequences, 
encouraged  the  cry  in  order  to  stir  up  popular  feeling  against  the 
Shogunate.  But  with  the  disappearance  of  the  Yedo  Government 
the  situation  had  changed.  Moreover,  in  the  course  of  the  fifteen 
years  which  had  elapsed  since  Perry’s  Treaty  the  first  bitterness  of 
anti-foreign  feeling  had  begun  to  wear  off.  Earlier  ignorance  of  the 
outside  world  had  given  way  to  better  knowledge.  Closer  association 
with  foreigners  had  revealed  the  prospect  of  certain  benefits  to  be 
derived  from  foreign  trade,  while  the  fighting  at  Kagoshima  and 
Shimonoseki  had  been  an  object-lesson  to  many,  whose  reading  of 
history  had  given  them  inflated  ideas  of  the  strength  of  their  country. 
There  were,  also,  among  the  leaders  men  who  were  aware  not  only 
of  the  military  weakness  of  Japan,  as  compared  with  foreign  nations 
with  whom  treaties  had  been  concluded,  but  of  the  importance  of 
introducing  changes  on  the  lines  of  Western  civilization  in  many 
branches  of  administration.  So  the  foreigner  remained,  and  the 
foreign  policy  of  the  Shogunate  was  continued.  The  other  cry  of 
“ Honour  the  Sovereign  ” permitted  much  latitude  of  interpretation. 
The  talk  about  establishing  direct  Imperial  rule,  in  which  Imperialists 
so  freely  indulged,  was  scarcely  intended  to  be  taken  literally,  any 

68 


Japanese  Chronology  69 

more  than  the  vague  phrases  in  the  manifestos  of  the  time  regarding 
the  abolition  of  dual  government,  for  the  personal  rule  of  the 
Sovereign  was  in  historical  times  unknown.  It  simply  expressed  in- 
directly the  main  object  in  view — the  cessation  of  Tokugawa  rule. 
This  aim  was  achieved,  and  more  easily  than  had  been  anticipated  ; 
but  the  dual  system  of  administration,  and  the  figure-head  method 
of  government,  were  too  deeply  rooted  to  be  removed  all  at  once, 
even  had  there  been  a desire  to  do  so.  The  Shogunate  was,  therefore, 
replaced  by  a government  of  the  clans  which  had  taken  a leading  part 
in  the  Restoration,  while  the  figure-head  method  of  rule  worked  on 
as  before. 

The  Restoration  ushered  in  what  is  known  as  the  “ Meiji  Era,”  or 
“ Era  of  Enlightened  Government,”  this  being  the  name  given  to  the 
new  year-period  then  created.  The  point  is  one  of  no  little  signifi- 
cance. This  year-period  marked  the  beginning  of  a reign  more 
fruitful  in  rapid  and  far-reaching  changes  than  any  which  had  pre- 
ceded it ; it  synchronized  with  the  rise  of  Japan  from  the  position 
of  an  obscure  Asiatic  country  to  that  of  a Great  Powrer  ; and  it  was 
chosen  with  undeniable  fitness  as  the  posthumous  name  of  the 
monarch  with  whose  death  it  ended.  In  dwelling  on  it,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  go  somewhat  fully  into  the  rather  complicated  question 
of  Japanese  chronology,  which  calls  for  explanation. 

There  were  formerly  four  ways  in  Japan  of  reckoning  time.  These 
were  : (i)  By  the  reigns  of  Mikados  ; (2)  by  year-periods  (Nengo), 
which  constantly  overlapped,  one  ending  and  the  other  beginning  in 
the  same  year  of  our  chronology,  so  that  the  last  year  of  the  former 
was  the  first  year  of  the  latter,  the  year  in  question,  which  never 
began  on  the  first  day  of  the  first  month,  having,  therefore,  two 
designations  ; (3)  by  the  Chinese  sexagenary  cycle  ; and  (4)  by  com- 
putation from  the  first  year  of  the  reign  of  Jimmu  Tenno,  the  mythical 
founder  of  Japan.  The  first  was  used  at  an  early  date  in  historical 
compilations.  It  ceased  to  be  employed  long  ago,  and  the  records 
based  on  it  are  unreliable.  The  second  was  borrowed  from  China  at 
the  time  of  the  “ Great  Reform  ” in  the  seventh  century,  which  gave 
its  name  to  the  first  Japanese  year-period.  This  and  the  third,  the 
sexagenary  cycle,  were  used  both  alone  and  in  conjunction  with  each 
other.  The  fourth  system  (based  on  the  imaginary  reign  of  the 
mythical  founder  of  Japan  about  the  year  660  b.c.)  is  of  comparatively 
recent  origin,  its  adoption  being  due  to  the  same  somewhat  far- 


70  Japanese  Chronology 

fetched  patriotism  which  encourages  belief  in  the  divinity  of  Japanese 

sovereigns. 

The  year-period,  or  Nengd,  copied  from  China,  had  in  that  country 
a special  raison  d’etre,  for  it  changed  with  the  accession  of  a new 
Emperor,  its  duration  being  consequently  that  of  the  reign  with 
which  it  began.  In  Japan,  owing  probably  to  the  seclusion  of  the 
Sovereign  and  the  absence  of  personal  rule,  the  year-period  had  no 
direct  connection  with  the  reign  of  a Mikado  or  the  rule  of  a Shogun, 
the  correspondence,  when  it  occurred,  being,  with  few  exceptions, 
merely  fortuitous.  As  a rule,  some  unusual  or  startling  event  was 
made  the  reason  for  a change,  but  in  Japan,  as  in  China,  great  care 
was  bestowed  on  the  choice  of  propitious  names  for  new  year- periods. 
Since  the  Restoration,  however,  it  has  been  decided  to  follow  the 
old  Chinese  practice,  and  create  a fresh  year-period  on  the  accession 
of  a new  sovereign.  This  decision  was  put  into  force  for  the  first 
time  on  the  death  of  the  late  Emperor  in  1912.  The  Meiji  year- 
period  then  came  to  an  end,  and  a new  year-period,  daishd,  or 
“ Great  Righteousness,”  began.  Owing  to  the  overlapping  of  year- 
periods,  to  which  attention  has  been  called,  the  new  year-period  dates 
from  the  same  year  as  that  in  which  the  preceding  Meiji  period 
ceased. 

The  sexagenary  cycle  was  formed  by  combining  the  twelve  Chinese 
signs  of  the  Zodiac,  taken  in  their  fixed  order,  namely,  “ Rat,” 
“ Bull,”  “ Tiger,”  “ Hare,”  etc.,  with  what  arc  known  as  the  “ ten 
celestial  stems.”  These  ten  stems,  again,  were  formed  by  arranging 
the  five  primitive  elements — earth,  water,  fire,  metal  and  wood — into 
two  sections,  or  classes,  called  respectively  “elder  ” and  “ younger 
brother.”  This  arrangement  fitted  in  exactly  with  a cycle  of  sixty 
years,  a number  divisible  by  ten  and  twelve,  the  numbers  of  its  two 
component  factors.  When  the  year-period  and  the  sexagenary  cycle 
were  used  in  conjunction  with  each  other,  it  was  customary  to 
mention  first  of  all  the  name  of  the  year-period,  then  the  number  of 
the  year  in  question  in  that  period,  and  then,  again,  the  position  of 
the  year  in  the  sexagenary  cycle. 

Formerly,  too,  the  month  in  Japan  was  a lunar  month.  Of  these 
there  were  twelve.  Every  third  year  an  intercalary  month  was  added 
in  order  to  supply  the  correction  necessary  for  the  exact  computation 
of  time.  There  was  no  division  of  time  corresponding  to  our  week. 
This,  however,  came  gradually  into  use  after  the  Restoration,  the  days 


V 


Alliance  of  Four  Clans  71 

being  called  after  the  sun  and  moon  and  the  five  primitive  elements. 
The  weekly  holiday  is  now  a Japanese  institution.  There  are  also  in 
each  year  twenty-four  periods  of  nominally  fifteen  days  each,  regu- 
lated according  to  climate  and  the  season  of  the  year,  which  arc 
closely  connected  with  agricultural  operations,  and  bear  distinctive 
names,  such  as  “ Great  Cold,”  “ Lesser  Cold,”  “ Rainy  Season,”  etc. 
Each  month,  too,  is  divided  into  three  periods  of  ten  days  each,  called 
respectively  Jojun,  Chiiijun  and  Gejun,  or  first,  middle  and  last 
periods. 

With  the  adoption  of  the  Gregorian  Calendar,  which  came  into 
force  on  January  1st,  1873,  the  sexagenary  cycle  and  lunar  month 
disappeared,  and  with  them,  of  course,  the  quaint  Zodiacal  appella- 
tions of  the  years.  The  other  distinctive  features  of  Japanese 
chronology  have  survived.  There  are  now  three  recognized  ways  of 
computing  time  annually — by  year-periods,  by  the  Christian 
Calendar  and  by  the  National  Calendar,  dating  from  the  year 
660  b.c.  The  year  1921  may  therefore  be  spoken  of  either  as  we  do, 
or  as  the  tenth  year  of  Taisho,  or  as  the  year  2581  of  the  National 
Calendar. 

The  adoption  of  the  Gregorian  Calendar  caused  some  grumbling, 
as  it  did  when  introduced  in  England  in  the  eighteenth  century, 
where  it  was  received  with  the  cry  : “ Give  us  back  our  eleven  days.” 
In  Japan  there  was  more  reason  for  complaint,  for  the  year  1872 
was  shortened  by  no  less  than  twenty-nine  days,  what  would,  under 
the  old  calendar,  have  been  the  third  day  of  the  twelfth  month  of 
the  fifth  year  of  Meiji  being  altered  so  as  to  become  the  first  day  of 
the  first  month  of  the  sixth  year  of  Meiji  (January  1st,  1873).  Much 
inconvenience  and  even  hardship  were  occasioned  by  the  change, 
since  the  end  of  the  year,  the  time  chosen,  is  the  time  fixed  for  the 
settling  of  all  accounts  between  debtors  and  creditors. 

The  Restoration  was  the  work  of  four  clans — Satsuma,  Choshiu, 
Hizen  and  Tosa — whose  territories  lay  in  each  case  in  the  south-west 
of  the  country,  though  they  had  no  common  frontiers.  The  forma- 
tion by  feudal  chiefs  of  alliances  of  short  duration  for  definite  objects 
had  been  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  the  unsettled  times 
which  preceded  the  establishment  of  Tokugawa  rule.  This  was  put 
an  end  to  by  the  Tokugawa  Shoguns,  who  by  various  measures, 
already  described,  kept  the  feudal  aristocracy  in  complete  subjection. 
As  soon,  however,  as  the  power  of  the  Shogunate  began  to  decline. 


72  Alliance  of  Four  Clans 

the  independent  spirit  of  the  clans  reasserted  itself.  This  tendency 
was  encouraged  by  the  attitude  of  the  leading  Tokugawa  families. 
On  Perry’s  arrival  the  House  of  Mito  had  supported  the  Court 
against  the  Shogunate  on  the  Treaty  question  ; while  the  House  of 
Owari  a few  years  later  sided  with  Choshiu  in  its  second  and  successful 
struggle  against  the  Yedo  Government,  thus  definitely  abandoning 
the  Tokugawa  cause.  The  alliances  formed  in  this  regrouping  of  the 
clans  were  of  the  same  artificial  kind  as  those  which  had  taken  place 
in  earlier  feudal  days.  Apart  from  the  common  object  which  brought 
them  together,  the  overthrow  of  Tokugawa  rule,  there  was  no  real 
sympathy  between  any  of  the  four  clans  which  took  the  chief  part 
in  the  Restoration.  It  would  have  been  strange  if  there  had  been, 
for  it  was  no  part  of  the  policy  of  any  clan,  whose  frontiers  were 
jealously  guarded  to  prevent  the  entry  of  strangers,  to  cultivate 
friendly  relations  with  another.  In  the  case  of  two  of  the  allied  clans, 
Satsuma  and  Choshiu,  special  difficulties  stood  in  the  way  of  an  under- 
standing. They  had  long  been  rivals  for  the  confidence  of  the  Court, 
while  the  constant  changes  in  the  relations  between  Kioto  and  Yedo 
gave  opportunities  for  further  friction  and  jealousy.  More  recently, 
too,  the  sinking  of  a Satsuma  steamer  by  Choshiu  forts,  the  Choshiu 
raid  on  the  Imperial  palace  and  the  subsequent  invasion  of  Chdshiu 
territory  by  the  Shogunate,  on  both  of  which  occasions  Choshiu 
clansmen  found  themselves  fighting  against  those  of  Satsuma,  had 
created  a feeling  of  active  hostility.  The  author  of  “ Isbin  Shi,”  or 
“ History  of  the  Restoration,”  explains  how  these  difficulties  were 
eventually  removed  by  the  exertions  of  men  in  the  Satsuma  clan, 
whom  the  critical  position  of  affairs  brought  to  the  front,  by  the 
mediation  of  men  of  influence  in  the  Tosa,  Hizen  and  other  clans, 
whose  political  sympathies  lay  in  the  same  direction,  and  by  the  co- 
operation of  certain  Court  nobles,  whose  knowledge  of  domestic 
affairs  gained  in  the  conduct  of  relations  between  the  Court  and 
Shogunate,  and  whose  position  at  the  Court  were  of  great  value  to 
the  Imperialist  party.  Some  of  these  Court  nobles  had  been  placed 
in  the  custody  of  the  daimio  of  Chikuzen  after  the  suppression  of  the 
first  Choshiu  rising,  and  through  their  efforts,  and  those  of  the  other 
mediators  already  mentioned,  a friendly  understanding  was  at  length 
established  between  Satsuma  and  Choshiu  clansmen.  This  obstacle 
having  been  removed,  a plan  of  campaign  was  discussed  and  settled 
by  the  four  clans.  The  military  strength  of  the  alliance  thus  formed 


Okubo  Ichizo. 

A leading  figure  in  the  Restoration  Movement  and,  until  his  early  death,  a member  of 
the  Government  subsequently  formed.  His  death  occurred  before  the  creation  of  the 
new  peerage,  but  his  son,  the  present  Marquis,  was  ennobled  in  recognition  of  his  father’s 

services. 


New  Clan  Government  73 

was  soon  proved  in  the  short  struggle  which  ended  in  the  fall  of  the 
Shogunate. 

There  remained  other  problems  of  a political  kind.  These  were 
solved  by  degrees  in  the  sequence  of  events.  Not  the  least  of  these 
was  the  form  of  the  Government  which  should  replace  that  which 
had  fallen.  On  this  point  there  had  before  the  Restoration  been 
much  divergence  of  opinion.  According  to  the  author  of  7 he  Awaken- 
ing oj  Japan , the  Satsuma  “ Federalists,”  as  he  calls  them,  wished  to 
reorganize  the  feudal  system  much  on  the  lines  existing  in  the  half 
century  that  preceded  the  Tokugawa  domination.  The  Choshiu 
leaders,  we  are  told,  sought  their  ideal  further  back.  They  advocated 
the  restoration  of  the  Imperial  bureaucracy  of  pre-feudal  days.  This 
view,  supported  by  the  Court  nobles,  who  perhaps  hoped  by  in- 
creasing Imperial  prestige  to  strengthen  their  own  position,  was  the 
one  which  ultimately  prevailed.  There  were  two  powerful  argu- 
ments in  favour  of  its  adoption.  One  was  the  inadvisability  of 
attempting  to  retain  the  constitution  of  the  previous  Government, 
even  had  it  been  possible  to  do  so.  Another  lay  in  the  necessity  of 
taking  full  advantage  of  the  current  of  popular  feeling  in  favour  of 
the  Restoration,  and  at  the  same  time,  while  as  yet  the  influence  of 
the  rising  men  was  small,  to  work  as  far  as  possible  through  the  class 
of  Court  nobles  who  had  administered  this  system  in  early  days. 

The  form  chosen  for  the  new  administration  was  that  of  the 
bureaucratic  system  of  pre-feudal  days,  modified  to  some  extent  by 
innovations  copied  from  abroad.  The  chief  feature  in  this  adminis- 
tration was  its  division  into  eight  departments.  Two  of  these,  the 
Department  of  Supreme  Administration  and  the  Department  of 
Shinto  (which  dealt  only  with  matters  concerning  the  native  faith, 
Shinto),  ranked  together,  and  before  the  other  six,  one  of  which  dealt 
with  legislation,  while  the  remaining  five  corresponded  in  a general 
way  to  similar  Departments  in  Western  countries.  As  between  the 
two  senior  Departments,  however,  though  authority  was  nominally 
equal,  the  greater  prestige  lay  with  the  Department  of  Shinto. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  new  Government,  formed  in  the  spring  of 
1 868  before  the  final  surrender  of  the  Tokugawa  forces,  was  at  best 
a patchwork  attempt  at  administrative  reconstruction.  Its  pre- 
feudal  form  had  little  in  common  with  the  feudalism  that  still  sur- 
vived, nor  was  it  possible  to  harmonize  innovations  borrowed  from 
the  West  with  an  ancient  system  in  which  the  highest  place  was 


74  New  Clan  Government 

reserved  for  the  department  which  controlled  all  matters  connected 
with  the  primitive  Shinto  cult.  In  the  autumn  of  the  same  year, 
and  at  various  times  in  the  course  of  succeeding  years,  many  adminis- 
trative changes  were  introduced.  Into  the  details  of  these  it  is 
unnecessary  to  enter  at  length.  They  will  be  referred  to,  when 
essential,  subsequently  in  the  course  of  this  narrative.  It  will  suffice 
for  the  present  to  note  that  a Council  of  State,  the  constitution  and 
functions  of  which  were  modified  from  time  to  time  so  frequently 
as  to  puzzle  the  administrators  themselves,  was  substituted  in  place 
of  the  Department  of  Supreme  Administration,  thus  reducing  the 
number  of  departments  to  seven  ; and  that  the  Department  of  the 
Shintd  cult  underwent  many  vicissitudes,  being  eventually  reduced 
to  the  comparatively  humble  status  of  a bureau  in  the  Home  Depart- 
ment, a position  which  it  occupies  to-day.  As  might  have  been 
expected  in  the  case  of  a Government  which  came  in  on  the  cry  of 
the  restoration  of  Imperial  power,  at  a time  when  an  atmosphere  of 
semi-divinity  still  surrounded  the  Court,  the  new  Ministry  included 
several  Imperial  princes  and  Court  nobles.  Prince  Arisugawa  became 
President  of  the  new  Government,  while  the  two  Court  nobles,  Sanjo 
and  Iwakura,  who  had  been  largely  instrumental  from  the  first  in 
promoting  the  clan  alliance  which  overthrew  the  Shogunate,  were 
appointed  Vice-Presidents.  Two  other  Imperial  princes  and  five 
Court  nobles  were  placed  at  the  head  of  the  remaining  seven  depart- 
ments, the  second  position  in  three  of  these  being  given  to  the 
daimios  of  fichizen,  Aki  and  Higo.  Among  those  who  held  offices 
in  minor  capacities  were  Okubo  and  Tcrashima  of  Satsuma,  Kido  of 
Choshiu,  Goto  of  Tosa,  ltd  and  Inouye,  the  two  young  Choshiu 
clansmen,  who,  on  their  return  from  England  in  1864,  had  tried 
without  success  to  prevent  the  Shimonoseki  hostilities,  Okuma  of 
Ilizen  and  others  whose  names  are  household  words  in  Japan. 

In  the  group  of  princes  and  other  notabilities  above  mentioned 
the  only  outstanding  personality  was  Iwakura,  who  at  once  took  a 
leading  place  in  the  direction  of  affairs.  The  rest  took  no  active 
part  in  the  administration.  They  were  simply  convenient  figure- 
heads, lending  stability  and  prestige  to  the  new  order  of  things, 
their  presence  also  carrying  with  it  the  assurance  that  the  main 
object  of  the  Restoration  had  been  accomplished. 

In  spite  of  the  Western  innovations  embodied  in  its  constitution 
the  form  assumed  by  the  new  Government  gave  little  indication  of 


The  “ Charter  Oath  ” 


75 

the  radical  reforms  which  were  destined  to  be  accomplished  in  the 
course  of  the  new  reign.  In  the  very  year  of  its  birth  the  murderous 
attack  on  the  British  Minister  and  his  suite  when  on  the  way  to  an 
audience  of  the  Emperor  in  Kioto  furnished  incontestable  proof  of 
the  existence  still  of  much  anti-foreign  feeling.  In  view,  however, 
of  the  fact  that  the  cry  of  “ Expel  the  foreigner  ” had  continued 
until  the  eve  of  the  downfall  of  the  Shogunatc,  and  that  up  to  the 
last  moment  the  bulk  of  the  military  class  in  many  districts  was  led 
to  believe  that  the  Restoration  would  be  accompanied  by  the  closure 
of  the  country,  it  was  not  surprising  that  the  survival  of  anti-foreign 
feeling  should  show  itself  in  fanatical  outbursts  of  this  nature.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  employment  in  subordinate  posts  under  the  new 
Ministry  of  men  of  the  military  class  who  were  known  to  be  con- 
vinced reformers  furnished  good  evidence  that  the  policy  of  the  new 
Government  would,  if  their  views  prevailed,  be  progressive  and  not 
reactionary.  And  further  proof  of  the  new  and  radical  departure 
contemplated  by  those  active  spirits  in  the  Government  was  supplied 
by  what  is  spoken  of  as  the  “ Charter  Oath  ” taken  by  the  young 
Mikado  on  the  6th  April,  1868,  after  the  new  Government  had  been 
formed. 

In  this  Oath  he  announced  his  intentions  in  unmistakable  language 
which  undoubtedly  reflected  the  ideas  and  aspirations  of  the  re- 
formers. The  first  of  the  five  clauses  of  the  Oath  furnished  the 
keynote  of  the  whole,  pointing,  as  it  did,  to  the  creation  of  parlia- 
mentary institutions.  “ Deliberative  Assemblies  ” — so  it  ran — 
“ shall  be  established  on  an  extensive  scale,  and  all  measures  of 
government  shall  be  decided  by  public  opinion.”  And  the  last 
clause  reinforced  the  resolution  expressed  by  stating  that  “ know- 
ledge shall  be  sought  for  throughout  the  world,”  a phrase  which 
indicated  indirectly  the  intention  to  draw  on  the  resources  of 
\\  estern  civilization.  The  other  passages  in  the  manifesto  simply 
expounded  the  time-w'orn  and  vague  principles  of  Chinese  statecraft, 
which  had  long  ago  been  adopted  by  Japanese  administrators. 

The  general  correspondence  of  the  Imperial  intentions,  as  set 
forth  in  the  Oath,  with  the  views  of  the  last  of  the  Shoguns,  as 
expressed  in  the  statement  announcing  his  resignation  which  was 
communicated  to  the  foreign  representatives  in  the  autumn  of  the 
previous  year,  is  noteworthy.  It  shows  that  the  liberal  policy 
enunciated  was  no  monopoly  of  the  party  of  progress  in  the  new 


The  “ Charter  Oath  ” 


76 

ministry,  but  that  a feeling  in  favour  of  reform  was  very  widely 
entertained.  There  was,  of  course,  no  idea  at  that  time  of  giving 
the  masses  a voice  in  the  government  of  the  country,  for  the  feudal 
system  was  still  in  existence,  and  the  bulk  of  the  population  had  no 
interest  in  public  affairs.  It  was,  nevertheless,  clear  that  repre- 
sentative institutions  of  some  kind,  however  imperfect  the  popular 
conception  of  these  might  be,  were  the  goal  towards  which  men’s 
thoughts  were  turning. 


CHAPTER  VII 


New  Government — Clan  Feeling  in  Satsuma — Administrative  Changes — 
Reformers  and  Reactionaries. 

IN  the  spring  of  the  following  year  (1869),  when  order  was 
finally  restored  and  the  young  Mikado  had  held  his  first 
audience  of  foreign  representatives,  an  attempt  was  made  to 
give  practical  effect  to  the  Imperial  intentions  by  establishing  a 
deliberative  assembly,  to  which  the  name  of  Kogisho,  or  parliament, 
was  given.  It  consisted  of  276  members,  one  for  each  clan.  Here, 
again,  we  are  struck  by  the  wide  range  of  progressive  opinion  in  the 
country,  irrespective  of  party  feeling  and  anti-foreign  prejudice, 
for  in  a manifesto  issued  by  the  ex-Shogun  two  months  before  his 
resignation  he  had  stated  his  desire  “ to  listen  to  the  voice  of  the 
majority  and  establish  a deliberative  assembly,  or  parliament  ” — the 
very  word  Kogisho  being  used. 

As  might  have  been  foreseen,  this  first  experiment,  made  in  an 
atmosphere  of  feudalism,  was  a failure  ; but  Sir  Harry  Parkes,  then 
British  Minister,  describing  a debate  on  the  subject  of  foreign  trade 
which  took  place,  said  that  the  result  of  the  discussion,  and  its 
general  tone,  were  creditable  to  the  discernment  of  this  embryo 
parliament. 

The  treatment  accorded  to  the  adherents  of  the  Tokugawa  cause 
when  hostilities  finally  ceased  in  the  spring  of  1869,  was  marked  by  a 
generosity  as  wise  as  it  was  unlooked  for.  In  Japan  up  to  that  time 
little  consideration  had  been  shown  to  the  defeated  party  in  civil 
wars.  The  defeated  side,  moreover,  in  opposing  the  Imperialists 
had  earned  the  unfortunate  title  of  rebels  ( Choteki ),  reserved  for 
those  who  took  up  arms  against  the  Crown.  In  this  instance  moderate 
counsels  prevailed.  The  territories  of  the  daimio  of  Aidzu,  the 
backbone  of  Tokugawa  resistance,  and  those  of  another  northern 
chieftain,  were  confiscated  ; eighteen  other  daimios  were  trans- 

77 


78  Clan  Feeling  in  Satsuma 

ferred  to  distant  fiefs  with  smaller  revenues  ; while  in  a few  cases  the 
head  of  a clan  was  forced  to  abdicate  in  favour  of  some  near  relative. 
Retribution  went  no  further.  Later  on,  when  the  feudal  system  was 
abolished,  the  same  liberality  was  displayed  in  the  matter  of  feudal 
pensions,  being  especially  noticeable  in  the  case  of  two  large  sections 
of  the  military  class,  the  Hatamoto  and  the  Gokenin,  who  formed  the 
hereditary  personal  following  of  the  Tokugawa  Shoguns. 

The  generosity  shown  by  the  Government  led  to  much  discontent 
in  the  military  class  in  many  clans.  This  was  notably  the  case  in 
Satsuma,  where  there  were  other  grounds  for  dissatisfaction.  The 
position  of  the  Satsuma  clan  had  always  been  somewhat  different 
from  that  of  other  clans.  Its  situation  at  the  south-western  extremity 
of  the  kingdom,  far  from  the  seat  of  authority,  had  favoured  the 
growth  of  an  independent  spirit,  and  the  clan  had  long  been  noted 
for  warlike  qualities.  Though  subdued  by  the  military  ruler  who 
preceded  the  Tokugawa  ShSguns,  and  professing  fealty  to  the 
Tokugawa  House,  the  clan  had  preserved  an  appreciable  measure  of 
importance  and  prestige,  if  not  independence,  which  the  ShSguns 
in  question  had  been  careful  to  respect.  The  previous  head  of  the 
clan  had  before  his  death  in  1859  adopted  as  his  heir  his  brother’s 
son,  then  a child  of  five  years.  The  affairs  of  the  clan  had  been  to  a 
large  extent  controlled  ever  since  by  this  brother,  Shimadzu  SaburS, 
a name  familiar  to  foreigners  in  connection  with  the  outrage  which 
led  to  the  bombardment  of  Kagoshima  ; but  he  was  in  poor  health, 
and  at  the  time  when  the  new  Government  was  formed  the  control 
of  clan  matters  had  largely  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  elder  Saigo, 
a man  of  commanding  personality,  whose  daring  defiance  of  the 
Tokugawa  authorities  in  the  stormy  days  preceding  the  Restoration 
had  made  him  a popular  hero,  and  of  other  influential  clansmen. 
Both  Shimadzu  and  the  elder  Saigo  were  thorough  conservatives, 
opposed  to  all  foreign  innovations.  But  there  was  a strong  progressive 
group  in  the  clan  led  by  such  men  as  Okubo  and  the  younger  Saigo, 
who  were  far  from  sharing  the  reactionary  tendencies  of  the  older 
leaders.  This  division  of  feeling  in  the  clan  was  one  of  the  causes  of 
the  dissensions  in  the  ministry  which  arose  in  1870,  and  it  had 
important  consequences,  which  were  seen  a few  years  later  in  the 
tragic  episode  of  the  Satsuma  Rebellion. 

The  first  note  of  discord  came  from  Satsuma.  One  of  the  first 
acts  of  the  new  Government  had  been  to  transfer  the  Capital  from 


Administrative  Changes  79 

Kioto  to  Yedo,  which  was  renamed  Tokio,  or  “ Eastern  Capital.” 
The  Satsuma  troops  which  had  been  stationed  in  Tokio  as  a guard 
for  the  Government  suddenly  petitioned  to  be  released  from  this 
service.  The  ground  put  forward  was  that  the  finances  of  the  clan, 
which  had  suffered  from  the  heavy  outlay  incurred  during  the  civil 
war,  did  not  permit  of  this  expensive  garrison  duty.  But  the  real 
reasons  undoubtedly  were  a feeling  of  disappointment  on  the  part 
of  a majority  of  the  clansmen  at  what  was  regarded  as  the  small 
share  allotted  to  Satsuma  in  the  new  administration,  and  some 
jealousy  felt  by  the  two  leaders  who  presented  the  petition  towards 
their  younger  and  more  active  colleagues,  combined  with  distrust  of 
their  enthusiasm  for  reform. 

The  garrison  was  allowed  to  go  home,  and  the  elder  Saigo  also 
returned  to  his  province.  The  moment  was  critical.  The  Govern- 
ment could  not  afford  to  lose  the  support  of  the  two  most  prominent 
Satsuma  leaders,  nor,  at  this  early  stage  in  the  work  of  reconstruction 
which  lay  before  it,  to  acquiesce  in  the  defection  of  so  powerful  an 
ally.  In  the  following  year  (1871),  therefore,  a conciliatory  mission, 
in  which  Iwakura  and  Okubo  were  the  leading  figures,  was  sent  to 
the  offended  clan  to  present  in  the  Mikado’s  name  a sword  of  honour 
at  the  tomb  of  Shimadzu’s  brother,  the  late  daimio  of  Satsuma. 
The  mission  was  also  entrusted  with  a written  message  from  the 
Throne  to  Shimadzu  urging  him  to  come  forward  in  support  of  the 
Mikado’s  Government.  By  this  step  clan  feeling  was  appeased  for 
the  moment,  and  Saigo  returned  to  the  Capital,  and  became  a 
member  of  the  Government. 

How  unstable  was  the  condition  of  things  at  that  time  was  illus- 
trated by  the  changes  in  the  personnel  of  the  Ministry  which  took 
place  in  September  of  the  same  year,  and  the  administrative  revision 
which  followed  within  a few  months.  The  effect  of  the  first  was  to 
strengthen  the  progressive  element  in  the  administration  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  old  feudal  aristocracy.  The  Cabinet,  as  reorganized, 
consisted  of  Sanjo  as  Prime  Minister  and  Iwakura  as  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  ; four  Councillors  of  State,  Saigo,  Kido,  Itagaki  and 
Okuma,  represented  the  four  clans  of  Satsuma,  ChSshiu,  Tosa  and 
Hizen,  while  another  Satsuma  man,  Okubo,  became  Minister  of 
Finance.  The  effect  of  the  revision  of  the  constitution  was  to  divide 
the  Dajokwan , or  Central  Executive,  established  in  the  previous 
year,  into  three  branches,  the  Sei-in , a sort  of  Council  of  State 


8o 


Administrative  Changes 

presided  over  by  the  Prime  Minister  ; the  Sa-in,  a Chamber  exer- 
cising deliberative  functions,  which  before  long  took  the  place  of  the 
Kogisho  ; and  the  U-in,  a subordinate  offshoot  of  the  Council  of 
State,  which  was  shortly  afterwards  merged  in  that  body.  These 
administrative  changes  had  little  real  significance.  Their  chief 
interest  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  show  how  obsessed  some  enthusi- 
astic reformers  were  with  the  idea  of  deliberative  institutions,  of 
parliamentary  methods  of  some  kind,  being  embodied  in  the  frame- 
work of  the  new  constitution  ; and  in  the  further  fact  that  the  new 
chief  Ministers  of  State,  under  this  reorganization,  the  Daijo  Daijin, 
Sadaijin,  and  Udajin,  borrowed  their  official  titles  from  the  Chambers 
over  which  they  presided.  Sir  Francis  Adams,  describing  these 
changes  in  his  History  oj  Japan,  mentions  that  the  deliberative 
Chamber  was  regarded  at  the  time  as  “ a refuge  for  political  vision- 
aries, who  had  thus  an  opportunity  of  ventilating  their  theories 
without  doing  any  harm,”  and  that  “ the  members  of  the  subordinate 
executive  Chamber  (the  U-in),  who  were  supposed  to  meet  once  a 
week  for  the  execution  of  business,  never  met  at  all.”  He  added  that 
he  had  never  been  able  to  learn  what  the  functions  of  this  Chamber 
were  supposed  to  be,  or  what  its  members  ever  did.  The  real  work 
of  administration  was  carried  on  by  the  small  but  active  group  of 
reformers  of  the  four  clans,  who  were  gradually  concentrating  all 
authority  in  their  own  hands. 

The  high  ministerial  offices  thus  created  were  filled  by  San  jo, 
Shimadzu  and  Iwakura.  The  last-named,  the  junior  in  rank  of  the 
three,  shared  with  Kido  and  Okubo  the  main  direction  of  affairs. 
The  other  two  were  mere  figure-heads,  though  their  positions  at 
Court  and  in  Satsuma,  respectively,  gave  strength  to  the  Govern- 
ment. 

Shimadzu’s  appointment  was  a further  step  in  the  conciliation  of 
Satsuma,  a development  of  the  policy  of  timely  concessions  which 
had  averted  a rupture  with  that  clan.  The  conclusion  of  the  alliance 
between  the  four  clans,  which  made  the  Restoration  possible,  had, 
as  we  have  seen,  been  a difficult  matter.  A still  harder  task  con- 
fronted the  new  Government.  This  was  to  maintain  the  alliance 
for  future  purposes, — to  ensure  the  further  co-operation  of  the  same 
clans  in  the  work  of  reconstruction.  The  first  step  in  the  new 
direction,  the  formation  of  a Government  to  fill  the  place  of  the 
Shogunate,  had  been  taken.  Even  if  this  Government  had  the  defects 


Kido  Junichiro. 

In  recognition  of  the  services  rendered  to  the  state  before  the  creation  of  the  new  peerage 
his  son  was  ennobled  after  his  father’s  death.  His  death  occurred  before  the  creation  of 
the  new  peerage,  but  his  son,  the  present  Marquis,  was  ennobled  in  recognition  of  his 
father’s  services. 


Reformers  Reactionaries  81 

of  its  purely  artificial  character,  even  if  it  were  nothing  better  than 
a jejune  attempt  to  combine  things  so  incompatible  as  Eastern  and 
Western  institutions,  feudal  and  pre-feudal  systems,  it  had  at  least 
the  merit  of  being  the  outcome  of  a genuine  compromise  brought 
about  by  the  pressure  of  political  need.  Of  the  grave  difficulties 
attending  the  work  of  reconstruction  both  the  conservative  and  anti- 
foreign,  as  well  as  the  progressive  elements  in  the  Ministry — the  two 
parties  to  the  compromise — must  have  been  more  or  less  conscious. 
The  discontent  in  Satsuma  was  only  one  of  many  symptoms  of  grave 
unrest  which  showed  themselves  throughout  the  country.  A sinister 
indication  of  the  gradual  decay  of  Tokugawa  authority  had  been 
furnished  by  the  discontinuance  in  1862  of  the  enforced  residence 
of  feudal  nobles  at  Yedo,  with  all  its  attendant  results.  This  decay 
had  carried  with  it  the  weakening  of  feudal  ties.  Laxity  of  clan 
administration,  its  natural  consequence,  had  given  opportunities  for 
mischief  to  the  dangerous  class  of  clanless  samurai,  or  ronin.  Of 
these  they  were  not  slow  to  avail  themselves,  as  was  shown  by  the 
frequency  of  murderous  attacks  on  Japanese  and  foreigners  alike  ; 
and  the  fear  of  combined  action  on  the  part  of  these  ruffians  which 
might  at  any  moment  threaten  the  safety  of  the  whole  foreign 
community  had  led  to  the  stationing  of  foreign  troops  in  Yokohama. 
The  action,  moreover,  of  the  Imperialists  in  encouraging  anti-foreign 
feeling  for  their  own  immediate  purposes  had  brought  its  own 
nemesis  by  giving  rein  to  the  turbulent  impulses  in  the  national 
character.  Clan  jealousies,  too,  which  the  alliance  of  four  clans  had 
stifled  for  a time,  began  to  reassert  themselves. 

With  the  downfall  of  the  Tokugawa  Government  these  disturbing 
influences  came  into  full  play,  while  the  resources  of  the  new  rulers 
for  coping  with  them  were  very  inadequate.  From  the  wreckage  of 
the  complicated  system  of  Tokugawa  administration  little  indeed 
which  was  of  material  value  to  the  builders  of  the  new  framework  of 
state  survived.  The  hand-to-mouth  methods  of  Tokugawa  finance, 
largely  dependent  on  irregular  feudal  contributions,  had  resulted  in 
a depleted  Exchequer,  more  debts  than  assets  being  left  for  the 
Shoguns’  successors.  Nor  were  the  finances  of  the  clans  in  a better 
condition.  The  currency  of  the  country  was  in  a state  of  hopeless 
confusion  due  to  the  great  variety  of  note  and  metallic  issues  in  circu- 
lation throughout  the  country,  the  Sh5gunate  and  most  of  the  clans 
having  their  own  paper  money,  which  were  at  a premium,  or  discount, 
F 


82  Reformers  Reactionaries 

according  to  circumstances.  Trade  and  industry  were  also  hampered 
in  their  development  by  the  rigid  rules  which  closed  the  frontiers  of 
clans  and  provinces  to  strangers,  and  by  the  numerous  impediments 
in  the  shape  of  barriers  and  tolls  which  obstructed  intercourse  and 
the  exchange  of  commodities  between  different  parts  of  the  country. 
To  crown  matters,  the  navy  consisted  of  only  a few  ships,  all  of 
obsolete  type  with  the  exception  of  a monitor  bought  by  the  Toku- 
gawa  Government  from  America,  and  there  was  no  regular  army 
at  the  service  of  the  State. 

The  military  forces  at  the  disposal  of  the  Shogunate  in  former 
days  constituted  on  paper  at  least  a respectable  army  for  those  times, 
sufficient,  coupled  with  the  policy  of  divide  et  impera  systematically 
followed  by  Tokugawa  Shoguns,  to  overawe  the  feudal  nobility 
whose  allegiance  was  doubtful.  The  total  number  of  these  troops 
may  be  reckoned  roughly  at  about  400,000.  They  consisted  of 
levies  from  the  clans.  By  a law  passed  in  the  middle  of  the  seven- 
teenth century  the  clans  were  bound  to  furnish  to  the  Government 
fixed  quotas  of  troops,  when  occasion  demanded,  the  number  of  men 
to  be  supplied  being  regulated  by  the  revenue  of  a clan — this  revenue, 
again,  being  the  value  of  the  assessed  annual  produce  of  its  terri- 
tories. But  the  efficiency  of  these  troops  had  naturally  deteriorated 
during  the  long  period  of  peace  coincident  with  Tokugawa  rule, 
nor  in  later  Tokugawa  days  could  much  dependence  be  placed  on 
their  loyalty  to  Yedo.  The  military  weakness  of  the  Shogunate  had 
been  exposed  in  the  course  of  the  operations  against  the  Choshiu 
clan,  nor  had  sufficient  time  elapsed  for  the  services  of  the  few 
foreign  instructors  employed  by  the  Tokugawa  Government  to  re- 
organize the  army  to  have  any  good  effect.  During  the  civil  war  the 
Imperialists  had  recourse  to  the  formation  of  small  bodies  of  irregular 
troops  called  shimpei,  or  “ New  Soldiers,”  recruited  mainly  from  the 
class  of  ronin  already  mentioned,  some  of  whom  were  armed  with 
rifles  ; but  these  hastily  raised  troops  were  untrained,  and  their  lack 
of  discipline  was  shown  when  they  acted  as  a voluntary  escort  to  the 
Mikado  on  his  first  visit  to  the  new  Capital.  From  their  conduct  on 
that  occasion  it  was  obvious  that  they  might  easily  become  a danger 
to  the  authorities  employing  them. 

Encouraged  by  the  success  which  had  attended  its  efforts  in 
Satsuma  the  mission  of  conciliation  sent  to  that  clan  proceeded 
under  instructions  to  Choshiu,  where  a message  from  the  Mikado  of 


Reformers  & Reactionaries  83 

import  similar  to  that  addressed  to  the  Satsuma  noble,  Shimadzu, 
was  delivered.  Here  it  was  joined  by  another  leading  member  of 
the  Government,  Kido.  The  mission,  thus  reinforced,  visited  in 
succession,  Tosa,  Owari  and  other  clans.  Besides  its  general  purpose 
of  conciliation,  elsewhere,  as  well  as  in  Satsuma,  for  the  attainment 
of  which  it  was  necessary  to  enquire  into  the  state  of  clan  feeling, 
and  take  what  steps  might  be  advisable  to  allay  the  prevailing  dis- 
content, the  chief  object  of  the  mission  was  to  enlist  the  support  of 
the  clans  concerned  for  the  Government,  and  organize  a provisional 
force  to  uphold  central  authority.  The  result  of  its  efforts,  so  far 
as  the  chief  object  was  concerned,  was  the  formation  of  a force  of 
some  eight  or  nine  thousand  troops,  which  was  obtained  from 
various  clans.  A favourable  augury  for  the  future  lay  in  the  fact 
that  it  included  not  only  clansmen  who  had  taken  part  in  the 
Restoration  movement,  but  others  who  had  supported  the  Tokugawa 
cause.  By  this  means  was  formed  the  first  nucleus  of  what  was  to 
develop  by  slow  degrees  into  a national  army. 

In  view  of  the  slender  financial  resources  at  the  disposal  of  the 
new  Government  it  was  decided  to  exact  a forced  contribution  for 
the  purpose  of  meeting  the  immediate  needs  of  the  Exchequer. 
This  contribution,  to  which  the  term  of  “ tribute  ” was  given,  was 
levied  on  all  classes  of  the  people,  officials  being  called  upon  to  pay 
a tax  amounting  to  one-thirtieth  of  their  salaries. 

The  important  points  to  be  noted  in  the  foregoing  imperfect 
sketch  of  the  situation  which  confronted  the  new  rulers  at  this  time 
is  that  the  revolution  was  planned  and  carried  out  by  the  military 
class  of  certain  clans,  with  the  aid  of  the  Court,  the  rest  of  the 
nation  taking  no  part  in  it  ; and  that  the  leading  men  in  that  class 
who  came  to  the  front  and  assumed  control  of  affairs  were  divided 
into  two  groups,  whose  views  on  future  policy  were  in  the  main 
different.  On  one  side  were  those  who  clung  to  the  old  traditional 
methods  of  administration,  amongst  whom  were  to  be  found, 
nevertheless,  men  of  moderate  views.  In  numbers  and  influence 
they  were  as  superior  to  their  opponents  as  they  were  inferior  in 
vigour,  ability  and  insight.  The  other  group  consisted  of  a few 
men  of  more  enlightened  and  progressive  views,  who  were  convinced 
that  the  time  had  come  for  the  nation  to  break  with  its  past,  and  that 
in  the  establishment  of  a new  order  of  things,  visible  as  yet  only  in 
the  vaguest  outline,  lay  the  best  hope  for  the  future.  The  con- 


84  Reformers  Reactionaries 

servative,  or  reactionary,  party,  as  it  may  now  be  called,  had  long 
obstinately  opposed  foreign  intercourse  in  any  form  save  that  which 
had  kept  Dutch  traders  in  the  position,  virtually,  of  prisoners  of  State. 
Driven  by  the  force  of  circumstances  from  that  position,  they  fell 
back  on  a second  line  of  entrenchments — resistance  to  changes  of 
any  kind  when  those  changes  meant  the  adoption  of  foreign  customs. 
There  was  a fatal  flaw  of  inconsistency  in  their  attitude  of  which, 
perhaps,  they  were  not  unconscious  themselves.  They  made  an 
exception  in  favour  of  foreign  innovations  which  appealed  to  the 
nation  at  large,  such  as  steamships  and  material  of  war.  Time,  too, 
was  on  the  side  of  their  opponents,  not  on  theirs.  The  doctrines 
they  upheld  were  part  of  an  order  of  things  which  the  nation  had 
outgrown,  and  was  preparing  to  discard.  New  ideas  were  taking 
hold  of  men’s  minds,  and  deserters  from  their  ranks  were  one  by  one 
joining  the  standard  raised  by  the  party  of  reform.  Never,  even  in 
pre-Tokugawa  days,  had  the  nation  lacked  enterprise.  Intercourse 
with  the  Dutch  had  quickened  appreciation  of  what  was  known  as 
“ Western  Learning,”  and  provoked  secret  rebellion  against  the 
Tokugawa  edicts  of  seclusion.  Now  the  spirit  of  progress  was  in  the 
air.  The  tide  of  reform,  which  later  on  was  to  sweep  the  less 
moderate  reformers  off  their  feet,  had  s£t  in. 

Fortunately  for  the  country  at  this  juncture  there  was  one  point 
on  which  both  parties  were  in  agreement.  Between  the  leading 
men  on  each  side  there  was  a general  understanding  that  the  abolition 
of  feudalism,  repugnant  as  it  was  to  many,  could  not  well  be  avoided. 
The  Tokugawa  administration  had,  as  we  have  seen,  been  established 
on  a feudal  basis.  The  survival  of  this  feudal  foundation  may  well 
have  appeared  compatible  neither  with  the  removal  of  the  rest  of 
the  administrative  structure,  nor  with  the  avowed  principles  of  the 
Restoration,  however  broadly  the  latter  might  be  interpreted.  The 
Shogunate,  moreover,  had  filled  two  roles,  so  to  speak.  Itself  part 
of  the  feudal  system,  it  was  also  the  central  government.  The 
extensive  territories,  situated  in  different  parts  of  the  kingdom, 
known  as  the  Shogun’s  domains,  the  feudal  revenues  of  which 
amounted  to  one-third  of  the  total  revenue  of  the  country,  had, 
under  the  Tokugawa  regime , been  administered  by  the  central  govern- 
ment. There  were  also,  as  has  already  been  explained,  other  feudal 
territories  which,  for  various  reasons,  had  also  been  subject,  either 
from  time  to  time  or  permanently,  to  the  same  central  administra- 


Reformers  &*  Reactionaries  8 5 

tion.  How  to  deal  with  the  large  area  represented  by  these  domains 
and  territories  if  the  feudal  system  were  to  continue,  would  have 
been  a difficult  problem.  The  Shogun’s  domains  themselves  had 
for  the  time  being  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  new  Government 
which  was  responsible  for  their  administration,  but  there  were 
obvious  objections  to  giving  to  them  the  permanent  character  of 
Imperial  domains.  Apart  from  the  difficulty  of  disposing  of  so  wide 
an  area  in  this  way,  the  adoption  of  this  course  would  have  per- 
petuated an  undesirable  arrangement,  the  dual  capacity  of  ruler  and 
feudal  lord  having  been  one  of  the  weak  points  in  the  Tokugawa 
system  of  administration.  It  would  also  have  lowered  the  dignity 
of  the  Throne,  which  in  principle  at  least  had  been  upheld  through 
all  vicissitudes,  by  placing  it  on  the  same  feudal  plane  as  the  defunct 
Shdgunate,  not  to  speak  of  the  reproach  of  treading  in  the  footsteps 
of  their  predecessors  which  the  new  rulers  would  have  incurred.  To 
have  made  them  Crown  Lands  would  have  entailed  still  more  awk- 
ward consequences.  On  the  other  hand,  a redistribution  of  this  wide 
extent  of  territory  amongst  new  or  old  feudatories  would  have 
occupied  much  time,  and  time  was  of  importance  in  the  work  of  re- 
construction in  hand.  Any  step,  moreover,  in  this  direction,  how- 
ever carefully  designed  to  reconcile  conflicting  claims,  would  have 
opened  the  door  to  grave  dissension  at  a moment  when  clan  rivalry 
was  reasserting  itself.  These  and  other  considerations,  in  which 
questions  of  national  finance — and  perhaps  also  the  idea,  borrowed 
from  abroad,  that  feudalism  implied  a backward  state  of  civilization 
— may  have  played  a part,  doubtless  contributed  to  the  unanimity 
of  the  decision  to  cut  the  Gordian  knot  by  abolishing  the  feudal 
system. 

That  this  solution  was  one  which  had  already  found  acceptance  in 
many  quarters  there  is  clear  evidence.  It  is  true  that  no  direct 
reference  to  the  measure  appears  in  the  Charter  Oath  of  April,  1868. 
But  the  manifesto  announcing  the  Shogun’s  resignation,  issued  in 
the  autumn  of  the  previous  year,  contained  the  suggestion  that  the 
old  order  of  things  should  be  changed,  and  that  administrative 
authority  should  be  restored  to  the  Imperial  Court.  The  language 
of  the  Tosa  memorial  which  inspired  this  resignation  was  still 
plainer.  It  spoke  of  the  danger  to  which  the  country  was  exposed 
by  the  discord  existing  between  the  Court,  the  Shogun  and  the 
feudal  nobility,  and  advocated  “ the  discontinuance  of  the  dual 


86 


Reformers  & Reactionaries 

system  of  administration  ” and  “ a return  to  the  ancient  form  of 
government.”  Making  due  allowance  for  the  vagueness  of  the 
phrases  used,  if  “ the  discontinuance  of  the  dual  system  of  administra- 
tion ” meant,  as  it  clearly  did,  the  cessation  of  Tokugawa  rule,  “ the 
restoration  of  the  ancient  ” (namely  pre-feudal)  “ form  of  govern- 
ment ” pointed  no  less  plainly  to  the  abolition  of  feudalism.  The 
same  sequence  of  ideas  appears  in  the  letter  addressed  by  the  Shogun 
at  the  time  of  his  resignation  to  the  hatamoto,  the  special  class  of 
feudal  vassals  created  by  the  founder  of  Tokugawa  rule,  and  in  the 
communication  on  this  subject  presented  by  his  Ministers  to  the 
foreign  representatives  on  the  same  occasion. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


Abolition  of  Feudal  System — Reconstitution  of  Classes — Effects 
of  Abolition  of  Feudalism. 

THE  abolition  of  the  feudal  system  formed  one  of  the  subjects 
of  discussion  in  the  embryo  parliament,  the  Kdgisho,  soon 
after  its  creation  in  1869.  The  way  had  been  prepared  for 
this  discussion  by  the  presentation  of  memorials  on  the  subject  at 
the  time  of  the  Shogun’s  resignation  eighteen  months  before  from 
several  clans  representing  both  of  the  parties  which  were  so  soon  to 
be  engaged  in  active  hostilities.  Memorials  of  this  kind  to  the  Throne 
and  Shogunate,  and  Edicts  and  Notifications  issued  in  response  to 
them,  were  common  methods  in  those  days  of  arriving  at  decisions 
in  grave  matters  of  State.  Borrowed  originally,  like  so  many  other 
things,  from  China,  they  were  part  of  the  machinery  of  central 
government.  The  recommendations  offered  in  these  Memorials 
revealed  a considerable  divergence  of  opinion.  But  they  also  showed, 
what  has  already  been  pointed  out,  namely,  the  recognition  of  the 
close  connection  between  feudalism  and  the  Shogunate  ; and  the 
existence  of  a very  general  feeling  that,  in  spite  of  the  serious  dis- 
turbance of  the  whole  administrative  structure  which  so  sweeping  a 
change  must  necessarily  involve,  nothing  short  of  the  surrender  of 
feudal  fiefs  to  the  Crown  would  be  a satisfactory  solution  of  the 
problem  presented  by  the  fall  of  the  Shogunate.  This  conviction 
had  taken  root  in  the  minds  of  men  like  Kido,  Iwakura  and  Okubo, 
whose  mission  to  the  clans,  mentioned  in  a previous  chapter,  was  a 
proof  of  their  leading  position  in  the  new  Government. 

The  method  adopted  for  giving  effect  to  the  decision  arrived  at 
was  the  voluntary  surrender  of  feudal  fiefs  to  the  Throne,  the  lead 
in  this  matter  being  taken  by  the  same  four  clans  which  had  planned 
and  carried  out  the  Restoration.  In  March,  1869 — a memorable  date 
for  the  nation — a Memorial  in  this  sense,  the  authorship  of  which  is 

87 


88 


Abolition  of  Feudal  System 

generally  ascribed  to  Kido,  was  presented  to  the  Throne  by  the 
daimids  of  Satsuma,  Choshiu,  Tosa  and  Hizen.  The  chief  point 
emphasized  in  the  Memorial  was  the  necessity  of  a complete  change 
of  administration  in  order  that  “ one  central  body  of  government 
and  one  universal  authority  ” might  be  established  ; and,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  intentions  of  the  Memorialists,  the  Sovereign  was  asked 
to  dispose  as  he  might  think  fit  of  the  land  and  the  people  of  the 
territories  surrendered.  The  circumstances  under  which  dual  govern- 
ment had  grown  up  were  explained,  stress  being  laid  on  the  defect 
of  that  system,  “ the  separation  of  the  name  from  the  reality  of 
power,”  and  the  Tokugawa  Shoguns  were  denounced  as  usurpers.  In 
this  denunciation  of  the  last  line  of  Japanese  rulers,  due  to  political 
reasons,  the  fact  that  the  system  of  dual  government  had  grown  up 
long  before  the  Tokugawa  family  appeared  upon  the  scene  was  con- 
veniently ignored.  As  to  “ the  separation  of  the  name  from  the 
reality  of  power,”  the  expression  is  a reference  to  an  old  Chinese 
phrase,  “ the  name  without  the  substance,”  a metaphor  applied, 
amongst  other  things,  to  figure-head  government.  This  is  a stock 
phrase  with  Chinese  and  Japanese  writers,  who  constantly  appeal  to 
a rule  of  conduct  more  honoured  in  the  breach  than  in  the  observance. 

The  example  set  by  the  four  clans  was  followed  by  others.  By  the 
end  of  the  year  out  of  2 76  feudatories  there  were  only  seventeen 
abstainers  from  the  movement,  these  being  daimids  of  eastern  terri- 
tories who  had  taken  the  Shogun’s  side  in  the  civil  war.  One  of  the 
earliest  and  most  enthusiastic  Memorialists  was  the  daimio  of  Kishiu, 
the  Tokugawa  prince  who  had  succeeded  to  that  fief  by  the  promotion 
of  his  relative,  Prince  Keiki,  to  be  Shogun.  Only  three  years  before 
he  had  been  an  advocate  of  the  continuance  of  the  Shogunate.  This 
change  of  attitude  on  the  part  of  a prince  who  ranked  with  the 
daimios  of  Owari  and  Mito  at  the  head  of  the  feudal  nobility  may 
be  interpreted  as  showing  how  natural  was  the  association  of  feudalism 
with  the  Shogunate  in  men’s  minds,  and  how  difficult  for  him,  as  for 
others,  was  the  conception  of  a feudal  system  without  a Shogun. 

The  reply  of  the  Throne  to  the  Memorialists  was  of  a non- 
committal nature.  They  were  told  that  the  question  would  be 
submitted  to  a Council  of  feudal  nobles  shortly  to  be  held  in  the 
new  Capital.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  caution  dis- 
played in  this  answer  implied  any  hesitation  on  the  part  of  the 
Government  to  carry  out  the  measure  contemplated.  The  drastic 


Reconstruction  of  Classes  89 

character  of  the  proposal  justified  caution  in  dealing  with  it,  and  the 
variety  of  the  interests  involved  called  for  careful  consideration.  The 
proposal  having  been  submitted  to  the  assembly  of  daimios  for  their 
formal  approval,  a Decree  was  issued  in  August  of  the  same  year 
announcing  its  acceptance  by  the  Throne,  which  felt,  it  was  said, 
“ that  this  course  would  consolidate  the  authority  of  the  Govern- 
ment.” As  a preliminary  step,  the  administration  of  clan  territories 
was  remodelled  so  as  to  correspond  with  the  new  order  of  things  ; 
the  daimios  called  together  to  pronounce  on  their  own  destinies  re- 
turned in  the  altered  role  of  governors  ( Chihanji ) to  the  territories 
over  which  they  had  hitherto  ruled  ; and  the  Government  settled 
down  to  consider  and  determine  in  detail  the  various  arrangements 
rendered  necessary  by  the  new  conditions  about  to  be  created. 

Two  years  later,  on  the  29th  August,  1871,  the  Imperial  Decree 
abolishing  the  feudal  system  appeared.  “ The  clans,”  so  it  ran,  “ are 
abolished,  and  prefectures  are  established  in  their  place.”  The 
brevity  of  the  Decree,  singular  even  for  such  documents,  the  length 
of  which  often  ranged  from  one  extreme  to  another,  may  in  this 
instance  be  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  an  Imperial  message  was 
at  the  same  time  addressed  to  the  new  clan  governors.  In  this 
reference  was  made  to  the  sanction  already  accorded  by  the  Throne 
to  the  proposal  for  the  surrender  of  feudal  fiefs,  and  it  was  pointed 
out  that  the  sanction  then  expressed  was  not  to  be  regarded  as  another 
instance  of  the  common  defect  of  “ the  name  without  the  substance,” 
but  that  the  Decree  now  issued  must  be  understood  in  its  literal  sense, 
namely,  the  abolition  of  the  clans  and  their  conversion  into  pre- 
fectures. The  message  was  followed  by  an  order  directing  the 
ex-daimios  to  reside  in  future,  with  their  families,  in  Yedo,  their 
territories  being  entrusted  temporarily  to  the  care  of  former  clan 
officers.  This  measure,  while  undoubtedly  strengthening  the  hands 
of  the  Government,  must  have  forcibly  reminded  the  nobles  con- 
cerned of  the  precautionary  methods  of  Tokugawra  days. 

A further  step  in  the  same  direction  was  taken  by  the  amalgama- 
tion of  the  Court  and  feudal  nobility  into  one  class,  to  which  the 
new  name  of  kzvazoku  (nobles)  was  given.  The  abolition  of  feudalism, 
moreover,  entailed  the  disappearance  of  the  samurai,  the  fighting 
men  of  the  clans,  and  the  rearrangement  of  existing  classes.  Under 
the  feudal  system  there  had  been,  outside  of  the  nobility,  four  classes 
— the  two-sworded  men,  or  samurai,  the  farmers,  the  artizans  and 


90  Reconstruction  of  Classes 

the  merchants,  or  tradesmen.  The  new  arrangement  now  introduced 
comprised  only  two  classes — the  gentry  ( shizoku ),  who  replaced  the 
samurai,  and  the  common  people  ( heiviin ).  What  also  had  formed  a 
pariah  class  by  itself,  consisting  of  social  outcasts  known  as  eta  and 
hinin,  was  abolished,  its  members  being  merged  into  the  class  of 
heimin.  A further  innovation  was  introduced  in  the  shape  of  a 
proclamation  permitting  members  of  the  former  military  class  to 
discontinue  the  practice  of  wearing  their  swords,  which  had  been  a 
strict  feudal  rule. 

The  Decree  abolishing  the  clans  was  anticipated  in  one  or  two 
feudal  territories,  the  authorities  concerned  acting  on  the  previous 
announcement  of  the  Imperial  sanction  having  been  given  to  the 
proposal  of  the  Memorialists,  and  amalgamating,  of  their  own  accord, 
the  samurai  with  the  rest  of  the  population.  The  example  was  not 
generally  followed,  but  ever  since  the  issue  of  that  announcement 
memorials  and  petitions  had  been  flowing  in  from  the  military  class 
in  many  districts  asking  for  early  effect  to  be  given  to  the  measure 
in  contemplation,  and  for  permission  to  lay  aside  their  swords  and 
take  up  agricultural  occupations.  Nor  was  there  wanting  the 
stimulus  in  the  same  direction  supplied  by  inspired  writers  in  the 
Press  that  was  just  coming  into  existence  under  official  auspices.  One 
of  these  observed  that  what  the  nation  needed  was  an  Imperial  army 
and  uniformity  in  land  tenure,  taxation,  currency,  education  and 
penal  laws — aspirations  all  destined  to  be  fulfilled  in  the  near  future. 
The  general  feeling  thus  shown  doubtless  influenced  the  Govern- 
ment in  taking  the  final  step. 

Shortly  before  the  issue  of  the  Decree  there  occurred  a recon- 
struction of  the  Ministry,  strengthening  the  position  of  the  leaders 
of  the  party  of  reform,  and  that  of  the  clans  they  represented,  while 
the  influence  of  the  aristocratic  element  in  the  Government  was 
diminished.  In  the  reconstituted  Cabinet,  as  we  may  now  call  it, 
Prince  San  jo  remained  Prime  Minister,  Prince  Iwakura  became 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  replacing  a Court  noble,  while  four 
prominent  clan  men  whom  the  Restoration  had,  as  we  have  seen, 
brought  to  the  front,  took  office  as  Councillors  of  State.  These  four 
were  Saig5,  Kido,  Itagaki  and  Okuma. 

To  this  date  also  belongs  a troublesome  incident  which  called  for 
the  intervention  of  the  foreign  representatives.  The  Japanese 
authorities,  fearing  a recurrence  of  the  disturbances  connected  with 


Reconstruction  of  Classes  91 

# 

the  Christian  propaganda  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries, 
had  always  regarded  with  misgiving  the  treaty  clause  permitting  the 
erection  of  Christian  places  of  worship  at  the  open  ports.  This 
apprehension  was  increased  by  the  renewal  of  missionary  effort  when 
the  country  was  reopened  to  foreign  trade  and  intercourse.  As  a 
precautionary  measure,  the  old  official  notices  denouncing  Chris- 
tianity as  a pernicious  doctrine  had  continued  to  be  displayed  in  all 
parts  of  the  country,  and  at  Nagasaki,  which  had  at  one  time  been 
a Christian  centre,  the  population  had  been  forced  annually  to 
trample  upon  emblems  of  the  proscribed  faith.  On  the  erection  in 
1865  of  a Roman  Catholic  Church  at  that  place,  which  had  in  the 
meantime  become  an  open  port,  people  from  the  neighbourhood 
attended  it  in  such  numbers  as  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  authori- 
ties. It  was  then  discovered  that  Christian  doctrines  had  not  been 
completely  stamped  out  there,  as  had  been  the  case  elsewhere.  The 
offending  individuals  were  consequently  ordered  to  be  banished  to 
remote  districts,  the  foreign  representatives  being  with  difficulty 
successful  in  obtaining  a temporary  suspension  of  the  orders.  After 
the  Restoration  the  official  notices  proscribing  the  Christian  religion 
were,  with  the  substitution  of  the  Mikado’s  authority  for  that  of 
the  Shogun,  deliberately  renewed,  and  in  1870  the  orders  for  the 
banishment  of  the  offenders  were  carried  out  in  spite  of  repeated 
remonstrances  on  the  part  of  the  foreign  representatives.  Other- 
wise, however,  judged  by  the  standard  of  those  days,  the  treatment 
to  which  the  exiles  were  subjected  appears  on  the  whole  to  have 
been  free  from  excessive  cruelty.  It  was  not  till  the  year  1873  that 
the  practice  of  Christianity  ceased  to  be  forbidden.  The  notices 
proscribing  the  Christian  religion  were  then  withdrawn,  and  the 
banished  persons  were  restored  to  their  homes.  In  curious  contrast 
to  this  recrudescence  of  persecution  was  the  suggestion,  made  in  a 
pamphlet  about  the  same  time,  that  Christianity  should  be  officially 
recognized,  a suggestion  which  is  said  to  have  been  carried  still  further 
some  years  later,  when  the  attraction  for  Western  civilization  was  at 
its  height,  by  a prominent  member  of  the  Ministry. 

To  return  to  the  subject  of  feudalism,  from  which  this  digression 
in  the  interests  of  chronological  order  has  led  us  away,  its  abolition 
was  the  first,  as  it  was  also  the  most  radical,  of  the  reforms  on  which 
the  new  Government  embarked.  It  struck  at  the  root  of  old- 
established  things  and  cleared  the  way  for  all  future  progress.  It  is 


92  Reconstruction  of  Classes 

a pity  that  Marquis  Okuma  in  his  Fifty  Tears  of  New  Japan  has 
dismissed  the  subject  in  a few  lines.  Himself  one  of  the  chief  actors 
in  the  scene,  no  one  was  better  qualified  to  deal  with  it.  Foreign 
writers  less  well  equipped  for  the  task  have  given  it  more  attention. 
Some  of  these  have  taken  the  superficial  view,  founded  on  the  signa- 
tures appended  to  the  Memorials,  that  the  voluntary  surrender  of 
fiefs  was  due  to  the  initiative  of  the  feudal  nobles  themselves,  and 
have  praised  their  action  for  what  they  regarded  as  its  exalted 
patriotism  and  unique  self-sacrifice.  This  view  is  quite  erroneous. 
Occasion  has  already  been  taken  to  point  out  how  the  surroundings 
in  which  the  daimios  of  those  days  were  brought  up  had  the  effect 
of  depriving  them  of  all  character  and  initiative,  and  how  they,  like 
the  Mikado  and  Shbgun,  were  mere  puppets  in  the  hands  of  others, 
unfitted  for  responsibility  of  any  kind,  unaccustomed  to  the  direction 
of  affairs.  Lest  it  be  thought  that  the  picture  has  been  overdrawn, 
it  may  be  well  to  quote  the  words  of  a Japanese  writer  of  the  time. 
They  occur  in  an  anonymous  pamphlet  published  in  1869,  extracts 
from  which  are  given  by  Sir  Francis  Adams  in  his  History  of  Japan. 

“ The  great  majority  of  feudal  lords,”  the  writer  says,  “ are 
generally  persons  who  have  been  born  and  nurtured  in  the  seclusion 
of  the  women’s  apartments  : . . . who  even  when  they  have  grown 
up  to  man’s  estate  still  exhibit  all  the  traits  of  childhood.  Leading 
a life  of  leisure,  they  succeed  to  the  inheritance  of  their  ancestors. 
. . . And  in  the  same  category  are  those  who,  though  designated 
vassals,  are  born  of  good  family  on  the  great  estates.” 

Of  the  truth  of  this  statement  there  is  abundant  evidence.  There 
were,  indeed,  a few  instances  of  feudal  chiefs  who  had  some  share  of 
power  and  influence.  But  they  were  exceptions  to  the  general  rule, 
and  the  authority  they  exercised  was  brought  to  bear  rather  on  the 
affairs  of  the  State  than  on  the  administration  of  their  own  terri- 
tories. Long  before  the  Restoration  the  government  of  feudal 
fiefs  had  passed  out  of  the  hands  of  the  nominal  rulers,  and  their 
hereditary  chief  retainers,  into  those  of  clansmen  of  inferior  status. 
These  were  the  real  authors  of  the  measure  of  reform  which  swept 
away  the  feudal  system.  They  were  the  same  men  who  carried  out 
the  Restoration.  Throughout  all  the  negotiations  for  the  surrender 
of  their  fiefs  the  feudal  nobility  counted  for  nothing,  and,  as  a class, 
were  only  dimly  conscious,  if  aware  at  all,  of  what  was  going  on  before 
their  eyes. 


Reconstruction  of  Classes  93 

In  return  for  the  voluntary  surrender  of  their  fiefs  the  dispossessed 
daimios  received  pensions  amounting  to  one-tenth  of  their  former 
revenues,  the  payment  of  the  small  hereditary  incomes  of  the  samurai, 
in  their  altered  status  of  gentry,  being  continued  for  the  present  by 
the  Government.  From  this  arrangement,  however,  the  samurai  of 
one  or  two  clans  who  had  offered  a prolonged  resistance  to  the 
Imperialist  forces  were  excluded,  a distinction  which  caused  much 
suffering  and  hardship. 

The  surrender  of  the  clan  territories  involved,  of  course,  the 
rendition  of  the  lands,  varying  greatly  in  extent,  that  were  held  by 
the  two  large  sections  of  the  military  class  already  mentioned,  the 
hatamoto  and  gokenin.  Their  pensions  were  regulated  on  a scale 
similar  to  that  adopted  for  the  feudal  nobility. 

The  amount  of  the  revenues  acquired  by  the  Government  in  con- 
sequence of  the  surrender  of  all  feudal  territories,  including  the 
Shogun’s  domains,  the  administration  of  which  had  previously  been 
taken  over,  is  not  easy  to  determine.  A very  rough  estimate  is  all 
that  is  possible.  The  extent  of  the  latter  has  already  been  noticed. 
Still  more  remarkable  was  its  wide  distribution.  Out  of  the  sixty- 
eight  provinces  into  which  Japan  at  the  time  of  the  Restoration  was 
divided  no  less  than  forty-seven,  by  reasons  of  lands  owned  therein 
by  the  Shogunate,  contributed  towards  the  Tokugawa  exchequer.  In 
the  Tokugawa  law  known  as  “ The  Hundred  Articles  ” the  total 
assessed  yield  of  the  country  is  given  as  28,000,000  koku  of  rice,  the 
yield  of  all  land,  whatever  the  nature  of  its  produce,  being  stated  in 
terms  of  that  cereal.  Of  this,  20,000,000  koku  represented  the 
produce  of  the  lands  of  the  feudal  nobility  and  gentry,  and  the 
balance  the  yield  of  the  Shogun’s  estates.  This  statement  was  made 
in  the  seventeenth  century,  and  it  is  natural  to  suppose  that  by  the 
time  the  Restoration  took  place  the  revenues  in  question  may  have 
increased  with  the  general  progress  of  the  nation.  In  the  absence 
of  exact  data  we  shall  probably  not  be  far  wrong  if  we  estimate  the 
gross  revenue  which  came  into  the  possession  of  the  Government  by 
the  abolition  of  the  Shogunate  and  the  feudal  system,  of  which  it 
formed  a part,  as  not  much  under  35,000,000  koku  of  rice,  equivalent, 
at  the  average  price  of  rice  at  that  time,  to  about  .£35,000,000.  From 
this  had  to  be  deducted  the  share  of  the  cultivators,  which  varied 
according  to  the  locality.  Out  of  the  residue,  again,  the  pensions 
due  to  the  feudal  nobility,  and  other  members  of  the  military  class, 


94  Effects  of  Abolition  of  Feudalism 

had  to  be  paid,  so  that  the  net  balance  accruing  to  the  national 
exchequer  in  the  first  years  of  the  new  administration  could  not  have 
been  large. 

The  effects  on  the  various  classes  of  the  nation  caused  by  the 
abolition  of  feudalism  were  very  different,  the  benefit  derived  from 
it  by  some  contrasting  sharply  with  the  hardship  inflicted  upon 
others.  These  effects,  however,  were  for  the  most  part  gradual  in 
their  operation.  They  were  not  realized  in  their  full  extent  until 
some  years  later,  when  the  multifarious  details  connected  with  the 
carrying  out  of  this  great  undertaking  had  been  laboriously  worked 
out. 

With  the  exception  of  the  fudai  daimios  and  the  feudal  groups  of 
hatamoto  and  gokenin — which  constituted  the  hereditary  personal 
following  of  thf  Tokugawa  Shoguns,  standing  between  the  higher 
feudal  aristocracy  and  the  bulk  of  the  military  class — there  is  no 
reason  to  think  that  the  territorial  nobility  suffered  very  greatly  by 
the  change,  save,  at  once,  in  loss  of  dignity,  and,  later  on,  in  the 
compulsory  commutation  of  their  pensions.  Denied  by  custom  all 
share  in  the  management  of  clan  affairs,  they  had  little  call  to  object 
to  a measure  the  true  import  of  which  was  imperfectly  appreciated, 
or  do  anything  else  but  silently  acquiesce  in  the  decisions  of  the 
masterful  retainers  by  whose  counsels  they  and  their  ancestors  were 
accustomed  to  be  guided.  As  a matter  of  State  policy  the  change 
was  as  much  beyond  their  control  as  it  was  above  their  powers  of 
comprehension,  which  rarely  strayed  outside  the  orbit  of  trivial 
pursuits  and  pleasures  in  which  they  were  content  to  move.  Some, 
indeed,  may  have  welcomed  the  change  as  a release  from  irksome 
conditions  of  existence,  and  as  offering  a prospect  of  wider  fields  of 
action.  The  case  of  the  judai  daimios,  and  others  in  the  same 
category,  was  different.  To  them  the  abolition  of  the  feudal  system 
was  a severe  blow,  for  it  meant  the  loss  of  official  emoluments  which, 
under  the  Shogunate,  they  had  enjoyed  as  a special  privilege  for 
generations. 

To  the  two  classes  of  artizans  and  merchants  the  immediate  effect 
may  very  naturally  have  been  unwelcome  in  so  far  as  it  entailed  dis- 
turbance of  existing  conditions  of  livelihood,  of  old-established  usages 
of  industry  and  trade.  Under  feudalism  not  only  had  a close  system 
of  clan  guilds  grown  up,  but,  as  in  Europe  during  the  Middle  Ages, 
artizans  and  tradesmen  engaged  in  the  same  handicraft  or  business 


Effects  of  Abolition  of  Feudalism  95 

were  restricted  to  separate  quarters  of  a town.  The  former  may  also 
have  had  reason  to  regret  the  liberal  patronage  of  feudal  customers, 
which  allowed  leisure  and  scope  for  the  exercise  of  individual  skill, 
and  to  view  with  concern  the  pressure  of  open  competition  in  the 
industrial  market.  But  as  the  new  conditions  became  stabilized,  and 
the  benefits  of  uniformity  of  administration  became  apparent,  neither 
class  had  any  reason  to  be  dissatisfied  with  the  alteration  in  their 
circumstances.  Certainly  not  the  merchants  and  tradesmen.  The 
disappearance  of  the  barriers  between  provinces  and  between  clans 
was  all  to  their  advantage,  while  the  opening  up  of  new  channels  of 
commercial  activity  must  have  more  than  compensated  for  any  draw- 
backs attending  the  new  order  of  things. 

One  class — the  most  important  at  that  time — the  samurai,  suffered 
greatly  by  the  change.  Accustomed  for  centuries  to  high  rank  in  the 
social  order,  to  a position  of  superiority  over  the  rest  of  the  people, 
from  whom  they  were  distinguished  by  privileges  and  customs  of  long 
standing,  as  well  as  by  a traditional  code  of  chivalry  in  which  they 
took  a legitimate  pride,  the  samurai  found  themselves  suddenly  rele- 
gated to  a status  little  differing  from  that  of  their  former  inferiors. 
It  is  true  that  the  military  class,  as  a whole,  had  long  been  in  an 
impoverished  condition  owing  to  the  embarrassment  of  clan  finances, 
which  had  led  in  several  cases  to  the  reduction  of  feudal  establish- 
ments, and  to  the  rigid  rule  which  kept  the  members  of  this  class 
from  engaging  in  any  of  the  profitable  occupations  open  to  the  rest 
of  the  nation  ; and  that  the  unrest  and  discontent  which  resulted 
from  this  state  of  things  may  have  induced  them  to  regard  with 
favour  any  change  which  held  out  the  prospect  of  a possible  ameliora- 
tion in  their  circumstances.  There  is  some  truth  also  in  the  view 
that  the  eager  enthusiasm  of  the  party  of  reform,  inspired  with  a 
belief  in  the  fulfilment  of  their  cherished  aspirations,  may  have  found 
an  echo  in  the  minds  of  the  military  class  and  stirred  the  patriotic 
impulses  so  conspicuous  in  the  nation  ; while,  at  the  same  time,  the 
sentiment  of  feudal  loyalty  may  have  dictated  implicit  obedience  to 
the  decision  of  clan  authorities.  Making  allowance  for  the  influence 
of  considerations  of  this  nature,  there  can,  nevertheless,  be  little  doubt 
that  the  sudden  change  in  the  fortunes  of  the  military  class  aroused 
a bitter  feeling,  wdiich  showed  itself  later  in  the  outbreak  of  grave 
disturbances. 

The  unpopularity  of  the  measure  wras  increased  by  the  commuta- 


96  Effects  of  Abolition  of  Feudalism 

tion  of  pensions,  which  bore  very  hardly  on  the  military  class.  In 
introducing  in  1873  a scheme  for  this  purpose  the  Government  was 
influenced  mainly  by  the  pressing  needs  of  the  national  exchequer. 
Under  this  scheme  Government  bonds  bearing  8 per  cent  interest 
were  issued.  Samurai  with  hereditary  incomes  of  less  than  100  koku 
of  rice  were  enabled  to  commute  their  pensions,  if  they  chose  to  do 
so,  on  the  basis  of  six  years’  purchase,  receiving  half  of  the  sum  to 
which  they  were  entitled  in  cash,  and  the  remainder  in  bonds ; while 
the  basis  for  those  in  receipt  of  annuities  was  fixed  at  four  and  a half 
years’  purchase,  the  low  rates  of  purchase  in  both  cases  being  accounted 
for  by  the  high  rates  of  interest  then  prevailing. 

Three  years  later  the  voluntary  character  of  commutation  was 
made  compulsory,  and  extended  to  all  members  of  the  military  class 
irrespective  of  the  amount  of  income  involved.  The  current  rate  of 
interest  having  by  that  time  fallen,  the  basis  of  commutation  was 
increased  to  ten  years’  purchase  for  all  alike,  a slight  reduction  being 
made  in  the  rate  of  interest  payable  on  the  bonds,  which  varied 
according  to  the  amount  of  the  income  commuted.  Indirectly  this 
commutation  resulted  in  further  misfortune  for  the  military  class. 
Unversed  in  business  methods,  without  experience  in  trading  opera- 
tions, many  samurai  were  tempted  to  employ  the  little  capital  they 
had  received  in  unremunerative  enterprises,  the  failure  of  which 
brought  them  to  extreme  poverty. 


CHAPTER  IX 


Effects  of  Abolition  of  Feudalism  on  Agricultural  Class — Changes  in 
Land  Tenure — Land-Tax  Revision. 

THE  abolition  of  feudalism  came  as  a boon  to  the  peasantry. 

If  it  inflicted  much  hardship  on  the  samurai , who  formed 
the  bulk  of  the  military  class,  while  the  verdict  as  to  its 
results  in  other  cases  depended  on  the  conclusion  to  be  reached 
after  balancing  the  gain  and  loss  attending  its  operation,  to  the 
farmers  it  was  a veritable  blessing.  Its  full  significance  was,  how- 
ever, not  felt  until  after  the  lapse  of  several  years. 

Under  the  feudal  system  the  position  of  the  farmer  varied  to  some 
extent  according  to  locality.  In  Satsuma,  for  instance,  besides  the 
ordinary  farming  class,  there  were  samurai  farmers.  Again,  in  certain 
parts  of  the  province  of  Mito,  and  elsewhere,  there  was  a special  class 
of  yeoman  farmers  who  enjoyed  some  of  the  privileges  of  the  samurai. 
But  throughout  the  country  generally  the  bulk  of  the  agricultural 
class  consisted  of  peasant  farmers,  who,  while  cultivating  their  land 
on  conditions  similar  to  what  is  known  in  Europe  as  the  metayage 
system,  were  in  many  respects  little  better  than  serfs.  The  peasant 
farmer  could  not  leave  his  holding,  and  go  elsewhere,  as  he  pleased  ; 
nor  could  he  dispose  of  his  interest  in  it,  though  by  means  of  mort- 
gages it  was  possible  to  evade  the  law  in  this  respect.  To  the  frequent 
call  for  forced  labour  he  was  obliged  to  respond.  He  was  subject  to 
restrictions  in  regard  to  the  crops  to  be  cultivated,  and  their  rotation, 
while  in  the  disposal  of  his  produce  he  was  hampered  by  the  inter- 
ference of  clan  guilds.  The  farmer  had  also  to  bear  the  expense  and 
risk  of  conveying  the  tax-produce  of  his  land  to  the  receiving  stations, 
besides  being  obliged  to  deliver  on  each  occasion  an  extra  amount  to 
cover  the  loss  supposed  to  occur  in  its  transportation.  On  the  other 
hand,  though  under  the  feudal  form  of  land  tenure  he  was  tied  to 
the  soil  and  transferable  with  it  when  it  changed  hands,  he  was 
practically  free  from  disturbance  in  his  holding  so  long  as  he  paid  his 
G 97 


98  Changes  in  Land  Tenure 

rent,  which  took  the  form  of  a share  of  the  produce  of  the  land,  and 
other  imposts  exacted  from  time  to  time  by  feudal  bailiffs.  Fixity 
of  tenure,  therefore,  he  certainly  enjoyed  ; and,  looking  at  the 
peculiar  nature  of  his  association  with  the  feudal  landlord,  it  seems 
questionable  whether  his  rights  in  the  land  he  cultivated  may  not  be 
regarded  as  having  much  of  the  character  of  ownership.  Holdings, 
it  may  be  added,  descended  from  father  to  son,  or,  failing  direct 
heirs,  in  the  same  family,  the  right  of  adoption  being,  of  course, 
recognized. 

The  interests  of  the  peasantry  were  affected  in  many  ways  by  the 
abolition  of  the  feudal  system.  The  abrupt  change  in  the  position 
of  the  cultivator  caused  by  the  disappearance  of  his  feudal  landlord 
opened  up  the  whole  question  of  land  tenure  and  land  taxation,  not 
only  as  it  affected  the  peasant  cultivator,  but  in  its  bearing  on  the 
occupiers  of  all  agricultural  land  throughout  the  country,  as  well  as 
other  land  not  included  in  this  category.  To  enable  the  Government 
to  cope  with  a task  of  this  magnitude,  and  at  the  same  time  to  carry 
out  their  declared  aims  in  the  direction  of  uniformity  of  adminis- 
tration, far-reaching  legislation  was  necessary. 

In  view  of  the  singular  character  of  the  feudal  tenure  we  have 
described,  under  which  landlord  and  tenant  were  associated  in  a 
kind  of  joint  ownership,  it  might  have  been  supposed  that  advantage 
would  be  taken  of  the  opportunity  offered  by  the  surrender  of  fiefs 
to  place  the  question  of  land  tenure  on  a clear  footing  by  defining 
accurately  the  position  of  the  people,  and  more  especially  the 
cultivators,  with  regard  to  the  land.  This,  however,  was  not  done. 
No  Decree  affecting  the  broad  issue  raised  by  the  abolition  of  the 
feudal  system  was  promulgated.  It  was  only  by  degrees  that  the 
intentions  of  the  Government  became  apparent.  Step  by  step  the 
policy  in  view  was  manifested  by  the  removal  of  the  various  re- 
strictions which  had  curtailed  the  tenants’  rights,  until  at  length  it 
became  clear  that,  while  retaining  the  theory  that  the  ownership  of 
all  land  was  vested  as  of  right  in  the  Crown,  the  intention  was  that 
each  occupier  of  land  should  become  virtually  the  proprietor  of  his 
holding. 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  Government  at  the  end  of  the  civil 
war  had  been  to  place  all  land  as  far  as  possible  on  a common  footing, 
the  earliest  step  in  this  direction  being  taken  in  the  spring  of  1869. 
It  was  then  enacted  that  all  land  held  in  grant  from  previous  govern- 


Land-Tax  Revision  99 

mcnts  should  be  liable  to  taxation.  This  measure  affected  all 
grantees  of  land,  the  yashikis,  or  feudal  residences  of  the  territorial 
nobility  in  Ycdo,  coming  under  the  new  rule.  The  ground  covered 
by  these  yashikis,  some  of  which  were  extensive,  forming  separate 
parks  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  castle  and  in  other  quarters  of 
the  city,  had  originally,  like  other  grants  of  land,  been  handed  over 
in  free  gift,  neither  rent  nor  land-tax  being  paid. 

An  essential  point  in  the  uniformity  of  administration  contem- 
plated by  the  new  Government  was  the  reform  of  all  taxation, 
precedence  being  given  to  the  revision  of  the  land-tax.  No  hesita- 
tion was  shown  in  taking  up  this  task.  Finance  was  the  weak  point 
in  the  administrative  situation,  as  it  had  been  that  of  the  previous 
Government  ; and  land  having  since  early  days  been  the  main 
source  of  revenue,  it  was  natural  that  the  question  of  the  land-tax 
should  be  the  first  to  receive  attention.  Before  the  abolition  of 
feudalism,  and  while  the  clans  still  retained  their  own  provincial 
administration,  it  was  not  possible  to  take  practical  steps  towards 
fiscal  changes  that  should  apply  to  all  parts  of  the  country.  But  the 
movement  in  favour  of  the  surrender  of  feudal  fiefs  had  begun  almost 
as  soon  as  the  triumph  of  the  Imperialist  forces  was  assured,  and  by 
the  time  the  feudal  system  was  abolished  by  the  Decree  of  August, 
1871,  the  subject  had  been  examined  by  the  new  Government  in  all 
its  bearings,  and  the  shape  which  the  revision  of  the  land-tax  should 
take  had  been  determined.  It  was,  therefore,  possible  for  a complete 
scheme  of  revision  to  be  brought  forward  by  the  Finance  Depart- 
ment before  the  end  of  the  same  year,  that  is  to  say,  within  four 
months  after  the  disappearance  of  the  clans. 

Before  dwelling  on  the  main  features  of  this  proposal,  for  which 
Marquis  Okuma  and  Marquis  Inouye,  then  Minister  and  Vice- 
Minister  of  Finance  respectively,  and  Baron  Kanda,  an  authority  on 
all  questions  of  administration,  were  mainly  responsible,  it  may  be 
well  to  glance  for  a moment  at  the  previous  system  of  land  taxation 
in  order  that  a clear  idea  of  the  changes  introduced  may  be 
formed. 

Put  shortly,  the  position  of  holders  of  land  in  regard  to  taxation 
in  the  last  days  of  Tokugawa  rule  was  this.  Only  land  under  culti- 
vation was  taxed.  The  land-tax  was  payable  everywhere  in  rice, 
whatever  the  crop  cultivated  might  be,  and  was  based  on  the  assessed 
yield  of  the  land.  But  the  methods  of  estimating  this  yield  varied 


IOO 


Land-Tax  Revision 


greatly.  In  one  place  this  would  be  done  by  taking  the  measurement 
of  the  land  bearing  the  crop  ; in  another  the  appearance  and  con- 
dition of  the  crop  would  be  the  decisive  factors  ; while  in  a third 
there  would  be  “ assessment  by  sample,”  as  it  was  called,  specimens 
of  the  growing  crop  being  selected  for  the  purpose.  The  land 
measures,  too,  were  not  everywhere  the  same.  Moreover,  the 
principle  which  governed  the  distribution  of  the  produce  of  the  land 
between  the  cultivator  and  the  landlord — the  latter’s  share  being, 
in  effect,  the  former’s  land-tax — varied  in  different  provinces,  and  in 
different  districts  of  the  same  province.  In  some  places  seven-tenths 
of  the  yield  of  land  went  to  the  landlord,  and  three-tenths  to  the 
cultivator  ; in  others  these  proportions  were  reversed  ; there  were 
districts,  such  as  the  Shogun’s  domains,  where  the  cultivator  received 
three-fifths,  and  other,  again,  where  the  proportions  were  equal. 
There  was  a general  resemblance,  dating  back  to  the  time  of  the 
Great  Reform,  between  the  taxation  systems  in  force  throughout  the 
country.  The  old  classification,  under  which  there  were  three  main 
heads  of  taxation,  the  land-tax,  the  industrial-tax  and  forced  labour 
— all  payable  by  the  cultivator — was  retained  everywhere  in  a modi- 
fied form.  But  each  clan  went  its  own  way  in  other  respects,  having 
its  own  methods  of  assessment  and  collection,  as  well  as  its  own 
rules  of  exemption  from,  and  remission  of,  taxation.  Except  in  the 
ShSgun’s  domains,  where  matters,  generally,  were  regulated  on  a 
somewhat  better  basis  than  elsewhere,  there  was  no  very  definite 
distinction  between  central  and  local  taxation  ; and,  whether  it  was 
a clan  or  the  Shdgunate  itself  to  which  taxes  were  due,  there  was  a 
constant  liability  to  irregular  exactions  imposed  at  the  pleasure  of 
the  authorities. 

The  main  features  of  the  new  scheme  show  the  importance  of  the 
changes  proposed. 

A new  official  survey  of  land  throughout  the  country  was  to  be 
carried  out.  Title-deeds  were  to  be  issued  for  all  land,  whether 
cultivated  or  not.  Land  everywhere  was  to  be  valued,  and  the  value 
stated  in  the  title-deed.  In  the  case  of  cultivated  land  the  land-tax 
was  to  be  made  payable  in  money,  instead  of  in  rice,  as  before,  and 
was  to  be  based  on  the  selling  value  of  the  land,  as  declared  in  the 
title-deed,  and  not,  as  before,  on  the  assessed  yield  of  the  holding. 
The  proprietor — for  this,  in  effect,  the  farmer  became  when  the 
revision  was  accomplished — was  to  be  free  to  cultivate  his  land  in  all 


Land-Tax  Revision  ioi 

respects  as  he  pleased,  and  could  sell  or  otherwise  dispose  of  it  as  he 
chose. 

The  Sei-in — that  curious  body  in  the  reorganized  Government  of 
1869  which  represented  an  attempt  to  combine  in  one  branch  of 
authority  legislative,  deliberative  and  executive  powers — signified 
its  approval  of  the  scheme,  and  arrangements  were  made  to  give 
effect  to  some  of  its  provisions.  In  January,  1872,  as  a tentative 
measure,  title-deed  regulations  were  issued.  These  were  made 
operative  at  first  only  in  the  Tokio  prefecture,  but  their  operation 
was  gradually  extended  to  other  places.  Shortly  afterwards  further 
regulations  providing  for  the  annual  payment  of  land-tax  at  the 
rate  of  2 per  cent  on  the  value  of  land,  as  entered  in  the  title-deed, 
were  published.  And  in  March  of  the  same  year  the  restrictions  on 
the  alienation  of  land,  which  had  previously  prevented  all  transfers 
of  land  between  the  military  class  and  other  classes  of  the  people,  as 
well  as  between  members  of  the  latter,  were  removed. 

Before,  however,  this  scheme  for  the  revision  of  the  land-tax 
assumed  its  final  legislative  shape  it  underwent  various  modifications. 
It  was  submitted  early  in  1873  to  a conference  of  the  chief  adminis- 
trative officials  in  the  provinces  which  took  place  in  the  Capital.  The 
necessity  of  reform  on  the  lines  suggested  was  admitted  by  all  con- 
cerned. The  main  point  on  which  opinions  differed  was  whether 
the  revision  of  the  land-tax  should  be  carried  out  as  soon  as  possible, 
or  gradually.  The  advocates  of  prompt  action  urged  that  the  ques- 
tion should  be  dealt  with  quickly  and  decisively,  arguing  that  what- 
ever disadvantages  might  attend  this  course  would  be  more  than 
counter-balanced  by  the  benefits  resulting  from  a uniform  system 
of  taxation.  The  other  side  held  that  it  would  be  unwise  to  do  away 
suddenly  with  old  customs  and  usages,  and  that  it  would  be  better 
to  carry  out  the  contemplated  changes  very  gradually,  taking  care 
not  to  offend  local  prejudice.  In  the  end  the  views  of  the  advocates 
of  prompt  action  prevailed,  and  a draft  law  was  prepared.  This, 
having  received  the  sanction  of  the  Throne,  was  notified  to  the 
country  by  Imperial  Decree  in  July  of  the  same  year.  No  direct 
reference  was  made  in  the  Decree  either  to  the  change  of  govern- 
ment, or  to  the  abolition  of  feudalism,  which  were  the  real  causes 
that  had  inspired  the  measure.  It  may  have  been  thought  in- 
advisable to  refer  to  a past  so  full  of  dangerous  memories,  and  so 
recent  as  to  invite  inconvenient  comparisons. 


102 


Land-Tax  Revision 

The  Decree  itself  merely  stated  the  object  of  the  measure,  which 
was  “ to  remedy  the  existing  harsh  and  unequal  incidence  of  taxa- 
tion,” and  the  fact  that  local  authorities,  besides  other  officials,  had 
been  consulted  in  its  preparation.  In  the  notification  accompanying 
it  further  information  was  given.  It  was  explained  that  the  old 
system  of  paying  taxes  on  cultivated  land  in  rice  was  abolished  ; that 
as  soon  as  fresh  title-deeds  had  been  prepared  land-tax  would  be  paid 
at  the  rate  of  3 per  cent  on  the  value  of  the  land  ; and  that  the  same 
course  would  be  followed  in  the  case  of  local  land  taxation,  with  the 
proviso  that  the  local  land  rate  should  not  exceed  one-third  of  the 
Imperial  land-tax. 

By  a looseness  of  wording,  which  may  have  escaped  notice  at  the 
time,  both  the  Decree  and  the  Notification  spoke  of  the  land-tax  as 
having  been  revised.  It  needed  more  than  a stroke  of  the  pen  to  do 
this.  Neither  those  who  in  the  conference  objected  to  hasty 
measures,  nor  those  who  were  in  favour  of  prompt  action,  had  fore- 
seen the  length  of  time  that  would  be  occupied  in  the  execution  of 
the  reform.  It  was  left  to  the  practical  exigencies  of  the  situation 
to  effect  a compromise  between  the  two  parties  which  the  con- 
ference had  failed  to  bring  about.  The  original  estimate  of  the  time 
needed  to  carry  out  the  measure  was  found  to  be  quite  inadequate. 
Though  the  task  was  set  about  at  once,  several  years  elapsed  before 
it  was  completed  ; and  eventually  it  was  decided  to  allow  the  new 
scheme  to  come  into  operation  in  each  district,  as  soon  as  the 
requisite  arrangements  had  been  made,  without  waiting  for  its 
adoption  in  other  places. 

Voluminous  regulations  were  appended  to  the  Notification.  In 
one  of  these  a promise  was  given  that  the  rate  of  land-tax  would  be 
reduced  to  1 per  cent  whenever  the  total  annual  revenue  from  other 
sources  should  have  reached  the  sum  of  Ten  2,000,000  (£400,000). 
This  promise  was  never  fulfilled.  By  the  time  the  revenue  from 
other  sources  had  reached  the  amount  stated  the  needs  of  the  new 
Government  had  so  outgrown  its  resources  that  reduction  to  the 
extent  contemplated  was  not  possible.  A reduction  from  3 to  2$ 
per  cent  was,  however,  made  a few  years  later,  while  the  work  of 
revision  was  still  proceeding. 

Some  other  points  may  be  noted  in  passing  which  throw  light  on 
the  principles  underlying  the  measure. 

All  holders  of  land  were  required  to  remeasure  it,  and  furnish  a 


Land-Tax  Revision  103 

statement  of  its  value.  These  estimates  were  then  to  be  checked  by 
comparison  with  similar  estimates  made  by  official  experts.  In  the 
case  of  a holder  of  land  refusing  to  agree  to  the  value  fixed  by  the 
assessors,  the  land  was  to  be  sold. 

The  land-tax  of  3 per  cent  was  to  be  levied  only  on  cultivated 
land,  this  category  including  both  rice  land  and  other  arable  land. 
The  tax  on  house  land  was  higher,  while  that  on  other  classes  of  land, 
such  as  land  covered  by  forests,  pasture  or  moorland,  wras  almost 
nominal. 

The  plan  adopted,  wherever  possible,  in  fixing  the  value  of  land 
in  a district  was  to  take  a certain  village  as  a specimen,  and,  having 
fixed  the  value  of  the  land  in  it,  to  make  that  value  the  basis  for 
determining  the  value  of  all  other  land  in  the  district,  the  guiding 
principle  being  to  ascertain  the  actual  profit  it  yielded  to  the  culti- 
vator. With  this  principle  in  view,  the  method  employed  for  deter- 
mining the  value  of  cultivated  land  was  as  follows  : Land  was  first 
of  all  divided  into  two  classes,  rice  land,  and  land  on  wrhich  other 
crops  were  grown.  The  official  assessors  having,  with  the  assistance 
of  the  cultivator,  estimated  the  annual  yield  of  the  holding,  this 
yield  was,  in  the  case  of  rice,  wheat  and  beans,  converted  into  money 
by  taking  the  average  market  price  per  koku  (about  five  bushels)  of 
each  of  these  articles  of  produce  for  the  five  years  1870-4  inclusive. 
In  fixing  this  average  market  price  it  would  have  been  impossible  to 
have  taken  one  price  for  the  whole  country,  since  the  prices  of  all 
staple  articles  varied  in  many  districts.  The  difficulty  was,  there- 
fore, met  by  fixing  several  market  values,  to  be  used  as  the  separate 
bases  of  valuation  wherever  local  conditions  and  circumstances 
required  special  consideration.  Thus  in  some  cases  one  market  price 
for  rice,  or  for  wheat,  was  made  the  basis  for  valuing  land  in  a whole 
province  ; whereas  in  other  cases  separate  market  prices  had  to  be 
determined  for  particular  districts,  or  even  villages.  In  the  case  of 
land  on  which  other  produce,  such  as  tea,  silk,  hemp  and  indigo,  etc., 
was  grown,  the  method  adopted  was  to  estimate  w’hat  crops  of 
wheat,  or  beans,  land  of  the  same  kind  in  the  same  place  yielded. 
This  yield  was  then  taken  as  that  of  the  land  in  question,  and  con- 
verted into  money  in  the  usual  way.  Up  to  this  point  the  method 
followed  was  the  same  for  all  land,  whether  a man  cultivated  his  own 
holding,  or  held  it  on  lease  from  the  proprietor.  In  the  former  case 
the  next  step  in  the  process  of  fixing  land  values  was  to  deduct  from 


104  Land-Tax  Revision 

the  total  value  of  the  yield  of  the  land  15  per  cent,  as  cost  of  seed 
and  manure.  From  the  sum  that  remained  the  land-tax  and  local 
taxes  were  again  deducted,  as  well  as  the  cost  of  wages,  if  these  were 
paid,  for  labour  employed.  The  balance  remaining  over  was  taken 
to  represent  the  net  value  of  the  yield  of  the  land.  And,  as  the 
Government  decided  to  regard  6 per  cent  as  the  average  rate  of 
profit  accruing  to  a cultivator,  the  value  of  a holding  was  determined 
by  a simple  calculation.  This  value,  so  determined,  became  the 
assessed  or  taxable  value  of  the  land,  and  on  this  the  land-tax  was 
levied.  The  process  by  which  the  value  was  arrived  at  in  the  case 
of  a cultivator  who  held  his  land  on  lease  was  a little  more  com- 
plicated. Stated  in  other  words,  the  taxable  value  of  cultivated 
land,  as  determined  by  the  revision,  was  in  all  cases  the  net  value 
of  its  yield  to  the  cultivator,  whether  the  latter  was  owner,  or  only 
tenant. 

To  the  question  of  the  periods  of  payment  of  the  land-tax  much 
attention  was  given.  The  three  instalments  in  which  it  was  at  first 
made  payable  were  afterwards  reduced  to  two,  the  dates  of  pay- 
ment varying  according  to  the  nature  of  the  crop  cultivated.  It 
should  be  noted,  also,  that  in  making  the  revised  land-tax 
uniform  throughout  the  country  an  exception  was  introduced  in 
favour  of  Yezo,  or  the  Hokkaido,  to  give  it  its  administrative 
name.  There,  in  order  to  encourage  the  development  of  what 
was  then  the  northernmost  island,  the  rate  of  tax  was  fixed  at 
1 per  cent. 

Four  years  after  the  work  of  revision  had  begun  the  land-tax  was, 
as  already  stated,  reduced  to  2 $ per  cent.  In  the  Decree  announcing 
this  reduction  allusion  was  made  to  the  growing  needs  of  the  country, 
which  had  not  yet  been  able,  it  was  said,  to  adjust  itself  to  the 
changed  conditions  brought  about  by  the  Restoration,  and  to  the 
distress  still  prevailing  amongst  the  agricultural  classes.  The 
apparent  slowness  with  which  the  work  of  revision  proceeded  was 
brought  to  the  notice  of  the  local  authorities  by  the  Government, 
and  the  year  1876  was  fixed  as  the  date  by  which  the  revision  must 
be  concluded.  Neither  that  year,  however,  nor  the  next  saw  the 
end  of  the  undertaking.  It  lasted  five  years  longer,  being  eventually 
completed  in  1881. 

By  a very  rough  computation,  which  is  all  that  the  unreliability  of 
statistics  in  those  days  will  permit,  the  extent  of  taxable  land  occu- 


Took  an  active  part  in  the  Government  formed  after  the  Was  prominent  in  the  formation  of  the  new  Government  subsequent 

Restoration,  and  was  an  outstanding  figure  in  Foreign  as  well  as  to  the  Restoration  ; was  for  some  time  in  Opposition,  returning  to 
Financial  affairs.  the  Ministry  later.  Conspicuous  as  an  advocate  of  constitutional 

government,  as  an  author,  and  as  an  educationalist,  he  was  the 
most  versatile  of  all  the  statesmen  of  his  day. 


Land-Tax  Revision  105 

pied,  or  owned,  by  the  people  previous  to  the  revision  may  be  esti- 
mated at  about  ten  million  acres.  As  the  result  of  the  revision  this 
area  was  more  than  quadrupled.  On  the  other  hand,  the  revenue 
derived  from  the  land  showed  a falling  off  of  5 per  cent.  This 
result  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  some  of  the  land  had  before  been 
over-taxed,  while  a large  portion  of  the  new  taxable  area  consisted 
of  uncultivated  land  paying  only  a nominal  tax,  and,  therefore, 
contributing  little  to  the  revenue. 

The  total  cost  of  the  revision  of  the  land-tax,  according  to  official 
estimates,  was  about  £7,500,000.  Of  this  sum  about  £6, 000,000 
were  repaid  by  the  people,  the  balance  being  defrayed  by  the  pro- 
vincial authorities,  with  the  exception  of  an  item  of  some  £100,000 
which  was  charged  to  the  central  government.  Heavy  as  this  expense 
was,  the  gain  to  Japan  would  have  justified  a greater  cost.  For  the 
first  time  in  her  history  there  was  one  uniform  system  of  land 
taxation  for  the  whole  country,  and,  with  the  exception  above- 
mentioned,  one  uniform  rate. 

Since  the  completion  of  the  task  of  revision  the  system  of  land 
taxation  has  in  its  main  jeatures  remained  unchanged.  But  the 
heavy  expenditure  entailed  by  the  Russo-Japanese  war  in  1904-5 
made  it  necessary  for  the  Government  to  increase  taxation  of  all 
kinds.  Special  war  taxes  were  then  imposed.  Amongst  these  was  an 
additional  land-tax.  When  the  war  came  to  an  end  this  additional 
tax  was  retained,  as  was  the  case  with  our  own  income-tax,  and  the 
Chinese  transit  tax  on  commodities  ( lekin ),  both  of  which  were  also 
originally  war  taxes. 

A feature  to  be  noted  in  connection  with  this  land  reform  is  the 
change  that  was  made  in  the  title  to  land.  Hitherto  the  registration 
of  land  in  the  local  land  register,  in  accordance  with  the  practice  of 
centuries,  as  well  as  entries  regarding  the  transfer  of  land  recorded 
in  the  same  land  register,  had  constituted  the  holder’s  title.  Hence- 
forth the  title  to  land  was  determined  by  the  possession  of  a title- 
deed.  The  new  system,  however,  did  not  come  to  stay.  After  a 
trial  of  over  fifteen  years  it  was  abandoned  in  March,  1889,  in  favour 
of  the  old  method  of  registration  in  the  land  books  of  a district 
which,  with  certain  later  modifications  in  matters  of  detail,  is  now 
in  force. 

The  reclassification  of  land — one  of  the  results  of  the  land  reform 
— was  set  forth  in  an  elaborate  schedule,  into  the  details  of  which  it 


io6 


Land-Tax  Revision 


is  unnecessary  to  enter.  A reference  to  the  various  classes  into  which 
land  was  divided  establishes  two  facts  : 

1.  All  cultivated  land,  with  a few  exceptions,  belongs  to  the 
people. 

2.  All  waste  land,  with  a few  exceptions,  belongs  to  the  Govern- 
ment. 

To  these  we  may  add  a third,  that  all  land  in  Japan  is  subject  to 
land-tax,  with  three  exceptions  : 

(a)  Government  land. 

(b)  Land  held  for  religious  purposes. 

(c)  Land  used  for  purposes  of  irrigation,  drainage,  and  roads. 


CHAPTER  X 


Missions  to  Foreign  Governments — Hindrances  to  Reform — Language 
Difficulties — Attitude  of  Foreign  Powers. 

THE  numerous  measures  called  for  by  the  abolition  of 
feudalism  did  not  prevent  the  new  Government  from 
turning  their  attention  to  foreign  affairs.  In  the  same 
year  (1871)  which  saw  the  issue  of  the  Decree  giving  practical  effect 
to  the  surrender  of  feudal  fiefs  a mission  composed  of  Iwakura, 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  two  Councillors  of  State,  Kido 
and  Okubo,  was  despatched  to  Europe  and  the  United  States.  The 
suite  of  the  mission,  which  numbered  more  than  fifty  persons, 
included  Mr.  (afterwards  Prince)  Ito. 

This  was  the  third  mission  sent  from  Japan  to  the  Courts  of 
Treaty  Powers,  and  by  far  the  most  important.  The  first  of  these, 
despatched  by  the  Tokugawa  Government  early  in  1862,  when  the 
conditions  surrounding  foreign  intercourse  were  rendered  pre- 
carious by  the  open  hostility  of  the  Court  party,  had  achieved  some 
measure  of  success  in  obtaining  a postponement  for  five  years  of  the 
dates  fixed  for  the  opening  of  the  ports  of  Hiogo  and  Niigata,  and 
the  towns  of  Yedo  and  Osaka  ; the  reasons  by  which  the  request 
was  supported,  as  well  as  the  conditions  on  which  consent  was  given, 
being  recorded  so  far  as  Great  Britain  was  concerned,  in  the  London 
Protocol  of  June,  1862.  The  reasons  were  : “ the  difficulties  experi- 
enced by  the  Tycoon  and  his  Ministers  in  giving  effect  to  their  engage- 
ments with  foreign  Powers  having  treaties  with  Japan  in  conse- 
quence of  the  opposition  offered  by  a party  in  Japan  which  was 
hostile  to  all  intercourse  with  foreigners.”  The  conditions,  shortly 
stated,  were  : the  strict  observance  of  all  other  Treaty  stipulations  ; 
the  revocation  of  the  old  law  outlawing  foreigners  ; and  the  cessa- 
tion in  future  of  official  interference  of  any  kind  with  trade  and 
intercourse. 


107 


108  Missions  to  Foreign  Governments 

The  second  was  sent  by  the  same  Government  in  February,  1864. 
Its  ostensible  object  was  to  apologize  to  the  French  Government 
for  the  murder  of  the  French  officer,  Lieutenant  Camus,  which  had 
taken  place  in  October  of  the  previous  year.  Its  real  objects,  however, 
were  to  endeavour  to  obtain  the  consent  of  Treaty  Powers  to  the 
closing  of  the  port  of  Yokohama,  a matter  in  regard  to  which  the 
Shogun’s  Ministers  had  already  appealed  in  vain  to  the  foreign 
representatives  ; and,  incidentally,  to  take  an  opportunity  if  it 
offered,  of  purchasing  war  material.  The  mission,  which  never  went 
beyond  Paris,  returned  to  Japan  in  the  following  August  at  the 
moment  when  arrangements  were  being  completed  for  the  forcing 
of  the  Straits  of  Shimonoseki  by  a combined  foreign  squadron.  It 
brought  for  the  approval  of  the  Shogun’s  Government  a convention 
concluded  by  the  members  of  the  mission  with  the  French  Govern- 
ment. This  somewhat  singular  instrument,  which  bore  the  signa- 
ture of  Monsieur  Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  then  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  provided  that  it  was — after  its  acceptance  by  the  Shogun’s 
Government — to  come  into  force  at  once,  and  was  to  be  regarded 
as  forming  an  integral  part  of  the  existing  Treaty  between  France 
and  Japan.  It  contained,  amongst  other  things,  a stipulation  for  the 
reopening  of  the  Straits  within  three  months  after  the  return  of  the 
mission  to  Japan,  and  also  provided  for  the  co-operation,  if  neces- 
sary, of  the  French  naval  squadron  in  Japanese  waters  with  the 
Shogun’s  forces  in  the  attainment  of  this  object.  The  Shogun’s 
repudiation  of  the  agreement  prevented  the  occurrence  of  what 
might  have  been  troublesome  complications,  the  only  result  of  the 
incident  being  a delay  of  a few  days  in  the  departure  for  Shimonoseki 
of  the  allied  squadron. 

The  ostensible  object  of  this  third  mission,  like  that  of  the  first, 
related  to  Treaty  stipulations.  By  a clause  of  the  treaties  of  1858 — 
the  texts  of  which  were  more  or  less  identical,  while  their  interpreta- 
tion was  governed  by  the  stipulation  regarding  “ most-favoured- 
nation ” treatment — provision  was  made  for  revision  by  mutual 
consent  in  1872.  This  consent  it  was  the  purpose  of  the  mission  to 
obtain.  The  number  of  Treaty  Powers  had  by  this  time  increased 
to  fifteen,  but  the  interests  of  most  of  them  being  very  small,  it  was 
recognized  that  if  the  consent  of  the  chief  Powers  could  be  obtained, 
no  difficulties  would  be  raised  by  others. 

The  working  of  the  treaties  had  been  on  the  whole  satisfactory, 


Missions  to  Foreign  Governments  109 

as  satisfactory,  that  is  to  say,  as  it  was  reasonable  to  expect  from  the 
exceptional  circumstances  attending  their  negotiation  ; and  there 
seemed  to  be  no  special  points  in  regard  to  which  revision  was  in  any 
way  urgent.  This,  however,  was  not  the  view  taken  by  the  Japanese 
Government.  Very  soon  after  the  coming  into  operation  of  the 
treaties  of  1858  the  Japanese  authorities  and  people  seem  to  have 
taken  umbrage  at  the  extra-territorial  privileges  enjoyed  by  foreigners 
in  Japan  under  Treaty  stipulations.  It  is  more  than  probable  that 
this  feeling  with  regard  to  extra-territoriality  may  not  have  been 
altogether  spontaneous,  but  may  have  been  inspired  at  this  time  by 
foreigners  actuated  by  mixed  motives,  and  inclined  to  draw  hasty 
conclusions.  In  any  case,  the  Japanese  early  became  aware  that  the 
enjoyment  of  extra-territoriality  was  regarded  generally  as  a privilege 
conceded  under  pressure  to  the  subjects  of  countries  possessing,  or 
claiming  to  possess,  a civilization  more  advanced  in  some  respects 
than  that  of  the  country  from  which  the  concession  was  obtained. 
The  pride  of  the  nation  rebelled  against  the  discrimination  thus  exer- 
cised, and  not  unnaturally  it  was  eager  to  seize  the  first  opportunity 
that  presented  itself  to  get  rid  of  the  obnoxious  extra-territorial 
clauses  that  stood  in  the  way  of  the  exercise  of  Japanese  jurisdiction 
over  foreigners  in  Japan.  This  was  the  main  motive  underlying  the 
desire  for  revision  of  the  treaties. 

There  were,  however,  additional  objects  in  view  in  sending  the 
mission.  To  the  foreign  representatives  the  Government  explained 
their  anxiety  to  communicate  to  the  Governments  of  Treaty  Powers 
details  of  the  internal  history  of  their  country  during  the  years  pre- 
ceding the  revolution  of  1868,  and  their  wish  to  inform  them  of  the 
actual  state  of  affairs,  and  the  future  policy  it  was  intended  to  pursue. 
They  also  considered  it  important,  it  was  added,  to  study  the  institu- 
tions of  other  countries  and  to  gain  a precise  knowledge  of  their  laws, 
of  the  measures  in  force  regarding  commerce  and  education,  as  well 
as  of  their  naval  and  military  systems. 

So  far  as  these  minor  objects  were  concerned,  the  proceedings  of 
the  mission  were  attended  with  success.  This  was  shown  not  only 
by  the  period  of  its  absence  abroad,  which  extended  over  two  years, 
far  longer  than  had  been  intended,  but  also  by  the  rapid  progress  of 
the  work  of  reform  after  its  return.  The  information  gained  by  its 
members,  amongst  whom  were  some  of  the  most  talented  men  of  the 
day,  was  later  on  of  much  service  to  their  country  ; while  the  insight 


I IO 


Hindrances  to  Reform 


they  gained  into  foreign  affairs,  and  the  disposition  of  foreign  Govern- 
ments towards  Japan,  was  of  the  greatest  value.  In  the  matter  of 
the  ostensible  purpose  of  the  mission,  however,  nothing  was  accom- 
plished. The  efforts  of  the  ambassadors  in  this  direction  met  w'ith 
no  encouragement.  The  foreign  Governments  concerned  were  in- 
disposed to  overlook  the  constant  obstructions  to  the  fulfilment  of 
Treaty  stipulations  caused  by  indifference  and  ill-will  on  the  part  of 
Japanese  officials.  Nor,  in  view  of  the  short  interval  that  had  elapsed 
since  Japan  had  emerged  from  feudalism,  were  they  in  any  haste  to 
gratify  the  aspirations  expressed  in  the  Letter  of  Credence  presented 
by  the  head  of  the  mission  to  the  President  of  the  United  States — • 
the  first  country  visited — which  spoke  of  an  “ intention  to  reform 
and  improve  the  treaties,  so  that  Japan  might  stand  on  an  equality 
with  the  most  enlightened  nations.”  They  accordingly  declined  to 
enter  into  any  discussion  on  the  subject  on  the  ground  that  the 
moment  had  not  arrived  when  the  discussion  could  be  useful. 

The  rebuff  thus  administered  caused  disappointment  and  ill- 
feeling,  and  led  before  long  to  the  beginning  of  an  agitation  for 
Treaty  revision,  which  did  much  mischief  to  foreign  relations  ; was 
frequently  used  as  a convenient  cry  by  politicians  in  the  course  of 
attacks  directed  against  the  Government  of  the  day  ; and  lasted  until 
the  first  of  the  new  revised  treaties  was  signed  by  Great  Britain  in 
the  summer  of  1894.  Its  chief  effect,  however,  so  far  as  foreigners 
were  concerned,  was  to  strengthen  the  Japanese  Government  in  its 
determination  to  resist  all  efforts  on  the  part  of  foreign  Powers  to 
obtain  further  access  to  the  interior  of  the  country,  and  to  restrict 
in  every  way  possible  the  granting  of  any  additional  facilities  for 
foreign  trade  and  intercourse  under  existing  treaties. 

Much  space  has  been  devoted  in  previous  chapters  to  the  abolition 
of  feudalism  as  being  the  starting-point  of  Japan’s  modern  progress. 
The  immediate  effect  of  that  step,  as  well  as  the  various  measures 
relating  to  land  tenure  and  land  taxation,  which  were  its  natural 
sequel,  have  also  been  explained  in  some  detail.  There  is,  however, 
no  intention  to  trace  with  the  same  minuteness,  or  in  strict  chrono- 
logical order,  the  successive  stages  of  the  work  of  reform.  Our  purpose 
being  to  give  a general  idea  of  the  process  which  brought  about  the 
gradual  transformation  of  an  Oriental  country  into  a progressive 
modern  Empire,  we  shall  pass  lightly  over  many  matters,  dwelling 


Language  Difficulties  iii 

mainly  on  such  conspicuous  and  outstanding  features  as  will  illus- 
trate most  clearly  the  character  and  course  of  Japan’s  modern 
development. 

Before  touching  on  other  measures  of  reform  undertaken  in  the 
first  years  following  the  Restoration,  it  may  be  well  to  glance  at  the 
conditions  under  which  the  work  of  reform  proceeded.  The  initial 
difficulty  which  hampered  the  reformers  at  the  outset  was  the 
absence  of  any  definite  scheme  of  reconstruction.  Beyond  the 
surrender  of  feudal  fiefs  nothing  in  the  nature  of  a detailed  pro- 
gramme had  been  thought  out.  They  had  to  feel  their  way.  As 
one  of  the  leading  figures  in  the  events  of  the  Restoration  said  some 
years  later,  “ They  could  not  look  far  ahead  ; it  was  sufficient  if  they 
could  agree  on  the  next  step  to  be  taken.”  Another  difficulty  with 
which  they  had  to  contend  was  the  question  of  language.  The  spread 
of  Christianity  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  had  not 
been  accompanied  by  the  introduction,  to  any  appreciable  extent, 
of  any  of  the  languages  of  the  three  nationalities — Portuguese, 
Spanish  and  Italian — to  which  the  early  missionaries  belonged.  The 
use  of  Latin  in  the  religious  services,  and  the  study  of  Japanese  by 
the  missionaries,  had  rendered  this  unnecessary.  And  when  Chris- 
tianity disappeared,  what  little  Portuguese,  or  other  Latin  language, 
had  come  with  it  disappeared  too.  But  with  the  advent  of  the  Dutch 
things  were  changed.  The  Dutch  language  became  the  medium  of 
commerce,  and  also  the  medium  through  which  all  Western  learning, 
and  indeed  all  knowledge  of  the  West,  was  received.  A class  of 
Dutch-speaking  interpreters,  who  found  employment  in  foreign 
trade,  grew  up  ; and  with  the  enterprise,  unsubdued  by  constant 
official  repression,  and  the  curiosity  for  what  is  new,  which  have 
always  distinguished  the  Japanese  people,  men  took  to  learning  Dutch 
in  order  to  educate  themselves. 

So,  when  foreign  relations  were  renewed  on  a wider  basis  in  the 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  Dutch  was  the  language  to  which 
Japanese  and  foreigners  naturally  turned  as  the  medium  for  the 
conduct  of  the  newly  established  intercourse.  All  communications 
were  carried  on  in  this  language,  and  it  became  the  authentic  text 
of  all  the  earlier  treaties,  including  those  of  1858.  Harris,  the  first 
American  representative  in  Japan,  in  his  diary  gives  us  some  idea  of 
he  trouble  and  vexation  involved  on  both  sides  in  wrestling  with  the 
language  problem.  The  Dutch  the  Japanese  had  learnt  was,  he  tells 


1 12 


Language  Difficulties 

us,  a mercantile  patois,  the  correct  Dutch  spoken  by  the  Dutch 
interpreters  attached  to  his  mission  being  quite  strange  to  them. 
When  it  came  to  drawing  up  written  agreements  in  both  languages, 
they  insisted  that  every  word  in  the  Dutch  version  should  stand  in 
the  same  order  as  its  equivalent  in  the  Japanese  version.  This,  he 
says,  occasioned  some  difficulty,  and  we  feel  that  he  is  not  overstating 
the  case. 

The  employment  of  Dutch  as  the  medium  of  communication  in 
the  early  days  of  renewed  foreign  intercourse,  though  inevitable,  was 
unfortunate.  And  for  this  reason.  During  many  years  of  the  Dutch 
monopoly — so  far  as  Western  nations  were  concerned — of  trade  with 
Japan,  Holland  was  at  the  zenith  of  her  power.  If  not  actually 
mistress  of  the  seas,  she  occupied  a position  of  pre-eminence  as  a 
maritime  state.  But  by  the  time  the  first  treaties  with  Japan  were 
negotiated  Holland  had  lost  this  high  position.  She  was  no  longer  a 
great  Power,  and  consequently  the  knowledge  of  Dutch  possessed  by 
many  Japanese  ceased  to  be  useful  to  Japan.  It  was  necessary  for 
some  other  language  to  take  its  place.  Thanks  to  the  growing  com- 
merce and  power  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  English 
was  the  language  which  stepped  naturally  into  the  breach,  and  it 
became  necessary  for  the  Japanese  to  abandon  Dutch,  and  turn  their 
attention  to  the  acquisition  of  the  new  language  which  had  super- 
seded it. 

So  far  we  have  dwelt  on  the  difficulty  connected  with  the  languages 
of  the  foreigners  who  had  made  their  more  or  less  unwelcome  appear- 
ance on  the  scene,  and  from  whom  Japan  was  intent  on  borrowing 
the  materials  of  the  contemplated  reforms.  If  we  now  turn  to  the 
other  side  of  the  question,  the  difficulty  arising  from  the  Japanese 
language  itself,  it  will  be  seen  how  serious  an  obstacle  to  Japan’s 
modern  progress  her  own  language  presented. 

Until  the  seventh  century  of  our  era  Japan  had,  as  we  have  seen, 
her  own  language.  This  was  spoken,  not  written.  Then  by  one  of 
those  unaccountable  impulses  which  affect  the  destinies  of  nations, 
she  followed  the  example  of  Korea,  which  had  also  spoken  dialects 
of  her  own,  and  adopted  the  written  language  of  China.  Later  on, 
from  the  Chinese  characters  thus  borrowed,  she  evolved  syllabaries, 
filling  the  place  for  her  of  our  alphabet  for  us,  and  so  developed 
native  scripts  of  her  own.  But  this  native  written  language  never 
prospered  in  its  competition  with  the  Chinese  characters  from  which 


Language  Difficulties  1 1 3 

it  was  derived.  Though  it  was  employed  in  poetry,  and  other  native 
classical  literature  and  served  a useful  purpose  as  a literary  vehicle 
for  women  of  the  upper  classes,  in  whose  hands  it  displayed  un- 
expected potentialities,  and  for  the  uneducated  masses,  it  eventually 
found  its  most  usual  place  in  literature  as  a simple  adjunct  to  the 
use  of  Chinese. 

This  incubus  of  two  languages,  disguised  as  one,  was  rendered  still 
more  irksome  by  the  fact  that  the  borrowed  Chinese  written  language 
never  became  thoroughly  assimilated  and  incorporated  with  the 
Japanese  spoken  language  to  which  it  was  joined,  but  preserved  a 
more  or  less  separate  identity.  It  would  have  simplified  matters  if 
the  Japanese  had  given  up  their  spoken  language  and  adopted  Chinese 
in  its  place.  There  would  then  have  been  a natural  harmony  and 
relation  between  the  spoken  and  written  tongues,  such  as  exists  in 
China  to-day.  Japanese  would  then  have  written  as  they  spoke,  and 
spoken  as  they  wrote.  But  this  they  did  not  do.  Their  own  spoken 
language  was  there,  and  had  sufficient  vitality  to  resent  the  intrusion 
of  the  alien  tongue,  though  not  enough  to  enable  the  nation  to  shake 
itself  free  of  the  incubus  it  had  voluntarily  imposed  upon  itself  by 
this  wholesale  importation  of  Chinese  characters.  In  these  con- 
siderations lies  the  explanation  of  the  constantly  recurring  agitation 
in  favour  of  the  adoption  of  the  Roman  alphabet  in  the  place  of 
Chinese. 

In  justice  to  Chinese  characters  it  is  well  not  to  overlook  the 
advantage  which  a knowledge  of  them  gives  to  the  Japanese  people 
over  foreign  competitors  in  their  intercourse  and  trade  with  China. 
It  should  also  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  Chinese  side,  so  to  speak, 
of  the  Japanese  language  lends  itself  with  peculiar  facility  to  the  for- 
mation of  new  words  to  express  new  ideas.  In  this  respect  it  has 
served  to  encourage  the  introduction  of  Western  civilization.  These 
advantages  are,  nevertheless,  counterbalanced  to  a large  extent  by 
the  addition  to  the  language  of  a countless  host  of  dissyllabic  words, 
only  to  be  distinguished  one  from  the  other  by  the  attendant  hiero- 
glyphs. The  result  is  the  creation  of  a cumbrous  vocabulary,  based 
on  Chinese,  which  is  growing  so  fast  as  to  discourage  scholarship,  thus 
hampering  the  very  progress  it  is  employed  to  promote. 

One  other  difficulty  remains  to  be  considered.  In  turning  to  the 
West  for  inspiration  in  the  work  of  reconstruction  Japan  was  borrow- 
ing not  from  one  country,  as  before,  but  from  several,  Nor  was  there 
H 


1 14  Attitude  of  Foreign  Powers 

any  natural  affinity  between  her  and  them,  as  in  the  case  of  the  first 
country,  China,  which  she  had  laid  under  contribution.  The  new 
ideas,  moreover,  she  was  assimilating  belonged  not  to  the  same,  but 
to  different  periods  of  time.  There  was  as  great  diversity  of  date, 
as  there  was  of  origin.  But  they  all  came  together,  and  had  to  be 
harmonized,  in  some  degree,  with  a foundation  of  things  in  its  origin 
Chinese.  Japan  has  been  generally  regarded  as  having  deliberately 
embarked  on  a policy  of  eclecticism.  No  other  course  lay  open  to 
her.  Out  of  the  crowd  of  new  things  which  presented  themselves 
she  had  to  make  a choice.  And  the  urgency  of  the  moment  left  her 
little  time  in  which  to  make  it. 

We  have  noticed  some  of  the  difficulties  which  lay  in  the  path  of 
Japan’s  progress,  and  tended  to  complicate  the  work  of  reconstruc- 
tion. Let  us  see  what  advantages  she  had  to  help  her.  There  were 
not  many,  and  some  were  moral  and  not  material.  The  reforming 
statesmen  were  helped  by  the  feeling  of  exaltation  common  to  all 
political  revolutions,  as  well  as  by  the  wave  of  enthusiasm  for  what 
was  hailed  as  the  restoration  of  the  direct  rule  of  the  Sovereign, 
though  what  this  would  mean,  when  accomplished,  beyond  the  dis- 
appearance of  the  Shogunate,  none  of  its  advocates  had  any  clear 
notion.  The  general  feeling  in  favour  of  reform  which,  with  excep- 
tions in  the  case  of  the  former  military  class,  existed  throughout  the 
country  was  also  in  their  favour.  Japan,  too,  in  these  early  years  was 
conscious  of  the  sympathy  of  Treaty  Powers.  It  has  been  the  fashion 
amongst  a certain  class  of  writers  to  decry  the  attitude  of  foreign 
Powers,  who  are  represented  as  unsympathetic  and  as  having  held 
out  no  helping  hand  to  the  young  Government  then  on  its  trial. 
This  is  an  erroneous  view.  Even  before  the  Restoration,  at  the  time 
when  the  Court  was  openly  hostile  to  foreign  intercourse,  and  the 
Shogunate,  in  its  extremity,  was  facing  both  ways — announcing  to 
the  Throne  its  determination  to  expel  the  hated  barbarian,  while 
assuring  the  latter  in  the  same  breath  of  the  friendliness  of  its  feel- 
ings ; conniving  at  obstruction  it  would  have  liked  to  direct  more 
openly  and  then  feigning  indignation  at  its  own  misdeeds — the 
forbearance  of  foreign  Governments,  and  the  patience  of  their 
agents,  are  things  of  which  the  West  may  well  be  proud.  And  as 
soon  as  the  sincerity  of  Japanese  reforms  was  clearly  understood,  the 
sympathy  of  foreign  Governments  took  a more  active  shape. 

Perhaps,  also,  we  shall  be  safe  in  assuming  that  the  new  Govern- 


Attitude  of  Foreign  Powers  1 1 5 

merit  was  assisted  to  some  extent  in  the  introduction  of  reforms  by 
the  submissiveness  of  the  people  they  were  called  upon  to  rule. 
Under  the  influence  of  Chinese  ideas  the  dividing  line  separating 
rulers  from  ruled  was  very  sharply  drawn.  Both  in  Confucian  ethics, 
and  in  Buddhist  teaching,  the  two  foundations  of  Japanese  morality, 
the  greatest  weight  is  given  to  the  virtue  of  loyalty  to  superiors, 
which  comprises — and  this  is  an  essential  point — obedience  to  con- 
stituted authorities.  Equal  prominence  in  the  same  ethics  and 
teaching  is  assigned  to  the  corresponding  duty  of  the  ruler  to  govern 
wisely,  or,  as  the  phrase  runs,  “ with  benevolence.”  The  conception 
of  the  relationship  between  governors  and  governed,  as  it  presented 
itself  to  the  Japanese  mind  of  those  days,  was  that  it  was  the  business, 
the  duty,  of  the  Government  to  govern,  the  privilege,  or  right,  of 
the  subject  to  be  ruled.  The  latter  looked  to  those  in  authority  for 
light  and  leading.  So  long  as  the  government  was  in  accordance 
with  Confucian  doctrine,  conducted  with  “ benevolence,”  that  is  to 
say,  without  glaring  injustice  and  tyranny,  he  was  satisfied.  The 
establishment  later  on  of  constitutional  government  and  the  practical 
working  of  a Diet  and  local  assemblies  have  somewhat  modified  this 
habit  of  mind.  But  even  in  the  most  stormy  and  tumultuous  sessions 
which  have  of  recent  years  characterized  the  development  of  parlia- 
mentary institutions  the  influence  of  this  old  idea  has  been  apparent  ; 
while  in  the  earlier  periods  of  which  we  are  now  speaking  it  was  a 
dominant  and  salutary  factor,  lightening  very  materially  the  task  of 
the  administrator. 

There  was  still  another  agency  working  in  the  same  direction. 
This  was  the  new  field  of  activity  opened  by  the  changes  accompany- 
ing the  Restoration  to  the  energies  of  the  people,  more  especially 
those  of  the  commercial  and  industrial  classes.  Their  attention  was 
engrossed  in  a large  measure  by  their  own  concerns,  which  were 
rendered  of  increased  and  more  varied  interest  by  the  upheaval 
caused  by  the  revolution  in  national  life.  They  had  thus  little  time, 
even  had  the  wish  been  there,  to  enquire  closely  into  the  direction 
of  public  affairs. 

There  was  advantage,  too,  in  the  fact  that  Japan  had  borrowed 
before,  and  had,  therefore,  gained  experience  in  the  art  of  assimi- 
lating foreign  ideas.  She  was  not  new  to  the  work.  She  was  only 
doing  now  on  a less  extensive  scale  what  she  had  done  on  a previous 
occasion.  And  her  task  was  rendered  more  simple  because  what  she 


1 1 6 Attitude  of  Foreign  Powers 

was  now  taking  from  the  West  lent  itself  to  her  immediate  require- 
ments, perhaps,  in  a more  practical  way  than  her  borrowings  of 
former  days  from  a sister  nation. 

Finally,  we  must  not  overlook  the  immense  advantage  she  had  in 
the  adoption  of  all  reforms  which  were  based  on  Western  models. 
At  no  cost  to  herself,  without  expenditure  of  time,  thought,  labour 
or  money,  she  took  the  fruit  of  generations  of  toil  in  Europe  and 
America.  She  levied  toll  on  all  the  Western  world.  Profiting,  at 
once,  by  the  discoveries  and  improvements  made  in  the  course  of 
centuries  in  every  field  of  human  energy,  she  began  in  her  career  of 
constructive  progress  at  the  point  which  other  countries  had  already 
reached. 


CHAPTER  XI 


Changes  and  Reforms — Relations  with  China  and  Korea — Rupture  in 
Ministry — Secession  of  Tosa  and  Hizen  Leaders — Progress  of  Reforms 
— Annexation  of  Loochoo — Discontent  of  Former  Military  Class. 

THE  changes  introduced  after  the  Restoration  group  them- 
selves broadly  into  two  kinds — those  borrowed  from  abroad, 
and  those  due  to  the  inspiration  of  the  reformers  them- 
selves. The  reforms  affecting  the  land,  which  we  have  already 
considered,  fall  essentially  into  the  latter  category.  Though  some 
colouring  of  Western  ideas  may  be  apparent  in  the  stress  laid  on 
uniformity  of  tenure  and  taxation,  and  in  some  other  respects,  the 
land  reform,  viewed  as  a whole,  was  the  logical  outcome  of  the 
abolition  of  feudalism.  It  was  thus  from  the  first  a matter  into 
which  domestic  considerations  alone  entered,  one  that  was  free, 
therefore,  from  any  marked  foreign  influences. 

Of  a different  kind,  and  bearing  the  manifest  impress  of  importa- 
tion from  the  West,  were  the  introduction  of  conscription  on 
European — mainly  German — lines  ; the  creation  of  a postal  system, 
and  the  opening  of  a mint  ; the  construction  of  the  first  railways, 
telegraphs  and  dockyards  ; the  suppression  of  anti-Christian  edicts, 
and  the  cessation  of  religious  persecution  ; the  adoption  of  the 
Gregorian  Calendar  ; the  formation  of  a Board  for  the  development 
of  Yezo  ; the  establishment  of  treaty  relations  with  China  in  accord- 
ance with  Western  usages  ; the  creation  of  the  Tokio  University  ; 
and  the  removal  of  the  prohibition  regarding  the  use,  in  speech  or 
writing,  of  the  Mikado’s  name.  All  these  changes  occurred  in  rapid 
succession  in  the  short  space  of  five  years. 

With  regard  to  the  change,  or  reform,  last  mentioned — the  re- 
moval of  the  interdict  regarding  the  use  of  the  Emperor’s  name — 
to  foreigners  the  permission  seems  as  strange  as  the  prohibition.  It 
sounds  like  an  echo  from  remote  ages.  But  it  is  difficult  to  ex- 
aggerate the  gulf  which  had  hitherto  separated  the  Throne  from 

117 


1 1 8 Changes  Reforms 

the  people.  Only  in  an  ironical  sense  could  the  phrase  “ the  fierce 
light  that  beats  upon  a throne  ” have  been  applied  to  a Japanese 
monarch.  Both  the  throne  and  its  occupant  were  veiled  in  mysteri- 
ous shadow,  and  to  the  respect  due  to  royalty  was  added  the  venera- 
tion paid  to  a God.  In  the  case  of  the  Mikado,  his  name  never 
appeared  in  writing  until  1868,  when  the  Message  dated  the  3rd 
February  of  that  year,  announcing  to  foreign  Governments  his 
assumption  of  “ supreme  authority,”  in  consequence  of  the  Shogun’s 
voluntary  resignation  of  “ the  governing  power,”  was  delivered  to 
the  foreign  representatives.  This  Message  bore  the  signature 
“ Mutsuhito,”  which  purported  to  be  the  sign-manual  of  the 
Sovereign.  The  change  introduced  was,  however,  of  no  practical 
importance,  for  no  one  wished  to  make  use  of  the  permission  vouch- 
safed. It  is  interesting  only  from  the  fact  of  its  being  a significant 
departure  from  traditional  custom,  and  also  because  it  illustrates 
the  spirit  in  which  all  reform  was  conceived. 

The  establishment  in  1871  of  a new  Board,  or  minor  department, 
for  the  development  of  the  then  northernmost  island  of  Yezo, 
thenceforth  to  be  known  as  the  Hokkaido,  or  Northern  Sea  Circuit — 
one  of  the  many  geographical  areas  distinguished  by  this  name  into 
which  Japan  is  divided — calls  for  notice  chiefly  from  the  fact  that 
it  was  one  of  the  few  instances  of  reforms  which  were  unsuccessful. 
For  the  enterprise  in  question  the  services  of  American  experts  were 
engaged.  The  project,  on  which  in  all  some  £10,000,000  are  stated 
to  have  been  spent,  languished  from  the  outset,  though  some  benefit 
was  ultimately  derived  from  the  horse-breeding  industry  which  was 
then  created  ; and  ten  years  later  the  Board  was  dissolved.  It  was 
in  connection  with  the  abandonment  of  this  undertaking,  the 
direction  of  which  was  entrusted  to  General  Kuroda,  a leading 
Satsuma  clansman,  that  Marquis  (then  Mr.)  Okuma  left  the  Ministry, 
which  he  did  not  rejoin  until  seven  years  later. 

Various  reasons  were  assigned  for  this  failure,  charges  of  official 
corruption  being  freely  made.  As  to  one  contributory  cause  there 
can  be  little  doubt — the  distaste,  or,  it  may  be,  the  constitutional 
unfitness,  of  the  Japanese  people  for  what  may  be  called  the  pioneer 
work  of  colonization.  Those  who  differ  from  this  view  may  point 
to  the  success  achieved  by  Japan  elsewhere,  in  Formosa,  for  instance, 
which  she  received  as  part  of  the  fruits  of  her  victory  over  China  in 
the  war  of  1894-95.  The  conditions  in  that  case,  however,  were 


Changes  &>  Reforms  1 1 9 

exceptionally  favourable.  The  secret  of  her  success  there  lay  in  the 
great  natural  riches  of  the  island,  due  to  virtues  of  climate  and  soil, 
in  a plentiful  supply  of  cheap  labour,  and  in  the  skill,  industry  and 
organizing  talent  which  distinguish  the  Japanese  people.  Formosa 
produces  nearly  the  whole  of  the  world’s  supply  of  camphor,  of  which 
Japan  has  made  a State  monopoly.  Among  other  notable  products 
are  cane  sugar,  now  also  a State  monopoly,  tea  and  rice.  The  de- 
velopment of  these  staple  products  is  a tribute  to  the  thoroughness 
of  Japanese  administrative  methods.  But  the  Japanese  were  never 
pioneers  there  ; nor  did  they  create  the  industries  they  developed. 
These  owe  their  inception  to  the  Chinese  population,  originally 
settlers  from  the  mainland,  which  was  disputing  the  hill  country 
with  the  aborigines  when  the  Japanese  arrived.  Ten  years  after  the 
Japanese  occupation  of  the  island  the  Japanese  inhabitants,  including 
many  officials,  numbered  only  40,000,  as  compared  with  some  100,000 
aborigines,  with  whom  an  intermittent  warfare  is  still  being  carried 
on,  and  about  3,000,000  Chinese.  These  figures  speak  for  themselves. 

The  less  favourable  conditions  of  climate  and  soil  under  which 
similar  operations  have  been  conducted  in  the  northernmost  Japanese 
islands  have  led  to  very  different  results.  Of  recent  years,  owing  to 
the  exploitation  of  coal  mines  and  the  general  growth  of  shipping 
and  commerce,  there  has  been  a marked  advance  in  the  development 
of  Yezo.  As  compared,  however,  with  the  great  strides  made  by 
Japan  in  other  directions,  the  record  of  what  has  been  accomplished 
there  in  the  half  century  which  has  elapsed  since  the  Restoration  is 
disappointing.  Viewed  in  conjunction  with  other  facts,  it  justifies 
the  inference  that  while  the  industry  and  enterprise  of  the  Japanese 
people  ensure  remarkable  results  in  favourable  conditions,  where  no 
pioneer  work  is  demanded, — as  in  Formosa,  Hawaii,  and  the  Pacific 
coasts  of  Canada  and  America — neither  by  physique  nor  by  tempera- 
ment are  they  fitted  to  cope  under  adverse  circumstances  with  the 
strenuous  toil  and  severe  hardships  of  pioneer  colonization.  And  this 
conclusion  is  supported  by  what  we  know  of  the  Japanese  occupation 
of  Manchurian  territory.  The  point  is  of  importance  as  bearing  on 
the  question  of  finding  an  outlet  for  the  surplus  population  of  Japan, 
a subject  which  is  frequently  discussed  in  the  Japanese  Press,  and 
which  will  be  referred  to  again  in  a later  chapter. 

If  the  importance  of  a subject  in  public  affairs  were  measured 
merely  by  the  amount  of  attention  and  labour  bestowed  upon  it, 


120  Relations  with  China  Korea 

religion  would  occupy  an  inconspicuous  place  in  the  list  of  reforms 
of  the  Meiji  era.  Only  to  a limited  extent,  and  then  only  as  identified 
in  a general  way  with  progressive  ideas  of  Western  origin,  can  the 
measures  taken  in  regard  to  religion  be  regarded  as  coming  under 
the  head  of  reforms  borrowed  from  abroad.  Apart  from  slight 
changes  in  the  details  of  ceremonial  observances  at  religious  festivals, 
adopted  later  on,  and  designed  to  bring  such  popular  celebrations 
more  into  keeping  with  Western  notions  of  propriety  and  decorum, 
religious  reform  had  from  the  first  a merely  negative  character.  It 
did  not  extend  beyond  the  withdrawal  of  the  anti-Christian  measures 
that  were  a survival  of  the  Christian  persecutions  of  the  seventeenth 
century.  It  is  generally  admitted  that  the  anti-Christian  feeling 
which  then  arose,  and  the  cruel  penal  law?  it  inspired,  were  due  to 
political  more  than  to  religious  causes.  In  the  toleration  extended 
to  Christianity,  which  found  expression  in  the  withdrawal  of  anti- 
Christian  edicts,  we  again  see  the  operation  of  political  rather  than 
religious  motives.  Political  expediency,  not  religious  animosity,  was 
thus  associated  with  the  beginning  and  end  of  the  anti-Christian 
movement.  This  is  in  accordance  with  all  that  we  know  of  the 
Japanese  character.  All  accounts  of  Japan,  whether  written  by 
Japanese  or  foreigners,  testify  to  the  absence  of  anything  approaching 
to  religious  fanaticism. 

As  for  the  other  measures  affecting  religion  taken  by  the  new 
Government,  they  were  not  even  progressive  in  intention,  for  they 
were  avowedly  a return  to  what  had  existed  centuries  before.  They 
were,  however,  in  accordance  with  the  principles  professed  by  the 
Imperialists  at  the  time  of  the  Restoration  ; and  this  was  the  reason 
for  their  adoption.  It  will  be  more  convenient  to  consider  these 
changes  under  the  head  of  Religion,  which  will  be  treated  in  subse- 
quent chapters. 

On  the  return  of  the  Iwakura  Mission  from  abroad  in  1873  its 
members  became  aware  of  the  serious  crisis  in  domestic  affairs  which 
had  occurred  in  their  absence.  A difference  of  opinion  had  arisen 
on  the  subject  of  Korea.  Since  the  ultimate  failure  of  the  Japanese 
invasion  of  that  country,  towards  the  close  of  the  sixteenth  century, 
which  was  due  to  the  intervention  of  China  at  a moment  when  Japan 
had  exhausted  herself  in  the  long  struggle,  the  relations  between  the 
two  countries  had  been  restricted  to  the  conduct  of  a trifling  trade, 


12  I 


Rupture  in  Ministry 

and  to  formal  missions  of  courtesy  sent  to  announce  the  accession  of 
a new  Sovereign,  or  to  offer  congratulations  on  the  occasion.  This 
trade  was  carried  on  by  the  Japanese  at  the  port  of  Pusan,  on  the 
southern  coast  of  Korea  opposite  the  Japanese  island  of  Tsushima. 
Here  there  was  a small  commercial  establishment  doing  business  with 
the  Koreans  much  in  the  same  way  as  the  Dutch  had  previously 
traded  with  the  Japanese  through  their  factory  at  Deshima  (Nagasaki). 
There  was  a further  resemblance  between  the  former  Dutch  position 
in  Japan  and  that  of  the  Japanese  in  Korea  in  the  fact  that  through 
ill-will,  or  lack  of  enterprise  on  the  part  of  the  Koreans,  the  trading 
operations  of  the  Japanese  merchants  had  become  gradually  more 
and  more  restricted.  At  the  time  in  question  the  attitude  of  the 
Koreans  towards  the  residents  in  the  tiny  settlement  was  the  reverse 
of  friendly,  and  the  Japanese  authorities  had  withdrawn  from  Pusan 
all  but  subordinate  officials.  According  to  Japanese  accounts,  the 
Koreans  appear  to  have  continued  to  send  periodical  missions  of 
courtesy  during  the  whole  period  of  Tokugawa  rule.  But  when  the 
Restoration  took  place  they  refused  to  send  the  customary  envoy  to 
Tokio,  and  also  declined  to  receive  the  envoy  despatched  by  the  new 
Japanese  Government.  Their  refusal  to  have  any  further  intercourse 
with  Japan  was  based  on  the  ground  that  by  adopting  a new  and 
progressive  policy  she  had  shown  herself  to  be  in  league  with  Western 
barbarians,  thus  abandoning  the  traditions  of  the  Far  East  to  which 
China  and  Korea  remained  faithful.  This  affront  to  Japanese  dignity 
caused  great  resentment  throughout  the  country.  It  came  at  a 
moment  when  there  was  already  a good  deal  of  friction  and  smoulder- 
ing ill-feeling  amongst  the  leading  members  of  the  Government,  and 
the  Cabinet,  if  we  may  so  regard  the  inner  political  group  which 
controlled  affairs,  became  at  once  divided  into  two  parties.  One  of 
these,  led  by  the  elder  Saigo,  Soyeshima,  Ito  Shimpei,  Itagaki  and 
Goto,  urged  the  immediate  despatch  of  a strong  remonstrance.  Of 
this  Saigo  was  anxious  to  be  the  bearer,  a course  which,  as  everyone 
who  knew  the  then  temper  of  the  nation,  and  the  character  of  the 
suggested  envoy,  was  aware,  must,  if  followed,  lead  to  war.  The 
other  party,  consisting  of  ChSshiu  and  other  clansmen  centred  round 
the  Prime  Minister,  though  little  disposed  to  condone  any  deliberate 
discourtesy  on  the  part  of  a neighbouring  State  which  had  played  so 
prominent  a part  in  Japanese  history,  felt  that  the  moment  was 
inopportune  for  war.  They  also  probably  distrusted — and  not  with- 


122 


Rupture  in  Ministry 

out  reason — the  motives  which  actuated  the  advocates  of  an  aggressive 
policy. 

The  matter  was  referred  to  Iwakura  and  his  colleagues  in  the 
mission.  Their  influence  turned  the  scale  in  favour  of  a peaceful 
solution  of  the  difficulty,  with  the  result  that  the  leaders  of  the  war 
party  resigned  their  positions  in  the  Government,  their  example 
being  followed  by  many  subordinate  office-holders.  Saigo  and  one 
or  two  others  retired  to  their  native  provinces,  the  rest  remaining  in 
the  Capital.  This  took  place  in  October,  1873. 

The  rupture  in  the  Ministry — the  first  to  occur  since  the  formation 
of  the  new  Government  five  years  before — had  ostensibly  arisen  over 
the  Korean  question.  But  in  reality  there  were  other  issues  at  stake. 
This  much  is  clear  from  the  Memorial  presented  to  the  Government 
in  January  of  the  following  year  by  four  of  the  retiring  statesmen, 
Soyeshima,  Ito  Shimpei,  Itagaki  and  Goto,  together  with  five  other 
officials  of  lesser  note,  whose  names  do  not  concern  us.  Neither  in 
the  Memorial  itself,  nor  in  the  joint  letter  in  which  it  was  enclosed, 
is  there  a word  about  Korea.  The  Memorialists  complain  in  their 
letter  of  the  delay  of  the  Government  in  taking  steps  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  representative  institutions.  One  of  the  objects  of  the 
Iwakura  Mission  was,  it  is  pointed  out,  to  gain  information  for  this 
purpose.  Since  its  return,  however,  the  promised  measures  had  not 
been  introduced.  The  continued  withholding  from  the  people  of 
opportunities  for  public  discussion  had  created  a dangerous  situation, 
calculated  to  lead  to  grave  trouble  in  the  country. 

It  will  be  seen  from  this  letter  that  the  grievance  of  the  Ministers 
who  resigned — with  the  exception  of  the  elder  Saigo — related  to  the 
question  not  of  war  with  Korea,  but  of  the  establishment  of  some 
form  of  representative  institutions,  as  foreshadowed  in  the  Imperial 
Oath.  Their  quarrel  with  the  Government  was  based  on  the  view 
that  the  latter  had  broken  its  promise  to  take  steps  in  the  desired 
direction. 

The  Memorial  was  a repetition  of  this  charge  in  very  prolix  form. 
It  dwelt  on  the  right  of  the  people  to  a share  in  the  direction  of 
public  affairs,  and  on  the  urgency  of  establishing  representative 
institutions. 

The  absence  of  Saigo’s  signature  both  from  the  letter  and 
Memorial  is  not  surprising.  He  had  no  sympathy  with  popular  re- 
forms of  Western  origin.  His  association  in  the  act  of  resignation 


Rupture  in  Ministry  123 

with  men  whose  political  views  were  so  different  from  his  own,  and 
with  whom  he  could  have  little  in  common  except  dissatisfaction  with 
the  conduct  of  public  affairs,  simply  indicates  the  existence  of  a 
general  spirit  of  unrest. 

The  answer  of  the  Government  to  the  memorialists  veas  not  un- 
favourable. They  were  told  that  the  principle  of  an  assembly  to  be 
chosen  by  the  people  was  an  excellent  one.  The  question  of  the 
establishment  of  local  assemblies  must,  however,  take  precedence, 
and  this  matter  was  already  occupying  the  Government’s  atten- 
tion. 

When  discussing  in  a previous  chapter  the  effects  of  the  abolition 
of  feudalism  it  was  pointed  out  what  great  hardship  this  measure 
inflicted  on  the  military  class.  That  the  cx-samurai,  or  shizoku,  to 
give  them  their  new  name,  should  as  a class  be  dissatisfied  with  the 
sudden  change  in  their  fortunes  was  not  surprising.  It  would  have 
been  strange  if  they  had  not  resented  the  loss  of  their  many  privi- 
leges : the  superior  social  status  they  enjoyed,  their  permanent 
incomes  hereditary  in  the  family ; a house  and  garden  free  of  rent ; 
exemption  from  all  taxation  ; and  the  advantage,  appreciated  by  so 
poor  a class,  of  being  able  to  travel  at  cheaper  rates  than  other  people. 
In  the  course  of  the  inevitable  reaction  which  followed  on  the 
accomplishment  of  the  common  object  which  had  united  the  Western 
clans,  and  which,  it  should  not  be  forgotten,  was  the  work  of  the 
military  class,  there  was  ample  occasion  for  the  shizoku  to  realize  all 
that  they  had  lost  by  the  disappearance  of  feudalism.  The  haste, 
too,  with  which  the  new  Government  had  embarked  in  their  course 
of  reform,  copied  from  abroad,  gave  umbrage  to  the  conservatives  in 
that  class  who  still  outnumbered  those  who  were  in  favour  of  pro- 
gress. Nor  was  the  engagement  of  foreigners,  whose  services  were 
indispensable  in  the  execution  of  these  reforms,  less  unwelcome.  The 
foreign  experts  needed  were  drawn  from  various  countries.  The 
assistance  of  France  was  invoked  for  the  army,  and  for  legal  reforms  ; 
that  of  Germany  for  the  army  and  for  medical  science  ; that  of 
Great  Britain  for  the  navy,  for  railway  construction,  telegraphs  and 
lighthouses,  as  well  as  for  technical  instruction  in  engineering  ; 
Americans  were  called  in  to  help  in  the  matter  of  education  and  in 
agriculture  ; while  experts  from  Italy  and  Holland  acted  as  advisers 
on  questions  concerning  silk  culture  and  embankments. 

Speaking  of  the  craze  for  imitating  the  West  which  prevailed  at 


124  Secession  of  Tosa  & Hizen  Leaders 

this  period,  the  History  oj  Japan,  compiled  under  official  direction 
for  the  Chicago  Exposition  of  1893,  says:  “During  the  early  years 
of  the  Meiji  era  any  knowledge,  however  slight,  of  Western  science 
was  regarded  as  a qualification  for  official  employment.  Students 
who  had  shown  themselves  intelligent  were  sent  to  Europe  and 
America  to  inspect  and  report  on  the  conditions  existing  there,  and, 
as  each  of  these  travellers  found  something  new  to  endorse  and 
import,  the  mania  for  Occidental  innovations  constantly  increased. 
To  preserve  or  revere  old  customs  and  fashions  was  regarded  with 
contempt,  and  so  far  did  the  fancy  run  that  some  gravely  entertained 
the  project  of  abolishing  the  Japanese  language,  and  substituting 
English  for  it.” 

Captain  Brinkley,  a friendly  critic,  in  his  History  oj  Japan  confirms 
this  statement.  “ In  short,”  he  says,  “ the  Japanese  undertook  in 
the  most  lighthearted  manner  possible  to  dress  themselves  in  clothes 
such  as  they  had  never  worn  before,  and  which  had  been  made  to 
fit  other  people.  The  spectacle  looked  strange  enough  to  justify  the 
apprehensions  of  foreign  critics  who  asked  whether  it  was  possible 
that  so  many  novelties  should  be  successfully  assimilated,  or  that  a 
nation  should  adapt  itself  to  systems  planned  by  a motley  band  of 
aliens  who  knew  nothing  of  its  characters  or  customs.” 

Nevertheless,  in  many  respects  the  inner  life  of  the  people  remained 
unaffected  by  the  Western  innovations  so  eagerly  adopted.  The 
nation  was  not  called  upon  to  make  such  sweeping  sacrifices  as 
appearances  suggested.  But  the  dissatisfied  conservative  of  the 
former  military  class  who  watched  the  rapid  progress  of  reform  in 
the  hands  of  enthusiastic  reformers  was  not  likely  to  make  any  fine 
discriminations  ; nor  was  it  surprising  if  the  zeal  he  witnessed,  and 
perhaps  also  the  employment  of  unwelcome  foreigners  at  what  to 
him  seemed  extravagant  salaries,  served  to  increase  his  dissatisfaction 
with  the  new  order  of  things. 

In  January,  1874,  a few  days  after  the  presentation  of  the  Memorial 
above  mentioned,  the  smouldering  discontent  burst  into  flame. 
Ito  Shimpei,  one  of  the  memorialists,  who  had  retired  to  Saga,  the 
chief  town  in  his  native  province  of  Hizen,  collected  there  a con- 
siderable body  of  disaffected  shizoku  and  made  a successful  raid  on 
the  prefectural  offices.  The  Government  quickly  despatched  troops 
against  the  rebels.  Driven  out  of  the  town,  they  fled  to  Satsuma, 
hoping  to  receive  assistance  from  Saigo.  No  aid,  however,  was  forth- 


Progress  of  Reforms  125 

coming  from  this  quarter,  and  ltd  and  the  other  insurgent  leaders 
were  arrested  and  executed. 

The  Hizen  insurrection,  and  the  existence  of  much  discontent 
throughout  the  country,  which  showed  itself,  among  other  incidents, 
in  the  attempted  assassination  of  Iwakura,  suggested  the  advisability 
of  finding  some  outlet  for  the  mischievous  energies  of  the  disbanded 
samurai , and  of  diverting  their  attention  from  home  politics.  At 
this  moment  there  arose  an  unlooked-for  difficulty  in  connection  with 
Loochoo,  which  furnished  the  desired  opportunity. 

Loochoo  will  be  remembered  as  the  place  which  Perry  made  his 
base  of  operations  before  negotiating  the  Treaty  of  1853.  The 
principality — for  in  those  days  there  was  a prince  to  whom  his  own 
subjects,  the  Chinese,  and  even  the  Japanese,  gave  the  title  of  King — 
consisted  of  the  large  island  of  Okinawa  and  nine  outlying  groups 
which  are  situated  some  two  hundred  miles  south  of  Japan,  according 
to  the  latter’s  geographical  limits  at  that  time.  By  a curious  “ Box 
and  Cox  ” sort  of  arrangement,  which  lent  itself  to  the  relations  then 
existing  between  Loochoo  and  her  more  powerful  neighbours,  and 
seems  to  have  had  the  tacit  sanction  of  each  suzerain,  the  principality 
regarded  itself  as  a dependency  of  both  China  and  Japan,  paying 
tribute  to  each  as  its  “ parents,”  in  the  phraseology  of  the  day.  The 
payment  of  tribute  to  China  dated  from  the  fourteenth  century  ; 
that  to  Japan  from  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth,  when  the 
islands  were  conquered  by  the  Satsuma  clan.  In  the  winter  of  1872-3 
some  Loochooans  who  were  shipwrecked  on  the  coast  of  Formosa 
(then  a part  of  China)  had  met  with  ill-treatment  at  the  hands  of 
savages  in  that  island.  When  news  of  the  outrage  reached  Japan, 
which  was  not  for  some  months,  the  Japanese  Government  made 
representations  at  Peking.  As  the  Chinese  authorities  refused  to 
accept  responsibility  for  the  acts  of  the  savages,  an  expedition  was 
fitted  out  in  Japan  in  May,  1894,  with  the  object  of  exacting  repara- 
tion from  the  offending  tribe.  General  Saig5  Tsugumichi,  the 
younger  brother  of  the  ex-Councillor  of  State,  from  whom  he  was 
distinguished  by  his  progressive  views,  was  placed  in  command  of 
the  Japanese  forces,  which  consisted  of  some  three  thousand  men. 
China  retaliated  by  sending  troops  of  her  own  to  Formosa,  and  for 
a time  there  was  every  prospect  of  a collision.  The  difficulty  was 
eventually  settled  through  the  intervention  of  the  British  Minister 
at  Peking.  The  Chinese  Government  agreed  to  pay  an  indemnity, 


126  Annexation  of  Loochoo 

and  the  expedition  returned  to  Japan  after  an  absence  of  six 
months. 

The  dispute  with  China  over  Loochoo  was  thus  settled  for  the 
time  being,  but  a few  years  later,  in  1879,  when  Japan  formally 
annexed  the  islands  and  the  King  was  removed  to  Tokio,  the  Chinese 
Government  impugned  her  action  on  the  ground  that  Loochoo  was 
a tributary  state  owing  allegiance  to  China.  The  incident  became 
the  subject  of  lengthy  discussion  between  Peking  and  Tokio,  in  the 
course  of  which  the  advice  of  General  Grant,  ex-President  of  the 
United  States,  who  was  then  visiting  Japan,  is  said  to  have  been 
sought  by  Japanese  Ministers  ; but  in  the  end  the  matter  was  allowed 
to  drop  without  any  definite  understanding  being  arrived  at. 

The  difficulty  with  Korea,  which  had  been  the  ostensible  cause  of 
the  first  rupture  in  the  new  Government,  was  also  settled  by  a show 
of  force  without  recourse  to  actual  hostilities.  In  the  summer  of 
1875  a Japanese  surveying  vessel  was  fired  at  whilst  surveying  the 
river  leading  to  the  Korean  capital.  General  (later  Count)  Kuroda 
and  Mr.  (afterwards  Marquis)  Inouye,  who  was  a native  of  Choshiu, 
were  sent  with  ships  of  war  to  demand  satisfaction.  The  Korean 
Government  offered  apologies,  and  the  envoys  concluded  a Treaty 
which  opened  two  Korean  ports  to  Japanese  trade. 

An  incident  in  Japan’s  foreign  relations  occurring  about  this  time, 
which  calls  for  passing  notice,  is  the  arrangement  made  with  Russia 
in  regard  to  Saghalien.  In  the  Treaty  of  1858  between  Russia  and 
Japan  the  island  was  declared  to  be  a joint  possession  of  the  two 
Powers.  The  Tokugawa  Government  subsequently  proposed  the 
50th  parallel  of  north  latitude  as  the  boundary  between  the  two 
countries,  but  no  final  decision  was  arrived  at.  After  the  Restoration 
the  Japanese  Government  reopened  negotiations  on  the  subject 
through  the  medium  of  the  United  States,  proposing  the  same 
boundary.  The  Russian  Government,  however,  would  not  accept 
this  solution  of  the  difficulty.  Eventually  the  two  Powers  concluded 
an  agreement  at  the  Russian  capital  by  which  Russia  gave  the  Kurile 
islands,  to  which  her  claim  was  doubtful,  to  Japan  in  exchange  for 
Saghalien. 

Neither  the  Formosan  expedition,  nor  the  resolute  measures  taken 
in  regard  to  Korea,  had  any  salutary  effect  upon  the  general  dis- 
content amongst  the  shizoku,  the  pacific  settlement  of  both  matters 
having  frustrated  any  hopes  which  might  have  been  formed  of 


Discontent  of  Former  Military  Class  127 

military  employment  in  a foreign  campaign.  The  settlement  of  the 
Korean  question  was  denounced  as  a weak  surrender,  and  the  Ministry 
were  condemned  for  making  a Treaty  on  a footing  of  equality  with 
a country  which  acknowledged  the  suzerainty  of  China,  thus  com- 
promising the  dignity  of  Japan.  Nor,  in  spite  of  the  appointment  of 
prominent  Satsuma  men  to  the  chief  command  of  each  expedition, 
and  the  inclusion  of  the  Satsuma  noble  Shimadzu  in  the  Government 
in  the  high  position  of  Sadaijin,  or  second  Minister  of  State,  was 
there  any  improvement  in  the  attitude  of  the  clan. 

In  the  course  of  1876  there  were  two  other  risings,  both  promptly 
suppressed,  in  Choshiu  and  Higo,  and  by  this  time  the  state  of  affairs 
in  Satsuma  caused  great  anxiety  to  the  Government.  The  tone  of 
semi-independence  assumed,  as  has  already  been  pointed  out,  by  that 
clan  during  the  Tokugawa  rule  was  maintained  after  the  Restoration. 
In  other  provinces  the  work  of  administrative  unification  had  pro- 
gressed quickly  and  smoothly,  local  officials  being  now  frequently 
chosen  from  other  parts  of  the  country.  But  in  Satsuma  there  was 
a refusal  to  accept  any  official  who  was  not  a native  of  the  province. 
Some  comfort  there  might  be  for  the  Government  in  the  fact  that 
the  clan  had  abstained  from  making  common  cause  with  the  rebel- 
lious clansmen  in  other  provinces,  and  that  the  relations  between  the 
two  chief  leaders,  Shimadzu  and  the  elder  Saigo,  continued  to  be 
strained.  But  these  considerations  were  outweighed  by  others. 

Of  all  the  measures  introduced,  or  contemplated,  by  the  new 
Government,  those  to  which  the  strongest  objection  was  felt  by  the 
shizoku  everywhere  were  the  establishment  of  conscription,  the  com- 
pulsory commutation  of  pensions,  and  the  prohibition  of  the  practice 
of  wearing  swords.  The  last  of  these  measures  came  into  force  in 
January,  1877.  That  conscription  should  be  viewed  with  disfavour 
by  the  former  military  class  was  only  natural,  if  only  for  the  reason 
that  its  adoption  by  opening  a military  career  to  all  classes  of  the 
nation  offended  ancient  prejudices,  besides  being  a death-blow  to 
any  hope  entertained  by  reactionary  clansmen  of  reviving  feudalism. 
The  commutation  of  pensions  had,  as  we  have  seen,  been  arranged 
in  1871,  when  feudalism  was  abolished.  But  the  system  then  intro- 
duced was  voluntary.  Now  it  was  made  compulsory.  Occurring 
when  it  did,  it  provoked  resentment.  The  wearing  of  swords  had 
also  at  the  same  date  been  made  optional.  The  prohibition  now 
enforced  mattered  little  to  the  shizoku  of  the  towns,  many  of  whom 


128  Discontent  of  Former  Military  Class 

had  welcomed  the  opportunity  of  relinquishing  a custom  not  without 
inconvenience  to  town-dwellers,  and  offering  no  longer  any  advan- 
tage. But  to  those  in  the  provinces,  with  whose  traditions  and  habits 
the  wearing  of  swords  was  intimately  associated,  the  change  was  most 
distasteful.  It  was,  moreover,  precisely  in  Satsuma  and  one  or  two 
neighbouring  clans  that  the  option  of  not  wearing  swords  had  been 
availed  of  least.  To  the  Satsuma  malcontents,  whose  military  pre- 
parations included  sword  exercise,  it  might  well  appear  that  the 
prohibition  was  aimed  specially  at  them. 


CHAPTER  XII 


Local  Risings — Satsuma  Rebellion — Two-Clan  Government. 

WHEN  mentioning  in  a previous  chapter  the  occurrence 
of  dissensions  in  the  Ministry  soon  after  the  Restoration, 
attention  was  drawn  to  a point  of  some  importance — 
the  division  of  feeling  which  existed  in  several  of  the  clans.  This 
was  most  conspicuous  in  Satsuma,  Choshiu  and  Mito.  Even  before 
the  Restoration  the  contentions  of  rival  parties  had  led  in  Choshiu 
to  grave  disorders,  which  had  weakened  that  clan  in  its  conflict  with 
the  Tokugawa  Government  ; while  in  Mito  the  struggle  of  opposing 
factions,  supporting,  respectively,  the  Shogunate,  and  the  Court 
party  represented  by  the  old  Prince  of  Mito,  had  resulted  in  pro- 
longed and  fierce  fighting.  Though  in  Satsuma  the  rivalry  of  indi- 
vidual leaders  had  stopped  short  of  open  hostilities,  the  division  of 
feeling  was  not  less  marked.  There,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  the 
situation  was  complicated  by  the  existence  of  no  less  than  three 
parties — two  conservative  groups  led,  respectively,  by  the  old  noble 
Shimadzu,  the  father  of  the  young  ex-daimio,  and  by  the  elder  Saigo, 
the  latter  being  at  once  the  most  influential  and  most  numerous  ; 
and  a third — the  party  of  reform — which  looked  for  guidance, 
amongst  other  prominent  men,  to  Okubo,  Kuroda,  Matsugata, 
Kawamura  and  the  younger  Saigo.  After  the  Restoration  the  con- 
dition of  things  became  less  unsettled  in  Mito,  and  to  some  extent 
also  in  Choshiu.  But  in  Satsuma  the  division  of  feeling  remained 
unaltered,  a circumstance  which,  added  to  separatist  tendencies  that 
stood  in  the  way  of  combined  action,  was,  in  the  sequel,  of  much 
benefit  to  the  Government. 

We  have  touched  on  the  general  and  special  causes  which  brought 
about,  first  a rupture  in  the  Ministry,  then  the  earlier  risings  in 
Hizen,  Choshiu  and  Higo,  and  lastly  the  Satsuma  rebellion.  One 
other  reason,  not  yet  mentioned,  was  personal  and  clan  jealousies  and 

129 


1 


130  Local  Risings 

ambitions.  What  the  disaffected  clans  and  individuals  wanted  was 
a larger  share  of  power.  All,  perhaps,  over-estimated  their  share  in 
the  accomplishment  of  the  Restoration.  They  had,  they  considered, 
paid  the  piper,  and  they  wished  to  call  the  tune. 

Ever  since  his  retirement  from  office,  and  his  withdrawal  to  his 
native  province  in  1873,  the  elder  Saigo  had  remained  in  Kagoshima, 
the  chief  town  of  Satsuma.  Here  he  had  established  an  institution 
which,  in  order  to  disguise  its  object,  was  called  a “ private  school.” 
In  reality  it  was  a military  college.  In  its  central  quarters  in  that 
town,  and  in  branches  elsewhere,  the  youth  of  the  clan  received  a 
military  training.  In  the  autumn  of  1875  it  was  already  in  a flourish- 
ing condition,  and  in  the  course  of  the  following  year  there  were  in 
Kagoshima  alone  some  seven  thousand  pupils,  or  associates.  By  this 
time  much  uneasiness  prevailed.  Public  apprehension  found  free 
expression  in  the  Press,  which  said  that  the  nation  was  divided  into 
two  parties,  one  being  for  the  Government,  the  other  for  Satsuma, 
and  asked  what  could  be  done  to  preserve  peace. 

The  coming  into  force  in  January,  1877,  of  the  edict,  issued  in 
the  previous  year,  prohibiting  the  wearing  of  swords,  was  followed 
by  Shimadzu’s  resignation  of  the  high  office  he  held  in  the  Ministry. 
In  disgust  at  this  latest  move  of  a Government  with  which  he  had 
never  from  the  first  been  in  sympathy,  he  left  Tokio.  Not  being 
allowed  to  travel  by  sea,  he  went  back  to  Satsuma  by  land,  following 
the  historic  route  he  and  other  nobles  had  so  often  taken  before. 
The  members  of  his  retinue  carried  in  cotton  bags  the  swords  they 
were  no  longer  allowed  to  wear  ; and  when,  at  the  end  of  his  journey, 
the  gates  of  the  yashiki  at  Kagoshima  closed  upon  his  palanquin,  he 
may  have  realized  that  he  had  passed  for  ever  out  of  the  political 
life  in  which  he  had  at  one  time  played  so  conspicuous  a role.  In 
the  hostilities  which  followed  he  took  no  part,  being  content  to  show 
his  disapproval  of  the  new  regime  by  withdrawing  into  a retirement 
from  which  he  never  again  emerged. 

Early  in  1877  the  rebellion  broke  out.  Some  excitement  had  been 
caused  in  Satsuma  by  the  rumour  of  a plot  to  murder  Saigo,  and  the 
Government  thought  it  prudent  to  endeavour  to  remove  a part  at 
least  of  the  stores  in  the  Kagoshima  arsenal.  The  execution  of  this 
plan  was  prevented  by  cadets  of  the  “ private  school,”  and  an  officer 
sent  from  Tokio  in  the  middle  of  January  to  arrange  matters  met 
with  a hostile  reception,  and  was  obliged  to  return  without  landing. 


Satsuma  Rebellion  1 3 i 

War  was  now  certain.  A few  days  later  Saigo  took  the  field,  and, 
marching  north  rapidly,  besieged  the  castle  of  Kumamoto,  the  chief 
town  of  the  province  of  Higo.  This  step  is  generally  held  to  have 
been  fatal  to  his  success.  His  proper  course,  it  is  thought,  would 
have  been  to  have  crossed  over  at  once  to  the  main  island  and  move 
straight  on  Tokio,  trusting  to  the  magic  of  his  name  to  secure  fresh 
adherents  on  his  way.  The  rebels  had  some  advantages  on  their  side. 
Their  preparations  had  been  made  ; their  leader  was  a popular  hero  ; 
and  the  reputation  of  the  clan  for  fighting  qualities  was  unrivalled. 
So  universal  was  the  respect  inspired  by  Satsuma  swordsmen  in  those 
days  that  mothers  in  districts  further  north  would  quiet  fractious 
infants  by  warnings  of  the  coming  of  the  dreaded  Satsuma  men, 
just  as  women  in  Europe  in  the  last  century  made  use,  for  the  same 
purpose,  of  Bonaparte’s  name.  It  was  doubtful,  moreover,  what 
reliance  could  be  placed  on  the  mixed  force  sent  by  the  Government 
to  encounter  the  rebels.  But  in  all  other  respects  the  Government 
was  far  better  equipped  for  the  struggle  than  its  opponents.  It  had 
large  military  supplies,  accumulated  in  anticipation  of  what  was 
coming,  besides  money  and  credit.  It  had  the  exclusive  use  of  rail- 
ways and  telegraphs,  a small  fleet,  shipping  facilities,  and  the  com- 
mand of  the  sea.  The  Crown,  too,  was  on  its  side,  an  important 
point,  as  we  have  seen,  in  Japanese  warfare  ; and  it  had  the  further 
and  somewhat  singular  advantage  of  being  assisted  by  the  co-operation 
in  army,  navy,  and  civil  administration  of  the  picked  men,  intellectu- 
ally speaking,  of  the  rebel  clan,  who  had  thrown  in  their  lot  with  the 
Government,  and  knew  the  Satsuma  resources  better,  possibly,  than 
the  rebels  themselves.  One  other  factor  in  the  struggle  remains  to 
be  noted — the  numerous  recruits  wdio  flocked  to  the  Imperial 
standard  from  districts  which  had  formerly  supported  the  Tokugawa 
cause.  Amongst  these  Aidzu  clansmen  were  conspicuous.  Filled 
with  hatred  of  their  late  foes  in  the  Civil  War  of  1868-9,  and  eager 
to  take  revenge  for  the  disaster  which  had  then  overtaken  them, 
they  fought  with  a dogged  courage  and  tenacity,  and,  as  swordsmen, 
in  the  close  hand-to-hand  fighting  which  was  a feature  of  the  war, 
they  more  than  held  their  own  against  their  redoubtable  an- 
tagonists. 

The  investment  of  Kumamoto  by  the  rebels  gave  time  for  the 
Imperial  forces  to  concentrate,  and  the  relief  of  that  place  in  the 
early  summer  was  the  turning-point  of  the  struggle.  It  closed  in 


132  Satsuma  Rebellion 

September  of  the  same  year  with  the  death  of  Saig5  in  Kagoshima, 
to  which  place  he  had  doubled  back  with  a few  followers  through  the 
Imperial  lines.  He  died  in  true  samurai  fashion.  Driven  by  shell- 
fire from  a hill  fort  in  the  Satsuma  capital,  he  was  retiring  to  another 
part  of  the  town,  when  a bullet  struck  him  in  the  thigh,  inflicting  a 
dangerous  wound.  He  fell,  calling  on  a friend  at  his  side  to  cut  off 
his  head,  so  as  to  avoid  the  disgrace  which,  according  to  the  military 
code  of  the  day,  would  be  incurred  were  it  to  come  into  the  hands 
of  the  enemy.  His  friend  did  as  he  was  asked,  and  made  his  escape 
with  the  head. 

The  war  was  a heavy  drain  on  the  Government  exchequer.  An 
official  estimate  of  its  cost,  made  in  1893,  placed  it  as  high  as 
£82,000,000,  an  estimate  which  seems  excessive.  But  the  benefits 
resulting  from  the  dangerous  crisis  through  which  the  nation  had 
safely  passed  far  outweighed  the  sacrifice  in  lives  and  treasure.  Nor 
is  it  easy  to  see  how  they  could  have  been  gained  in  any  other  way. 
The  suppression  of  the  rebellion  was  more  than  a mere  victory  for 
the  Government.  It  meant  the  triumph  of  a progressive  policy  over 
the  medisevalism  of  old  Japan.  The  reactionary  and  disturbing 
elements  in  the  country  had  been  taught  that  the  new  order  of  things 
must  be  accepted.  The  new  conscript  army  had  dispelled  all  doubts 
of  its  efficiency  and  had  demonstrated,  to  the  surprise  of  everybody, 
that  the  fighting  spirit  was  not  the  inheritance  solely  of  the  former 
military  class,  but  that  an  army  recruited  from  all  classes  of  the 
people  was  an  institution  on  which  the  State  could  safely  depend. 
Moreover,  the  administrative  organization  having  successfully  passed 
the  severest  test  to  which  it  could  have  been  put,  the  Government 
felt  that  it  had  acquired  the  confidence  of  the  nation,  and  also  of 
foreign  Powers,  to  a degree  unknown  before.  One  result,  therefore, 
of  the  rebellion  was  that  the  Government  emerged  from  the  struggle 
stronger  and  more  compact  than  before.  To  this  must  be  added 
another  even  more  striking : the  fact  that  the  Satsuma  influence  in 
the  Government  remained  unimpaired  in  spite  of  recent  events. 
This  may  be  explained  partly  by  the  circumstance,  already  noted, 
that  the  party  in  the  rebel  clan  in  favour  of  progress  had  never 
wavered  in  its  allegiance  to  the  Government,  and,  perhaps  also, 
partly  by  the  generosity  shown  to  the  vanquished  by  the  victors. 
The  liberal  policy,  quite  opposed  to  the  traditions  and  the  spirit  of 
that  day,  adopted  by  the  Imperialists  at  the  close  of  the  war  of  the 


Two-Clan  Government  133 

Restoration  was  again  followed  after  the  Satsuma  rebellion.  No 
stigma,  when  hostilities  had  ceased,  attached  to  the  men  who  had 
fought  for  the  clan.  The  temple  dedicated  shortly  afterwards  to 
those  who  had  fallen  in  the  conflict  was  erected  to  the  common 
memory  of  all,  both  loyalists  and  rebels.  From  that  moment,  too — 
though  the  tendency  in  this  direction  had  shown  itself  earlier — the 
administration,  instead  of  being,  as  after  the  Restoration,  a govern- 
ment of  the  four  leading  clans,  became  frankly  a government  of 
the  two  clans  of  Satsuma  and  Choshiu,  a character  it  retains 
to-day. 

The  leading  fact  which  emerges  from  the  foregoing  account  of 
events  is  the  grave  difficulties  with  which  the  Government  estab- 
lished after  the  Restoration  had  to  contend.  One  sees  the  contest 
going  on  between  old  and  new  Japan,  and  the  conflict  of  views  which 
divided  the  men  who  carried  out  the  revolution  ; one  notices  how 
tenaciously,  in  spite  of  edicts  and  regulations,  old  feudal  instincts 
survived  ; and  one  realizes  what  courage  and  skill  were  needed  to 
enable  the  Ministry  of  reformers  to  steer  a middle  course  between 
those  who  wished  to  put  back  the  hands  of  the  clock  and  those  who 
wanted  the  rate  of  progress  to  be  still  faster. 

During  the  period  of  civil  commotion,  which  ended  with  the 
suppression  of  the  Satsuma  rebellion,  the  work  of  reconstruction  did 
not  stand  still  altogether.  To  this  period  belong  the  birth  of  the 
Press  and  the  formation  of  the  Mitsu  Bishi,  the  earliest  Japanese 
steamship  company  ; the  first  assembly  of  provincial  governors,  which, 
after  the  suppression  of  the  Satsuma  rebellion,  became  a yearly 
feature  of  administrative  procedure  ; the  issue  of  regulations  which 
were  the  first  step  in  the  revision  of  local  administration  in  towns 
and  villages  ; and  the  creation  of  a High  Court  of  Justice  ( Daishinin ) 
and  a Legislative  Chamber,  or  Senate  ( Genro-in ),  composed  of 
officials,  that  continued  in  existence  until  1890.  The  Imperial 
message  delivered  at  the  opening  of  the  first  session  announced  the 
desire  to  establish  representative  government  gradually,  and  de- 
scribed the  creation  of  the  Senate  as  a first  step  in  this  direction. 
In  some  respects  the  functions  of  this  Chamber  were  more  those  of 
an  Advisory  Council  than  a Senate  of  the  character  found  in  Western 
Constitutions.  It  had  no  power  to  initiate  legislation,  nor  to  give 
it  final  effect.  But  it  filled  a useful  place  as  a provisional  institution 


134  Two-Clan  Government 

in  the  machinery  of  administration.  It  facilitated  the  work  of 
government  by  drafting  new  laws,  and  by  discussing  and  suggesting 
alterations  in  any  measures  submitted  for  its  consideration.  In  the 
domain  of  foreign  affairs,  too,  by  the  establishment  of  treaty  rela- 
tions with  Korea,  and  the  conclusion  of  an  agreement  with  Russia 
regarding  Saghalien  and  the  Kurile  islands,  to  which  reference  has 
already  been  made,  controversies  of  a troublesome  nature  were 
definitely  settled.  With  the  restoration  of  order  the  work  of  recon- 
struction proceeded  more  rapidly.  A Stock  Exchange  and  a Chamber 
of  Commerce  were  formed  in  the  Capital,  where  also  the  first  National 
Industrial  Exhibition  was  held  ; a bimetallic  system  of  currency  was 
introduced  ; while  the  complications  attending  the  double  allegiance 
of  Loochoo  were  put  an  end  to  by  the  annexation,  already  recorded, 
of  that  island.  A further  step  was  also  taken  in  the  direction  of 
appeasing  popular  clamour  for  representative  government  by  the 
promise  made  in  1878  of  introducing  prefectural  assemblies  at  an 
early  date. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  its  answer  to  the  Memorials  of 
impatient  reformers  in  1873,  when  the  first  rupture  in  the  Ministry 
took  place,  the  Government  had  explained  that  the  introduction  of 
prefectural  assemblies  must  necessarily  precede  the  creation  of  a 
National  Parliament.  Its  attitude  at  that  time  in  regard  to  the 
demands  of  the  advanced  section  of  reformers,  who  were  agitating 
for  the  establishment  forthwith  of  representative  institutions,  was 
clearly  expressed  in  an  inspired  article  which  appeared  in  a Tokio 
newspaper.  In  this  it  was  pointed  out  that  outside  of  the  official 
class  there  was  very  little  knowledge  of  public  affairs,  that  the  imme- 
diate need  of  the  country  was  education,  and  that  the  Government 
could  work  to  better  purpose  by  increasing  educational  facilities 
through  the  establishment  of  schools  than  by  the  hasty  creation  of 
a Representative  Assembly.  The  definite  promise  now  made  after 
the  lapse  of  five  years  was  in  accordance  with  the  view  then  expressed 
as  to  the  necessity  of  giving  precedence  to  local  assemblies,  and  was 
fulfilled  two  years  later. 

It  seems  desirable  to  explain  more  fully  how  the  Government 
directed  by  the  four  clans  which  effected  the  Restoration  became  a 
Government  of  only  two  of  these.  When  referring  to  the  concen- 
tration of  administrative  authority,  after  the  suppression  of  the 
Satsuma  rebellion,  in  the  hands  of  the  two  clans  of  Satsuma  and 


Two-Clan  Government  135 

Choshiu,  mention  was  made  of  an  earlier  tendency  in  that  direction. 
This  was  in  1873,  when  dissensions  in  the  Ministry  first  occurred. 
The  opposition  then  encountered  by  the  Government  came  from  two 
opposite  quarters — from  reactionaries  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the 
other,  from  the  section  of  advanced  reformers.  In  each  case  the 
jealousies  and  ambitions  of  clans  and  individuals  played,  as  we  have 
seen,  a certain  part.  But  whereas  the  aim  of  the  reactionaries  barred 
the  door  to  compromise,  since  they  were  opposed  to  Western  inno- 
vations of  any  kind,  all  that  distinguished  the  views  of  the  more 
eager  reformers  from  those  of  the  Government  was  the  question  of 
expediency — in  other  words,  the  rate  at  which  progress  on  modern 
lines,  equally  the  object  of  both,  should  proceed.  The  reactionaries 
relied  on  force  to  gain  their  ends.  They  were  met  by  force,  and 
were  crushed.  After  the  failure  of  local  risings,  and  of  the  more 
formidable  Satsuma  rebellion,  it  became  clear  that  the  Government 
was  not  to  be  deterred  from  pursuing  its  policy  of  gradual  reform 
by  the  open  menace  of  armed  forces.  Thenceforth,  beyond  the 
isolated  attacks  of  fanatical  assassins,  to  one  of  which  Okubo,  one  of 
the  strongest  of  the  new  Ministers,  fell  a victim  in  the  spring  of  1878, 
the  Government  had  nothing  to  fear  from  the  reactionary  elements 
in  the  country.  There  remained  the  weapon  of  political  agitation, 
open  to  all  who  disagreed  with  the  Government.  To  this  the 
advanced  reformers  resorted. 

The  charge  they  brought  against  the  Government  of  failing  to 
fulfil  the  promise  regarding  the  creation  of  representative  assemblies 
made  in  the  Imperial  Oath  was  not  wholly  unfounded.  There  was, 
as  we  have  seen,  no  obscurity  in  the  wording  of  the  Imperial  Oath  in 
this  respect.  For  a document  drawn  up  in  a language  which  lacks 
the  precision  of  European  tongues,  the  Imperial  announcement  was 
singularly  clear.  It  has  been  stated  by  more  than  one  writer  on 
Japan,  who  has  dealt  with  this  question,  that  the  Imperial  Oath  did 
not  mean  what  it  said,  and  that  it  is  a mistake  to  suppose  that  the 
establishment  of  representative  institutions  was  seriously  contem- 
plated at  that  time.  There  is  no  reason,  it  is  true,  to  credit  the  men 
to  whose  hands  the  shaping  of  the  new  Government  was  committed 
with  anything  but  crude  ideas  of  what  the  Imperial  announcement 
was  intended  to  convey  ; for  the  Oath  was  not  a declaration  of 
rights,  but  simply  a statement  of  intentions,  of  the  principles  on 
which  the  new  Government  was  to  be  conducted.  Nor  is  it  likely 


136  Two-Clan  Government 

that  at  a time  when  the  feudal  system  was  in  operation  any  clear-cut 
notions  of  popular  rights,  as  they  came  afterwards  to  be  conceived, 
could  have  existed.  Without  doubt,  too,  those  responsible  for  the 
language  of  the  Imperial  Oath  purposed  to  impose  class  restrictions 
on  the  deliberative  rights  to  be  granted.  This  much  is  clear  from  the 
character  given  to  the  deliberative  element  in  the  new  administra- 
tion. What,  however,  is  equally  certain  is  that  in  a general,  though 
vague,  way  there  was  a hope  widely  entertained,  and  supported  by 
the  terms  of  the  Imperial  Oath,  of  broadening,  and,  in  a sense, 
popularizing  the  basis  of  administration  ; and  that  the  fact  of 
representative  government  and  public  discussion  being  important 
features  of  administration  in  certain  Western  countries  was  well 
known  to  many  leading  Japanese,  who  understood  them  to  be  typical 
of  advanced  conditions  of  progress,  and  desired  the  early  establish- 
ment of  similar  conditions  in  Japan. 

From  this  point  of  view  the  action  of  the  advanced  reformers  was 
not  without  some  justification.  The  Government,  on  the  other 
hand,  in  deciding  to  move  cautiously  in  the  matter  of  establishing 
representative  institutions  was  probably  guided  by  the  conviction 
that  the  promise  in  the  Imperial  Oath  made,  as  it  was,  in  the  first 
flush  of  revolutionary  enthusiasm,  should  not,  in  the  interests  of 
the  country,  be  construed  too  literally  ; and  in  the  light  of  subse- 
quent events  the  correctness  of  its  decision  was  abundantly 
proved. 

The  views  on  the  subject  of  representative  government  held  by 
advanced  reformers,  amongst  whom  Tosa  clansmen  predominated, 
had,  as  we  have  seen,  received  substantial  recognition  from  those  in 
authority.  A deliberative  element  had  been  introduced  into  the 
new  administration  formed  after  the  Restoration  ; and  the  prin- 
ciple, thus  recognized,  had  been  retained  throughout  all  subsequent 
administrative  changes.  After  the  rupture  in  the  Ministry,  which 
took  place  in  1873,  the  Government  had  again  showed  itself  anxious 
to  meet  the  wishes  of  the  advanced  reformers,  who  had,  mean- 
while, formed  in  the  Capital  the  first  political  association  in 
Japan,  to  which  the  name  of  “Association  of  Patriots  ” ( Aikoku-to ) 
was  given.  About  the  same  time  the  chief  Tosa  leader,  Itagaki, 
had  formed  in  his  native  province  the  first  local  political  society 
called  the  Risshi-sba  or  “ Association  of  men  with  a definite 
purpose.”  In  the  chapter  on  “Political  Parties”  in  Fijty  Tears 


Two-Clan  Government  137 

of  New  Japan  this  society  is  described  as  a political  school  similar 
to  the  Cadet  College  established  by  the  elder  Saigo  before  the 
Satsuma  rebellion.  Early  in  1875  overtures  for  a reconciliation 
had  been  made  by  the  Ministry,  and  at  a Conference  in  Osaka, 
attended  by  Itagaki,  and  by  Kido  who  had  resigned  from  office 
on  another  question  in  the  previous  year,  an  understanding  was 
arrived  at,  both  Itagaki  and  Kido  rejoining  the  Government.  So 
far  as  the  former  was  concerned,  one  of  the  conditions  of  recon- 
ciliation was  the  creation  of  the  Senate  ( Genro-in ),  to  which  reference 
has  already  been  made. 

The  reconciliation  effected  with  the  Tosa  party  was  of  short 
duration.  At  the  assembly  of  prefects,  already  noted,  which  was 
held  a few  weeks  later,  the  question  of  representative  government 
was  discussed.  The  opinion  of  the  prefects  was  in  favour  of  the 
Government’s  previous  decision,  announced  in  its  answer  to  the 
memorialists  in  1873,  that  the  establishment  of  prefectural  assem- 
blies must  precede  the  creation  of  a National  Parliament.  The 
prefects’  endorsement  of  the  attitude  already  adopted  by  the 
Government  on  this  point,  and  the  latter’s  final  decision  not  only  to 
withhold  from  the  Senate  the  elective  character  desired  by  the 
advanced  reformers,  but  to  restrict  membership  to  officials  only, 
caused  much  dissatisfaction  in  the  Tosa  party,  and  in  March,  1876, 
Itagaki  again  severed  his  connection  with  the  Government,  to  which 
he  did  not  return  until  several  years  after  parliamentary  government 
had  been  established.  Ever  since  the  first  rupture  in  the  Ministry 
there  had  been  much  sympathy  between  the  Tosa  party  and  those 
Hizen  clansmen  who  entertained  similar  advanced  views  on  reform. 
Itagaki’s  final  withdrawal  from  the  Government  led  to  the  establish- 
ment of  still  closer  relations.  From  this  moment  dates  the  formation 
of  a regular  opposition  party  of  advanced  Radicals,  and  the  com- 
mencement of  a vigorous  political  agitation  in  favour  of  popular 
reforms,  which  continued,  with  intervals  of  quiescence,  for  many 
years. 

As  the  estrangement  of  Tosa  and  Hizen  clansmen  from  the  Govern- 
ment grew  more  pronounced  in  the  course  of  this  agitation,  the 
relations  between  the  other  two  more  conservative,  and  at  the 
same  time  more  warlike,  clans,  which  supplied  the  military 
strength  essential  to  the  administration,  became  naturally  closer. 
After  the  suppression  of  the  Satsuma  rebellion — which,  as  we  have 


138  Two-Clan  Government 

seen,  in  no  way  impaired  Satsuma  influence  in  the  Ministry — a 
more  definite  understanding  in  regard  to  general  policy  was 
gradually  evolved,  with  the  result,  already  noted,  that  the  direc- 
tion of  affairs  passed  into  the  hands  of  Satsuma  and  Choshiu, 
where  it  still  remains. 


CHAPTER  I XI 1 1 


Japanese  Religions  before  Restoration  : Shinto  and  Buddhism. 

IN  the  previous  chapter  the  outbreak  and  suppression  of  the 
Satsuma  rebellion  were  recorded.  An  outline  was  also  given 
of  the  course  of  events  by  which  the  administration  assumed  a 
new  character,  the  direction  of  affairs  passing  into  the  hands  of  the 
Satsuma  and  Choshiu  clans.  The  point  now  reached,  when  the  new 
Government  is  seen  at  length  firmly  seated  in  the  saddle,  seems  to 
furnish  a suitable  opportunity  for  dealing  with  the  subject  of 
religion.  Though  not  in  all  respects  very  closely  connected  with 
the  development  of  Japan  on  modern  lines,  it  was,  as  we  have  seen, 
indirectly  associated  with  the  work  of  reconstruction  and  reform  ; 
and  this  association  continues,  being  noticeable  from  time  to  time 
in  various  ceremonial  changes  and  other  innovations. 

In  the  moulding  of  Japanese  life  and  character  four  religions  have 
played  a part,  Shinto,  Buddhism,  Confucianism  and  Taoism.  To 
these  a fifth,  Christianity  in  different  forms,  has  in  recent  times  been 
added.  There  is  nothing  peculiar  in  this,  for  other  countries  have 
more  than  one  religion.  But  in  Japan  the  existence  side  by  side  of 
religions  quite  separate  in  character  has  had  curious  results.  Not 
only  have  the  four  earliest  of  these  different  religions  influenced  each 
other  in  a marked  degree,  this  interaction  resulting  in  one  case  in  a 
fusion  of  two  faiths  which  might  almost  be  classified  as  a fresh 
religion,  or  sect,  but  the  singular  habit  of  professing  two  religions 
at  the  same  time  has  been  evolved — a circumstance  without  parallel 
elsewhere.  Every  Japanese  house,  no  matter  whether  the  occupant 
is  an  adherent  of  the  Shinto,  or  Buddhist,  faith,  has  both  Shinto  and 
Buddhist  altars,  at  which  daily  offerings  are  made.  To  the  persons 
concerned  this  dual  worship  conveys  no  sense  of  incongruity,  nor, 
strangely  enough,  is  it  regarded  as  incompatible  with  acknowledged 
adherence  to  one  of  the  two  faiths.  When  questioned  as  to  the 

139 


140  Japanese  Religions  before  Restoration 

religion  they  profess,  they  will  reply  that  it  is  Shinto,  or  Buddhism, 
as  the  case  may  be.  And  there  the  matter  is  left. 

Referring  to  this  point  the  Ja-pan  Tear  Book  for  1915  admits  that 
most  Japanese  are  dualist  in  the  matter  of  religion.  “ A new-born 
child,”  it  says,  “ is  taken  to  a Shinto  ” — [the  words  “ or  Buddhist  ” 
should  here  have  been  added] — “ temple  to  invoke  the  help  of  the 
guardian  deity  for  its  prosperity  or  success  in  life.  When  it  dies,  it 
is  taken  to  a Buddhist  temple  for  burial.” 

The  foregoing  facts  seem  to  confirm  the  statement  made  by  the 
author  of  Fijty  Tears  oj  New  Japan  as  to  the  freedom  of  the 
Japanese  people  from  sectarian  prejudice.  “Whereas  in  China,” 
Marquis  Okuma  says,  “ the  co-existence  of  Taoism,  Confucianism  and 
Buddhism  resulted  in  a war  of  creeds  which  weakened  that  empire, 
and  was  the  cause  of  its  present  condition,  the  presence  side  by  side 
of  four  different  beliefs  in  Japan  ” [not  counting  Christianity]  “ gave 
rise  to  no  sectarian  strife  whatever.”  Marquis  Okuma’s  assertion 
applies,  indeed,  with  more  accuracy  to  present  than  to  past  times. 
He  appears  to  overlook  more  than  one  instance  in  Japanese  history 
where  excess  of  religious  zeal  has  caused  not  only  sectarian  strife, 
but  popular  commotion,  which  has  led  in  its  turn  to  interference 
on  the  part  of  the  authorities.  There  can  be  little  doubt,  however, 
that  the  matter  of  religion  has,  on  the  whole,  never  been  taken  so 
seriously  by  the  Japanese  as  by  other  peoples.  It  is  equally  clear  that 
the  authorities  in  their  attitude  towards  religion  have  invariably 
been  guided  by  political  expediency,  rather  than  by  religious 
motives. 

How  far  political  considerations  have  affected  religious  develop- 
ment in  Japan  will  be  seen  later  on  in  the  course  of  the  next  chapter, 
when  it  will  also  be  more  convenient  to  deal  with  the  latest  of 
Japanese  religions,  Christianity,  as  being  specially  identified  with 
the  nation’s  modern  progress.  Let  us  first  dwell  briefly  on  the 
distinctive  features  of  the  religions  themselves,  as  they  existed  before 
the  reopening  of  Japan  to  foreign  intercourse,  beginning  with  Shinto 
the  native  faith. 

Originally  a form  of  nature-worship,  Shinto  at  an  early  date  came 
to  include  ancestor-worship.  This  was  due  to  the  influence  of 
Buddhism  and  Confucianism.  The  cult  of  natural  deities  known  by 
the  general  designation  of  kami — a word  of  many  meanings — was 
thus  extended  so  as  to  include  deified  heroes,  deceased  sovereigns, 


Shinto  Buddhism  14 1 

and,  finally,  abdicated  and  reigning  Mikados,  as  being  of  divine 
descent.  Shinto  ritual,  as  handed  down  from  ancient  times,  is 
limited  to  formulas  of  prayer  to  natural  deities  ; its  ceremonial  is 
concerned  solely  with  purification  for  wrong-doing,  or  for  defilement 
by  contact,  real  or  imaginary,  with  the  dead.  It  had  no  authorized 
funeral  rites,  nor  were  there  any  Shinto  cemeteries.  It  has  no  sacred 
books,  no  dogmas,  no  moral  code.  All  these  it  was  left  to  other 
religions,  chiefly  Buddhism,  to  supply.  Notwithstanding  the  absence 
of  these  features,  common  to  most  religions,  the  author  of  a work  on 
Buddhism,  The  Creed  of  Half  Japan  (the  Rev.  Arthur  Lloyd),  speaks 
of  it  as  having  “ a slight  flavour  of  philosophy,  a vague  but  deep- 
seated  religiosity,”  and  as  making  “ a strong  appeal  to  Japanese 
pride.”  The  correctness  of  this  last  statement  no  one  will  be  inclined 
to  dispute,  for  to  the  influence  of  Shinto  ideas  regarding  the  semi- 
divinity of  Japanese  monarchs  the  unbroken  character  of  the  dynasty 
is  largely  due. 

A peculiar  feature  of  the  Japanese  native  religion,  namely,  its 
connection  with  the  worship  of  animals,  is  described  by  Mr.  Aston 
in  his  “ Shinto  ” : — 

“ Animals,”  he  says,  “ may  be  worshipped  for  their  own  sakes,  as 
wonderful,  terrible,  or  uncanny  beings.  The  tiger,  the  serpent,  and 
the  wolf  are  for  this  reason  called  kami.  But  there  are  no  shrines 
in  their  honour,  and  they  have  no  regular  cult.  A more  common 
reason  for  honouring  animals  is  their  association  with  some  deity  as 
his  servants,  or  messengers.  Thus  the  deer  is  sacred  at  ” [the  shrine 
of]  “Kasuga,the  monkey  at”  [that  of]  “Hiyoshi,the  pigeon  to  the  god 
(of  war),  the  white  egret  at  the  shrine  of  Kebi  no  Miya,  the  tortoise 
at  Matsunoo,  and  the  crow  at  Kumano.  . . . The  pheasant  is  the 
messenger  of  the  Gods  generally.  The  best  known  case  of  the 
worship  of  an  associated  animal  is  that  of  Inari,  the  rice-god,  whose 
attendant  foxes  are  mistaken  by  the  ignorant  ” [namely,  the  uneducated 
masses]  “ for  the  god  himself,  and  whose  effigies  have  offerings  made 
to  them.”  The  “ Korean  dogs,”  he  adds,  seen  in  front  of  many 
Shinto  shrines,  are  meant  not  as  gods  but  as  guardians,  like  the  great 
figures  on  each  side  of  the  entrance  to  Buddhist  temples. 

Japanese  writers  fix  the  date  of  the  introduction  of  Buddhism 
into  Japan  at  about  the  middle  of  the  sixth  century.  The  Buddhism 
then  introduced  was  that  of  the  so-called  Northern  School,  the 
doctrines  of  which  are  based  on  what  is  known  as  the  “ Mahayana 


142  Japanese  Religions  before  Restoration 

Vehicle.”  One  of  its  earliest  adherents  was  the  Imperial  Prince 
Shotoku  Taishi,  who,  though  he  never  occupied  the  throne,  virtually 
ruled  the  country  for  many  years  as  deputy,  or  Vice-Regent,  for  his 
aunt  the  Empress  Suiko.  He  it  was  who  carried  out  the  “ Great 
Reform,”  which  revolutionized  Japanese  administration  in  imitation 
of  Chinese  models.  He  also  did  much  to  propagate  Buddhism,  which 
at  that  time  was  unsectarian.  It  was  not  till  after  his  death  in  a.d.  620 
that  the  first  sects  came  into  existence.  By  the  end  of  the  eighth 
century  there  were  eight  sects,  of  which  two  only,  the  Tendai  and 
Shingon,  now  survive.  The  chief  sects,  in  addition  to  these  two,  are 
the  Zen,  Jodo,  Shin  and  Nichiren,  all  of  which  were  founded  during 
the  rule  of  the  Hojo  Regents  in  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries. 
Into  the  question  of  the  tenets  which  distinguish  these  different 
sects,  one  from  another,  it  is  unnecessary  to  enter.  It  will  be  suffi- 
cient to  indicate  the  main  characteristics  of  the  three,  the  Zen,  Shin 
and  Nichiren  sects,  which  have  by  far  the  most  numerous  adherents. 

The  Zen  sect,  the  earliest  of  the  three,  which  has  six  sub-sects, 
was  established  in  the  first  years  of  the  thirteenth  century,  its  founder 
being  the  Buddhist  priest  Eisai  Zenshi.  It  has,  Mr.  Lloyd  tells  us, 
always  been  more  or  less  influenced  by  Confucianism,  and  is  opposed 
to  what  its  followers  regard  as  the  anthropomorphic  tendencies  of 
other  sects.  It  recognizes  a supreme  being,  but  refuses  to  personify 
him,  holding  that  personification  of  this  kind  is  but  a pious  device  to 
adapt  the  truth  to  the  weakness  of  human  intellect.  Apart  from 
actual  doctrine,  the  main  feature  of  the  Zen  sect  is  the  practice  of 
silent  meditation  for  the  purpose  of  acquiring  by  introspective  con- 
templation a detached  and  philosophic  habit  of  mind.  Before  the 
abolition  of  feudalism  it  was  the  favourite  sect  of  the  military  class, 
and  to  this  day  it  includes  more  naval  and  military  men  among  its 
adherents  than  other  sects,  while  its  influence  on  Bushido  has  been 
very  marked. 

The  Shin  sect,  which  has  also  six  sub-sects,  was  founded  by  the 
priest  Shinran  Shonin.  The  position  which  it  holds  in  regard  to 
other  Buddhist  sects  is  in  some  respects  similar  to  that  of  Protestantism 
in  regard  to  Roman  Catholicism.  Its  followers  eat  meat,  and  the 
clergy  are  free  to  marry.  The  chief  point  in  its  doctrine  is  salvation 
by  faith  through  the  mercy  of  Buddha,  and,  in  Mr.  Lloyd’s  opinion, 
the  whole  system  of  the  founder  “ savours  strongly  of  Nestorianism,” 
which  was  propagated  in  China  as  far  back  as  the  seventh  century. 


Shinto  & Buddhism  143 

There  remains  to  be  noticed  the  Nichiren  sect.  This,  the  most 
active  and  indeed  aggressive,  and,  it  may  be  added,  the  noisiest  in 
the  conduct  of  religious  festivals,  of  all  Buddhist  sects,  was  estab- 
lished by  the  priest  Nichiren.  His  object,  as  we  learn  from  the 
author  previously  quoted,  was  to  purge  Japanese  Buddhism  from  the 
errors  which,  in  his  view,  had  crept  into  it,  and  restore  the  primitive 
character  imparted  to  the  Buddhist  faith  by  its  Indian  founder. 
The  ardour  with  which  he  pursued  his  object  led  him  to  trench  on 
political  matters,  and  brought  him  into  collision  with  the  authorities. 
He  was  a fierce  opponent  of  the  Zen  sect,  and  its  Confucian  ten- 
dencies, describing  it  as  “ a doctrine  of  demons  and  fiends.” 

Owing  to  the  circumstances  attending  its  introduction  the  traces 
of  Chinese  influence  in  Japanese  Buddhism  are  naturally  very 
marked.  This  influence  was  increased  by  the  frequent  visits  paid  by 
Japanese  monks  to  China,  where  they  came  into  direct  contact  with 
Chinese  religious  thought.  Nevertheless,  the  fact  that  the  three 
sects  most  prominent  to-day  owe  their  origin  and  development  to 
Japanese  priests  is  evidence  of  a certain  tendency  towards  national 
independence  in  religious  matters.  Buddhism,  it  may  be  added, 
has  more  adherents  in  Japan  than  ShintS,  though  the  difference  in 
numbers  is  not  great. 

The  fusion  of  Shinto  and  Buddhism  under  the  name  of  Riobu 
Shinto,  which,  according  to  the  best  authorities,  took  place  in  the 
ninth  century,  is  generally  regarded  as  the  work  of  the  Shingon  sect 
of  Buddhists,  though  the  Tendai  sect  appears  to  have  been  associated 
in  the  movement.  By  this  fusion,  which  seems  to  have  been  copied 
from  earlier  attempts  in  China  to  amalgamate  Buddhism  and  Con- 
fucianism, the  Shinto  Kami,  or  deities,  were — by  a pious  fraud  known 
to  Japanese  Buddhists  by  the  term  hoben — received  into  the  Buddhist 
pantheon  as  avatars  of  ancient  Buddhas.  Its  Buddhist  character  is 
sufficiently  indicated  by  the  qualifying  prefix  in  its  name  of  Riobu, 
which  means  “ two  parts,”  namely,  the  two  mystical  worlds  that 
figure  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Shingon  sect  ; its  Shinto  connection  is 
shown  by  the  worship  of  Shinto  deities  under  Buddhist  names. 
“ Despite  its  professions  of  eclecticism,”  says  Mr.  Aston  in  his  book 
already  quoted,  “ the  soul  of  Riobu  Shinto  was  essentially  Buddhist.” 
He  speaks,  also,  of  the  movement  as  the  formation  of  a new  sect,  a 
view  in  which  Professor  Chamberlain  in  his  Things  Japanese  does 
not  seem  altogether  to  concur.  The  point  may  be  left  to  Shinto 


144  Japanese  Religions  before  Restoration 

and  Buddhist  scholars  to  determine.  The  result  of  the  fusion,  in 
any  case,  was  that  most  Shinto  shrines  became  Riobu  Shinto  temples. 
In  many  of  these  Buddhist  priests  alone  officiated,  but  in  some  cases 
such  temples  had  separate  establishments  of  Shinto  and  Buddhist 
clergy,  who  conducted  services  alternately  in  the  same  buildings. 

Although  Confucianists  can  point  to  the  existence  of  a temple  of 
that  religion  in  Tokio,  neither  Confucianism  nor  Taoism — both  of 
which  came  to  Japan  with  the  adoption  of  the  written  language  of 
China — had  ever  quite  the  status  of  established  religions.  It  would 
be  difficult  to  overestimate  the  part  played  by  Confucian  ethics  in 
the  development  of  Japanese  character  and  thought.  Those,  more- 
over, who  have  studied  the  subject  profess  to  see  both  in  Shinto  and 
Buddhism  the  impress  of  Taoist  philosophy.  In  both  cases,  however, 
the  influence  of  these  cults  on  the  Japanese  people  has  been  exercised 
indirectly,  by  the  infiltration  of  Confucian  and  Taoist  principles  into 
other  faiths,  and  not  directly,  as  would  have  been  the  case  had  they 
operated  in  the  character  of  separate  and  distinct  religions. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


Japanese  Religions  after  Restoration  : Christianity — BushidS — 
Religious  Observances. 

THE  political  considerations  which  have  affected  religious 
development  in  Japan  are  chiefly,  though  by  no  means 
entirely,  connected  with  her  modern  progress.  Under  the 
Tokugawa  administration  matters  concerning  religion  were  entrusted 
to  official  dignitaries  called  Jisha-bugid,  who,  as  their  name,  “ Con- 
trollers of  Buddhist  and  Shinto  temples,”  implies,  took  charge,  in 
addition  to  other  and  more  important  administrative  duties,  of  all 
business  connected  with  these  two  religions.  Both  religions  were  thus 
recognized  by  the  State,  and  were  equally  matters  of  concern  to  the 
Tokugawa  Government,  though  its  leanings  were  towards  Buddhism. 
The  Imperial  Court,  on  the  other  hand,  during  this  period  favoured 
Shinto.  This  it  had  not  always  done.  Until  the  advent  to  power  of 
the  military  ruler  Nobunaga  in  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century 
Buddhism  had  for  several  centuries  been  the  dominating  religion. 
The  Jesuit  missionaries  who  then  reached  Japan  found  Buddhism  at 
the  high  tide  of  its  power.  At  the  Imperial  Court,  and  everywhere 
throughout  the  country,  it  exercised  a supreme  influence.  Its  mili- 
tary strength,  too,  at  that  time  was  formidable.  The  abbots  of 
Buddhist  monasteries  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Capital  and  elsewhere, 
like  militant  bishops  in  the  Middle  Ages  in  Europe,  kept  garrisons  of 
fighting  monks,  which  constituted  a serious  menace  to  administrative 
authority.  A ruthless  campaign  conducted  by  the  ruler  in  question 
put  an  end  to  this  state  of  things.  From  the  blow  then  dealt  to  it 
the  Buddhist  militant  clergy  never  recovered.  As  a result  of  the 
movement  in  the  eighteenth  century,  known  as  “ The  Revival  of 
Pure  Shinto,”  to  which  reference  was  made  in  a previous  chapter, 
Buddhism  for  a time  came  under  a cloud.  But  its  influence  was 
subsequently  re-established,  Shinto  sinking  back  again  into  the 
secondary  place  it  had  occupied  before. 

K 145 


146  Japanese  Religions  after  Restoration 

When  the  Restoration  took  place  the  respective  positions  of  the 
two  religions  were  entirely  changed.  The  professed  aim  of  the 
revolution  being  to  restore  the  system  of  direct  Imperial  rule,  the 
new  Government  naturally  adopted  every  means  of  accomplishing 
this  object.  And,  as  belief  in  the  divine  descent  of  the  Mikados  was 
a part  of  Shinto  doctrine,  the  encouragement  of  the  native  religion 
became  an  important  point  in  the  programme  of  the  reformers.  In 
the  organization  of  the  new  administration,  therefore,  formed  on  an 
ancient  bureaucratic  model,  prominence  was  given  to  religion  in  the 
single  form  of  Shinto  by  the  creation  of  a separate  department  of 
State  for  the  control  of  Shinto  affairs.  To  this  the  name  of  Jinji- 
jimu-Kioku,  shortly  afterwards  changed  to  jingikwan,  was  given. 
Shinto  thus  became  a synonym,  as  it  were,  for  religion  ; while 
Buddhism  was  left  out  in  the  cold,  and,  as  a Church,  was  practically 
disestablished.  Nor  did  the  zeal  of  the  reformers,  who  had  thus  in 
effect  created  a State  religion,  end  here. 

A form  of  abdication  of  frequent  occurrence  in  Japan  had  been 
retirement  into  the  Buddhist  priesthood.  The  custom  was  common 
to  the  whole  nation,  and  its  practice  by  Mikados,  princes  of  the 
Imperial  House,  Court  nobles  and  the  feudal  aristocracy,  had  in- 
creased the  prestige  of  Buddhism,  while  enriching  the  sects  whose 
temples  were  thus  favoured.  The  new  Government  prohibited  this 
custom,  so  far  as  the  Imperial  House  and  the  nobility  were  con- 
cerned ; all  Riobu  Shinto  temples  were  restored  to  their  ancient  status 
of  Shinto  shrines  ; and  at  the  same  time  many  Buddhist  temples 
throughout  the  country  were  deprived  of  the  lands  from  which  their 
revenues  were  largely  drawn.  This  act  of  spoliation  served  a double 
purpose.  It  benefited  the  depleted  national  exchequer  and  dis- 
couraged the  adherents  of  the  ex-Shogun,  whose  family  had  always 
patronized  Buddhism. 

An  innovation  introduced  at  this  time,  with  the  object  apparently 
of  popularizing  Shinto  and  bringing  it  into  line,  so  to  speak,  with 
religions  elsewhere,  was  the  institution  of  Shinto  funerals  ; the  per- 
formance of  funeral  rights,  as  well  as  the  care  of  cemeteries,  having 
been  entrusted  hitherto  to  Buddhist  priests. 

That  these  steps  were  dictated  by  policy,  and  were  not  due  to 
sectarian  feeling,  is  evident  from  the  whole  course  of  subsequent 
action  in  regard  to  religious  matters.  In  1871  the  jingikwan  was 
abolished,  and  Shinto  ceased  to  be  the  only  State  religion,  though 


Christianity  147 

retaining  to  some  extent  its  privileged  character.  The  place  of  the 
defunct  department  which  had  ranked  with  the  Council  of  State 
was  taken  by  the  Kiobusho,  or  Department  of  Religion,  in  which  both 
Shinto  and  Buddhism  enjoyed  official  recognition,  as  before.  For 
convenience  of  administration  a distinction  was  made  between  secular 
matters  and  religious  worship,  the  latter  being  placed  under  the 
control  of  a Bureau  of  Rites  and  Ceremonies.  This  distinction  is 
still  maintained.  The  official  recognition  enjoyed  by  each  religion 
has  been  tacitly  extended  to  Christianity  ; but  the  principle  of  State 
policy  regarding  Shinto  survives.  It  is  still  par  excellence  the  Court 
religion,  though  the  fact  that  on  the  accession  of  a new  Sovereign 
his  robes  are  blessed  at  a certain  Buddhist  temple  in  Kioto  show's  that 
Buddhism  has  still  an  accepted  position  at  Court.  There  is  a Shinto 
bureau  in  the  Imperial  Household  Department,  and  a Shinto  shrine 
stands  in  the  Palace. 

The  services  in  the  Palace  shrine  at  w'hich  the  Emperor  personally 
officiates,  and  the  worship  by  members  of  the  Imperial  family,  or 
their  proxies,  at  the  chief  shrines  in  the  country,  secure  for  the  Shinto 
faith  the  first  place  in  public  esteem.  The  erection,  moreover,  in 
the  Capital,  since  the  Restoration,  of  a national  shrine  to  the  memory 
of  all  who  have  died  fighting  at  home,  or  abroad,  has  established  a 
new  centre  of  Shinto  worship,  where  the  native  religion,  in  direct 
association  with  military  and  patriotic  sentiment,  gains  a fresh  hold 
on  popular  sympathy.  More  recently,  too,  the  functions  of  the 
Shinto  clergy  have  been  extended  so  as  to  include  the  ceremony  of 
marriage,  which  was  formerly  unconnected  wdth  religion  of  any  kind, 
while  since  the  annexation  of  Korea  a Shinto  shrine  has  been  estab- 
lished in  Seoul. 

The  purely  national  character  of  the  Japanese  native  religion  ex- 
cludes the  idea  of  its  propagation  in  foreign  countries.  No  such 
obstacle  exists  in  the  case  of  Buddhism.  After  the  Restoration  several 
Buddhist  sects  turned  their  attention  to  missionary  effort  abroad.  A 
more  or  less  active  propaganda  has  since  then  been  carried  on  in 
Asiatic  countries,  and  the  right  of  Japanese  subjects  to  engage  in 
missionary  work  in  China  is  recognized  in  the  Treaty  concluded  with 
that  country  in  1905  after  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  The  activity  of 
the  Buddhist  clergy  in  recent  times  has  shown  itself  in  two  ways  quite 
unconnected  with  religious  propaganda.  Extensive  journeys  in 
Central  Asia  for  political  and  scientific  purposes  have  been  under- 


148  Japanese  Religions  after  Restoration 

taken  by  Buddhist  travellers,  who  in  the  course  of  their  wanderings 
have  gained  much  valuable  information  ; while  others  have  done 
useful  work  in  supplying  the  spiritual  needs  of  Japanese  communities 
abroad. 

The  reopening  of  Japan  to  foreign  intercourse  added  another  to 
the  list  of  Japanese  religions,  though  it  was  not  till  after  the  with- 
drawal of  the  anti-Christian  edicts  in  1870  that  the  Japanese  people 
were  permitted  to  adopt  openly  the  new  faith.  If  the  progress 
Christianity  has  made  since  then  compares  unfavourably  with  its 
rapid  spread  when  first  introduced  in  the  sixteenth  century,  this  is 
explained  by  the  less  favourable  circumstances  attending  its  re- 
introduction.  When  introduced  by  Jesuit  missionaries,  it  was 
regarded  in  some  places  as  being  simply  a new  form  of  Buddhism, 
the  authorities  being  misled  by  a certain  resemblance  in  ritual.  On 
its  later  reintroduction  it  had  to  contend  against  official  and  popular 
prejudice  due  to  the  previous  persecution,  while,  instead  of  being 
preached,  as  formerly,  in  the  single  form  of  Roman  Catholicism,  it 
came  under  several  forms,  the  number  of  which  increased  as  more 
missionaries  arrived.  A somewhat  similar  advantage,  however, 
marked  its  introduction  on  each  occasion.  Just  as  Christianity,  when 
introduced  under  Jesuit  auspices,  was  at  first  encouraged  for  the  sake 
of  the  trade  which  came  with  it,  so,  on  its  reintroduction,  it  was 
welcomed  as  a means  of  learning  English.  This  advantage  it  still 
retains.  An  account,  written  in  1917,  of  the  religious  work  carried 
on  by  the  “ Young  Men’s  Christian  Association  ” since  its  establish- 
ment in  the  Capital  in  1880  contains  the  following  statement  : “ One 
of  the  most  fruitful  phases  of  the  movement  has  been  the  securing 
of  Christian  college  graduates  from  Canada  and  the  United  States 
to  teach  English  in  Japanese  schools.  While  these  teachers  arc 
appointed  and  salaried  by  the  schools,  they  are  free  to  use  their 
leisure  for  Christian  work  among  the  students.  There  are  now 
twenty-seven  such  teachers.”  Evidence,  moreover,  of  the  close 
connection  between  Christianity  and  the  modern  progress  of  Japan, 
and  of  the  benefit  derived  by  the  former  from  the  increased  study 
of  foreign  languages,  which  is  one  of  the  results  of  this  progress,  is 
supplied  by  a Japanese  bishop,  the  Rev.  Y.  Honda,  and  Mr.  Y.  Yamaji 
in  the  chapter  on  Christianity  contributed  by  them  to  the  book 
already  mentioned,  Fijty  Tears  of  New  Japan. 


Bushido  149 

Opinions  differ  as  to  the  future  of  Christianity  in  Japan.  The 
Reports  of  foreign  missionary  societies  furnish  encouraging  data 
regarding  the  results  of  missionary  efforts  during  the  last  half-century. 
Nevertheless,  a feeling  of  uncertainty  regarding  the  prospects  of 
Christianity  prevails  both  in  Japanese  and  foreign  circles.  There  is 
a tendency  to  regard  the  eventual  Christianization  of  the  country  as 
doubtful,  though  the  progress  already  made  is  freely  admitted.  To 
enter  into  the  various  considerations  which  influence  opinion  on  this 
point  would  require  more  space  than  is  at  our  disposal.  An  idea, 
however,  which  is  entertained  by  not  a few  attentive  observers  is 
that,  in  the  event  of  Christianity  becoming  in  the  distant  future  the 
dominant  religion  of  Japan,  it  will  be  Christianity  in  a new  form 
evolved  by  the  people  for  themselves.  They  will  do,  it  is  thought, 
with  Christianity  as  they  have  done  with  the  Buddhism  imported 
from  abroad,  and  mould  it  to  suit  their  own  taste.  This  view  derives 
some  support  from  the  two  separate  movements — one  towards  inde- 
pendence, namely,  freedom  from  foreign  control ; the  other  towards 
amalgamation — which  have  taken  place  in  recent  years  in  several 
Japanese  Christian  churches.  A notable  instance  of  the  first  of  these 
movements  occurred  some  years  ago  in  the  case  of  the  Congregation- 
alist  University  in  Kioto.  In  that  case  the  agitation  for  independence 
resulted  in  the  control  of  the  college  passing  into  the  hands  of  the 
Japanese  directors,  the  American  missionaries  connected  with  the 
institution  remaining  simply  as  advisers.  American  influence  pre- 
dominates to-day  in  foreign  missionary  enterprise,  the  outstanding 
feature  in  the  work  of  American  missions  being  the  establishment  of 
educational  institutions  on  a Christian  basis.  According  to  official 
statistics  for  1917  the  number  of  Japanese  Christians  amounted  in 
that  year  to  a little  over  200,000. 

No  account  of  Japanese  religions  can  be  complete  without  some 
mention  of  Bushido,  the  religion  of  the  warrior,  as  its  name  implies. 
A product  of  Japanese  feudalism,  round  which  a good  deal  of  romantic 
sentiment,  and  still  more  philosophical  literature,  has  grown  up,  it 
may  be  described  as  an  unwritten  rule  of  conduct  to  be  observed  by 
members  of  the  military  class.  Its  best-known  exponent  is  Yamaga 
Sokd,  whose  lectures  and  writings  in  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth 
century  on  Bushido,  Confucianism  and  military  strategy,  as  under- 
stood in  those  days,  gained  for  him  a great  reputation.  Oishi,  the 
famous  leader  of  the  Forty-Seven  renin,  was  one  of  his  pupils.  The 


150  Religious  Observances 

virtues  on  which  stress  was  laid  in  Bushido  ethics  were  chiefly  feudal 
loyalty,  self-sacrifice,  filial  piety  and  simple  living,  all  of  which  might, 
perhaps,  be  summed  up  in  the  one  word  duty.  The  endeavour  of 
the  samurai  who  was  true  to  Bushido  ideals  was  to  live  a life  of  self- 
restraint,  so  as  to  be  ready  to  answer  the  call  of  duty  at  any  moment. 
This  explains  the  attraction  for  the  adherents  of  Bushido  which  lay 
in  the  Zen  sect  of  Buddhism  with  its  practice  of  silent  meditation. 
It  helped  them  to  cultivate  the  austere  and  detached  habit  of  mind 
that  was  supposed  to  be  essential  to  the  proper  observance  of  the 
Spartan  rules  of  Bushido.  At  the  same  time  the  strong,  though  un- 
acknowledged, influence  of  the  Sung  school  of  Confucianism  on  Zen 
doctrine  indirectly  affected  Bushido  ideas,  imparting  to  them  a tinge 
of  the  abstruse  philosophy  of  that  school.  The  association  of  the 
Zen  sect,  moreover,  with  the  quaint  ceremonial  of  tea-drinking  known 
as  “ Cha-no-yu ,”  resulted  in  the  practice  of  this  ceremonial  being 
widely  adopted  in  Bushido  circles.  In  no  sense  a religion  in  the  strict 
meaning  of  the  word,  despite  its  connection  with  Buddhism  and 
Confucianism,  Bushido  in  the  course  of  its  later  development  came 
to  be  identified  with  patriotism.  It  is  this  aspect  of  it  which  has  been 
most  conspicuous  since  the  disappearance  of  feudalism.  Constant 
reference  is  made  by  modern  Japanese  writers  on  the  subject  to  the 
Y amato  Damashii,  or  Japanese  spirit,  which  it  is  considered  to  repre- 
sent ; and  though  much  of  what  is  said  is  far-fetched,  and  possibly 
meant  for  foreign  consumption,  the  simple  precepts  of  Bushido  have 
undoubtedly  served  a useful  purpose  in  stimulating  in  all  classes  of 
the  people  the  exercise  of  the  virtues  it  inculcates.  Quick  to  recognise 
the  usefulness  of  its  ethical  teaching,  the  Japanese  Government  has 
availed  itself  of  the  services  of  Bushido,  in  conjunction  with  Shinto, 
to  strengthen  the  fabric  of  monarchy.  Its  action  in  this  direction, 
due,  apparently,  to  motives  similar  to  those  which  influenced  German 
policy  before  the  Great  War  in  encouraging  a creed  of  State  worship, 
was  criticized  shrewdly,  though  somewhat  harshly,  a few  years  ago 
in  a magazine  article  entitled  “ The  Invention  of  a new  Religion.” 
The  Japanese  people  may,  as  has  been  suggested,  be  disposed  to 
take  religion  less  seriously  than  other  nations.  As  to  the  great  part, 
nevertheless,  which  it  plays  in  the  national  life,  in  the  shape  of 
pilgrimages  and  religious  festivals,  there  can  be  no  question.  At 
certain  periods  of  the  year,  regulated  by  custom  so  as  to  cause  the 
least  interference  with  agricultural  operations,  thousands  of  pilgrimo 


Religious  Observances  1 5 1 

of  both  sexes,  not  content  with  visiting  less  remote  shrines,  make 
long  journeys  to  noted  shrines  throughout  the  country.  The  pilgrim 
who  has  thus  visited  the  Great  Shrine  at  Ise,  ascended  one  of  Japan’s 
many  sacred  mountains,  or  worshipped  at  other  distant  shrines,  not 
only  “ acquires  virtue  ” thereby,  but  gains  social  prestige  in  his  home 
circle  in  town,  or  village,  much  in  the  same  way  as  the  Mussulman 
hadji  who  has  been  to  Mecca,  or  the  Russian  peasant  who  has  seen 
the  sacred  places  in  the  Holy  Land.  These  pilgrimages  also  serve 
indirectly  an  educational  purpose.  Among  the  countless  religious 
festivals  which  vary  the  monotony  of  daily  life  in  Japan,  the  flower 
fairs  are  those  which  are  most  typically  Japanese.  On  every  evening 
of  the  year  a flower  fair,  associated  with  the  festival  of  a local  shrine, 
takes  place  in  some  quarter  of  the  city  of  Tokio.  Nor  are  these  fairs 
peculiar  to  the  Capital.  They  are  to  be  seen  in  most  provincial 
towns  of  importance,  though  the  smaller  number  of  urban  shrines 
precludes  their  daily  occurrence.  Neither  pilgrimages  nor  religious 
festivals,  it  should  be  noted,  are  due  entirely  to  religious  sentiment. 
They  appeal  to  the  love  of  ceremonies,  and  the  passion  for  sight- 
seeing, which  distinguish  the  nation. 

Before  leaving  the  subject  of  religion  it  may  be  well  to  emphasize 
a point  which  has  received  only  passing  attention.  In  all  the  three 
religions  which  have  had  most  to  do  with  the  moulding  of  Japanese 
character  and  thought,  Buddhism,  Shinto  and  Confucianism,  the 
principle  of  ancestor-worship  is  imbedded.  The  result  has  been  that 
a closer,  a more  intimate,  association  of  the  past  with  the  present,  of 
the  dead  with  the  living,  is,  perhaps,  possible  in  Japan  than  elsewhere. 
The  beautiful  Buddhist  festival  of  departed  spirits  ; the  simpler,  if 
more  primitive,  services  at  Shinto  shrines  in  memory  of  deceased 
relatives ; the  daily  worship  at  family  altars  decorated  with  ancestral 
tablets  ; the  careful  keeping  of  the  anniversaries  of  deaths  ; the 
religious  care  bestowed  on  graves ; and  the  idea,  not  to  say  belief, 
in  the  participation  of  departed  spirits  in  National  Festivals — all  tend 
not  only  to  keep  fresh  in  men’s  minds  the  memory  of  their  dead,  but 
to  encourage  the  feeling  of  their  continued  existence  in  spirit  land. 
Thus  the  mischief  wrought  by  time  is  lessened,  while  death  is  robbed 
of  a part  of  its  terrors. 


CHAPTER  XV 


Political  Unrest — The  Press — Press  Laws — Conciliation  and  Repression — 
Legal  Reforms — Failure  of  Yezo  Colonization  Scheme — Okuma’s 
Withdrawal — Increased  Political  Agitation. 

WHEN  the  main  thread  of  our  narrative  was  interrupted  in 
order  to  enable  the  teader  to  form  some  idea  of  Japanese 
religions,  and  their  relation  to  the  modern  progress  of  the 
country,  the  train  of  events  which  resulted  in  the  concentration  of 
authority  in  the  hands  of  the  Satsuma  and  Choshiu  clans,  and  the 
formation  of  a regular  opposition  party  of  advanced  reformers,  had 
been  briefly  described.  At  this  time,  as  was  pointed  out,  there  was 
no  great  difference  of  principle,  so  far  as  domestic  reforms  were 
concerned,  between  progressive  politicians  in  the  Government  and 
those  outside.  Both  were  agreed  on  the  importance  of  widening  the 
basis  of  administration  and  of  associating  the  people  in  the  work  of 
government.  The  idea,  also,  of  what  was  meant  by  the  people  had 
grown  so  as  to  include  all  classes  of  the  nation.  The  point  of  dis- 
agreement was  simply  the  rate  at  which  progress  in  the  shape  of 
reform  on  Western  lines  should  proceed.  As  between  moderate  and 
advanced  reformers,  therefore,  matters  should  have  been  open  to 
compromise.  But  the  situation  was  not  so  simple  as  it  appeared  to 
be.  One  circumstance  that  stood  in  the  way  of  compromise  between 
the  two  sections  of  reformers  was  the  large  number  of  disbanded 
samurai  which  the  abolition  of  feudalism  had  thrown  upon  the 
country,  and  for  the  absorption  of  which  in  other  occupations  under 
the  new  order  of  things  there  had  not  yet  been  time.  Many  men  of 
this  class  had  really  nothing  in  common  with  the  advanced  reformers 
save  in  the  matter  of  discontent.  Idle  and  impecunious,  they  were 
ready  for  mischief  of  any  kind,  and  joined  eagerly  in  an  agitation  for 
things  of  which  they  were  mostly  ignorant.  Moved  by  the  mere 
desire  to  fish  in  troubled  waters,  these  people  did  much  harm  to  the 
cause  they  espoused,  giving  to  it  a character  of  turbulence  which 

152 


Political  Unrest  153 

excited  the  apprehension  of  the  authorities.  A further  consideration 
which  may  have  influenced  the  situation  was  the  reaction  following 
upon  the  troubled  period  through  which  the  country  had  passed. 
Fully  alive  to  the  serious  nature  of  the  crisis  it  had  successfully  sur- 
mounted, and,  at  the  same  time,  conscious  of  its  newly  found 
strength,  the  Government  was  probably  in  no  mood  to  brook  any 
opposition,  however  well-intentioned,  to  its  now  settled  policy  of 
gradual  reform.  The  fact,  too,  that  the  Ministry  was  now  one  of 
two  clans,  and  not,  as  originally,  of  four,  sharpened  the  line  of 
cleavage  between  those  who  directed  affairs  and  those  who,  perforce, 
looked  on  from  outside.  Clan  feeling  embittered  the  movement  set 
on  foot  by  the  advanced  reformers  not  only  at  the  outset,  but 
throughout  its  whole  course.  Much  of  the  sympathy  and  support 
they  received  from  many  quarters,  as  the  agitation  progressed,  had 
little  connection  with  their  declared  objects,  being  due  largely  to 
dislike  and  jealousy  of  the  continued  predominance  of  men  of  these 
two  clans  in  the  Ministry,  which  was  nicknamed  the  “ Satcho 
Government.” 

The  final  withdrawal  of  Itagaki  from  the  Government  in  the 
spring  of  1876  has  been  mentioned  as  the  moment  from  which  the 
organized  agitation  for  representative  government  may  be  con- 
sidered to  have  commenced.  It  is  difficult  to  assign  exact  dates  for 
political  movements  of  this  kind.  It  may  with  equal  correctness  be 
considered  as  having  begun  in  1873,  when  the  Tosa  leader  first  re- 
signed office,  which  is  the  view  taken  by  Mr.  Uyehara  in  The  Political 
Development  oj  Japan.  The  point  is  of  small  importance,  but  it 
seems  permissible  to  regard  the  agitation  as  not  having  assumed  the 
form  of  an  organized  movement  until  after  Itagaki’s  final  secession 
from  the  Ministry. 

Before  that  happened  the  Government,  doubtless  well  informed  of 
the  intentions  of  the  advanced  reformers,  had  taken  the  first  step  in 
a series  of  repressive  measures  designed  to  check  the  agitation.  This 
was  the  Press  law  promulgated  in  July,  1875.  It  is  difficult  to  see 
how  the  Government  could  at  this  time  have  done  otherwise,  and 
remained  in  power.  The  attempted  assassination  of  Iwakura  by  Tosa 
malcontents  had  revealed  the  danger  to  be  feared  from  extremists 
of  a dangerous  class,  whose  dissatisfaction  at  the  pacific  settlement 
of  the  Korean  difficulty  had,  it  was  known,  been  shared  by  the  Tosa 
leader.  The  disturbed  condition  of  the  country  had  also  been  shown 


154  The  Press 

by  the  abortive  provincial  risings,  and  was  to  be  demonstrated  still 
more  clearly  by  the  Satsuma  rebellion. 

Up  to  that  time  there  had  been  little  interference  with  the  Press. 
The  first  newspapers  had  appeared  in  the  late  ’sixties.  These  were 
of  an  ephemeral  kind,  but  a few  years  later  the  press  in  its  more 
developed  and  permanent  form  came  into  existence.  It  increased 
very  rapidly,  while  its  vitality  may  be  gauged  by  the  fact  that  some 
of  the  papers  which  then  made  their  appearance  are  in  circulation 
to-day.  In  the  Capital  alone  there  were  soon  six  or  seven  daily  papers 
of  some  standing,  all  of  which,  with  one  exception,  lent  their  aid  to 
the  agitation.  Into  the  crusade  for  popular  rights  the  young  Press 
flung  itself  with  enthusiasm,  finding  its  advantage  in  the  very  circum- 
stances which  were  embarrassing  to  the  Government.  Amongst  the 
former  military  class — the  educated  section  of  the  nation — which  the 
abolition  of  feudalism  had  left  stranded  with  but  scanty  means  of 
subsistence,  there  were  many  men  of  literary  attainments,  as  such 
were  understood  in  those  days.  From  these  the  Press  could  draw  an 
ample  supply  of  writers,  all  with  real  or  fancied  grievances,  some 
with  a bias  in  favour  of  popular  reforms,  others  again  with  a veneer 
of  Western  knowledge  which  did  duty  for  learning.  The  political 
articles  which  appeared  in  the  newspapers  of  that  time  were  hardly 
of  the  quality  noticeable  to-day.  They  were  full  of  quotations  from 
European  writers  on  the  subject  of  equality  and  the  rights  of  man, 
interspersed  with  phrases  from  the  Chinese  classics,  which  were  the 
stock-in-trade  of  all  journalists ; and,  strange  as  was  the  contrast 
presented  by  materials  culled  from  sources  so  different,  they  were  all 
equally  effective  for  the  purpose  intended,  which  was  to  denounce 
what  was  described  as  the  tyrannical  policy  of  the  Government. 

Educational  influences,  other  than  those  working  through  the 
medium  of  the  Press,  lent  force  to  the  agitation.  The  fusion  of 
classes,  one  of  the  first  results  of  the  Restoration,  had  the  effect  of 
opening  public  and  private  schools  alike  to  all  sections  of  the  people, 
thus  bringing  within  reach  of  everyone  the  education  which  before 
had  been  the  privilege  only  of  the  military  class  and  Buddhist  clergy. 
By  teachers  in  these  schools,  by  educationalists  writing  for  the 
express  purpose  of  disseminating  Western  ideas,  and  by  lecturers, 
the  work  of  educating  the  nation  proceeded  apace. 

By  none  were  greater  services  rendered  in  this  direction  than  by 
Fukuzawa  Yukichi.  Conspicuous  in  each  of  these  roles,  as  school- 


Press  Laws 


155 

master,  author  and  lecturer,  as  well  as  in  the  double  capacity  of 
founder  of  a school,  which  has  attained  the  dimensions  of  a university, 
and  chief  teacher  therein  ; and  as  the  proprietor  and  editor  of  one  of 
the  best  Japanese  newspapers,  the  Jiji  Shimpd,  his  name  will  always 
be  famous  in  the  history  of  his  time.  The  “ Sage  of  Mita,”  as  he 
was  called  from  the  quarter  of  the  city  in  w'hich  he  lived,  will  be 
remembered  as  one  who,  besides  helping  the  cause  of  education, 
strove  from  the  first  to  give  effect  to  the  fusion  of  classes  by  en- 
couraging a spirit  of  independence  in  those  sections  of  the  people 
whose  self-respect  had  been  weakened  by  centuries  of  feudalism. 
For  purely  party  politics  Fukuzawa  had  little  taste,  owing  perhaps 
to  the  fact  that  he  had  no  clan  connection  with  political  affairs,  nor 
was  his  newspaper  ever  identified  with  any  political  association.  But 
it  was  an  active  champion  of  popular  rights,  and  his  voluminous 
writings,  the  popularity  of  which  was  so  great  that  of  one  book  more 
than  three  million  copies  were  printed,  gave  much  indirect  encourage- 
ment to  the  agitation  for  popular  reforms. 

The  public  indignation  excited  by  the  Press  law  was  succeeded  by 
consternation  at  the  rigorous  manner  in  which  it  was  enforced.  Im- 
prisonment of  editors  for  what  would  now  be  regarded  as  trifling 
infringements  of  the  law  was  of  common  occurrence,  while  journals 
publishing  any  matter  considered  by  the  authorities  to  be  objection- 
able w’ere  promptly  suspended.  To  such  lengths  was  interference 
with  the  Press  carried  that  at  one  time  more  than  thirty  journalists 
were  in  prison  in  Tokio  alone.  The  constant  depletion  of  the  staffs 
of  newspapers  which  incurred  official  displeasure  resulted  in  the 
evolution  of  a class  of  dummy  editors,  whose  duty  it  was  to  be  the 
“ whipping  boys  ” of  the  papers  they  represented,  and  undergo  the 
sentences  of  imprisonment  imposed.  The  agitation,  nevertheless, 
continued  unabated,  and  political  associations,  in  whose  programmes 
a demand  for  representative  government — never  very  clearly  defined 
— occupied  the  first  place,  sprang  up  in  various  places.  A leading 
figure  in  the  movement,  who  came  into  notice  soon  after  its  incep- 
tion, and  for  several  years  took  a prominent  part,  in  company  with 
Itagaki  both  as  a lecturer  and  in  the  formation  of  political  clubs,  was 
Kataoka  Kenkichi,  also  a native  of  Tosa.  His  arrest  and  that  of 
other  members  of  the  party  at  the  height  of  the  political  disturbances 
which  culminated  in  the  Satsuma  rebellion,  brought  about  a tem- 
porary cessation  of  agitation,  and  checked  for  a time  the  growth  of 


156  Conciliation  Repression 

political  clubs.  But  with  the  restoration  of  order  in  the  country  the 
agitators  resumed  their  activity.  The  leaders  made  tours  of  the 
provinces  to  stimulate  local  effort,  as  a result  of  which  twenty-seven 
provincial  associations,  representing  some  90,000  members,  were 
formed  ; and  at  a meeting  held  in  Osaka  these  were  amalgamated 
under  the  name  of  “ Union  for  the  establishment  of  a parliament.” 
The  Government  replied  by  promulgating  in  1880  the  Law  of  Public 
Meetings,  which  restricted  considerably  the  rights  hitherto  enjoyed 
by  the  public  in  this  respect.  But  the  agitators  continued  to  work 
with  undiminished  energy,  and  the  fact  that,  in  spite  of  the  issue  of 
this  law,  a meeting  held  in  Tokio  in  the  autumn  of  the  same  year 
was  attended  by  representatives  from  more  than  half  of  the  pre- 
fectures into  which  Japan  was  then  divided  shows  how  strong  a 
hold  on  the  country  the  movement  had  by  this  time  acquired. 

We  have  seen  how  the  work  of  reconstruction  carried  on  by  the 
Government,  though  hindered,  never  stopped  during  the  period  of 
civil  commotions.  It  was  the  same  during  the  long  course  of  popular 
agitation  which  followed  it.  Side  by  side  with  repression  there  went 
always  reform.  Steady  progress  was  made  with  the  long  and  diffi- 
cult business  of  land-tax  revision.  Involving,  as  it  did,  a resurvey 
and  the  valuation  of  all  land,  as  well  as  the  investigation  of  titles  to 
land,  and  boundaries,  this  was  a task  of  the  first  magnitude.  At  the 
same  time  attention  was  given  to  the  reorganization  of  local  govern- 
ment. This  included,  besides  the  readjustment  of  local  taxation, 
the  arrangements  necessary  for  the  eventual  establishment  of  the 
prefectural  and  other  local  assemblies,  forming  part  of  the  general 
scheme  of  local  self-government,  w:hich,  it  was  considered,  must 
necessarily  precede  the  creation  of  a national  parliament.  It  was 
not  until  after  the  restoration  of  order,  when  it  was  at  length 
possible  for  the  task  of  reconstruction  to  proceed  more  rapidly, 
that  the  results  of  this  tedious  and  little-noticed  work  became 
apparent. 

In  the  spring  of  1878  the  first  of  these  results  was  seen  in  the 
completion  at  the  second  conference  of  Prefects,  to  which  reference 
has  already  been  made,  of  drafts  of  the  “ three  great  laws,”  as  they 
were  called  at  the  time.  These,  which  conceded  a large  measure  of 
local  autonomy,  concerned  local  taxation,  prefectural  assemblies, 
and  similar  smaller  bodies  to  be  created  in  urban  and  rural  districts, 
towns  and  villages. 


Legal  Reforms  157 

The  law  establishing  prefectural  assemblies  came  into  force  in 
1880;  the  arrangements  relating  to  smaller  bodies  not  until  some 
years  later.  These  measures  will  be  referred  to  again  when  we  come 
to  deal  with  the  whole  question  of  the  revision  of  local  govern- 
ment. 

It  has  been  said  that  in  the  earlier  stages  of  agitation  for  popular 
reforms  no  concession  was  ever  made  by  the  Government  till  it  was 
compelled  to  do  so  by  the  force  of  circumstances.  And  the  assertion 
has  been  supported  by  the  suggestion  of  a connection  in  point  of 
time  between  certain  manifestations  of  popular  feeling,  and  some 
of  the  liberal  measures  adopted  by  the  Government.  The  attempted 
assassination  of  Iwakura  was  certainly  followed  shortly  afterwards 
by  the  decree  establishing  the  annual  conferences  of  Prefects.  On 
the  other  hand  the  completion  of  the  drafts  of  the  three  laws  above- 
mentioned  at  the  second  of  these  conferences  occurred  only  a month 
before  Okubo’s  assassination.  In  that  case  there  was  no  possible 
connection.  Nor  in  subsequent  years  does  it  seem  possible  to 
establish  any  connection  of  the  kind  suggested.  If  traceable  at  all, 
it  may  be  regarded  as  due  simply  to  coincidence. 

A somewhat  similar  view  as  to  the  pressure  put  upon  the  Govern- 
ment by  the  agitation  is  taken  by  Mr.  Uyehara,  the  author  already 
quoted,  who  does  not  conceal  his  sympathy  with  the  advanced  re- 
formers. He  speaks  of  the  movement  as  being  from  its  inception  a 
struggle  for  constitutional  reform,  in  which  the  agitators  were 
successful,  and  regards  the  introduction  of  representative  govern- 
ment when  it  came  as  a proof  of  their  success.  It  is  indeed  more 
than  probable  that  the  agitation  they  conducted  for  so  long,  fortified 
as  it  was  by  an  increasing  measure  of  support  from  the  public, 
hastened  in  some  degree  the  establishment  of  the  representative 
institutions  for  which  they  clamoured.  But  the  impression  one  de- 
rives from  studying  the  course  of  action  adopted  by  the  Government 
is  that,  while  not  hesitating  to  control  the  agitation  by  repressive 
measures,  as  occasion  demanded,  they  were  ready  to  conciliate  public 
feeling  by  meeting  the  views  of  the  advanced  party  whenever  it 
seemed  expedient  to  do  so  ; thus  pursuing  on  the  whole,  consistently, 
under  circumstances  of  unusual  difficulty,  the  policy  of  gradual 
reform  which  it  had  marked  out  for  itself.  Assuming  the  correct- 
ness of  this  impression,  the  progressive  stages  by  which  the  establish- 
ment of  representative  government  was  eventually  reached  may 


158  Legal  Reforms 

with  more  reason  be  regarded  as  a successful  vindication  of  that 
policy,  than  as  a triumph  for  the  agitators.  It  is  important  to  bear 
in  mind  that  the  latter  were  not  the  only  advocates  of  reform.  The 
Government  itself  was  a government  of  reformers,  who  had  more 
than  justified  their  title  to  be  regarded  as  such.  Some  of  its  members 
had  thought  of  representative  institutions  even  before  the  Restora- 
tion. The  men  in  power  were  in  a better  position  than  others  to 
estimate  correctly  the  extent  of  preparation,  the  spade-work  which 
was  necessary  before  any  step  of  practical  reform  could  be  accom- 
plished ; and  if  they  were  reluctant  to  move  as  fast  as  more  eager, 
and,  possibly,  ill-balanced  enthusiasm  desired,  their  hesitation  may 
not  unfairly  be  ascribed  to  prudent  statesmanship. 

Nevertheless,  in  the  adoption  by  the  Government  of  this  twofold 
policy  of  conciliation  and  repression  the  influence  of  the  conservative 
element  in  the  Ministry  should  not  be  overlooked.  It  doubtless 
modified  earlier  ministerial  impulses  towards  a more  advanced 
programme  ; increased  the  hesitation  to  make  what  were  regarded 
as  dangerous  experiments  in  view  of  the  nation’s  recent  emergence 
from  feudalism  ; and  created  the  tendency  which  ultimately  showed 
itself  in  the  decision  to  look  for  guidance  in  framing  representative 
institutions,  as  well  as  in  other  matters  of  administrative  reorganiza- 
tion, to  countries  less  governed  by  democratic  ideas  than  those  from 
which  the  leaders  of  the  Restoration  movement  had  drawn  their 
first  inspiration.  Another  reason  for  the  cautious  trend  of  minis- 
terial policy  may  also  be  found  in  the  experience  gained  by  some,  at 
least,  of  the  members  of  the  Government  in  studying  the  growth 
and  development  of  the  Western  institutions  it  was  proposed  to 
copy. 

The  year  1880  saw  the  completion  of  the  first  legal  reforms.  In 
the  course  of  that  year  a new  Penal  Code,  and  a Code  of  Criminal 
Procedure,  in  the  preparation  of  which  the  services  of  a French 
jurist,  Monsieur  Boissonade,  had  been  utilized,  were  promulgated. 
The  first  steps  in  the  framing  of  these  important  laws,  based,  it  should 
be  noted,  on  French  models,  had  been  taken  seven  years  before,  when 
a committee  of  investigation  had  been  formed  in  the  Department  of 
Justice.  Both  of  these  Codes  came  into  operation  early  in  1882. 
The  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  was  replaced  by  a later  Code  in 
1890.  The  Penal  Code  also  underwent  subsequent  revision,  coming 
into  force  in  its  revised  form  in  1908. 


Failure  of  Yezo  Colonization  Scheme  159 

In  the  autumn  of  1881  the  ranks  of  the  advanced  party  were  rein- 
forced by  the  retirement  from  the  Ministry  of  Okuma.  Since  the 
rupture  of  1873,  when  the  leading  Tosa  and  Hizen  politicians  with- 
drew from  office,  he  had  been  the  sole  representative  of  the  province 
and  clan  of  Hizen.  Rumour  assigned  more  than  one  reason  for  his 
withdrawal.  Disagreement  on  various  questions  with  Choshiu  states- 
men, whose  influence  was  increasing ; umbrage  at  the  conduct  of 
affairs  by  two  clans ; the  holding  of  views  on  reform  which  were  in 
advance  of  those  of  the  Government  as  a body ; and  intrigues  with 
the  Court  were  points  to  which  prominence  was  given  in  the 
political  gossip  of  the  day.  That  Okuma’s  liberalism  was  of  a 
more  pronounced  type  than  that  of  his  colleagues  seems  very 
probable  in  the  light  of  after  events.  Personal  considerations,  how- 
ever, had  possibly  something  to  do  with  his  leaving  the  Govern- 
ment. The  force  of  character,  coupled  with  exceptional  and  versatile 
talent,  which  marked  him  out  as  a leader,  made  it  hard  for  him 
to  accept  the  leadership  of  others,  and  detracted  from  his  usefulness 
as  a colleague. 

Shortly  before  his  resignation  an  administrative  scandal  had 
occurred  in  connection  with  the  abolition  of  the  Board  for  the 
development  of  the  Hokkaido,  to  which  reference  has  already  been 
made.  Its  abolition  involved  the  disposal  of  Government  property, 
and  in  the  course  of  the  examination  of  a scheme  for  this  purpose 
which  had  been  submitted  to  the  Government  grave  official  irregu- 
larities were  disclosed.  The  scheme,  which  he  had  been  among  the 
first  to  condemn,  was  consequently  abandoned,  but  the  incident 
brought  discredit  on  the  Ministry. 

The  retirement  of  Okuma  was  followed  almost  immediately  by 
the  issue  of  a decree  fixing  the  year  1890  as  the  date  for  the  establish- 
ment of  a Parliament. 

This  definite  promise  at  this  juncture  of  a Parliament  was  inter- 
preted in  some  quarters  as  a concession  necessitated  by  the  discredit 
which  the  Government  had  incurred  through  the  administrative 
scandal,  and  from  its  position  being  weakened  by  Okuma’s  retire- 
ment. But  the  almost  simultaneous  issue  of  the  law  imposing 
restrictions  on  public  meetings,  and  freedom  of  speech,  seems  to 
justify  the  view  that  both  measures  were  simply  an  illustration  of 
the  twofold  policy  of  repression  alternating  with  reform  which  the 
Government  was  pursuing. 


160  Okuma’s  Withdrawal  from  Govt. 

With  the  important  concession  now  made  by  the  Government  the 
first  period,  so  to  speak,  of  the  agitation  for  popular  rights  may  be 
regarded  as  drawing  to  its  close.  The  chief  features  of  this  period 
have  been  noted  ; the  outbreak  and  suppression  of  grave  disorders, 
which  at  one  time  threatened  to  put  a stop  to  all  national  progress ; 
the  creation  of  a strong  Government  of  two  clans ; the  growth  of  a 
political  movement  which  derived  a large  measure  of  support  from 
public  feeling ; and  the  measures  taken  for  its  control  by  the 
Government.  We  have  also  seen  how  little  homogeneous  in  its 
character  was  the  opposition  party  conducting  the  movement  ; how 
it  comprised  genuine  reformers,  others  actuated  mainly  by  clan 
jealousy,  disappointed  politicians,  and  impecunious  shizoku,  the 
wreckage  of  the  feudal  system,  who  were  long  a disturbing  element 
in  politics,  and  developed  later  on  into  the  class  of  political  rowdies 
known  as  soshi. 

For  all  of  these  ill-assorted  associates  the  demand  for  popular 
rights  was  a convenient  rallying  cry.  To  the  opposition  thus  formed, 
which  grew  gradually  more  compact  as  it  shed  its  less  desirable 
elements,  the  withdrawal  of  Okuma  from  the  Ministry  meant  the 
accession  of  a powerful  ally,  though  his  independence  of  thought 
and  somewhat  uncompromising  temperament  never  allowed  him  to 
identify  himself  too  closely  with  the  views  of  other  politicians.  With 
the  energy  and  versatility  that  marked  all  his  actions  he  threw  himself 
into  the  movement  led  by  the  advanced  reformers,  and  soon  appeared 
in  the  new  role  of  educationalist.  Following  the  example  set  by 
Fukuwaza  fifteen  years  earlier,  he  established  the  Waseda  College, 
now  a University,  which  remains  a monument  to  his  abilities.  Like 
his  predecessor,  he  was  a voluminous  author,  never,  however,  writing 
himself  but  dictating  to  an  amanuensis,  and  founded  a daily  paper 
which  is  still  in  circulation.  Like  him,  again,  he  could  lay  claim 
to  having  trained  a very  large  number  of  those  who  now  fill  official 
posts  in  Japan. 

The  political  creeds  of  the  advanced  reformers,  with  whom  Okuma 
was  to  be  associated  for  the  seven  years  during  which  he  remained  in 
opposition,  were  necessarily  shaped  to  some  extent  by  the  foreign 
influences  with  which  the  Japanese  people  first  came  into  touch  after 
the  reopening  of  the  country  to  foreign  intercourse.  Western 
political  literature  of  all  kinds,  in  which  the  product  of  advanced 
American  thought  figured  largely,  was  then  eagerly  studied  by  a 


Increased  Political  Agitation  161 

people  shut  out  for  centuries  from  contact  with  the  outside  world. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  is  only  natural  that  the  republican 
atmosphere  of  Japan’s  nearest  Western  neighbour — the  first  to  enter 
into  Treaty  relations  with  her — should  have  coloured  in  some  degree 
the  political  aspirations  of  those  who  were  clamouring  for  popular 
reforms,  and  have  even  affected  the  studies  of  students  in  the 
educational  institutions  to  which  attention  has  been  drawn. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

Promise  of  Representative  Government — Political  Parties — Renewed 
Unrest — Local  Outbreaks. 

THE  decree  announcing  the  Imperial  decision  to  establish  a 
Parliament  in  1890  was  issued  on  the  12th  October,  1881. 
In  this  decree  the  Emperor  refers  to  his  intention  from  the 
first  to  establish  gradually  a constitutional  form  of  government, 
evidence  of  which  had  already  been  furnished  by  the  creation  of  a 
Senate  ( Genro-in ) in  1875,  and  the  drafting,  three  years  later,  of  the 
laws  concerning  local  government — measures  designed,  it  is  expl  ined, 
to  serve  as  a foundation  for  the  further  reforms  contemplated.  Con- 
scious, His  Majesty  proceeds  to  observe,  of  his  responsibility  in  the 
discharge  of  his  duties  as  Sovereign  to  the  Imperial  ancestors,  whose 
spirits  were  watching  his  actions,  he  declares  his  determination  to 
proceed  with  the  work  of  reform,  and  charges  his  Ministers  to  make 
preparations  for  the  establishment  of  a Parliament  at  the  time 
appointed ; reserving  to  himself  the  task  of  deciding,  later  on,  the 
questions  of  the  limitations  to  be  imposed  on  the  Imperial  preroga- 
tive, and  the  character  of  the  Parliament  to  be  created.  The  decree 
dwells  on  the  undesirability  of  sudden  and  startling  changes  in 
administration,  and  concludes  with  a warning  to  the  people,  under 
pain  of  the  Imperial  displeasure,  not  to  disturb  the  public  peace  by 
pressing  for  innovations  of  this  nature. 

Although  the  granting  of  a Constitution  was  not  expressly  men- 
tioned in  the  decree,  the  reference  in  it  to  the  limitations  to  be 
imposed  on  the  Imperial  prerogative  clearly  implied  that  the  creation 
of  a Parliament,  and  the  granting  of  a Constitution,  would  go  to- 
gether. That  the  latter,  when  promulgated,  would  be  a written 
Constitution  was  also  clear  both  from  the  circumstances  of  the  time 
and  from  the  methods  already  followed  by  the  Government  in  carry- 
ing out  its  policy  of  legislative  reforms. 

162 


Promise  of  Representative  Government  163 

No  time  was  lost  in  beginning  the  preparations  mentioned  in  the 
Imperial  announcement.  In  March  of  the  following  year,  as  we  read 
in  the  reminiscences  contributed  by  him  to  Fijty  Years  oj  New  Japan, 
the  late  Prince  (then  Mr.)  Ito  was  ordered  by  the  Emperor  to  prepare 
a draft  of  a Constitution,  and  on  the  fifteenth  of  the  same  month  he 
set  out,  he  tells  us,  on  “ an  extended  journey  in  different  constitu- 
tional countries  to  make  as  thorough  a study  as  possible  of  the  actual 
workings  of  different  systems  of  constitutional  government,  of  their 
various  provisions,  as  well  as  of  theories  and  opinions  actually  enter- 
tained by  influential  persons  on  the  actual  stage  itself  of  constitutional 
life.”  In  the  prosecution  of  this  enquiry  into  constitutional  matters, 
which  occupied  his  attention  for  eighteen  months,  Prince  Ito  was 
assisted  by  a numerous  staff  of  assistants. 

By  the  definite  promise  of  a Parliament,  to  be  accompanied  by  a 
Constitution,  the  position  of  the  agitators  was  changed.  With  the 
disappearance  of  their  chief  grievance  the  ground  had  been  cut  from 
under  their  feet.  It  was  no  longer  a question  of  whether  there  should 
be  a Parliament  or  not,  but  what  sort  of  Parliament  the  one  to  be 
established  in  1890  should  be.  Neither  on  this  point,  however,  nor 
on  the  framing  of  the  Constitution,  was  there  any  intention  of  con- 
sulting the  nation.  The  decree  had  expressly  stated  that  these 
questions  would  be  reserved  for  the  Imperial  decision  later  on.  While 
the  Government,  therefore,  proceeded  with  its  preparations  for  the 
establishment  of  representative  institutions,  it  was  incumbent  on  the 
leaders  of  the  opposition  party  to  prepare  on  their  side  for  the  time 
when  constitutional  government  of  a kind  would  be  an  accomplished 
fact,  and  complete  their  organization  in  readiness  for  the  Parliament, 
whose  opening  would  furnish  them  with  the  desired  field  for  their 
activities.  Thus,  the  effect  of  the  Imperial  decree  was  to  hasten  the 
development  of  political  parties.  For  these,  when  formed,  there  was 
little  to  do  until  representative  institutions  came  actually  into 
operation  ; and  their  restricted  sphere  of  utility  was  still  further 
reduced  by  the  increasing  severity  of  the  repressive  measures  adopted 
by  the  Government.  Nevertheless,  the  same  things  which  had 
previously  assisted  the  progress  of  the  agitation  for  popular  reforms 
now  encouraged  the  development  of  political  parties.  These  were  : 
the  magic  of  the  expressions  “ public  discussion  ” and  “ public 
opinion,”  first  heard  at  the  time  of  the  Restoration,  which  had 
captivated  the  public  ear  all  the  more,  perhaps,  from  their  being 


164  Political  Parties 

imperfectly  understood  ; and  the  novelty,  always  attractive  to  the 
Japanese  people,  of  the  methods  adopted  by  the  advanced  reformers 
in  the  shape  of  public  meetings  and  public  addresses  which  were  a 
new  phenomenon  in  the  history  of  the  country. 

Political  associations  had,  as  we  have  seen,  been  formed  before,  in 
connection  with  the  agitation  for  popular  reforms,  both  in  the  Capital 
and  in  the  provinces.  Owing  their  creation  chiefly  to  the  leader  of 
the  Tosa  party  and  his  lieutenants,  most  of  them  had  led  a rather 
precarious  existence,  flourishing  or  dying  down  in  response  to  the 
degree  of  severity  characterizing  the  measures  of  control  taken  by 
the  authorities.  Neither  in  point  of  organization,  nor  in  definiteness 
of  aim,  could  they  be  regarded  quite  as  political  parties.  The  latest 
and  most  important  of  these  associations  had  been  the  Union  for  the 
establishment  of  a Parliament,  formed  in  1880,  which,  as  already 
mentioned,  represented  between  twenty  and  thirty  societies  in  various 
parts  of  the  country.  Out  of  this  unwieldy  body  the  first  political 
party  grew,  taking  the  place  of  the  parent  society  which  was  dis- 
solved. This  was  the  Jiyuto,  or  Liberal  Party,  established  by  Itagaki 
in  October,  1881,  a few  days  only  after  the  issue  of  the  Imperial 
decree.  Its  birth  was  signalized  by  collision  with  the  authorities,  a 
misfortune  which  might  not  incorrectly  have  been  interpreted  as  an 
omen  of  a stormy  career.  The  party  managers  had,  it  seems,  omitted 
to  give  notice  to  the  police  of  gatherings  of  the  party,  thereby  in- 
fringing the  Law  of  Public  Meetings.  For  their  omission  to  do  so 
the  managers  were  fined,  and  a further  result  of  the  infringement 
was  that,  though  actually  founded  on  the  date  above-mentioned,  the 
party  did  not  receive  official  recognition  until  July  of  the  following 
year.  Itagaki  was  elected  President  of  the  party,  and  one  of  the  four 
Vice-Presidents  was  Goto  Shojird,  whose  connection  with  the  resigna- 
tion of  the  last  of  the  Shoguns  will  be  remembered. 

The  programme  of  the  Liberal  Party  was  comprehensive,  if  rather 
vague.  Its  intentions,  as  announced  in  the  manifesto  issued,  were 
“ to  endeavour  to  extend  the  liberties  of  the  people,  maintain  their 
rights,  promote  their  happiness  and  improve  their  social  condition.” 
The  manifesto  also  expressed  the  party’s  desire  “ to  establish  a con- 
stitutional government  of  the  best  type,”  and  its  readiness  to  co- 
operate with  all  who  were  inspired  by  similar  aims.  Its  President, 
Itagaki  Taisuke,  had  from  the  first  been  the  prime  mover  in  the 
agitation  for  popular  reforms,  which  without  his  inspiration  and 


Political  Parties  165 

guidance  would  never  have  attained  the  dimensions  it  did  ; both  in 
and  out  of  season  he  had  pressed  upon  the  attention  of  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  country  the  desirability  of  broadening  whenever  and 
wherever  possible  the  basis  of  administration  ; and  he  shared  with 
Okuma  the  distinction  of  being  a pioneer  in  the  organization  of 
political  parties  in  preparation  for  the  Parliament  to  be  established 
and  a successful  party  leader  after  representative  institutions  had 
come  into  operation.  Lacking  the  versatility  of  his  Hizcn  contempo- 
rary and  colleague,  he  was  nevertheless  a leading  figure  in  political 
circles,  where  his  sincerity  and  tenacity  of  purpose  commanded  much 
respect.  The  public  indignation  excited  by  the  unsuccessful  attempt 
on  his  life  made  in  the  spring  of  1882  was  a tribute  to  his  popularity, 
and  the  words  he  is  said  to  have  uttered  when  stabbed,  “ Itagaki  may 
die,  but  not  liberty,”  are  still  quoted.  Had  he,  like  other  politicians 
of  his  time,  lived  more  in  Tokio  and  less  in  his  native  province,  he 
might  have  been  better  known  outside  of  Japan. 

In  the  spring  of  1882  two  other  political  parties  came  into  exist- 
ence. One  of  these  was  the  “ Rikken-Kaishintd ,”  or  Constitutional 
Reform  Party,  which  was  established  by  Okuma  with  the  co-operation 
of  a number  of  well-known  men  who  had  followed  him  into  retire- 
ment when  he  left  the  Ministry  in  the  previous  year.  Prominent 
among  these  ex-officials  were  Shimada  Saburo,  a distinguished  writer, 
who  afterwards  became  President  of  the  House  of  Representatives  ; 
Yano  Fumio,  another  distinguished  writer,  who  later  on  filled  the 
post  of  Japanese  Minister  to  China  ; and  Ozaki  Yukid,  who  was  after- 
wards Minister  of  Education,  as  well  as  Mayor  of  Tokio,  and  now 
occupies  a foremost  position  as  speaker,  writer  and  parliamentarian. 
The  programme  of  the  Kaishinto  was  more  definite  than  that  of  the 
Liberal  Party.  Besides  the  usual  stock  phrases  as  to  upholding  the 
dignity  of  the  Throne  and  promoting  the  happiness  of  the  people, 
it  dwelt  on  the  necessity  of  internal  progress  as  a preliminary  step  to 
“ the  extension  of  national  rights  and  prestige,”  and  advocated  the 
development  of  local  self-government,  the  gradual  extension  of  the 
franchise  pari  passu  with  the  progress  of  the  nation,  the  encourage- 
ment of  foreign  trade,  and  financial  reform. 

The  points  of  difference  between  the  Liberal  Party  and  the 
Kaishinto,  or  Moderate  Liberals,  as  we  may  call  them,  were  of  the 
kind  that  distinguished  the  two  party  leaders  from  each  other.  The 
greater  culture  and  refinement,  as  well  as  the  moderation,  of  the 


1 66  Political  Parties 

Hizen  statesman  were  reflected  in  the  more  sober  views  of  his  party, 
which  appealed  to  a more  educated  section  of  the  people  than  the 
cruder  and  more  radical  doctrines  and  methods  of  the  Jiyutd. 

The  third  party  established  at  this  time  was  the  Rikken  Teisei-to, 
or  Constitutional  Imperialist  Party.  Fukuchi,  editor  of  the  Nichi 
Nichi  Shimbun,  which  was  then  a semi-official  organ,  took  an  active 
part  in  its  formation.  Its  raison  d’etre  was  support  of  the  Govern- 
ment, which  the  other  two  parties  opposed.  It  was,  therefore, 
usually  known  as  the  Government  party.  Some  of  the  items  of  its 
elaborate  programme  were  in  themselves  a sufficient  indication  of  its 
official  sympathies.  Approval  was  expressed  of  the  date  (1890)  fixed 
for  the  establishment  of  a parliament  ; of  whatever  form  of  Con- 
stitution might  be  decided  upon  by  the  Government  with  the 
Imperial  sanction  ; of  there  being  two  Chambers ; of  the  necessity 
of  qualifications  for  members  ; and  of  the  final  decision  in  all  matters 
resting  with  the  Emperor.  But  other  points  in  the  programme 
suggested  some  independence  of  opinion.  The  party  favoured  the 
separation  of  the  army  and  navy  from  politics  ; the  independence  of 
judges ; freedom  of  public  meetings  in  so  far  as  was  consonant  with 
national  tranquillity ; as  well  as  freedom  of  public  speech,  of  publica- 
tion and  of  the  Press  within  legal  limits,  and  financial  reform. 

The  same  spirit  which  led  to  the  formation  of  these  three  political 
parties  in  the  Capital  inspired  the  birth  of  many  more  in  the  pro- 
vinces. More  than  forty  of  these  sprang  up  like  mushrooms,  and  the 
confusion  naturally  attending  the  sudden  appearance  of  so  many  was 
increased  by  the  rule  which  made  it  necessary  for  each  to  be  regis- 
tered as  a separate  organization,  even  when  name  and  associations 
clearly  indicated  its  connection  with  the  parent  party  in  the  Capital. 
Almost  every  prefecture  could  boast  of  its  own  political  party, 
usually  affiliated  to  one  of  the  three  chief  parties  in  Tokio,  whose 
example  was  generally  followed  in  the  inclusion  of  the  word  “ Con- 
stitutional ” in  the  title,  a fact  which  shows  what  importance  was 
attached  to  constitutional  principles  as  a basis  of  government. 
Occasionally,  too,  the  dearth  of  fixed  political  ideas  was  shown  by 
the  comprehensive  vagueness  of  the  name  chosen.  An  instance  of 
this  occurred  in  the  case  of  the  political  party  formed  in  the  province 
of  Noto,  which  assumed  the  non-committal  designation  of  the 
Jiyu-Kaisbinto , which  was  intended  to  mean  the  Party  of  Liberty 
and  Reform,  but  lent  itself  to  the  interpretation  of  being  the  Liberal 


Political  Parties  167 

and  Moderate  Liberal  Party.  In  this,  as  in  many  other  instances,  the 
name  was  a mere  label  without  much  meaning. 

In  spite  of  the  flourish  of  trumpets  which  accompanied  the  forma- 
tion of  these  three  political  parties,  and  their  numerous  branches — 
for  such  they  mostly  were — in  the  provinces,  the  movement  collapsed 
as  suddenly  as  it  arose.  Before  eighteen  months  had  passed  one  of 
the  three,  the  Imperialist  Party,  had  decided  to  dissolve.  A year 
later  its  example  was  followed  by  the  Liberal  Party  ; while  the  third, 
the  party  of  Moderate  Liberals,  led  by  Okuma,  though  it  escaped 
dissolution,  was  by  the  end  of  1884  in  a moribund  condition,  without 
either  president  or  vice-president. 

For  this  sudden  blighting  of  the  hopes  of  the  newly  formed  class 
of  politicians  there  were  several  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  in  pur- 
suance of  what  had  been  termed  its  settled  policy  of  alternate 
conciliation  and  repression,  the  Government,  after  the  issue  of  the 
Imperial  decree  promising  a parliament,  had  embarked  upon  a course 
of  further  repressive  legislation.  The  law  restricting  the  right  of 
public  meeting  and  speech,  which  had  been  issued  in  1880,  was  in 
1882  revised  and  made  much  more  stringent.  Under  this  revised  law 
the  powers  of  the  police  for  inquisitorial  purposes  were  increased  ; 
political  parties  were  bound  to  furnish  full  particulars  concerning 
the  rules  of  association  and  lists  of  members ; no  meeting  could  be 
held  unless  permission  from  the  police  had  been  obtained  three  days 
before  ; it  was  forbidden  to  advertise  the  subjects  of  political  lectures 
and  debates,  or  to  invite  attendance  at  a meeting  ; political  associa- 
tions were  not  only  debarred  from  having  branches  in  other  places, 
but  from  holding  communications,  or  carrying  on  any  kind  of  relations 
with  other  political  parties — a provision  which  was  said  to  be  inspired 
by  fear  of  the  amalgamation  of  parties  opposed  to  the  Government  ; 
and,  on  the  simple  ground  of  its  being  necessary  for  the  preservation 
of  the  public  peace,  the  police  had  power  at  any  time  to  close  a 
public  meeting.  And  yet,  strange  to  say,  the  Government  which  did 
these  things,  which  left  no  stone  unturned  in  its  efforts  to  thwart  the 
designs  of  suspected  politicians,  was  itself  a Government  of  reformers, 
and  betrayed  at  moments  no  little  sympathy  with  the  popular  cause 
it  was  fighting. 

The  severity  of  the  policy  adopted  by  the  Government  extended 
to  the  Press.  In  the  spring  of  1883  the  Press  law  of  1875,  the  opera- 
tion of  which  had  given  rise  to  a special  class  of  “ prison  editors,” 


1 68  Political  Parties 

was  revised  in  a spirit  of  increasing  harshness.  In  cases  falling  under 
what  was  known  as  the  “ Law  of  Libel,”  not  the  editor  of  a paper 
only,  as  before,  but  the  proprietor  and  manager  also,  were  held 
jointly  responsible  ; the  law  itself  was  construed  so  as  to  leave  no 
loophole  of  escape  for  the  suspected  offender  ; and  the  conditions 
imposed  on  journalistic  enterprise  made  it  almost  impossible  to  start 
a newspaper  or  to  carry  it  on  when  started. 

The  newly  formed  political  parties  were  also  at  a disadvantage  as 
regards  the  place  which  was  of  necessity  their  centre  of  operations. 
We  have  seen  how  before  the  reopening  of  Japan  to  foreign  inter- 
course Tokio,  then  called  Yedo,  had  for  nearly  three  centuries  been 
the  seat  of  administration  ; how  with  the  gradual  decay  of  Tokugawa 
authority  the  centre  of  political  activity  had  shifted  for  a time  to 
the  former  capital,  Kioto  ; and  how  after  the  Restoration  of  1868-9 
Tokio,  now  called  by  its  changed  name,  had  more  than  regained  its 
position,  becoming  as  the  new  Capital  the  place  where  the  new  life 
of  the  nation  and  its  interests  were  focussed.  Its  position  was  now 
stronger  than  ever,  for  the  abolition  of  feudalism  had  put  an  end  to 
all  separatist  tendencies,  and  provincial  towns  had  lost  much  of  their 
former  importance.  The  change  was  not  without  its  effect  on  the 
organization  of  political  parties.  However  great  the  local  influence 
of  the  leaders  might  be,  it  was  in  Tokio  that  the  constitution  of 
parties  took  place.  The  provinces  counted  for  little.  They  might 
supply  the  leaders,  but  the  Capital  was  the  centre  of  operations. 
There,  as  being  the  seat  of  administration,  the  Government  was  at 
its  strongest,  while  the  party  politicians  on  the  other  hand  were  at  a 
disadvantage.  Beyond  the  reach  of  the  local  ties  in  clan  or  province, 
on  which  they  depended  for  support,  they  worked  in  strange  and 
uncongenial  surroundings.  Moreover,  the  enforcement  of  the  rule 
forbidding  the  formation  of  provincial  branches  and  combination 
with  other  political  bodies,  condemned  them  to  a position  of  com- 
parative isolation. 

Another  difficulty  with  which  political  parties  had  to  contend  was 
the  absence  of  any  concrete  and  well-defined  issues  upon  which 
politicians  could  concentrate.  As,  in  the  early  ministerial  rupture  of 
1873,  in  which  political  parties  had  their  genesis,  no  broad  question 
of  principle,  so  far  as  reforms  were  concerned,  had  divided  the 
retiring  statesmen  from  their  colleagues  who  remained  at  the  head 
of  affairs,  so  it  was  with  political  parties  at  this  time,  and  for  many 


Political  Parties  169 

years  afterwards.  No  clear  line  of  demarcation  separated  one  from 
another.  All  alike  were  in  favour  of  progress  and  reform,  all  anxious, 
though  not  altogether  in  equal  measure,  for  the  extension  of  the 
people’s  rights.  It  is  true  that  the  programmes  issued  by  the  different 
parties  at  the  time  of  their  formation,  as  well  as  the  speeches  of  party 
leaders,  showed  some  divergencies,  but  the  views  therein  expressed 
were  pious  opinions,  and  nothing  more.  They  dealt  with  things  in 
the  abstract,  not  with  practical  issues,  which  had  not  yet  arisen.  It 
is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  in  the  absence  of  more  material 
concerns  time  should  have  been  wasted  in  vague  and  futile  con- 
troversy on  such  abstract  subjects  as  sovereign  rights  and  their 
exercise  ; the  Liberals  declaring  that  sovereignty  lay  with  the  people, 
the  Imperialists  that  it  rested  with  the  Sovereign  ; wliile  the  party 
of  Constitutional  Reform  contended  that  it  resided  in  something 
representing  both,  namely,  a parliament,  which  had  as  yet  no  exist- 
ence. Under  such  circumstances  popular  enthusiasm  declined,  and 
even  serious  politicians  lost  interest  in  the  welfare  of  their  party. 

Much  mischief  was,  also,  caused  by  disunion,  the  result  of  inexperi- 
ence and  lack  01  discipline.  This  was  aggravated  in  the  case  of  the 
Liberal  Party  by  the  departure  on  a tour  of  observation  in  Europe 
and  America  of  its  president,  Itagaki,  and  Goto,  one  of  its  vice- 
presidents.  The  Government  was  accused  of  arranging  this  tour 
with  the  double  object  of  weakening  the  Jiyuto  by  depriving  it  of 
the  services  of  its  ablest  politicians,  and  of  creating  discord  between 
the  Liberals  and  the  Party  of  Constitutional  Reform.  If  this  was 
its  plan,  it  certainly  succeeded.  Not  only  was  the  Jiyuto  weakened 
by  internal  dissensions,  but  the  relations  of  the  two  parties  became 
at  once  estranged.  The  one  accused  the  other  of  receiving  bribes 
from  the  Government,  and  when  they  both  practically  disappeared 
from  the  scene,  the  feud  was  bequeathed  to  their  successors. 

One  reason  alone,  however,  in  the  absence  of  any  others,  would 
probably  have  sufficed  to  render  futile  this  first  experiment  at  party 
making  for  parliamentary  purposes.  There  was  no  parliament,  and 
no  one  knew  what  sort  of  parliament  there  would  be.  In  these 
circumstances  the  proceedings  of  political  parties  lacked  reality,  and 
gave  the  impression  of  a stage  performance. 

The  results  of  the  political  activity  of  the  nation  in  the  direction 
we  have  described  were  certainly  not  encouraging.  All  that  was  left 
of  the  three  parties  after  two  or  three  years  of  strenuous  endeavour 


Renewed  Unrest 


170 

was  a shattered  and  leaderless  remnant  of  one,  the  other  two  having 
melted  away  altogether  ; and  of  their  work  nothing  survived  save  a 
faint  tracing  of  lines  along  which  the  subsequent  development  of 
political  parties  proceeded. 

More  than  once  in  the  preceding  pages  attention  has  been  called 
to  the  embarrassment  and  danger  caused  to  the  country  by  the  large 
numbers  of  ex-samurai  with  little  means  and  less  occupation,  whom 
the  abolition  of  the  feudal  system  had  left  stranded,  and  wdio  now 
lay  like  a blight  upon  the  land.  For  some  of  the  better  educated  of 
these  former  members  of  the  military  class  the  rapidly  developing 
Press  had  furnished  employment.  The  restless  energies  of  the  re- 
mainder had  found  occupation  for  a time  in  the  movement  for  the 
formation  of  political  parties.  As  soon,  however,  as  the  first  impulse 
of  the  movement  had  spent  its  force,  and  before  the  actual  dissolution 
of  any  of  the  parties,  their  attention  was  diverted  to  other  channels 
of  political  activity  which  promised  more  immediate  results ; and 
the  occurrence  of  several  outbreaks  and  plots  following  one  another 
at  short  intervals,  testified  to  the  serious  mischief  still  to  be  appre- 
hended from  this  unruly  class. 

The  first  of  these  to  call  for  the  intervention  of  the  authorities 
was  a rising  which  took  place  in  1883  in  a prefecture  to  the  north  of 
the  Capital.  The  cause  of  the  trouble  was  a dispute  between  the 
officials  and  the  people  of  the  district  in  regard  to  the  construction 
of  roads.  Into  the  question  of  road  construction,  as  into  that  of  all 
other  public  works,  entered  the  question  of  the  corvee.  This  was  an 
important  feature  of  rural  administration,  dating  back  to  ancient 
times,  and  consisted  of  personal  service,  or  its  commutation  by  a 
money  payment.  It  opened  the  door  to  many  abuses,  but,  if  imposed 
in  the  form  of  personal  service  at  seasons  when  there  was  little  out- 
door work  to  be  done,  it  was  preferred  by  the  peasant  to  other  modes 
of  taxation.  In  the  case  in  question  there  was  no  objection  in 
principle  to  the  corvee , but  the  action  of  the  authorities  was  resented 
on  the  ground  that  the  roads  it  was  intended  to  construct  were  not 
required.  Consequently,  when  the  governor  called  for  labour  on  the 
roads,  the  people  refused  to  work,  and  the  disturbances  which  ensued 
became  so  serious  as  to  require  the  use  of  troops  for  their  suppres- 
sion. In  pre-Restoration  days  the  trouble  would  not  have  extended 
beyond  the  compass  of  a simple  agrarian  riot.  What  made  it  more 
important,  and  gave  it  a political  aspect,  was  the  admixture  of  the 


Local  Outbreaks  17 1 

shizoku,  or  ex-samurai,  clement,  which  in  feudal  times  could  never 
have  occurred.  One  of  the  ringleaders  in  this  rising,  who  escaped 
with  a term  of  imprisonment  for  an  offence  which  a few  years  before 
would  have  cost  him  his  head,  afterwards  became  President  of  the 
House  of  Representatives.  In  this  capacity  he  speedily  earned  fresh 
notoriety  by  headstrong  action  leading  to  the  immediate  dissolution 
of  Parliament,  and  the  extinction  of  his  parliamentary  career. 

Other  risings  and  plots  which  had  no  connection  with  local 
grievances,  but  were  the  outcome  of  discontent  and  lawlessness, 
occurred  in  various  parts  of  the  country.  The  most  singular,  as  it 
was  the  last  of  the  series,  was  a fantastic  attempt  made  in  1885  to 
stir  up  trouble  in  Korea,  in  the  hope  that  this  might  react  on  the 
political  situation  in  Japan,  and  hasten  the  establishment  of  repre- 
sentative government.  Those  concerned  in  the  plot  were  all  of 
samurai  origin,  and  subsequently  took  a prominent  part  in  the  pro- 
ceedings of  parliamentary  parties. 

The  complicity  of  many  members  of  the  Liberal  Party,  both 
before  and  after  its  dissolution,  in  these  insurrectionary  movements 
is  admitted  by  Japanese  writers,  who  are  disposed  to  attribute  it 
mainly  to  the  excessive  severity  of  the  measures  of  repression  taken 
by  the  authorities. 


CHAPTER  XVII 


Framing  of  Constitution — New  Peerage — Reorganization  of  Ministry — 
English  Influence — Financial  Reform — Failure  of  Conferences  for 
Treaty  Revision. 

WITH  the  return  of  the  Ito  mission  in  September,  1883, 
the  task  of  framing  a Constitution  was  commenced. 
By  that  time  the  conservative  tendencies  in  the  Ministry 
had  become  more  marked.  They  were  to  increase  still  further  as  a 
result  of  the  study  of  Western  political  systems  in  which  the  mission 
had  been  engaged.  Most  of  its  time  had  been  spent  in  Germany. 
The  rapid  progress  of  that  country  since  its  expansion  into  an 
Empire,  the  bureaucratic  basis  of  its  administration,  the  conservative 
bias  of  its  rulers,  and  the  personality  of  Bismarck,  were  presumably 
reasons  that  pointed  to  the  adoption  of  German  models  in  constitu- 
tional, as  well  as  other  administrative  matters,  as  those  best  suited 
to  a nation  which  had  just  emerged  from  feudalism.  For  a Govern- 
ment, too,  which  wished  to  retain  as  much  power  as  possible  in  the 
hands  of  the  Crown,  a Constitution,  such  as  those  of  German  States, 
under  which  the  Sovereign  and  his  ministers  were  independent  of 
Parliament,  had  a natural  attraction.  And  there  may  have  been  a 
conviction  of  the  necessity  of  some  counterpoise  to  the  democratic 
ideas  derived  from  intercourse  with  republican  countries,  and  from 
Western  literature  of  an  advanced  type,  whose  mischievous  effects 
had  been  shown  in  the  extreme  views,  and  still  more  extreme 
methods,  of  the  political  agitators  who  clamoured  for  representative 
institutions. 

In  the  spring  of  1884  Ito  became  Minister  of  the  Imperial  House- 
hold, and  a special  bureau  was  formed  in  that  department  for  the 
purpose  of  drawing  up  a Constitution  under  his  direction.  The 
choice  of  the  Household  Department  for  this  task  was  determined 
by  political  considerations.  It  was  desired  to  emphasize  the  point 
that  the  constitution  was  granted  of  his  own  accord  by  the  Sovereign, 

172 


New  Peerage  173 

not  wrested  from  him  by  his  subjects.  There  was  also  a wish  to  im- 
press upon  the  nation  the  fact  that  the  Throne  was  the  source  of  all 
authority.  The  arrangement  had  also  the  advantage  of  disarming 
criticism,  while  the  privacy  associated  with  the  proceedings  of  a 
department  representing  the  Court  removed  all  risk  of  interference 
from  outside. 

Soon  after  Ito’s  appointment  as  Minister  of  the  Household  new 
orders  of  nobility  were  created,  the  model  adopted  being  that  of  the 
continent  of  Europe.  With  the  fall  of  the  Shogunate,  and  the 
abolition  of  the  feudal  system,  all  territorial  titles  had  disappeared. 
Gone  also  were  the  empty  Court,  or  official,  titles,  so  eagerly  sought, 
the  bestowal  of  which  had  been  one  of  the  last  surviving  prerogatives 
of  the  Crown. 

An  account  of  these  ancient  titles  has  already  been  given.  Many 
of  them  had  become  hereditary  in  the  families  which  held  them, 
and  their  disappearance  had  been  viewed  with  regret  in  many 
quarters.  The  creation  of  the  new  orders  of  nobility,  therefore, 
gained  much  popularity  for  the  new  Minister  of  the  Household. 
There  was  indeed  a special  reason  for  the  measure.  It  was  the  first 
step  towards  the  establishment  of  a constitutional  regime.  A House 
of  Peers  was  to  be  a leading  feature  of  the  Constitution  now  in 
course  of  preparation,  and  it  was  essential  to  create  a new  nobility 
before  the  institution  of  which  it  was  to  form  a part  came  into 
operation.  Some  five  hundred  peers  in  all  were  created,  the  number 
including  12  princes,  24  marquises,  74  counts,  321  viscounts  and  69 
barons.  The  recipients  of  these  new  titles  were  the  ex-Kuge , or 
Court  nobles,  the  ex-daimios,  who  under  the  feudal  system  had 
constituted  the  territorial  nobility,  and  ex-samurai,  still  in  office, 
who  had  rendered  eminent  service  to  the  State  at  the  time  of  the 
Restoration.  Not  unnaturally  the  lion’s  share  of  the  titles  received 
by  commoners  fell  to  Satsuma  and  Choshiu  men.  Assuming  the 
number  of  ex-Kuge  to  be  150,  and  that  of  the  ex-daimios  to  be  300, 
it  will  be  seen  that  the  number  of  commoners  ennobled  amounted  to 
only  one-tenth  of  the  whole.  The  disproportionately  large  number 
of  viscounts  created  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  there  was  little 
difference  in  the  positions  of  most  of  the  territorial  nobility,  although 
each  had  his  fixed  place  in  the  table  of  official  precedence.  It  was, 
therefore,  difficult  to  make  any  discrimination  in  these  cases  when 
the  old  system  of  things  was  translated  into  the  new.  It  would 


174  Reorganization  of  Ministry 

appear,  moreover,  that  this  was  also  the  case  with  the  old  Court 
nobility.  Among  the  ex-samurai  to  be  ennobled  were  the  Choshiu 
statesmen,  Ito,  Yamagata  and  Inouye,  and  three  Satsuma  members 
of  the  Government,  Kuroda,  the  younger  Saig5,  and  Matsugata,  all 
of  whom  became  Counts.  The  services  of  other  ex-samurai  who 
had  distinguished  themselves  at  the  time  of  the  Restoration,  but  were 
in  opposition  when  the  new  nobility  was  created,  were  recognized 
some  years  later,  Okuma,  Itagaki  and  Goto  then  receiving  the  same 
title  of  Count. 

In  the  reorganization  of  the  administrative  system  which  took 
place  in  the  following  year  the  hand  of  the  new  Minister  of  the 
Household  could  again  be  seen.  The  previous  reorganization  of  the 
Ministry  had  occurred  in  1871.  The  changes  then  made  had  been  of 
two  kinds  : the  substitution  in  the  new  Government  of  the  leading 
spirits  of  the  Restoration  in  place  of  representatives  of  the  feudal 
aristocracy,  thus  strengthening  the  progressive  element  in  the 
Ministry ; and  the  separation  of  the  Central  Executive  into  three 
branches  directed  by  the  three  chief  Ministers  of  State  (the  Daijo 
Daijin,  or  Prime  Minister,  the  Sadaijin,  or  Minister  of  the  Left, 
and  the  U daijin,  or  Minister  of  the  Right).  Under  this  system, 
which,  in  its  main  outlines,  had  continued  ever  since,  there  was  no 
clear  division  between  the  different  departments  of  State,  nor  had 
the  Prime  Minister,  in  whose  name  all  decrees  were  issued,  proper 
control  over  the  ministers  in  charge  of  them,  who  were  all  independent 
of  each  other.  The  effect  of  the  change  now  introduced,  in  imitation 
of  the  German  Cabinet  system,  was  to  give  increased  importance  and 
authority  to  the  post  of  Premier  who  received  the  new  designation  of 
Minister  President  of  the  Cabinet.  By  the  creation  of  a new  Depart- 
ment of  Agriculture  and  Commerce  the  number  of  State  Departments 
was  increased  to  nine.  The  Ministers  of  these  Departments,  together 
with  the  Minister  President,  constituted  the  Cabinet.  The  Imperial 
Household  formed  a separate  department,  the  Minister  of  the 
Household  not  being  included  in  the  Cabinet.  Under  the  new 
arrangement  the  Premier  virtually  directed  the  policy  of  the  State, 
and  was  eligible  for  a portfolio,  if  he  chose  to  hold  one.  Like  the 
German  Chancellors  under  Hohenzollcrn  rule,  he  was  responsible 
for  the  whole  administration,  while  exercising  a general  control  over 
all  Departments.  The  changes  involved  in  this  administrative 
reorganization,  which  is  still  in  existence,  had  also  another  and 


English  Influence  175 

deeper  signification.  They  meant  the  final  triumph  of  Western  ideas, 
and  the  open  assumption  of  the  reins  of  Government  by  the  men  who 
had  up  to  that  time  been  working  behind  the  scenes. 

Other  changes  effected  about  this  time,  and  due  to  the  initiative 
of  the  same  statesman,  were  the  creation  of  the  office  of  Lord 
Keeper  of  the  Seals  ( Naidaijin ) who  presided  over  a body  of  fifteen 
Court  Councillors  ( Kiuchiu-Komonkwan ),  whose  duties  were  to  give 
advice  regarding  Court  ceremonies  and  usages ; and  the  establish- 
ment of  a system  of  competitive  examinations  for  employment  in 
the  Civil  Service.  This  reform,  which  one  is  tempted  to  regard  as 
the  application  of  one  of  the  principles  mentioned  in  the  Imperial 
Oath,  though  the  motive  may  have  been  simply  the  same  that 
prompted  other  Western  innovations,  put  an  end  to  much  of  the 
favouritism  which  had  previously  influenced  official  appointments, 
and  had  furnished  political  agitators  with  a useful  cry.  A further 
indication  of  progressive  tendencies  was  furnished  by  the  adoption 
of  English  as  a subject  of  study  in  primary  schools.  This  step  was 
an  official  recognition  of  the  influence  it  had  exercised  and  was  still 
exercising  upon  the  modern  development  of  Japan.  That  influence 
has  been  fully  recognized  by  Japanese  writers.  In  Fijty  Tears  oj 
New  Japan,  a book  to  which  reference  has  been  made  more  than 
once  in  these  pages,  Professor  Haga,  speaking  of  the  effects  of  the 
reopening  of  Japan  to  foreign  intercourse,  tells  us  that  it  has  always 
been  through  books  in  the  English  language  that  the  Japanese  people 
formed  their  conceptions  of  things  European,  and  obtained  glimpses 
of  the  general  features  of  the  outside  world.  Elsewhere  in  the  same 
work  Professor  Nitobe,  who  studied  chiefly  in  the  United  States, 
remarks  that  “ the  effect  of  the  English  tongue  on  the  mental  habits 
[?  mentality]  of  the  Japanese  people  is  incalculable  ” ; and  he  adds 
that  “ the  moral  influence  of  some  of  the  simple  text-books  used  in 
our  schools  cannot  be  overrated.” 

The  year  1886  is  associated  with  a financial  reform  of  the  first 
importance — the  resumption  of  specie  payments,  in  other  words, 
the  substitution  of  convertible  for  inconvertible  paper  money. 
When  dwelling  for  a moment  in  a previous  chapter  on  the  financial 
difficulties  confronting  the  new  Government  that  was  formed  after 
the  Restoration,  mention  was  made  of  the  confused  state  of  the 
monetary  system  at  that  time,  and  more  especially  the  chaotic 
condition  of  the  paper  money  then  in  circulation.  From  a History 


176  Financial  Reform 

oj  the  Currency  published  by  the  Government  in  the  above-mentioned 
year  we  learn  that  the  money  in  use  at  the  beginning  of  the  Meiji 
era  (1868)  included  four  kinds  of  gold  coins  (one  being  a coin  not  in 
general  use)  ; two  kinds  of  silver  coins,  besides  bars  and  balls  of  silver 
of  fixed  weights ; six  kinds  of  copper,  brass  and  iron  coins,  known 
by  the  general  term  of  zeni,  or  “ cash  ” (one  of  these  being  merely 
a money  token,  and  not  an  actual  coin)  ; and  no  less  than  1600 
different  currencies  of  paper  money.  Much  of  the  coinage  was 
debased.  The  paper  currencies  emanated  partly  from  the  central 
Tokugawa  Government  and  partly  from  the  local  feudal  authorities. 
More  than  two-thirds  of  the  270  odd  clans  then  in  existence,  and 
eight  hatamoto  territories,  had  paper  currencies  of  their  own,  and  in 
many  cases  issues  of  different  dates  were  in  circulation  together. 
This  paper  money,  too,  was  of  various  kinds.  There  were  gold 
notes,  silver  notes,  sen  notes,  notes  representing  fixed  amounts  in 
copper,  brass  and  iron  “ cash,”  as  well  as  rice  notes  representing 
definite  quantities  of  rice,  and  used  in  the  payment  of  taxes,  which 
were  levied  chiefly  in  kind.  There  were  also  what  were  called 
“ credit  notes  ” — issued  in  return  for  money  deposited  by  the 
commercial  establishments  which  did  duty  for  banks  in  those  days — 
representing  gold,  silver,  cash,  or  rice,  as  the  case  might  be.  The 
mischief  was  intensified  by  the  erroneous  ideas  then  held  as  to  the 
proper  ratio  between  gold  and  silver,  and  between  these  two  metals 
and  copper,  which  enabled  the  foreign  trader  to  make  illegitimate 
profits,  and  caused  great  loss  to  the  country.  The  steps  taken  by  the 
Government,  after  the  establishment  of  a mint,  and  the  abolition  of 
the  feudal  system,  to  remedy  this  state  of  things  included  the  with- 
drawal of  current  issues  of  coin  and  paper  money,  and  the  issue  of 
other  currency  in  their  place.  The  first  effect,  therefore,  of  these 
measures  was  to  increase  the  existing  confusion.  The  issue  of  the 
new  coinage  struck  at  the  Osaka  mint  also  tended  to  obscure  the 
situation.  Though  the  standard  adopted  was  nominally  a gold  one, 
in  its  working  it  became  bimetallic  ; for  in  1878  the  Government 
allowed  one-yen  silver  coins  to  come  into  general  and  unrestricted 
circulation,  a step  which  was  tantamount  to  changing  the  mono- 
metallic standard  into  a bimetallic  one. 

Meanwhile,  by  the  establishment  in  1872  of  National  Banks,  em- 
powered to  issue  notes  in  a certain  proportion  to  their  capital,  it  was 
sought  to  facilitate  the  withdrawal  of  the  old  paper  money,  encourage 


Prince  Ito. 

Took  an  active  part  in  the  Government  formed  after  the  Restoration  ; he  was  the  chiet 
framer  of  the  Japanese  Constitution  and  parliamentary  institutions,  and  founder  of  the 
Seiyukai.  His  last  post  was  that  of  Governor  General  of  Korea. 


Financial  Reform  177 

banking  enterprise  on  a modern  system,  and  place  matters  generally 
on  a more  satisfactory  footing.  At  the  end  of  four  years  only  four 
National  Banks,  the  pioneers  in  Japan  of  modern  banking,  having 
come  into  existence,  it  was  found  necessary  to  revise  the  National 
Bank  regulations.  The  revision  had  immediate  effect.  Within  five 
years  the  number  of  National  Banks  had  increased  from  four  to  one 
hundred  and  fifty-one,  many  of  which,  however,  as  Baron  Shibusawa, 
the  well-known  banker,  explains  in  his  chapter  on  banking  in  Fijty 
Tears  oj  New  Japan,  were  local  undertakings  of  limited  importance. 
One  of  the  objects  of  the  establishment  of  National  Banks,  the 
encouragement  of  banking  enterprise,  had  thus  been  achieved. 
Progress  had  also  been  made  in  the  attainment  of  another  object, 
the  redemption  of  previous  paper  currencies  by  the  issue  of  Paper 
Money  ( Kinsatsu ) Exchange  Bonds  and  Pension  Bonds,  which  the 
National  Banks  were  allowed  to  hold  as  security  for  their  note  issue. 
But  the  permission  given  to  the  National  Banks  to  issue  notes  had 
been  made  use  of  too  freely,  with  the  result  that  paper  money 
depreciated  considerably  in  value ; and  when  during  the  Satsuma 
rebellion  the  Government  had  recourse  to  a further  large  issue  of 
notes  in  order  to  meet  increased  expenditure,  a further  fall  in  value 
occurred.  The  lowest  level  in  the  price  of  paper  money  was  reached 
in  the  spring  of  1 88 1 , when  it  stood  at  a discount  of  over  70  per  cent. 
The  creation  of  the  Bank  of  Japan  in  the  following  year  furnished 
the  country  with  a banking  centre  independent  of  the  National 
Banks,  in  a position  to  exercise  a check  on  their  operations,  and 
empowered  to  issue  convertible  notes  on  the  basis  of  a specie  reserve 
which  the  National  Banks  were  required  to  deposit  with  it  ; and  a 
year  later  the  then  Minister  of  Finance,  Mr.  (afterwards  Marquis) 
Matsugata,  introduced  a scheme  for  the  cessation  of  the  privilege  of 
issuing  notes  given  to  these  banks,  the  gradual  withdrawal  of  their 
note  issue  in  circulation,  and  the  alteration  of  their  status  to  that  of 
private  banks.  The  adoption  of  these  and  other  steps,  into  the 
details  of  which  it  is  unnecessary  to  enter,  rendered  it  at  last  possible 
to  effect  specie  resumption  on  a silver  basis.  A Notification  to  this 
effect  was  issued  in  June,  1885,  and  the  measure  came  into  force  on 
the  1st  January,  1886.  The  gold  standard  now  in  existence  was  not 
established  until  eleven  years  later. 

The  same  year  (1886)  witnessed  a revival  of  political  agitation. 
This  had,  as  we  have  seen,  died  down  after  the  failure  of  the  first 

M 


178  Failure  of  Treaty  Revision  Conferences 

attempt  to  organize  political  parties  in  preparation  for  the  promised 
parliament,  and  the  extremist  members  of  the  now  numerous  party 
of  advanced  reformers  had  been  tempted  to  employ  more  violent 
methods  to  attain  their  ends,  with  results  already  described.  In 
September  of  that  year  a meeting  of  politicians  of  all  shades  of 
liberal  and  radical  opinion  was  held  in  the  Capital  to  concert 
measures  for  the  taking  of  united  action.  Simultaneously  with  this 
renewed  activity  the  field  of  operations  was  extended.  Ever  since 
the  agitation  had  assumed  a more  or  less  organized  form  the  politi- 
cians conducting  it  had  confined  their  attention  almost  exclusively 
to  domestic  affairs.  Now,  however,  an  important  foreign  question 
came  before  the  public  in  a shape  more  definite  than  before.  This 
was  the  question  of  Treaty  Revision. 

It  has  already  been  explained  in  a previous  chapter,  in  connection 
with  the  mission  of  Iwakura  to  Europe  and  America  in  1872  for  the 
ostensible  purpose  of  obtaining  a revision  of  the  treaties  with  foreign 
Powers,  how  soon  after  the  reopening  of  foreign  intercourse,  and  how 
strongly,  the  Japanese  nation  resented  the  exemption  of  foreigners 
from  Japanese  jurisdiction  under  the  treaties  of  1858  ; what  im- 
portance was  attached  by  the  Japanese  Government  to  a revision  of 
those  treaties  which  would  do  away  with  extra-territorial  privileges ; 
and  what  disappointment  and  ill-feeling,  as  well  as  other  unwelcome 
results,  were  caused  by  the  failure  of  the  mission  to  persuade  the 
foreign  Governments  concerned  to  enter  into  negotiations  on  the 
subject.  It  will  be  more  convenient  to  give  this  important  question 
a place  to  itself  later  on,  when  the  course  of  our  narrative  has  reached 
the  point  at  which  the  object  of  the  long-continued  negotiations  was 
at  length  successfully  accomplished.  For  the  present  it  will  be 
sufficient  to  mention  that  the  question  was  not  allowed  to  drop 
because  of  the  ill-success  of  the  Iwakura  Mission  : that  negotiations 
were  reopened  by  the  Japanese  Government  in  1882,  when  a Prelimi- 
nary Conference  was  held  in  Tokio ; that  a further  and  more  formal 
Conference  took  place  in  the  same  Capital  four  years  later  ; and  that 
on  neither  of  these  occasions  was  a definite  result  reached. 

Such  was  the  position  of  affairs  when  in  the  course  of  the  revival 
of  political  agitation  this  question,  so  embarrassing  to  the  Govern- 
ment, and  so  irritating  to  the  susceptibilities  of  the  nation,  came  to 
play  a more  prominent  part  in  public  controversies.  A national 
grievance  of  this  kind  felt  by  all  educated  persons  was  naturally 


Failure  of  Treaty  Revision  Conferences  179 

shared  by  politicians.  It  was  rendered  more  acute  by  the  recognition 
of  the  fact,  now  become  common  knowledge,  that  the  absence  of  any 
fixed  term  for  the  duration  of  existing  treaties  constituted  a serious 
obstacle  to  their  revision.  Treaty  revision,  therefore,  became  a chief 
feature  in  the  programme  of  political  agitators,  and  increased  im- 
portance was  given  to  it  by  the  failure  of  the  second  Conference  to 
achieve  any  definite  results,  and  by  the  resignation,  as  a result  of  this 
failure,  of  the  then  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Count  (afterwards 
Marquis)  Inouy6,  who,  as  chief  Japanese  delegate,  had  presided  over 
its  meetings. 

Some  increase  of  confusion  in  the  country,  and  a general  sense  of 
instability,  were  caused  too  at  this  time  by  the  pro-foreign  tendencies 
which  for  some  years  had  characterized  the  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment. Associated  in  its  origin  with  a desire  for  the  revision  of  the 
treaties  which  should  relieve  Japanese  susceptibilities,  and  with  the 
well-grounded  conviction  that  the  adoption  of  Western  institutions, 
laws  and  customs  would  enlist  the  sympathies  of  foreign  countries, 
and  thus  assist  the  attainment  of  the  end  desired,  the  movement 
assumed  such  proportions  in  official  and  Court  circles  in  the  Capital 
as  to  lead  to  the  supposition  that  nothing  less  than  the  Europeaniza- 
tion of  Japan  was  intended.  More  serious  than  some  in  its  character, 
and  in  its  effects  more  lasting,  it  ran  its  course  like  other  similar 
movements,  the  recurrence  of  which  is  a testimony  to  the  impulsive 
character  of  the  people  ; and  when  it  died  out  the  process  was  so 
silent  and  gradual  that  no  reactionary  wave  came  to  swell  the  normal 
tide  of  anti-foreign  sentiment. 

The  failure  in  1887  of  the  second  Conference,  which  had  lasted 
more  than  a year,  furnished  a welcome  opportunity  to  political 
agitators.  The  moment  was  favourable  for  the  stirring  up  of 
trouble.  The  renewal  of  political  activity  was  signalized  by  the 
formation  of  a confederation  of  men  of  all  parties,  including  even  a 
sprinkling  of  conservatives,  under  the  name  of  General  Agreement 
Union  ( Daidd-ShS-i  Danketsu ),  a title  which  was  intended  to  convey 
the  meaning  that  it  was  an  association  of  persons  whose  opinions 
agreed  in  the  main  and  differed  only  in  non-essentials.  It  was  not  a 
political  party  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  but  a loose  conglomera- 
tion of  persons  united  only  by  dissatisfaction  with  the  Government. 
Encouraged  by  the  birth  of  this  new  and  powerful  association,  the 
class  of  political  rowdies  increased  in  numbers ; the  law  which  im- 


180  Failure  of  Treaty  Revision  Conferences 

posed  restrictions  on  the  organization  of  political  parties  was  evaded 
by  the  formation  of  secret  societies ; and  eventually  the  condition 
of  affairs  became  so  serious  that  the  Government  took  the  strongest 
step  adopted  since  the  Restoration  and  issued  what  are  known  as  the 
Peace  Preservation  Regulations  (Ho-an  Jorei).  These  regulations 
prohibited  under  severe  penalties  the  holding  of  secret  meetings, 
the  formation  of  secret  societies,  and  the  publication  of  books  or 
pamphlets  of  any  kind  of  a nature  to  disturb  the  public  peace.  They 
also  armed  the  authorities  with  power  to  arrest  and  banish  for  three 
years  from  the  district  in  which  he  lived  any  person  suspected  of 
disturbing  the  public  peace  who  resided  within  a radius  of  seven  miles 
from  the  Imperial  Palace  in  the  Capital. 

The  regulations  were  put  into  force  on  the  date  of  their  pro- 
mulgation, the  25th  December,  1887.  More  than  five  hundred 
persons  were  arrested  and  banished  at  twenty-four  hours’  notice  from 
the  Capital  and  its  neighbourhood,  the  number  including  several 
prominent  men,  who  afterwards  filled  high  positions  as  Cabinet 
Ministers  or  Presidents  of  the  Lower  House.  The  precautions  taken 
by  the  authorities  did  not  end  here.  The  garrison  of  Tokio  was 
increased,  the  departments  of  State  and  the  official  residences  of 
Ministers  were  guarded  by  police  patrols,  and  the  Ministers  them- 
selves never  ventured  out  without  an  escort  of  two  or  three  armed 
detectives.  The  nature  of  the  precautionary  measures  taken  indicates 
that  it  was  not  popular  disorders  so  much  as  dangerous  political 
trouble  that  was  feared.  That  they  were  needed  is  proved  by  the 
fact  that  during  the  year  1889  one  Cabinet  Minister  was  murdered, 
while  another  was  dangerously  wounded  by  political  malcontents. 

As  before,  conciliation  went  hand  in  hand  with  repression.  Three 
days  after  the  Peace  Preservation  Regulations  were  promulgated  the 
issue  of  a new  and  more  lenient  Press  law  encouraged  the  freer  ex- 
pression of  popular  views.  And  in  February  of  the  following  year 
(1888)  public  opinion  was  further  conciliated  by  the  inclusion  in  the 
Cabinet  of  Okuma,  whose  views  on  constitutional  questions  had 
always  been  in  advance  of  those  of  the  Ministry  which  he  rejoined. 
His  return  to  the  Cabinet  was  of  great  service  to  the  country  at  a 
critical  time,  helping  the  Government  to  tide  over  an  uncomfortable 
interval  which  still  remained  before  the  promulgation  of  the  Con- 
stitution. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


Imperial  Authority — Privy  Council — Local  Self-Government — Promulga- 
tion of  Constitution — Imperial  Prerogatives — The  Two  Houses  of 
Parliament — Features  of  Constitution  and  First  Parliamentary 
Elections. 

THE  Peace  Preservation  Regulations  provided,  as  we  have 
seen,  amongst  other  things,  for  the  removal  of  persons 
suspected  of  designs  to  disturb  the  public  peace  from  areas 
in  the  Capital,  and  its  suburbs,  within  a radius  of  seven  miles  from 
the  Imperial  Palace.  This  mention  of  the  Imperial  Palace  shows 
how  strong  the  force  of  habit  was,  and  still  is,  in  Japan.  The  main- 
tenance of  “ the  security  of  the  Throne,”  a phrase  borrowed  from 
the  Chinese  classics,  was  for  centuries  a leading  idea  in  Japanese 
administration.  The  expression,  usually  to  be  found  in  association 
with  another  classical  phrase,  “ the  tranquillity  of  the  people,”  recurs 
from  an  early  date  in  all  official  literature,  in  Decrees,  Memorials  and 
Manifestos.  As  remarkable  as  the  continuity  of  the  dynasty,  of 
which  the  nation  is  not  unnaturally  proud,  this  constant  solicitude 
for  the  Imperial  welfare,  this  manifestation  of  what  to  foreign  eyes 
may  seem  a somewhat  excessive  degree  of  reverence  for  the  Throne, 
was  often  in  inverse  ratio  to  the  authority  it  wielded.  We  have  seen, 
for  instance,  how  the  policy  of  the  founder  of  the  Tokugawa  line  of 
Shoguns  was  to  increase  the  outward  respect  paid  to  the  Court  by 
surrounding  it  with  an  enhanced  semblance  of  dignity,  while  at  the 
same  time  its  authority  was  sensibly  diminished.  At  no  time  was 
the  ceremonial  governing  relations  between  what  was  left  of  the 
Court  and  the  Shogunate  more  elaborate  than  under  the  rule  of  the 
Shoguns  of  this  line  ; never,  perhaps,  was  the  authority  of  the  Throne 
less  effective.  This  was,  however,  the  effect  of  deliberate  policy, 
in  which  may  be  traced  a desire  to  hoodwrink  the  nation,  and  conceal 
the  ambitious  designs  of  its  rulers.  When  in  the  closing  years  of 
Shogunate  rule  its  prestige  declined,  the  reassertion  of  Imperial 

181 


1 82  Imperial  Authority 

authority  was  accompanied  by  a tendency  to  lay  additional  emphasis 
on  the  immemorial  respect  due  to  the  Throne.  It  was  this  feeling 
which  led  the  Court  party  before  the  Restoration  to  insist  on  no 
“ treaty  port  ” being  opened  in  the  five  “ home  provinces  ” because 
of  the  vicinity  of  Kioto,  where  the  Emperor  resided.  When  the 
opening  of  the  port  of  Hi5go  could  no  longer  be  withstood,  the  same 
feeling  inspired  the  narrowing  of  “ treaty  limits  ” — the  name  given 
to  the  area  in  the  neighbourhood  of  a “ treaty  port  ” in  which 
foreigners  were  allowed  under  the  treaties  to  make  excursions — in 
the  direction  of  the  old  Capital ; now,  several  years  later,  after  the 
personal  rule  of  the  Sovereign  had,  in  name  at  least,  been  re-estab- 
lished, we  notice  the  same  anxiety  for  the  security  of  the  Throne 
still  closely  connected  with  the  maintenance  of  public  tranquillity. 
And  evidence  of  the  same  exalted  respect  for  the  Throne  will  be 
seen  in  the  Constitution  which  was  shortly  to  be  promulgated,  and 
in  the  official  “ Commentaries  ” which  accompanied  its  promulga- 
tion. But  the  unusual  context  in  which  the  indirect  allusion  to  the 
Throne  appeared  in  the  Peace  Preservation  Regulations  showed  that 
a further  reason  lay  behind  this  mention  of  the  Imperial  Palace.  It 
was  customary  then,  as  now,  for  the  official  measurement  of  all  dis- 
tances from  the  new  Capital  to  be  taken  from  a central  point  in  the 
city.  This  was  the  Nihonbashi,  or  Bridge  of  Japan,  situated  in  the 
centre  of  the  old  town.  It  being  generally  understood,  however, 
that  all  distances  were  measured  from  this  centre,  it  was  considered 
unnecessary  to  mention  the  point.  The  fact  that  in  the  present 
instance  the  point  from  which  distances  were  to  be  measured  was 
mentioned  at  all,  coupled  with  the  substitution  of  the  Imperial 
Palace  for  the  bridge  in  question,  could  not  fail  to  attract  attention. 
The  public  was  thereby  reminded  both  of  its  duty  in  the  matter  of 
solicitude  for  the  security  of  the  Throne,  and  of  the  Imperial  authority 
that  supported  the  course  adopted  by  the  Government.  Throughout 
the  stormy  times  which  followed  the  establishment  of  parliamentary 
institutions  in  Japan,  the  invocation  of  the  Imperial  authority,  either 
directly  or  indirectly,  served  as  a political  barometer  by  which  the 
seriousness  of  a political  crisis  might  be  definitely  gauged. 

In  April,  1888,  two  months  after  the  return  of  Okuma  to  the 
Ministry  with  the  title  of  Count,  the  Privy  Council  ( Sumitsu-in ) was 
established.  The  decree  announcing  its  creation  stated  that  the 
Emperor  found  it  expedient  “ to  consult  personages  who  had  ren- 


Privy  Council  183 

dered  signal  service  to  the  State  ” in  regard  to  important  matters, 
thus  making  it  clear  that  the  functions  of  the  Council  would  be  of 
a purely  advisory  nature — a point  confirmed  later  on  by  the  Con- 
stitution— and  that  its  members  would  be  chosen  from  officials  of 
wide  experience.  The  scope  of  its  duties,  as  defined  in  the  rules 
governing  its  organization,  covered  a wide  field,  including,  amongst 
other  matters,  the  drafting  and  consideration  of  new  administrative 
measures,  the  revision  of  existing  laws,  amendments  to  the  Constitu- 
tion, the  presentation  of  its  views  on  treaties  with  foreign  countries 
and  financial  questions. 

With  functions  in  some  few  respects  similar  to  those  of  the  corre- 
sponding body  in  Great  Britain,  the  Japanese  Privy  Council  fills  a 
larger  place  in  the  political  machinery  of  the  State  and  takes  a more 
active  part  in  legislation,  though  it  has  no  judicial  functions.  Even 
more  so  than  with  us  is  it  the  final  goal  to  which  all  public  servants 
aspire,  and  where  their  services  are  still  available  for  the  State.  But 
it  is  something  else,  too.  It  has  a political  influence  which  does  not 
exist  in  the  case  of  our  own  institution  of  the  same  name  ; its 
members  are  eligible  for  re-entry  into  the  Ministry  or  for  other  State 
employment  ; and  they  are  in  constant  and  close  touch  with  public 
affairs. 

The  need  for  something  of  the  kind  in  Japan  was  far  greater  than 
in  Europe.  To  realize  its  necessity  it  must  be  remembered  that  the 
same  tendencies  in  Japan  which  encouraged  the  system  of  figure-head 
government  favoured  the  existence  of  advisory  councils,  whose  duties 
were  to  suggest  or  offer  an  opinion  on  administrative  policy,  the 
carrying  out  of  which  was  entrusted  to  executive  officials.  When  the 
whole  system  of  government  was  reorganized  on  a Western  basis,  the 
opportunity  of  introducing  this  feature  of  Western  administrative 
systems  was  eagerly  seized,  as  it  was  felt  that  it  would  in  some  sense 
fill  the  embarrassing  gap  caused  by  the  disappearance  of  the  groups 
of  advisers  which  had  played  so  leading  a part  under  the  old  regime. 

Prompt  use  was  made  of  the  services  of  the  new  Council.  The 
Constitution  had  by  this  time  been  drafted,  and  was  ready  for  the 
consideration  of  the  Privy  Council.  Accordingly,  within  a fortnight 
of  its  coming  into  existence  the  new  Privy  Councillors  were,  in 
accordance  with  the  duties  assigned  to  them,  discussing  the  draft 
Constitution  at  a series  of  meetings,  to  which  the  attendance  of  the 
Emperor  gave  an  increased  importance. 


184  Local  Self-Government 

The  year  1888  was  marked  by  the  enactment  of  another  important 
measure.  This  was  the  local  Self-government  Act,  known  as  the  Law 
of  Cities,  Towns  and  Villages  ( Shi-cho-som-po ).  The  first  step  in  the 
reform  of  local  government,  by  which  a representative  character  was 
given  to  it,  had  been  taken  in  1878,  when  drafts  of  the  “ Three  Great 
Laws,”  as  they  were  popularly  called,  were  prepared  by  the  Con- 
ference of  Prefects.  One  of  these,  the  law  creating  Prefectural 
Assemblies,  came  into  force,  as  we  have  seen,  two  years  later.  The 
operation  of  the  other  arrangements  drafted  at  the  same  time,  and 
affecting  smaller  areas  of  local  administration,  had  been  postponed. 
These  now  came  into  force  in  the  spring  of  1889,  some  changes  having 
in  the  meantime  been  made.  In  the  following  year  these  arrange- 
ments, as  well  as  the  whole  system  of  local  government,  underwent 
further  revision.  The  revised  system  then  introduced  is  now  in 
operation  in  forty-five  of  the  forty-six  prefectures  into  which  Japan 
proper  is  divided,  the  exception  being  Loochoo,  known  since  its 
annexation  as  the  Okinawa  prefecture.  The  basis  of  the  present 
system  is  the  separation  of  local  administration  into  two  main 
branches,  urban  and  rural.  Each  of  these  prefectures — three  of 
which  (Tokio,  Ki5to  and  Osaka)  have  a separate  status  as  urban  pre- 
fectures ( Fu ),  the  rest  being  rural  prefectures  {Ken) — is  now  divided 
into  urban  districts,  or  “ cities  ” (Ski),  and  rural  districts,  or  counties 
(Gun).  A rural  district,  or  county  (Gun),  is  again  subdivided  into 
towns  ( Cho ) and  villages  (Son).  The  classification  of  a town  as  an 
urban  district,  or  “ city  ” (Shi),  or  a “ town  ” (Cho),  depends  on  its 
population.  Unless  otherwise  determined  by  the  Minister  of  the 
Interior,  with  whom  the  final  decision  rests,  all  towns  of  over  25,000 
inhabitants  have  the  status  of  “ cities,”  enjoying  as  such  a somewhat 
larger  measure  of  self-government  than  those  not  in  this  category. 
In  each  prefecture  there  is  a prefectural  assembly  (Kenkwai  or  Fukwai, 
as  the  case  may  be),  and  an  executive  council  (Sanjikwai).  Similar 
assemblies  and  executive  councils  exist  in  each  rural  district  and 
“ city,”  but  towns  and  villages,  though  they  are  provided  with 
assemblies,  have  no  executive  councils,  the  duties  of  these  latter 
bodies  being  entrusted  to  the  mayors. 

The  system  of  election  to  local  administrative  bodies  is  more  or 
less  the  same  in  each  administrative  unit.  In  prefectures  where  the 
population  does  not  exceed  700,000  an  assembly  has  thirty  members. 
Where  the  population  is  larger  another  member  may  be  elected  for 


Took  an  active  part  in  the  Government  formed  after  the  Rendered  distinguished  services  in  the  war  with  China,  and  was 

Restoration.  As  Finance  Minister  he  carried  out  specie  resumption  Commander-in-Chief  in  the  Russo-Japanese  war. 
on  a silver  basis  in  1886,  and  introduced  the  present  gold  standard  in 
1897. 


N. 


Local  Self-Government  185 

each  additional  50,000  inhabitants.  “ City  ” assemblies  contain  more 
members,  the  number  varying  from  thirty  to  sixty,  the  latter  number 
being  the  maximum.  The  Sanjikivai,  or  executive  council,  of  a pre- 
fecture consists  of  ten  councillors  chosen  by  the  assembly  from 
amongst  its  members.  The  prefect  presides,  and  is  assisted  by  two 
prefectural  officials.  In  rural  districts  the  presiding  official  is  the 
Guncho,  or  district  administrator,  who,  as  in  the  case  of  prefects,  is 
appointed  by  the  Minister  of  the  Interior.  In  “ cities  ” the  mayor 
of  the  city  presides,  being  assisted  by  a deputy,  or  deputies,  as  the 
case  may  be.  The  chief  duty  of  all  these  assemblies  is  to  regulate 
expenditure,  and  apportion  the  taxation  required  to  meet  it.  In  the 
scheme  of  local  taxation  the  corvee  still  occupies  a prominent  place, 
though,  except  on  occasions  of  emergency,  substitutes  may  be  pro- 
vided, or  money  payments  made  in  commutation.  In  the  election  of 
members  voting  is  by  secret  ballot.  The  property  qualification  for 
electors,  and  for  those  eligible  as  members,  is  determined  by  the 
annual  amount  of  national,  or  Imperial,  taxes  paid  by  an  individual. 
The  age  qualification  is  fixed  at  twenty-five  years,  the  legal  age  at 
which  majority  is  attained.  The  possession  of  civil  rights  is  also 
necessary. 

The  legislative  activity  displayed  in  the  series  of  administrative 
measures  above  mentioned  shows  how  wide  an  effect  was  produced 
by  the  decision  to  create  a Parliament,  to  which  a Constitution 
became  under  the  circumstances  an  essential  corollary.  In  some  cases 
this  legislation  was  the  direct  offspring  of  that  decision.  The  new 
peerage,  the  reorganization  of  the  Ministry,  the  Privy  Council,  all 
had  their  separate  places  in  the  scheme  of  the  Constitution.  In  other 
cases  the  connection,  though  not  so  close,  was  still  obvious ; for  it 
was  not  possible  to  make  a Constitution  and  fit  it  into  the  existing 
framework  of  government,  put  together,  as  the  latter  had  been,  piece 
by  piece,  without  some  sensible  alterations  of  administrative 
machinery.  From  this  point  of  view  it  will  be  seen  that  the  reform 
of  local  government,  and  even  the  institution  of  Court  Councillors, 
who  might  be  chosen  to  sit  in  the  Upper  House,  had  a definite, 
albeit  indirect,  bearing  on  the  Constitution,  and  on  the  National 
Parliament  about  to  be  established. 

The  Constitution  having  been  considered  and  approved  by  the 
Privy  Council,  to  whose  deliberations  on  the  subject  an  increased 
dignity  had,  as  we  have  seen,  been  given  by  the  attendance  of  the 


1 86  Promulgation  of  Constitution 

Sovereign,  was  promulgated  by  the  Emperor  in  person  on  the  nth 
February,  1889.  The  ceremony  took  place  in  the  Throne  Room  of 
the  newly  built  palace  in  Tokio,  a building  of  Japanese  architecture, 
modified  in  some  of  its  features  by  a slight  admixture  of  foreign 
designs.  The  Emperor  and  Empress  occupied  daises  of  unequal 
height  at  one  end  of  the  hall,  which  was  filled  with  the  dignitaries 
of  the  Empire,  and  officials  of  senior  grades.  Seats  outside  the  Court 
circle  were  arranged  according  to  the  new  rules  of  precedence.  The 
three  first  places  were  assigned  to  the  ex-daimids  of  Satsuma  and 
Choshiu  and  to  the  new  head  of  the  Tokugawa  family,  in  the  order 
named,  all  three  having  the  rank  of  princes  in  the  new  nobility.  The 
head  of  the  Tokugawa  House  was  the  cousin  and  adopted  heir  of  the 
ex-Shogun  Keiki,  and  succeeded  to  the  headship  of  the  family  on 
the  enforced  retirement  at  the  close  of  the  civil  war  of  the  last  of 
the  Shoguns.  The  dignitaries  and  officials  present  all  wore  modern 
Court  costume  of  European  style,  with  the  marked  exception  of 
Prince  Shimadzu  of  Satsuma,  whose  appearance  in  Japanese  costume, 
with  hair  dressed  in  the  old-fashioned  cue,  bore  witness  to  the  in- 
grained conservatism  of  the  clan  he  represented.  Never  before  in 
the  country’s  history  had  a scene  more  impressive  occurred,  nor, 
indeed,  one  less  in  keeping  with  Japanese  traditional  ideas.  Great  as 
had  always  from  time  immemorial  been  the  reverence  felt  by  all 
classes  of  the  people  for  the  Crown,  it  was  a reverence  tinged  with 
political  expediency,  which  showed  itself  in  the  fixed  policy  of 
screening  from  public  view  the  object  of  veneration.  The  atmo- 
sphere of  mystery  and  seclusion  which  surrounded  the  monarch  had 
naturally  extended  to  the  palace  and  its  precincts,  and  in  a still 
greater  degree,  for  reasons  common  to  all  Oriental  countries,  to  the 
person  of  the  Imperial  Consort.  Now  for  the  first  time  the  palace 
was  thrown  open  to  a gathering  so  large  as  to  deprive  it  of  any  very 
select  or  exclusive  character,  and  the  tradition  of  centuries  was  broken 
in  a manner  contrary,  not  to  say  repugnant,  to  all  previous  ideas  by 
the  attendance  of  the  Sovereign  and  his  Consort  in  person,  the  former 
taking  an  active  part  in  the  proceedings.  The  ceremony,  therefore, 
in  a certain  sense  symbolized  the  new  spirit  which  inspired  the  nation, 
ushering  in  a different  order  of  things.  Apart  from  the  pomp  and 
magnificence  of  its  surroundings,  it  set  the  seal  on  the  new  departure 
in  State  policy,  and  represented  the  final  bridging  of  the  gulf  between 
old  and  new  Japan. 


Promulgation  of  Constitution  187 

The  speech  read  by  the  Emperor  on  this  occasion  was  couched  in 
the  vague  and  grandiloquent  style  common  to  all  utterances  from  the 
Throne.  It  spoke  of  the  Constitution  as  “ an  immutable  funda- 
mental law,”  and  described  the  foundations  of  the  Empire  as  having 
been  laid  by  the  Founder  of  the  Imperial  House  and  other  Imperial 
ancestors,  with  the  help  of  their  subjects,  on  a basis  that  was  to  last 
for  ever,  an  achievement  due  to  the  glorious  virtues  of  the  Imperial 
ancestors  and  the  bravery  and  loyalty  of  the  people  ; and  it  expressed 
the  hope  that  the  same  loyal  co-operation  between  Sovereign  and 
subject  would  for  ever  secure  the  stability  of  the  fabric  of  State 
bequeathed  by  the  Imperial  ancestors. 

The  Imperial  Decree,  or  Rescript,  issued  on  the  same  day  as  that 
on  which  the  Constitution  was  promulgated,  and  bearing  the  sign- 
manual  of  the  Sovereign  and  the  signatures  of  the  nine  Ministers  of 
State,  appears  as  a Preamble  in  the  official  English  text  of  the 
“ Commentaries  on  the  Constitution,”  though  it  is  not  found  in  the 
original  Japanese  text.  It  provided  that  the  Imperial  Diet  (the  name 
given  to  the  new  Parliament)  should  be  convoked  for  the  first  time 
in  1890,  and  that  the  date  of  its  opening  should  be  that  on  which 
the  Constitution  should  come  into  force.  The  date  thus  fixed  was 
the  29th  November,  1890.  In  this  Decree,  which  contained  a refer- 
ence to  the  promise  of  a Parliament  made  in  1881,  the  Emperor 
stated  his  intention  to  exercise  his  Sovereign  rights  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  for  the  execution  of  which 
the  Ministers  of  State  would  be  responsible.  Stress  was  also  laid  on 
the  important  condition  that  any  proposal  for  the  amendment  of  the 
Constitution  in  the  future  must  proceed  from  the  Throne,  and  that 
in  no  other  way  would  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Emperor’s 
descendants,  or  subjects,  to  alter  it  be  permitted. 

Additional  solemnity  was  given  to  the  promulgation  of  the  Con- 
stitution by  an  Oath  taken  by  the  Emperor  in  the  Shinto  Shrine 
(called  the  “ Sanctuary  ” in  the  English  official  text  of  the  “ Com- 
mentaries ”)  attached  to  the  palace.  In  this  Oath — the  second  of 
its  kind,  the  first  having,  as  we  have  seen,  been  taken  in  1869 — the 
Emperor  bound  himself  “ to  maintain  and  secure  from  decline  the 
ancient  form  of  government,”  and,  while  acknowledging  the  help 
received  from  the  Imperial  ancestors  in  the  past,  implored  the  con- 
tinuance of  their  support  in  the  future. 

The  Constitution,  as  promulgated,  consisted  of  seventy-six  articles 


1 88  Imperial  Prerogatives 

divided  into  seven  chapters,  dealing,  respectively,  with  the  position 
and  prerogatives  of  the  Sovereign,  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  people, 
the  functions  of  the  Diet,  the  relations  between  the  Cabinet  and  the 
Privy  Council,  the  judicature  and  finance  ; and  one  of  the  supple- 
mentary rules  attached  to  it  provided  for  its  revision,  a point  reserved, 
as  we  have  seen,  for  the  initiative  of  the  Crown.  Simultaneously 
with  its  promulgation  various  accessory  laws  were  enacted.  These 
were  the  Imperial  House  Law,  mentioned  in  the  Imperial  Oath,  the 
Imperial  Ordinance  concerning  the  House  of  Peers,  the  Law  of  the 
Houses,  the  Law  of  Election  of  the  members  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives and  the  Law  of  Finance. 

The  general  lines  of  the  Constitution  follow  those  of  the  Bavarian 
Constitution,  which  was  taken  as  the  model.  Its  leading  principles 
are  the  small  limitations  placed  on  the  Imperial  prerogative  and  the 
independence  of  the  Cabinet,  which  is  responsible  to  the  Sovereign 
alone,  and  not  in  any  way  to  the  Diet.  No  mention  either  of  the 
Cabinet,  or  of  the  Minister  President,  occurs  in  the  Constitution, 
though  they  are  referred  to  in  Prince  Ito’s  “Commentaries.”  But 
Article  LXXVI  of  the  Constitution  provides  that  all  existing  enact- 
ments, in  so  far  as  they  do  not  conflict  with  it,  shall  continue  in  force. 
The  enactment  of  1885  reorganizing  the  Ministry  comes  under  this 
rule.  Consequently  the  position  of  the  Minister  President,  and  of 
the  Cabinet  over  which  he  presided,  remained  unaltered  after  the 
Constitution  came  into  operation. 

The  enumeration  of  the  Imperial  prerogatives  occupies  much  space 
in  the  Constitution.  The  chief  points  to  be  noted  are  that  the 
Sovereign  exercises  the  legislative  powers  with  the  consent  of  the 
Diet  ; that  his  sanction  is  necessary  for  all  laws ; that  he  is  em- 
powered on  occasions  of  emergency  which  arise  when  the  Diet  is  not 
sitting  to  issue  “ Imperial  Ordinances  ” which  have  provisionally  the 
force  of  law,  but  which  require  the  approval  of  the  Diet  at  its  next 
session,  when,  if  not  approved,  they  cease  to  be  operative  ; that  he 
determines  the  peace  standing  of  both  army  and  navy  ; and  that  the 
authority  to  declare  war,  make  peace,  announce  a state  of  siege  and 
conclude  treaties  rests  with  him.  All  of  these  matters  are  removed 
from  the  control  of  the  Diet,  which  has  also  no  voice  in  any  future 
modifications  of  the  Law  of  the  Imperial  House.  The  remarkable 
reverence  for  the  Throne  which  is  characteristic  of  the  people  is 
illustrated  by  the  declaration,  in  one  of  the  early  articles,  of  the 


The  Two  Houses  of  Parliament  189 

sacredness  and  inviolability  of  the  person  of  the  Emperor.  This,  we 
are  told  in  the  “ Commentaries,”  is  a consequence  of  his  divine 
descent.  He  must,  indeed,  it  is  explained,  “ pay  due  respect  to  the 
law,  but  the  law  has  no  power  to  hold  him  accountable  to  it  ” — a 
statement  which  seems  to  involve  a contradiction  in  terms,  for  it  is 
difficult  to  understand  how  a Sovereign  who  is  not  accountable  to 
law  can  be  bound  to  respect  it. 

Among  the  duties  of  Japanese  subjects,  as  defined  in  the  Constitu- 
tion, is  liability  to  service  in  the  army  or  navy.  It  should  be  explained, 
however,  that  whereas  service  in  the  army  is  based  on  conscription 
alone,  recruiting  for  the  navy  is,  in  practice,  based  on  the  volunteer 
system,  supplemented  by  conscription.  Their  rights  include  immun- 
ity from  arrest,  trial  or  punishment,  except  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions  of  the  law  ; similar  immunity  in  the  matter  of  the  entry 
or  search  of  houses,  and  as  regards  private  correspondence  ; and 
freedom  of  religious  belief.  With  regard  to  the  omission  to  place 
on  record  the  fact  that  there  are  two  officially  recognized  religions, 
Shinto  and  Buddhism,  one  may,  after  reading  the  explanations  on 
this  point  given  in  the  “ Commentaries,”  be  tempted  to  think  that 
the  last  word  has  not  been  said  on  the  subject.  At  the  same  time  it 
will  be  recognized  that  the  course  adopted  represents  the  simplest 
solution  of  the  question. 

The  Diet,  or  Parliament — for  Japanese  writers,  when  writing  in 
English,  use  both  terms  indifferently — comprises  two  Chambers,  a 
House  of  Peers  and  a House  of  Representatives.  The  House  of  Peers 
is  composed  of  members  of  five  different  categories  : (i)  Members 
of  the  Imperial  family  who  have  attained  majority,  fixed  in  such  cases 
at  twenty  years ; (2)  princes  and  marquises  who  have  attained  legal 
majority,  namely,  twenty-five  years  ; (3)  other  members  of  the 
nobility  chosen  by  their  respective  orders  ; (4)  distinguished  persons 
specially  nominated  by  the  Emperor  ; and  (5)  persons  (one  for  each 
urban  and  rural  district)  elected  by  and  from  the  highest  taxpayers. 
Those  coming  under  the  first,  second  and  fourth  categories  are  life 
members ; those  coming  under  the  third  and  fifth  categories  are 
elected  for  seven  years.  The  number  of  members  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  as  originally  fixed  by  the  Constitution,  was  300,  and 
there  was  a property  qualification  for  membership.  They  are  elected 
by  voters  who  have  attained  legal  majority,  and  pay  annually  direct 
national  taxes  amounting  to  about  £1.  Under  the  revised  Electoral 


190  Features  of  Constitution 

Law  which  came  into  force  in  1902  there  is  no  longer  any  property 
qualification  for  membership,  the  only  conditions  now  being  an  age 
limit  of  thirty  years  and  the  possession  of  civil  rights.  The  same  law 
reduced  both  property  and  age  qualifications  in  the  case  of  electors, 
this  extension  of  the  franchise  resulting  in  the  number  of  electors 
being  increased  to  1,700,000  ; substituted  the  secret  ballot  for  open 
voting  ; and  raised  the  number  of  members  of  the  Lower  House  to 
381,  urban  districts  returning  73  and  rural  districts  308.  The  large 
majority  of  members  in  this  Chamber  have  always  belonged  to  the 
agrarian  class.  The  natural  term  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
is  four  years.  Dissolution,  which  is  one  of  the  Imperial  prerogatives, 
applies  only  to  the  Lower  House.  When  it  occurs,  the  Upper  House 
(or  House  of  Peers)  is  prorogued.  New  elections  must  take  place 
within  five  months  from  the  date  of  dissolution,  the  next  session  of 
the  Diet  becoming  what  is  known  as  an  Extraordinary  Session. 

The  Imperial  House  Law  contains  various  provisions  relating  to 
the  succession  to  the  Throne,  which  is  limited  to  the  male  line  ; the 
appointment  of  a Regent,  for  which  post  in  certain  circumstances 
the  Empress,  Empress  Dowager  and  other  ladies  of  the  Court  are 
eligible,  and,  during  the  minority  of  the  Sovereign,  of  a governor,  or 
guardian  ; and  the  age  (18)  at  which  a Sovereign  attains  majority. 
A point  to  be  noted  is  the  restriction  of  the  custom  of  adoption  in 
the  case  of  the  Imperial  Family,  no  member  of  which  is  allowed  to 
adopt  a son. 

In  concluding  this  brief  sketch  of  the  Constitution  and  accessory 
laws,  it  may  be  well  to  mention  a point  which  has  an  important 
bearing  on  the  practical  working  of  the  Japanese  parliamentary 
system,  namely,  the  control  exercised  by  the  Diet  over  the  Budget. 
This  to  some  extent  remedies  the  weakness  of  parliamentary  oppo- 
sition parties — as  compared  with  similar  parties  elsewhere — which 
arises  out  of  the  fact  that  the  Cabinet  is  independent  of  the  Diet. 
When  conflicts  over  the  Budget  take  place,  the  Diet  may  by  with- 
holding supplies  force  a dissolution.  In  these  cases  by  the  terms  of 
the  Constitution  the  Government  is  obliged  to  substitute,  in  place 
of  the  rejected  Budget,  the  Budget  of  the  previous  financial  year 
passed  in  the  preceding  session.  Any  new  financial  programme, 
therefore,  to  which  the  Government  may  have  committed  itself  in 
the  rejected  Budget  is  consequently  held  up,  and  cannot  be  pro- 
ceeded with  until  a fresh  Budget  has  been  passed  in  a subsequent 


First  Parliamentary  Elections  191 

extraordinary  session  of  Parliament.  This  means  a delay  of  at  least 
several  months.  The  Government  is,  however,  not  necessarily  always 
the  sufferer  financially  thereby,  for,  as  Marquis  Okuma  points  out 
in  his  book  already  referred  to,  the  effect  of  dissolutions  occurring 
through  this  cause  has  usually  been  to  reduce  expenditure  rather  than 
revenue. 

The  first  parliamentary  elections  were  held  in  the  summer  of  1890, 
the  first  session  of  the  Diet  taking  place  in  the  following  autumn. 


CHAPTER  XIX 


Working  of  Representative  Government — Stormy  Proceedings  in  Diet — 
Legal  and  Judicial  Reform — Political  Rowdyism — Fusion  of  Classes. 

THE  simultaneous  creation  in  Japan  of  a Parliament  and  a 
Constitution  offers  a contrast  to  the  sequence  of  political 
history  elsewhere.  There  is  no  essential  connection  be- 
tween the  two.  Some  countries  have  enjoyed  parliamentary  rights 
of  various  kinds  before  being  endowed  with  Constitutions.  In  others, 
again,  the  order  of  precedence  has  been  reversed.  The  fact  that  in 
Japan  the  two  came  together  may  be  regarded  as  the  natural  outcome 
of  the  decision  of  the  new  Government  formed  at  the  Restoration 
to  reorganize  the  general  administration  of  the  country  on  Western 
lines.  The  establishment  of  parliamentary  institutions  of  some  kind 
was  the  fixed  idea  of  all  reformers.  The  working  of  this  leading  idea 
may  be  traced  throughout  the  whole  course  of  administrative  recon- 
struction. Reference  to  it  was  made  in  the  Imperial  Oath  of  1869 — 
spoken  of  by  Japanese,  when  writing  in  English,  as  the  “ Charter  Oath 
of  the  nation.”  It  is  seen  in  the  introduction  of  a deliberative 
element  into  the  otherwise  archaic  form  given  to  the  new  adminis- 
tration ; in  the  subsequent  creation  of  a Senate  ( Genro-in ) ; in  the 
creation  of  prefectural  assemblies  in  1880  ; in  the  definite  promise 
of  a Parliament,  to  be  accompanied  by  a Constitution,  in  1881  ; in 
the  creation  in  1890  of  smaller  local  assemblies  on  the  same  repre- 
sentative basis  as  the  prefectural  assemblies ; and,  finally,  in  the 
promulgation  in  1889  of  the  Constitution  which  came  into  operation 
in  the  following  year,  simultaneously  with  the  Diet,  signalizing  the 
accomplishment  of  the  purpose  in  view  from  the  first.  That  the 
Constitution,  when  promulgated,  was  of  a less  liberal  kind  than  that 
which  had  been  originally  intended,  and  was  still  desired  by  advanced 
reformers,  was  due  to  the  pressure  of  reactionary  influences  already 
described.  This,  as  well  as  the  short  space  of  years  covered  by  the 

192 


Legal  & Judicial  Reform  193 

transition  from  feudalism  to  constitutional  government,  of  the  work- 
ing of  which  the  nation  had  no  experience,  save  what  little  had  been 
acquired  in  connection  with  the  revision  of  local  government, 
accounts  to  a large  extent  for  the  stormy  character  which  marked  the 
proceedings  of  the  Diet  for  several  years  after  it  came  into  existence. 

The  final  establishment  of  representative  government  was  accom- 
panied in  the  same  year  by  evidence  of  further  substantial  progress 
in  the  direction  of  legal  and  judicial  reform.  The  Code  of  Civil 
Procedure  and  the  Commercial  Code  were  completed.  Of  these,  the 
first  came  into  operation  immediately  ; the  latter  not  until  eight 
years  later,  by  which  time  it  had  undergone  careful  revision.  The 
law  of  the  organization  of  Judicial  Courts  was  also  promulgated,  and 
the  Criminal  Code  and  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  which  had 
been  in  force  since  1882,  appeared  in  new  and  revised  forms.  In  the 
preparation  of  all  these  laws,  as  in  the  framing  of  the  Constitution 
and  other  subsidiary  measures,  much  assistance  was  rendered  by 
foreign  jurists,  amongst  whom  the  names  of  Mr.  (now  Sir  Francis) 
Piggott  and  the  late  Mr.  Feodor  Satow  may  be  mentioned. 

The  interval  of  nearly  two  years  which  elapsed  between  the  pro- 
mulgation of  the  Constitution  and  its  coming  into  operation  was  a 
period  of  increased  political  agitation  and  unrest.  On  the  very 
morning  of  the  promulgation  of  the  Constitution  the  Minister  of 
Education,  Viscount  Mori,  whose  pro-foreign  tendencies  had  caused 
much  irritation  in  reactionary  circles,  was  murdered  by  a Shinto 
priest  in  the  presence  of  his  guards  as  he  was  stepping  into  his 
carriage  to  proceed  to  the  Palace.  It  was  to  his  initiative  that  the 
addition  of  the  English  language  to  the  curriculum  of  elementary 
schools  had  been  due.  It  was  reported  at  the  time  that  his  assassina- 
tion was  the  result  of  some  real,  or  fancied,  slight  on  the  part  of  the 
deceased  statesman  when  paying  an  official  visit  of  inspection  to  the 
national  shrines  at  Ise.  What  truth  there  was  in  this  rumour  will 
probably  never  be  known. 

The  resumption  at  this  time  of  negotiations  for  the  revision  of 
the  treaties  with  foreign  Powers  led  to  further  agitation  also  on  this 
subject.  When  it  became  known  that  in  the  new  proposals  put  for- 
ward by  the  Japanese  Government  the  appointment  of  foreign  judges 
was  contemplated,  popular  indignation  at  what  was  regarded  as  a 
slight  to  the  dignity  of  Japan  found  vent  in  an  attempt  in  the  autumn 
of  the  same  year  on  the  life  of  the  new  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 

N 


1 94  Political  Rowdyism 

Count  (afterwards  Marquis)  Okuma.  Though  escaping  with  his  life, 
he  was  so  severely  injured  by  the  explosion  of  a bomb  thrown  by  a 
political  fanatic,  a native  of  his  own  province  of  Hizen,  that  he  was 
forced  to  resign.  Nor  did  the  opening  of  the  first  session  of  the  Diet 
have  any  calming  effect  on  the  general  unrest  which  prevailed.  So 
serious,  indeed,  was  the  recrudescence  of  anti-foreign  feeling  that  in 
the  spring  of  1891  the  late  Tsar  of  Russia,  Nicholas  II,  who,  as  Crown 
Prince,  was  on  a visit  to  Japan,  had  a narrow  escape  from  injury  at 
the  hands  of  a policeman  on  duty,  who  attacked  him  with  a sword. 
If,  however,  the  state  of  things  both  on  the  eve  of  the  opening  of 
the  Diet,  and  after  parliamentary  institutions  were  in  full  operation, 
wore  a disquieting  aspect,  the  anxieties  of  the  Government  were 
lessened  by  the  want  of  unity  among  the  various  political  factions  in 
opposition.  The  dissolution  of  the  General  Agreement  Union,  one 
of  whose  prominent  leaders,  Count  Goto,  rejoined  the  Government, 
showed  that  internal  dissensions  were  stronger  than  the  motives 
which  brought  its  adherents  together,  and  its  example  was  followed 
by  other  equally  ephemeral  associations.  In  the  reconstruction  of 
political  parties  which  subsequently  took  place  the  Jiyutd  was  revived 
under  the  leadership  of  Count  Itagaki,  its  numbers  being  reduced  to 
very  small  dimensions ; the  General  Agreement  Union  reappeared 
in  the  form  of  an  organized  political  party,  a character  it  had  not 
possessed  before,  and  under  the  changed  name  of  the  Daido  Club  ; 
while  the  Kaishinto,  which  had  narrowly  escaped  dissolution,  retained 
its  original  constitution,  but  without  its  most  prominent  leaders. 

Meanwhile  the  first  elections  for  the  Diet  had  taken  place  in  the 
summer  of  1890.  The  result  was  in  accordance  with  what  might 
have  been  anticipated  in  view  of  the  confusion  of  ideas  then  existing 
in  the  political  world,  and  the  local  feeling  which  stood  in  the  way 
of  combined  action.  The  members  who  were  returned  to  the  first 
Parliament  owed  allegiance  to  ten  different  political  groups,  the  most 
numerous  of  all  being  the  free  lances,  who  belonged  to  no  party  and 
were  grouped  together  under  the  name  of  Independents.  It  was  not, 
therefore,  an  organized  nor,  in  any  sense,  a united  Opposition  which 
confronted  Ministers  in  the  Diet  ; but,  much  as  they  might  differ 
among  themselves  on  questions  of  the  day,  the  various  groups  were 
capable  of  forming  temporary  alliances,  which,  owing  to  the  un- 
certainty resulting  from  the  large  number  of  independent  members, 
caused  no  little  embarrassment  to  the  “ Two-Clan  ” Government 


First  Parliamentary  Elections  195 

which  had  called  them  into  parliamentary  life.  The  general  tone  of 
the  first  House  of  Representatives  was  unmistakably  democratic. 

Buckle,  in  his  History  oj  Civilization,  makes  some  remarks  on  the 
social  conditions  prevailing  in  France  on  the  eve  of  the  French 
Revolution  which  are  applicable  to  those  existing  in  Japan  at  the 
time  of  which  we  are  speaking.  In  the  latter  country,  however, 
these  conditions  were  the  result,  not  the  forerunner,  of  revolution. 
“ As  long,”  he  says,  “ as  the  different  classes  confined  themselves  to 
pursuits  peculiar  to  their  own  sphere  they  were  encouraged  to  pre- 
serve their  separate  habits  ; and  the  subordination  or,  as  it  were,  the 
hierarchy  of  society  was  easily  maintained.  But  when  the  members 
of  the  various  orders  met  in  the  same  place  with  the  same  object, 
they  became  knit  together  by  a new  sympathy.  The  highest  and 
most  durable  of  all  pleasures,  the  pleasure  caused  by  the  perception 
of  fresh  truths,  was  now  a link  which  banded  together  those  social 
elements  that  were  formerly  wrapped  up  in  the  pride  of  their  own 
isolation.”  And  he  goes  on  to  point  out  how  the  new  eagerness  for 
the  study  of  science  at  this  time  in  France  stimulated  democratic 
feeling. 

In  Japan  the  separation  of  pursuits,  to  which  Buckle  alludes,  had 
been  a striking  feature  of  pre-Restoration  days.  Not  only  were  there 
the  class  distinctions,  rigidly  maintained,  between  the  samurai,  the 
farmer,  the  artizan  and  the  merchant ; but  two  of  these  classes,  those 
of  the  merchants  and  artizans,  were  split  up  into  guilds  of  an  ex- 
clusive character.  The  towns,  moreover,  like  those  of  mediaeval 
Europe,  were  divided  into  quarters  inhabited  by  those  following  the 
same  trade,  or  handicraft.  The  fusion  of  classes  had  begun  even 
before  the  Restoration.  The  first  impulse  in  this  direction  had  arisen 
out  of  the  economic  situation  which  existed  towards  the  close  of  the 
Tokugawa  administration.  The  distress  of  the  farmer,  and  the 
poverty  of  the  samurai,  caused  breaches  in  the  barriers  separating 
class  from  class,  and  notably  in  those  which  divided  the  two  classes 
mentioned  from  the  rest  of  the  nation.  These  were,  however,  only 
premonitory  symptoms.  The  real  fusion  of  classes  came  after  the 
Restoration,  when  the  abolition  of  feudalism  put  an  end  to  the  privi- 
leged position  of  the  samurai,  diminishing  at  the  same  time,  though 
not  wholly  extinguishing,  class  prejudice.  The  various  reforms  which 
followed : the  establishment  of  schools  and  colleges  which  brought 
education  within  the  reach  of  everyone  ; the  measures  affecting  land 


196  Fusion  of  Classes 

tenure  and  taxation  ; the  codification  of  laws ; and  conscription — to 
name  only  a few — -all  tended  to  promote  uniformity  ; the  final  factor 
in  the  process  being  the  creation  of  parliamentary  institutions,  which 
supplied  a meeting-ground  for  all  sections  of  the  nation,  and  a 
common  field  of  interest  for  all. 

An  increase  of  democratic  feeling  was  thus  a logical  consequence 
of  the  policy  of  reform  on  Western  lines,  on  which  the  Government 
had  embarked  after  the  Restoration.  When  the  Monarch  and  his 
Ministers  proclaimed  with  one  voice  their  intention  to  associate  the 
people  in  the  work  of  government,  when  local  autonomy  was  by 
degrees  introduced,  when  a Constitution  was  in  operation,  and  a 
Parliament  in  session,  it  would  have  been  strange  indeed  if  the 
general  stream  of  popular  tendencies  had  not  set  in  the  direction  of 
democratic  ideas.  Nor  were  such  tendencies  incompatible  with 
Imperialist  sentiment,  the  feeling  that  had  counted  for  so  much  in 
the  overthrow  of  the  previous  regime.  For  this  latter  feeling  was 
simply  a habit  of  mind,  a passive  tradition,  a principle  which,  so  far 
as  politics  were  concerned,  had  rarely  been  translated  into  practice, 
though  it  formed  the  groundwork  for  a more  active,  if  somewhat 
artificial,  loyalty,  and  an  exaggerated  patriotism. 

With  the  coming  into  force  of  the  Constitution  the  ancient 
monarchy  entered  upon  a new  phase  in  its  existence.  During  the 
long  period  of  Tokugawa  ascendancy  the  Crown  had  slumbered,  as 
before,  in  complete  security,  its  repose  guarded  by  the  Shogunate. 
Removed  from  all  contact  with  outside  influences,  it  was  free  from 
all  possibility  of  collision  with  the  people.  Although  after  the 
Restoration  the  severity  of  its  seclusion  was  relaxed,  the  personality 
of  the  Monarch  made  little  or  no  impression  beyond  the  select  inner 
circle  of  statesmen  who  constituted  the  governing  oligarchy.  The 
representative  institutions  now  established,  while  limiting  Imperial 
prerogatives,  enabled  the  Sovereign  to  come  more  prominently  into 
view,  and  to  be  brought  into  direct  association  with  his  people  within 
the  forms  prescribed  by  the  Constitution. 


CHAPTER  XX 


Working  of  Parliamentary  Government — Grouping  of  Parties — Government 
and  Opposition — Formation  of  Seiyukai — Increasing  Intervention  of 
Throne — Decrease  of  Party  Rancour — Attitude  of  Upper  House. 

THE  stage  now  reached  in  our  narrative  seems  to  be  a suit- 
able moment  for  giving  a sketch  of  the  main  features  which 
marked  the  proceedings  of  the  Diet  from  the  date  of  its 
first  session  up  to  the  present  time.  By  the  adoption  of  this  course, 
instead  of  adhering  strictly  to  chronological  sequence,  it  may  be 
possible  to  convey  a clearer  idea  of  the  character  and  working  of 
parliamentary  government  in  Japan. 

We  have  seen  that  the  results  of  the  first  elections  were  unfavour- 
able to  the  Government,  the  majority  of  successful  candidates 
belonging  to  one  or  other  of  the  Opposition  factions.  While  no 
single  party  could  point  to  any  decisive  numerical  superiority  as 
evidence  of  the  favour  of  the  electors,  three  of  the  groups — the 
Daidd  Club,  the  Kaishinto,  or  Progressives,  and  the  Independents — 
were  nearly  equal  in  numbers,  the  others  being  much  less  strongly 
represented.  Between  the  date  of  the  elections,  howrever,  and  the 
opening  of  Parliament  a further  reconstruction  of  parties  took  place. 
Both  the  Daidd  Club  and  the  revived  Jiyuto  were  dissolved,  to  re- 
appear in  an  amalgamated  form  under  the  name  of  Constitutional 
Liberals.  A Conservative  Party  supporting  the  Government  was 
also  organized.  It  is  unnecessary  to  refer  to  the  various  party  mani- 
festos issued  at  this  time  further  than  to  say  that  they  covered  a 
wide  range  of  subjects  ; reduction  of  expenditure,  naval  and  military 
policy,  finance,  questions  of  local  government  and  taxation  consti- 
tuting the  chief  points  on  which  attention  wras  concentrated.  Owing 
to  the  sudden  changes  which  had  altered  the  constitution  of  parties 
since  the  elections,  when  the  Diet  met,  the  new  Association  of  Con- 
stitutional Liberals,  whose  ranks  had  meanwhile  been  further 


197 


198  Grouping  of  Parties 

strengthened  by  the  adhesion  of  many  independent  members,  became 
by  far  the  strongest  party  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  the  only 
two  others  of  any  prominence  being  the  Progressives  and  the  Con- 
servatives. By  the  time,  therefore,  that  the  first  Parliament  had 
settled  down  to  business  the  members  of  the  Lower  House  were 
divided  into  three  main  groups : the  Liberals,  the  Progressives,  and 
a Conservative  Party,  without  much  cohesion,  which  supported  the 
Government.  This  grouping  has,  in  spite  of  kaleidoscopic  changes 
occurring  with  bewildering  frequency,  in  membership,  nomenclature 
and  political  programmes,  survived  more  or  less  to  this  day,  although 
both  the  Liberal  and  Progressive  parties  are  now  known  by  other 
names,  while  the  foundations  on  which  they  rest  have  to  some  extent 
shifted. 

The  first  session  of  the  Diet  passed  without  a dissolution.  Early 
in  its  proceedings  the  question  which  has  furnished  the  predominant 
note  of  all  parliamentary  sessions,  that  of  finance,  came  to  the  front. 
The  Opposition  attacked  the  Budget.  In  the  debates  which  ensued 
a crisis  was  only  averted  by  a compromise  involving  a recasting  of 
the  Budget  and  a large  reduction  of  expenditure.  It  was  Japan’s 
first  essay  in  parliamentary  government  ; the  new  order  of  things 
was  on  its  trial.  Both  sides,  therefore,  were  probably  disinclined  to 
push  matters  to  extremities.  In  the  remarks  on  the  Constitution 
made  in  a previous  chapter  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  comparative 
weakness  of  parliamentary  Opposition  parties  in  Japan  was  in  some 
degree  remedied  by  the  control  over  the  Budget  exercised  by  the 
Diet,  which  could  force  a dissolution  by  refusing  to  vote  supplies. 
This  is  what  happened  in  the  second  session.  No  such  moderate 
counsels  as  those  which  had  led  to  a compromise  before  prevailed  on 
this  occasion.  The  Budget  was  again  attacked,  the  attitude  of  the 
Opposition  being  so  hostile  and  uncompromising  that  the  House  of 
Representatives  was  dissolved  soon  after  the  opening  of  Parliament. 
This  was  the  first  instance  of  dissolution.  The  first  Japanese  Parlia- 
ment had  thus  lasted  for  only  two  years. 

The  history  of  these  two  earliest  sessions — a record,  that  is  to  say, 
of  sustained  conflict — is  the  history  of  many  others,  and,  indeed, 
viewed  in  not  too  critical  a light,  it  is  the  history  of  thirty  years  of 
constitutional  government.  We  see  the  same  tactics  pursued  by  the 
Opposition  on  each  occasion,  financial  questions  being  almost  in- 
variably the  issue  which  is  raised  ; and  the  attacks  are  met  in  one  of 


Government  Opposition  199 

two  ways — by  dissolution  or  compromise.  The  aims  of  popular 
parties  also  continue  from  year  to  year  with  little  change.  Financial 
retrenchment,  taxation,  naval  and  military  establishments,  education, 
as  well  as  constitutional  reform  in  the  shape  of  party  government 
and  the  responsibility  of  Ministers  to  the  Diet,  all  figure  repeatedly 
in  party  programmes ; but,  with  the  gradual  rise  of  Japan  to  the 
position  of  a world  Power,  foreign  politics,  and  the  development  of 
national  resources,  come  to  occupy  a larger  share  of  the  Diet’s 
attention. 

Although  the  conflicts  which  occurred  between  the  Diet  and  the 
Government  in  the  first  two  sessions  continued  to  be  a constantly 
recurring  feature  of  parliamentary  proceedings,  in  the  course  of  a 
few  years  a marked  change  in  the  relations  between  the  Government 
and  parliamentary  parties  took  place.  The  Government  began  to 
display  more  tolerance  of  popular  views  which  did  not  altogether 
coincide  with  their  own,  while  resistance  to  Government  measures 
on  the  part  of  the  Opposition  became  less  uncompromising.  The 
reason  for  this  change  of  attitude  on  both  sides  lay  in  the  fact  that 
the  statesmen  in  power  had  begun  to  realize  that,  in  spite  of  the 
Constitution  having  been  framed  on  the  principle  of  the  responsi- 
bility of  Ministers  to  the  Sovereign  and  their  independence  of  the 
Diet,  as  a matter  of  practical  politics  the  maintenance  of  this  prin- 
ciple on  too  rigid  lines  was  attended  by  serious  disadvantages.  In 
other  words,  the  position  of  the  Government  might  be  rendered 
very  uncomfortable,  and  the  conduct  of  affairs  seriously  hampered, 
by  the  constant  antagonism  of  an  unfriendly  Diet.  Consequently 
from  the  time  of  the  eighth  session  (1894-5)  a tendency  on  the  part 
of  one  of  the  Opposition  parties  to  draw  nearer  to  the  Government 
was  observable,  and  in  the  course  of  the  next  session  the  Liberals 
announced  the  conclusion  of  an  understanding  with  the  Ministry, 
and  appeared  openly  as  its  supporters.  From  the  original  standpoint 
the  Government  had  occupied  to  reliance  on  the  support  of  a 
political  party  was  a significant  advance.  Two  years  later  the  normal 
routine  of  parliamentary  government  was  interrupted  by  a still  more 
significant  departure  in  administrative  policy.  The  two  chief 
Opposition  parties,  which  the  Government  had,  as  we  have  seen, 
succeeded  in  holding  in  check  by  playing  off  one  against  the  other, 
combined  against  it.  Confronted  by  an  overwhelming  hostile 
majority  in  the  Lower  House,  the  Ministry  resigned,  the  formation 


200 


Formation  of  Seiyukai 

of  a new  Cabinet  being  entrusted  to  the  leaders  of  those  parties, 
Counts  Okuma  and  Itagaki.  Since  the  reconstruction  of  the  Ministry 
in  1873  the  direction  of  affairs  had  rested  with  the  Satsuma  and 
Choshiu  clans,  this  policy  being  continued  without  change  after  the 
Constitution  came  into  operation.  Now,  for  the  first  time  since  the 
year  in  question,  the  government  of  the  country  was  placed  in  the 
hands  of  men  of  other  clans.  But  with  the  important  reservation  that 
the  control  of  the  army  and  navy  was  still  confided  to  Satsuma  and 
Choshiu  clansmen,  and  that  decisions  on  important  questions  of 
State  still  rested  with  the  inner  circle  of  statesmen  who  guided 
affairs.  The  experiment,  for  such  it  was,  was  not  successful.  Within 
a few  weeks  after  the  new  Ministers  entered  upon  their  duties  serious 
dissensions  broke  out,  and  the  Coalition  Cabinet  resigned  in  the 
autumn  of  the  same  year  before  the  opening  of  Parliament,  although 
the  result  of  the  General  Elections  had  assured  it  of  a majority  not 
less  than  before. 

The  desire  to  establish  party  government  has  been  mentioned  as 
one  of  the  aims  kept  constantly  in  view  by  the  parties  in  opposition. 
By  party  government  was  meant  the  party  system  of  government  as 
it  exists  in  Great  Britain  and  elsewhere.  It  is  interesting  to  note 
that,  while  the  Government  in  the  building  up  of  modern  Japan 
went  to  Germany  mainly  for  its  materials,  there  was  all  the  time  in 
unofficial  circles  a noticeable  undercurrent  of  opinion  in  favour  of 
British  ideas  and  institutions.  The  establishment  of  party  govern- 
ment would,  of  course,  involve  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution, 
nor  would  it  be  possible  so  long  as  the  principle  of  clan  government 
in  its  present  form  survived.  Of  this  the  Opposition  leaders  have 
always  been  well  aware,  and  in  making  the  question  of  party  govern- 
ment so  prominent  a point  in  their  programmes  their  object  has 
probably  been  to  carry  on  indirectly  a persistent  crusade  against  the 
two  chief  obstacles  which  lie  in  their  path.  Although  Japanese 
Cabinets  are  in  theory  independent  of  the  Diet,  they  have,  as  we 
have  seen,  from  time  to  time,  like  German  Cabinets,  found  it  neces- 
sary to  rely  on  parliamentary  support,  the  withdrawal  of  which  has 
usually  resulted  in  the  fall  of  the  Ministry.  Further  than  that, 
however,  and  the  occasional  replacement  of  the  outgoing  Ministry 
by  one  with  stronger  democratic  leanings,  the  influence  of  political 
parties  has  never  extended. 

An  event  of  great  importance  which  lent  a new  aspect  to  parlia- 


Increasing  Intervention  of  Throne  201 

mentary  affairs  was  the  reconstitution  in  1900  of  the  Liberal  Party 
as  the  “ Society  of  Political  Friends  ” ( Seiyiikai ) — a name  which  it 
still  retains — under  the  leadership  of  Prince  (then  Marquis)  Ito,  with 
the  avowed  object  of  perfecting  constitutional  government.  The 
Yamagata  Ministry  had  just  resigned,  and  had  been  succeeded  by  a 
Ministry  in  which  Prince  Ito  occupied  the  position  of  Premier. 
Coming  as  it  did  from  one  who  was  the  framer  of  the  Constitution, 
and  had  identified  himself  with  the  doctrine  of  ministerial  inde- 
pendence of  Parliament,  though  he  was  the  first  to  recognize  the 
necessity  of  working  in  the  Diet  with  party  support,  the  step  thus 
taken  by  Japan’s  leading  statesman  was  a surprise  to  the  country. 
Its  futility  in  the  face  of  existing  conditions  of  administration  was 
evident  from  the  moment  his  Ministry  was  formed,  for  the  control 
of  the  army  and  navy  being  reserved,  as  before,  for  the  two  dominant 
clans,  those  departments  were  virtually  independent  of  the  Cabinet. 
The  new  Ministry,  in  fact,  found  itself  in  much  the  same  position 
as  that  formed  in  1898.  Its  success  was  scarcely  greater.  It  survived, 
it  is  true,  one  session  of  Parliament,  but  it  remained  in  office  for 
only  eight  months,  its  resignation  being  hastened  by  the  hostile 
attitude  of  the  Upper  House.  Marquis  Ito  was  not  more  successful 
in  opposition  in  the  next  two  sessions  than  he  had  been  when  com- 
bining the  functions  of  Premier  and  Leader  of  the  Seiyiikai  ; and 
in  the  summer  of  the  year  1903  he  withdrew  from  the  party  he  may 
be  said  to  have  created  and  resumed  his  former  post  of  President  of 
the  Privy  Council. 

A feature  of  some  importance  in  the  prolonged  constitutional 
struggle  which  has  characterized  parliamentary  government  in  Japan 
has  been  the  increasing  tendency  of  the  Government  to  have  recourse 
to  the  intervention  of  the  Throne  for  the  solution  of  ministerial 
crises  arising  out  of  conflicts  between  the  Cabinet  and  the  Lower 
House,  or  out  of  questions  that  indirectly  affect  the  Diet.  This 
intervention  has  taken  the  form  of  Imperial  Decrees  recognizable 
through  the  circumstances  attending  their  issue  as  being  more  or 
less  measures  of  emergency.  Though,  as  we  have  seen,  the  influence 
of  the  Throne,  as  a silent  factor  in  affairs,  had  counted  for  much  in 
the  Restoration  movement,  and  in  the  consolidation  of  the  new 
Government  which  came  into  being,  the  direct  intervention  of  the 
Sovereign  was  but  rarely  invoked.  It  was  otherwise  after  the  Con- 
stitution came  into  operation.  The  difficulties  accompanying  parlia- 


202  Decrease  of  Party  Rancour 

mentary  government  rendered  appeal  for  the  direct  support  of  the 
Throne  more  necessary  than  had  been  the  case  before,  although  the 
Government  was  doubtless  fully  aware  that  the  influence  of  the 
Throne  must  inevitably  diminish  in  proportion  to  the  frequency  of 
its  invocation.  The  most  recent  instance  of  direct  Imperial  inter- 
vention took  place  when  the  third  Katsura  Ministry  was  formed. 
The  grave  crisis  then  occurring,  which  had  defied  all  other  remedies, 
was  brought  about  by  the  resignation  of  the  previous  Ministry  in 
consequence  of  the  resistance  of  the  military  party  to  certain  pro- 
jected economies  in  the  Budget. 

A very  noticeable  feature  of  Japanese  parliamentary  government 
is  the  increasing  tendency  towards  moderation  observable  in  the 
political  world — shown,  that  is  to  say,  at  elections,  in  parliamentary 
proceedings,  and  in  the  Press.  During  the  earlier  years  of  the  Diet’s 
existence  elections  were  conducted  amidst  scenes  of  violence  and 
disorder.  Party  polemics  both  inside  and  outside  of  Parliament 
were  carried  on  with  an  absence  of  decorum  and  self-restraint  which 
augured  badly  for  the  future  working  of  parliamentary  institutions ; 
political  passions  were  inflamed  by  the  recriminations  of  party 
journals ; and  a new  class  of  political  rowdies,  called  sdshi,  stood  ready 
to  intervene  whenever  their  services  might  be  required.  Bands  of 
these  rowdies  carrying  wooden  clubs  escorted  popular  leaders  in  the 
Lower  House  through  the  streets  of  the  Capital,  and  during  two  or 
three  of  the  stormiest  sessions  the  precincts  of  the  Diet  presented 
the  singular  spectacle  of  rows  of  gendarmes  and  police  confronted  by 
regiments  of  sdshi.  The  political  rowdy  of  those  days  is  fast  disappear- 
ing, his  occupation,  like  that  of  his  predecessor,  the  ronin,  having 
gone  ; while  turbulence,  riotous  conduct,  and  intemperate  writing 
are  no  longer  regarded  as  the  necessary  accompaniments  of  parlia- 
mentary life.  One  of  the  moderating  influences  in  Japanese  public 
life  has  been  the  existence  usually  of  a general  understanding,  more 
tacit,  perhaps,  than  expressed,  between  the  Government  and  people 
on  broad  questions  of  national  policy.  Another  may  be  found  in 
the  rapid  progress  of  the  nation.  A people  so  busily  engaged  as  the 
Japanese  have  been  in  making  up  for  the  time  lost  by  centuries 
of  seclusion  is  disinclined  to  pay  too  much  attention  to  such  matters 
as  jealousy  of  “ clan  government,”  or  objections  to  naval  and 
military  expansion,  more  especially  if  the  policy  pursued  in  both 
respects  is  attended  with  success,  as  in  Japan’s  case. 


Attitude  of  Upper  House  203 

From  this  brief  sketch  of  Japanese  parliamentary  history  it  will 
be  seen  that  circumstances  have  conspired  to  focus  attention  on 
the  proceedings  of  the  Lower  House.  It  is  there  that  the  struggles 
between  rival  factions,  and  between  the  Diet  and  the  Government 
have  chiefly  been  conducted,  and  issues  involving  the  fate  of  parties 
and  of  Cabinets  decided.  Although,  however,  the  Upper  House 
has  consequently  played  a less  conspicuous  part  in  parliamentary 
affairs,  this  has  not  been  due  to  any  hesitation  to  assert  its  authority 
when  necessary.  It  has  never  shrunk  from  joining  issue  with  the 
Lower  House  in  regard  to  matters  within  its  competency,  pushing 
its  claims  so  far  as  to  assert  successfully  its  right  to  amend  money 
bills.  Differing  from  the  other  Chamber  in  its  composition,  in  the 
grouping  of  its  members  which  has  no  relation  to  parties  in  the 
Lower  House,  and  in  its  greater  exposure,  through  the  class  of 
Imperial  nominees,  to  powerful  bureaucratic  influences,  the  Upper 
House  has  never  concealed  the  fact  that  its  sympathies  are  with 
the  Government  ; and  it  was  its  wholehearted  support  that  brought 
the  latter  safely  through  the  parliamentary  crisis  of  1901  and 
1902. 

In  view  of  the  short  interval  which  separated  the  establishment 
of  representative  institutions  from  feudalism,  and  the  unsettled 
condition  of  affairs  that  prevailed  for  some  years  after  the  Restora- 
tion, the  nation  has  good  reason  to  be  satisfied  with  the  results  which 
have  so  far  attended  the  working  of  parliamentary  government. 


CHAPTER  XXI 


Treaty  Revision — Great  Britain  Takes  Initiative — Difficulties  with  China. 

THE  year  1894  marks  a memorable  stage  in  the  rise  of  Japan 
to  the  position  in  the  world  she  has  since  attained.  It 
witnessed  two  events  of  far-reaching  importance : the 
revision  of  the  Treaty  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  which, 
though  only  the  first  of  a series,  practically  solved  the  long-pending 
question  of  Treaty  revision  ; and  the  outbreak  of  war  with  China. 
The  new  Treaty  with  Great  Britain  was  signed  on  the  16th  July, 
and  within  a fortnight  of  its  signature  Japan  was  at  war  with  her 
continental  neighbour.  Both  events,  it  may  be  noted  in  passing, 
had  a calming  effect  on  parliamentary  proceedings,  the  Diet  then 
in  existence,  though  not  actually  in  session,  being  the  only  one 
which  lasted  for  the  full  constitutional  term  of  four  years. 

The  question  of  the  revision  of  the  treaties  with  foreign  Powers 
has  been  referred  to  more  than  once  in  previous  chapters.  These 
treaties,  as  we  have  seen,  formed  part  of  a series  of  Conventions 
concluded  between  the  years  1858  and  1869,  which  were  framed 
on  the  same  lines,  while  their  effect  was  rendered  uniform  by 
the  “ most-favoured-nation  ” clause  contained  in  each.  As  has 
already  been  pointed  out,  the  features  of  the  treaties  which  caused 
dissatisfaction  in  Japan  were  the  concession  of  extra-territoriality, 
and  the  absence  of  any  fixed  period  for  their  duration.  Revision 
being  subject  to  the  consent  of  both  parties,  it  was  felt  that  Japan 
might  be  indefinitely  deprived  of  tariff  autonomy  and  the  right 
of  exercising  jurisdiction  over  foreigners  in  her  own  territory. 
It  was  not  unnatural  that  the  Japanese  Government,  while  over- 
looking the  many  disadvantages  attaching  to  foreign  residence 
and  trade  in  what  was  a mere  fringe  of  the  country,  should,  as  soon 
as  it  became  aware  that  the  character  of  the  treaties  was  different 
from  that  of  those  made  by  Western  Governments  with  each  other, 

204 


Treaty  Revision  205 

have  taken  an  early  opportunity  to  protest  against  conditions 
which  were  regarded  as  derogatory  to  the  dignity  of  the  nation, 
nor  that  it  should  have  made  repeated  attempts  to  secure  their 
removal  by  negotiation  with  the  Powers  concerned.  We  have 
seen  how  the  failure  of  these  efforts  roused  popular  feeling,  supplied 
political  agitators  with  a weapon  used  with  effect  in  the  campaigns 
they  directed  from  time  to  time  against  the  Government,  and 
eventually  led  to  a serious  recrudescence  of  the  anti-foreign  feeling 
of  pre-Restoration  days ; so  that  by  the  time  that  the  Constitution 
came  into  operation  Treaty  revision  was  no  longer  regarded  as  a 
mere  matter  of  departmental  policy,  with  which  the  public  at 
large  had  little  concern,  but  had  become,  so  to  speak,  a national 
question. 

In  view  of  the  importance  which  this  question  gradually  came 
to  assume  in  public  affairs,  affecting  as  it  did  both  domestic  policy 
and  foreign  relations,  it  may  be  well,  at  the  risk  of  some  repetition, 
to  give  a succinct  account  of  the  lengthy  negotiations  on  this 
subject,  asking  the  indulgence  of  the  reader,  should  he  be  taken 
over  ground  traversed  before. 

Undeterred  by  the  failure,  already  recorded,  of  Prince  Iwakura’s 
mission  in  1872,  the  Japanese  Government  made  another  attempt 
two  years  later  to  negotiate  a new  Treaty  which  would,  it  was 
hoped,  be  the  forerunner  of  others.  The  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Japan  were  at  this  time,  if  anything,  more  friendly 
than  those  of  Japan  with  other  Powers.  This  was  to  a great  extent 
the  natural  result  of  circumstances.  By  taking  the  initiative  in  the 
reopening  of  Japan  to  foreign  intercourse,  America  had  given 
evidence  of  an  intention  to  pursue  an  independent  policy  in  regard 
to  foreign  questions.  Having  been  the  first  Western  Power  to  appear 
on  the  scene,  her  influence  had  been  the  first  to  be  felt  in  Japan. 
Moreover,  her  great  commercial  expansion  being  still  in  its  infancy, 
she  had  fewer  interests  to  protect  in  Japan  than  older  countries. 
American  representatives  were  thus  spared  much  of  the  friction 
with  the  Japanese  authorities  which  fell  to  the  lot  of  other  foreign 
representatives.  Influenced  probably  by  these  considerations,  it 
was  to  the  United  States  that  the  Japanese  Government  addressed 
its  overtures  on  this  occasion.  They  were  favourably  received,  and 
a new  Treaty  was  negotiated  with  little  difficulty.  But  the  Treaty 
remained  a dead  letter  owing  to  the  inclusion  of  a clause  providing 


206 


Treaty  Revision 

that  it  should  come  into  operation  only  when  similar  treaties  had 
been  concluded  with  other  Powers. 

For  several  years  no  further  steps  were  taken  by  the  Japanese 
Government  in  the  matter  of  Treaty  revision.  Ministerial  dis- 
sensions and  the  disturbed  state  of  the  country,  which  culminated 
in  the  Satsuma  rebellion,  called  for  the  concentration  of  attention 
on  domestic  affairs.  Foreign  questions,  therefore,  ceased  for  a 
time  to  be  a subject  of  public  interest.  By  this  time  also  it  is 
probable  that  the  Government  began  to  realize  more  clearly  than 
before  the  nature  of  the  objections  entertained  by  foreign  Powers 
to  the  revision  of  their  treaties  with  Japan  ; and  to  understand 
that,  so  far  as  the  point  of  extra-territoriality  was  concerned, 
the  unwillingness  of  foreign  Governments  to  accede  to  Japanese 
demands  was  based  on  the  reasonable  ground  that,  until  some  sub- 
stantial evidence  of  progress  in  the  direction,  at  least,  of  legal 
reforms,  was  forthcoming,  they  must  naturally  hesitate  to  make  their 
subjects  amenable  to  Japanese  jurisdiction.  The  energy  and  deter- 
mination with  which  the  Japanese  Government  set  to  work  to 
carry  out  legal  and  judicial  reforms  showed  that  it  was  alive  to 
the  necessity  of  meeting  the  objections  of  foreign  Powers  in  the 
direction  indicated.  One  result  of  the  progressive  spirit  displayed 
was,  as  we  have  seen,  the  promulgation  of  a Criminal  Code  and 
Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  framed  in  accordance  with  Western 
ideas,  which  came  into  operation  early  in  1882.  In  the  autumn 
of  that  year  negotiations  for  Treaty  revision  were  reopened,  and  a 
preliminary  conference  of  the  representatives  of  Japan  and  the 
leading  Treaty  Powers  was  held  in  Tokio.  No  definite  result  was 
then  reached,  but  the  ground  was  cleared  for  subsequent  discussion, 
which  took  place  four  years  later,  the  Japanese  Capital  being,  as 
before,  the  seat  of  negotiations.  At  this  second  and  more  formal 
conference,  at  which  no  less  than  seventeen  Treaty  Powers  were 
represented,  and  which  lasted  from  May,  1886,  to  June,  1887,  definite 
progress  was  made.  In  the  end,  however,  negotiations  were  abruptly 
broken  off  by  the  Japanese  delegates,  in  consequence,  as  was  under- 
stood at  the  time,  of  popular  dissatisfaction  with  the  proposed 
employment  of  foreign  judges  in  Japanese  Courts  of  First  Instance 
and  Courts  of  Appeal  in  cases  where  foreigners  were  defendants.  In 
1889  negotiations  were  again  reopened  in  Tokio.  The  proposals 
then  submitted  by  Count  (afterwards  Marquis)  Okuma,  as  Foreign 


Treaty  Revision  207 

Minister,  were  accepted  by  the  American  and  Russian  Governments  ; 
but  public  feeling  again  showed  itself  hostile  to  the  appointment 
of  foreign  judges,  even  on  the  reduced  scale  contemplated  by  the 
new  proposals.  The  attempted  assassination  of  the  Minister  who 
had  brought  them  forward  once  more  put  a stop  to  negotiations, 
and  arrangements  were  made  for  the  cancellation  of  the  two  treaties 
that  had  been  concluded. 

On  all  these  occasions  discussion  had  centred  chiefly  round  the 
question  of  Japanese  jurisdiction  over  foreigners.  The  main  diffi- 
culty had  always  been  the  same  : to  reconcile  the  natural  desire  of 
foreign  Governments  to  secure  such  guarantees  in  the  matter  of 
the  administration  of  justice  as  would  safeguard  the  surrender 
of  extra-territorial  privileges  with  the  equally  natural  wish  of 
Japan  to  recover  the  right  of  jurisdiction  over  foreigners  in  her 
territories.  And  it  will  be  seen  that  even  when  a compromise 
satisfactory  to  both  negotiating  parties  had  been,  or  was  about 
to  be,  reached,  the  sensitiveness  of  the  public  in  Japan  concerning 
any  point  which  it  regarded  as  detrimental  to  Japanese  dignity 
prevented  its  acceptance  by  the  nation. 

In  the  following  year  Lord  Salisbury  presented  to  the  Japanese 
Government  in  Tokio  proposals  for  Treaty  revision  which  were 
based  on  the  results  achieved  during  the  second  conference,  and 
on  the  general  experience  gained  in  the  long  course  of  negotiations. 
These  British  proposals  conceded  the  principle  of  territorial  juris- 
diction on  the  condition  that  all  the  new  Japanese  Codes  of  Law 
should  be  in  operation  before  the  revised  Treaty  came  into  force, 
and  offered  an  increase  of  3 per  cent  in  the  Customs  Import  Tariff. 
The  period  of  duration  of  the  proposed  Treaty  and  tariff  was  fixed 
at  twelve  years,  at  the  end  of  which  time  Japan  would  recover 
complete  tariff  autonomy.  The  proposed  Treaty  further  provided 
for  the  opening  of  the  whole  of  Japan  to  British  trade  and  inter- 
course, and  for  her  adhesion  to  the  International  Conventions  for 
the  Protection  of  Industrial  Property  and  Copyright.  This  latter 
provision  was  called  for  by  the  frequent  imitation  of  foreign  trade- 
marks, and  the  issue  of  cheap  copies  of  foreign  publications.  In 
order  to  avoid  offending  Japanese  susceptibilities  careful  attention 
was  given  to  the  form  in  which  these  proposals  were  framed.  It 
might  have  been  expected  that  proposals  so  liberal  could  not  fail  of 
acceptance.  The  fact  that  they  were  so  far  in  advance  of  the 


208 


Treaty  Revision 

views  regarding  Treaty  revision  entertained  by  the  majority  of 
foreign  Governments  implied  a recognition  of  the  progress  made 
by  Japan,  and  confidence  in  her  future,  which  could  hardly  fail  to 
be  gratifying  to  the  Government  to  which  they  were  presented. 
The  favourable  impression  they  at  first  produced  justified  the 
hope  that  negotiations  might  result  in  an  agreement  on  this  long- 
pending  question.  Again,  however,  popular  agitation  stood  in  the 
way  of  a settlement.  Objection  was  raised  to  the  ownership  of  land 
by  foreigners,  a point  which  had  figured  in  all  previous  schemes  of 
Treaty  revision,  and  the  matter  was  quietly  shelved  without  ever 
reaching  the  stage  of  negotiations.  One  explanation  of  the  attitude 
assumed  by  Japanese  Ministers  at  this  time  may  be  found  in  the 
jealousy  prevailing  in  political  circles  which  made  it  difficult  for  any 
single  statesman,  or  party,  to  gain  the  credit  of  disposing  of  a 
problem,  which  had  defied  solution  for  so  long.  Any  official  jealousy 
of  this  kind  which  may  have  existed  would  tend  to  encourage 
agitation  on  the  subject  irrespective  of  the  merits  of  the  question  at 
issue.  Another  reason  likely  to  influence  public  opinion  in  a nation 
in  whose  character  pride  is  so  predominant  a trait  may  have  been 
the  feeling  that  it  was  desirable  for  the  country’s  prestige  that 
proposals  which  should  furnish  the  basis  of  the  new  treaties  should 
emanate  from  Japan. 

Treaty  revision  had  thus  become  a national  question  in  which 
political  parties,  as  well  as  the  Press,  took  an  active  interest,  and 
in  succeeding  years  the  Diet  was  frequently  the  scene  of  animated 
discussions,  which  caused  no  little  embarrassment  to  the  Govern- 
ment. Fortunately  for  both  Government  and  people,  and  for 
relations  between  Japan  and  foreign  Powers,  the  long  looked-for 
solution  came  in  sight  in  1894.  In  the  spring  of  that  year  negotia- 
tions were  resumed  by  the  Japanese  Government  in  London.  The 
proposals  then  submitted  to  the  British  Government  were  practically 
the  same  both  in  form  and  substance  as  the  previous  British  pro- 
posals, the  chief  difference  lying  in  the  substitution  of  a right  of 
lease  only  in  place  of  the  right  of  ownership  of  land  by  British 
subjects.  The  Japanese  Government  had  reason  subsequently  to 
regret  this  alteration,  for  it  gave  rise  to  a controversy,  which,  on 
being  referred  for  arbitration  to  the  Hague  Tribunal  in  1905,  was 
decided  against  Japan.  The  negotiations  proceeded  smoothly,  and 
ended  in  the  signature  on  the  16th  July  of  that  year  of  a new 


Great  Britain  Takes  Initiative  209 

Treaty  and  Protocol,  some  minor  matters  being  regulated  by  an 
exchange  of  Notes.  By  the  new  Treaty  arrangements  consular 
jurisdiction  was  abolished,  and  the  whole  of  Japan  was  opened  to 
British  trade  and  intercourse.  It  was  also  provided  that  before  the 
new  Treaty  came  into  operation  the  new  Japanese  Codes  should 
have  been  brought  into  force,  and  Japan  should  have  notified 
her  adhesion  to  the  International  Conventions  for  the  Protection 
of  Industrial  Property  and  Copyright.  It  was  also  agreed  between  the 
two  parties  that  the  new  Treaty  should  not  come  into  operation 
before  the  expiration  of  five  years  from  the  date  of  signature,  the 
object  of  this  stipulation  being  to  allow  time  for  the  negotiation 
of  similar  treaties  with  other  foreign  Powers.  The  ad  valorem 
duties  in  the  tariff  accompanying  the  agreement  were  subsequently 
converted  into  specific  rates  by  delegates  of  the  two  Governments 
who  met  in  Tokio  for  that  purpose. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  new  Treaty  should  have  met  with 
scanty  approval  from  the  British  mercantile  community  in  Japan. 
In  the  wide  areas  over  which  the  interests  of  the  British  Empire 
are  spread  it  is  inevitable  that  there  should  at  times  be  some  points 
of  divergence  between  Imperial  policy  and  local  views,  between 
the  appreciation  of  a situation  by  the  Government  with  its  wider 
outlook  and  far-reaching  responsibilities  in  matters  of  Imperial 
concern,  and  by  British  communities  abroad.  Nor  was  it  unnatural 
for  British  residents  in  the  Far  East,  accustomed  by  long  experience 
to  regard  extra-territorial  privileges  in  Oriental  countries  almost  as 
part  of  the  British  Constitution,  to  view  with  unwillingness  their 
surrender.  But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  time  had  come  for 
a concession  of  this  kind  to  be  made.  The  progress  of  Japan  in  the 
thirty-six  years  that  had  elapsed  since  the  treaties  of  1858  had 
been  attended  by  evidences  of  stability  in  administration  and 
policy  which  invited  the  confidence  as  it  evoked  the  admiration  of 
the  world.  The  conditions  of  foreign  residence  in  Japan  compared 
more  than  favourably  with  those  in  other  countries  where  there  was 
no  exemption  from  territorial  jurisdiction.  Nor  in  any  case  would 
it  have  been  right,  or  even,  under  the  circumstances,  possible, 
from  the  point  of  the  position  which  Japan  had  already  attained, 
for  Treaty  revision  to  be  longer  deferred.  Subsequent  events 
have  established  the  wisdom  of  the  course  taken  by  Great  Britain. 
It  is  true  that  Great  Britain  gained  little  material  advantage  from 
0 


210  Great  Britain  Takes  Initiative 

the  agreement.  But  Japan  had  very  little  to  offer  in  return  for 
what  she  received.  Circumstances  precluded  anything  in  the 
nature  of  a bargain.  The  opening  of  the  whole  country — already 
rendered  accessible  to  travellers,  and  indirectly  to  merchants,  by 
means  of  a passport  system — was  of  little,  if  any,  benefit  to  British 
commerce,  which  was  unlikely  to  diverge  from  the  trade  routes 
already  established.  But  by  being  the  first  to  revise  her  Treaty  on 
terms  practically  identical  with  those  she  had  herself  offered  two 
years  before,  Great  Britain  showed  her  frank  recognition  of  the 
changed  conditions  resulting  from  the  steady  progress  of  more 
than  thirty  years.  And  she  thereby  retained  her  position  as  the 
leading  Western  Power  in  the  Far  East,  and  gained  the  goodwill 
of  Japan,  thus  paving  the  way  for  the  future  Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance. 

Lest  it  should  be  thought  that  in  the  foregoing  account  of 
Treaty  revision  too  much  importance  has  been  attached  to  it, 
and  possibly  too  close  a connection  traced  between  negotiations 
on  this  subject  and  the  development  of  Japan  on  Western  lines, 
it  may  be  well  to  conclude  these  remarks  with  a quotation  from  a 
speech  delivered  by  Viscount  Chinda,  then  Japanese  Ambassador 
in  London,  at  the  Sheffield  University  on  June  29th,  1918. 

In  the  course  of  his  speech  Viscount  Chinda  said  : “ Perhaps 
no  one  except  a Japanese  will  be  able  to  appreciate  truly  and 
fully  the  great  importance  attached  to  the  question  of  Treaty 
revision.  For  the  Japanese,  however,  the  question  was  a matter 
of  paramount  importance,  connoting  as  it  did  nothing  less  than 
a national  emancipation.  The  first  treaties  of  Japan  with  foreign 
Powers  were  signed  while  the  nation  was  still  in  a state  of  torpor 
from  a long  slumber  of  seclusion,  and  in  the  circumstances  amounted 
almost  to  duress.  ...  So  defective  indeed  were  these  treaties 
that  Japan  was  in  effect  deprived  of  the  two  essential  attributes 
of  a Sovereign  State.  The  redemption  of  her  judicial  and  fiscal 
autonomy  became  henceforth  the  dream  of  Japanese  national 
aspiration,  and  her  policies,  both  foreign  and  domestic,  ever 
shaped  principally  with  this  one  supreme  end  in  view.  Innova- 
tion after  innovation,  often  involving  sacrifices  of  traditional 
sentiments,  were  introduced  for  the  purpose  of  assimilating  the 
country  and  its  institutions  to  the  standard  of  Western  civiliza- 
tion.” 


Difficulties  with  China  2 1 1 

Similar  language  has  been  held  by  other  prominent  Japanese 
statesmen,  notably  by  Viscount  Kato,  at  one  time  ambassador 
in  London,  and  now  the  leader  of  a powerful  political  party,  whose 
experience  as  a Cabinet  Minister  qualifies  him  to  speak  with  authority 
on  the  subject. 

The  outbreak  of  war  with  China  within  a few  days  of  the  signa- 
ture of  the  revised  British  Treaty  has  already  been  mentioned. 
To  foreign  residents  in  the  Far  East,  who  had  opportunities  of 
observing  the  relations  between  Japan  and  China  during  the 
previous  years,  the  event  caused  little  surprise.  At  no  period 
of  history  had  their  relations  been  cordial,  except  perhaps  for 
a time  in  the  seventh  century,  when  China  became  the  model 
on  which  Japan  remoulded  her  institutions.  The  Mongol  invasions 
of  Japan  in  the  thirteenth  century  had  left  unpleasant  memories 
in  both  countries,  and  relations  were  not  improved  by  the  inter- 
vention of  China  in  support  of  Korea  when  the  Japanese  in  their 
turn  invaded  that  country.  On  neither  side,  however,  was  the 
recollection  of  past  hostilities  allowed  to  stand  in  the  way  of  the 
customary  intercourse  between  neighbouring  Oriental  States, 
which  was  limited  to  the  despatch  at  irregular  intervals  of  com- 
plimentary missions,  and  the  occasional  visits  of  Chinese  traders. 
By  the  time  that  Japan  embarked  on  a policy  of  seclusion,  in 
consequence  of  the  domestic  troubles  which  arose  in  connection 
with  the  first  efforts  of  foreign  missionary  enterprise,  Chinese 
traders  had,  as  we  have  seen,  established  a small  centre  of  commerce 
in  the  south-west  of  Japan.  There,  after  the  country  was  closed, 
they,  and  the  Dutch  traders,  were  allowed  to  remain,  though 
under  conditions  which  deprived  the  privilege  of  much  of  its 
value,  and  eventually  reduced  the  commerce  thus  conducted 
to  small  and  rapidly  dwindling  proportions.  Prior  to  the  issue 
of  the  edict  which  put  an  end  to  maritime  enterprise  the 
Japanese  had  shown  no  lack  of  seafaring  spirit.  Even  then, 
however,  the  pursuit  of  trade  as  a definite  object  never  seems 
to  have  attracted  the  nation,  the  visits  of  Japanese  vessels  to 
the  mainland  of  Asia  being  undertaken  more  with  an  eye  to  the 
prosecution  of  piratical  raids  than  the  conduct  of  peaceful  com- 
merce. 

V ith  the  reopening  of  Japan  to  foreign  intercourse  the  situation 


212 


Difficulties  with  China 


underwent  a complete  change.  The  establishment  of  “ treaty 
ports  ” and  the  development  of  Japanese  trade  with  foreign 
countries  had  the  natural  effect  of  drawing  Japan  and  China  more 
closely  together,  though  for  some  years  circumstances  conspired 
to  prevent  the  growth  of  more  intimate  relations  between  the 
two  peoples.  Much  of  the  new  commercial  intercourse  between 
them  was  conducted  not  directly  between  Chinese  and  Japanese 
merchants,  but  indirectly  through  the  medium  of  merchants 
of  other  nationalities,  who  acted  as  the  middlemen  of  foreign 
commerce  in  the  Far  East.  Incompatibility  of  temperament, 
moreover,  and  of  ideas — the  result  of  a fundamental  difference 
in  conditions  of  national  development — acted  as  a barrier  between 
the  two  peoples.  Nor  was  the  state  of  affairs  in  either  country 
such  as  to  favour  a recognition  of  the  common  interests  which 
pointed  to  the  desirability  of  a closer  understanding.  The  decay 
of  China  under  spiritless  Manchu  rule  had  already  begun.  Resting 
in  fancied  security  on  the  traditions  of  past  greatness,  and  uncon- 
scious of  her  own  decadence,  she  was  too  proud  to  make  advances 
to  a smaller  though  near  neighbour,  whose  existence  she  had 
hitherto  found  it  convenient  to  ignore.  Japan,  for  her  part,  in 
the  throes  of  a revolution  which  was  to  usher  in  a new  order  of 
things,  was  too  busy  for  a time  to  pay  much  attention  to  inter- 
course with  China,  of  whose  attitude  towards  herself  she  was, 
nevertheless,  well  aware. 

It  was  not  until  after  the  Restoration  that  the  relations  between 
the  two  countries  were  placed  on  a formal  Treaty  basis.  The 
Treaty  concluded  at  Peking  in  1871,  on  the  initiative  of  the  new 
Japanese  Government,  was  framed  on  simple  lines,  something 
both  as  to  form  and  substance  being  borrowed  from  the  treaties 
in  existence  between  the  two  nations  and  Western  Powers.  By 
the  most  important  of  its  stipulations  it  was  arranged  that  the 
Consuls,  or  “ administrators,”  as  they  were  termed,  of  each  country 
should  exercise  supervision  and  control  over  their  nationals  resident 
therein  ; that  these  officials  should  endeavour  to  settle  amicably 
all  disputes  that  might  arise  between  the  subjects  of  the  two 
countries ; and  that,  failing  a settlement  in  this  manner,  the 
questions  at  issue  should  be  referred  to  the  Consuls  and  local 
authorities  for  joint  decision — the  latter  having,  moreover,  the 
right  of  arrest  and  punishment  in  all  criminal  cases.  Trade  rcgula- 


Difficulties  with  China  213 

tions  and  an  ad  valorem  tariff  were  attached  to  the  Treaty,  but 
no  period  of  duration  was  mentioned. 

Not  long  after  the  conclusion  of  this  Treaty  the  friendly  rela- 
tions thus  formally  established  between  the  two  countries  were 
disturbed,  as  we  have  seen,  by  the  quarrel  w'hich  arose  out  of  the 
ill-treatment  received  by  natives  of  Loochoo  in  Formosa.  The 
adoption  by  Japan  of  Western  innovations  had  already  given 
offence  to  the  Chinese  Government,  which  viewed  with  strong 
disapproval  this  departure  from  the  traditional  policy  hitherto 
followed  by  Far  Eastern  States.  The  forcible  measures  taken  by 
Japan  in  connection  with  this  incident  to  obtain  redress  caused 
both  surprise  and  irritation.  These  feelings  were  intensified  by 
the  controversy  which  took  place  a few  years  later  over  the  annexa- 
tion of  Loochoo  by  Japan.  On  this  occasion  China  contented 
herself  with  making  a formal  protest.  No  definite  understanding 
was  effected  in  the  course  of  the  negotiations  that  ensued,  and 
the  incident  was  closed  by  China’s  tacit  acquiescence  in  the  new 
situation.  Thenceforth,  however,  the  relations  between  the 
two  countries  assumed  a character  of  estrangement,  which  only 
needed  the  stimulus  of  some  further  dispute  to  ripen  into  hos- 
tility. 

This  further  cause  of  quarrel  was  supplied  by  Korea. 


CHAPTER  XXII 


China  and  Korea — War  with  China — Naval  Reform — Defeat  of  China — 
Treaty  of  Shimonoseki — Peace  Terms. 

THOSE  who  are  at  all  familiar  with  Chinese  history  will 
scarcely  have  failed  to  notice  one  persistent  feature  of  it — 
the  suzerainty  that  China  has  either  exercised,  or  claimed 
to  exercise,  over  neighbouring  States  which  at  one  time  or  another 
have  fallen  under  her  domination.  This  has  been  the  common 
experience  of  nearly  all  countries  whose  situation  on  the  frontiers 
of  the  Chinese  Empire  has  exposed  them  to  invasion  by  their  restless 
and  powerful  neighbour.  At  the  time  of  which  we  are  speaking 
some  of  these  States  had  already  recovered  their  independence,  which 
was  not,  however,  always  recognized  formally  by  China  ; in  others 
Chinese  suzerainty  had  been  replaced  by  that  of  another  Power  ; 
while  in  a few  instances  China,  in  the  wish  to  evade  the  responsi- 
bilities of  a protectorate,  had  of  late  years  allowed  her  suzerainty  to 
become  almost  nominal.  This  last-mentioned  position  was  that  of 
Korea,  when  Japan  in  1876  concluded  the  Treaty  with  that  country, 
to  which  reference  has  already  been  made.  For  many  years  pre- 
viously Chinese  suzerainty  had  ceased  to  be  effective,  but  it  was  still 
asserted  by  China,  and  acknowledged  by  Korea.  The  despatch  from 
time  to  time  of  missions  to  Peking  bearing  presents,  which  the 
Chinese  were  justified  in  regarding  as  tribute,  the  form  given  to 
correspondence  between  the  two  countries,  and  the  ceremonies 
observed  on  official  occasions,  constituted  an  admission  of  the  status 
of  vassalage.  With  this  acknowledged  status  the  Treaty  of  1876 
was  inconsistent,  since  its  first  Article  contained  the  declaration  that 
Korea  was  an  independent  State  ; and  in  1882 — when  Great  Britain 
and  America  followed  Japan’s  example  by  negotiating  treaties  with 
that  country — China,  with  an  inconsistency  equal  to  that  displayed 
by  Korea,  weakened  her  own  position  as  suzerain  by  making  a Treaty 

214 


China  Korea  215 

with  her  nominal  vassal  on  the  lines  of  those  already  concluded 
between  Korea  and  the  three  Powers  above  mentioned.  This  false 
step  on  the  part  of  China  strengthened  the  attitude  adopted  by 
Japan  in  declining  to  recognize  Chinese  suzerainty.  At  the  outset, 
therefore,  of  Japan’s  new  relations  with  Korea  the  situation  as  be- 
tween herself,  Korea,  and  the  latter’s  nominal  suzerain,  China,  was 
anomalous  and  contradictory.  In  this  fact  alone  lay  the  seeds  of 
future  trouble.  Nor  was  the  aspect  of  affairs  in  Korea  itself  such  as 
to  offer  any  assurance  that  the  difficulties  which  there  was  every 
reason  to  anticipate  would  not  shortly  occur. 

Its  condition  was  that  of  an  Oriental  State  in  complete  decay. 
Long  years  of  misrule  had  broken  the  spirit  of  the  people  ; the 
occupant  of  the  Throne  was  a nonentity  in  the  hands  of  unscrupulous 
and  incompetent  Ministers,  who  were  supported  by  rival  factions 
struggling  with  each  other  for  power  ; there  were  no  regular  forces, 
nor  police,  worthy  of  the  name  ; intrigue  and  corruption  prevailed 
everywhere  unchecked  ; and  the  resources  of  the  country  were 
wasted  by  swarms  of  rapacious  officials  intent  only  on  enriching 
themselves. 

In  these  circumstances  the  appearance  on  the  scene  of  two  neigh- 
bouring Powers,  each  bent  on  obtaining  a predominant  influence  in 
the  peninsula,  could  only  result  in  making  matters  worse  than  they 
were  before.  The  introduction  of  foreign  elements  into  the  intrigues 
of  contending  factions  gave  fresh  force  to  domestic  quarrels,  until 
increasing  disorder  in  the  country  culminated  in  anti-foreign  dis- 
turbances, in  the  course  of  which  the  Japanese,  against  whom  popular 
feeling  was  chiefly  directed,  were  driven  out  of  Seoul,  and  their 
Legation  destroyed.  The  puppet  King,  accused  of  favouring  Japan, 
was  also  compelled  to  abdicate,  his  father,  the  Tai-won-kun,  one  of 
the  few  Koreans  who  possessed  both  character  and  ability,  assuming 
charge  of  the  administration.  Thereupon  China  intervened.  Exer- 
cising her  acknowledged  authority  as  suzerain,  she  sent  a military 
force,  supported  by  some  men-of-war,  to  Korea  to  restore  order. 
The  Korean  capital  (Seoul)  was  occupied,  and  the  Tai-won-kun 
arrested  and  taken  to  China.  This  was  in  1883.  It  was  then  that 
Yuan  Shih-kai,  afterwards  President  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  first 
came  into  public  notice  on  his  appointment  as  Chinese  Resident  in 
Seoul.  For  a short  time  after  the  reassertion  of  her  authority  by 
China,  and  the  restoration  of  order  in  the  Korean  capital,  affairs 


2 1 6 


China  &?  Korea 

remained  quiet,  both  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  Governments  main- 
taining garrisons  in  Seoul ; but  in  the  following  year  a conspiracy 
fomented  by  the  pro-Japanese  party  led  to  the  outbreak  of  further 
disturbances,  in  the  course  of  which  a collision  occurred  between 
the  Chinese  and  Japanese  garrisons,  the  latter,  which  was  greatly 
outnumbered,  withdrawing  to  the  port  of  Chemulpo. 

The  critical  situation  produced  by  this  collision  between  the 
troops  of  the  two  Powers  in  the  Korean  capital  impressed  on  both 
Governments  the  necessity,  if  further  and  more  serious  trouble  were 
to  be  avoided,  of  arriving  at  some  understanding  in  regard  to  action 
in  Korea.  With  this  object  negotiations  were  opened  early  in  1885, 
and  in  the  spring  of  that  year  a convention  was  signed  at  Tientsin 
between  China  and  Japan,  by  which  the  independence  of  Korea  was 
recognized.  Both  Governments  agreed  to  withdraw  their  forces 
from  Korea,  leaving  only  small  detachments  as  guards  for  their 
Legations,  and  to  give  each  other  previous  notice  “ in  writing,” 
should  the  despatch  of  troops  by  either  to  that  country  become 
necessary  at  any  time  in  the  future.  A further  stipulation  provided 
that  the  King  of  Korea  should  be  asked  to  organize  an  armed  force 
for  the  preservation  of  order  and  public  security,  and  to  engage  the 
services  of  foreign  military  experts  for  this  purpose  from  a foreign 
country  other  than  China  and  Japan. 

This  was  still  the  position  of  affairs  in  1894  under  the  modus  vivendi 
established  by  the  Tientsin  Convention.  Though  by  that  agreement 
China  had  abandoned  her  pretensions  to  suzerainty,  the  rivalry 
between  the  two  Powers  continued  unabated.  The  interval  since 
1885  had  been  marked  by  constant  strife  among  Korean  factions, 
and  the  prosecution  of  busy  intrigues  between  the  latter  and  the 
Chinese  and  Japanese,  to  which  the  growing  interest  now  taken  by 
Russia  in  the  affairs  of  the  peninsula  gave  fresh  impetus.  The 
Chinese  representative  in  Korea  retained  the  title  of  Resident,  which 
conveyed,  as  was  intended,  the  impression  of  the  superiority  of  his 
position  to  those  of  other  foreign  representatives ; and  the  influence 
of  China  at  the  Capital — exercised  through  the  masterful  Queen, 
who  did  not  conceal  her  pro-Chinese  sympathies — was  predominant. 
Nevertheless,  what  advantage  China  enjoyed  in  these  respects  over 
her  rival  was  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  political  and  com- 
mercial activity  displayed  by  Japan.  Proof  of  this  had  already  been 
given  by  the  prompt  action  of  the  Japanese  Government  in  obtain- 


Field-Marshal  Prince  Yamagata. 


Distinguished  himself  in  the  Restoration  campaign  ; took  an  active  part  in  the 
Government  subsequently  formed,  in  the  reorganization  of  the  Japanese  army,  and  in  the 
wars  with  China  and  Russia  ; he  wielded  throughout  great  influence  in  State  affairs. 


War  with  China  217 

ing  redress  for  the  results  of  the  disturbances  of  1882  and  1884,  and 
by  the  steadily  increasing  volume  of  Japanese  trade. 

In  the  spring  of  1894  the  value  of  the  arrangement  under  which 
the  two  Powers  had  agreed  to  conduct  their  relations  with  Korea 
was  put  to  the  test  by  the  outbreak  of  an  insurrection  in  the  south 
of  Korea.  The  Korean  troops  sent  from  the  Capital  to  quell  the 
revolt  having  been  worsted  in  several  encounters  with  the  insurgents, 
the  Min  party,  to  which  the  Queen  belonged,  appealed  to  China  for 
assistance.  The  Chinese  Government  responded  to  the  appeal  by 
sending  troops  to  Asan,  the  scene  of  the  revolt,  informing  Japan  at 
the  same  time,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  Tientsin  Con- 
vention, of  its  intention  to  do  so.  The  Japanese  Government  replied 
by  taking  similar  action.  The  tenour  of  the  correspondence  that 
ensued  between  the  two  Governments  gave  little  hope  of  an  amicable 
settlement  of  the  difficulty,  China  reasserting  the  suzerainty  she  had 
previously  waived,  and  seeking  to  impose  limits  upon  Japanese  action  ; 
while  Japan  insisted  on  her  right  to  interfere,  and  supported  it  by 
reinforcing  the  troops  she  had  already  despatched.  China  at  once 
took  similar  measures,  but  the  reinforcements  sent  never  reached 
their  destination.  The  British  vessel  conveying  them,  under  convoy 
of  Chinese  men-of-war,  was  met  and  sunk  at  sea  by  a Japanese 
squadron  commanded  by  Admiral  (then  Captain)  Togo.  A day  or 
two  later  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  forces  at  Asan  came  into  conflict, 
with  the  result  that  the  Chinese  troops  were  defeated  and  were  with- 
drawn to  China.  Hostilities  had,  therefore,  already  commenced  on 
land  and  sea  when  simultaneous  declarations  of  war  were  made  by 
both  Governments  on  the  1st  August. 

These  first  encounters  were  a true  presage  of  what  was  to  follow. 
The  war  thus  begun  was  disastrous  for  China.  By  the  wide  extent 
of  her  territories,  her  vast  population,  her  seemingly  inexhaustible 
resources  and  her  traditions  of  conquest,  not  to  mention  her  industrial 
and  commercial  activities,  she  had  for  centuries  filled  a big  place  in 
the  world.  Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  was  a comparatively  small 
country,  little  known,  that  had  just  emerged  from  a long  era  of 
seclusion,  and  was  regarded  abroad  with  feelings  which  at  the  best, 
apart  from  the  interest  her  art  inspired,  did  not  extend  beyond 
sympathetic  curiosity. 

It  was  quite  natural,  therefore,  that  foreigners  outside  Japan  who 
knew  little  of  the  silent  progress  made  since  the  Restoration  should 


2l8 


War  with  China 

have  wondered  at  her  audacity  in  challenging  a neighbour  who  in 
all  respects  appeared  to  be  so  much  more  powerful  than  herself.  In 
reality,  however,  the  prospects  of  success  for  China  were  hopeless 
from  the  first.  She  was  in  an  advanced  stage  of  decadence.  Her 
foremost  statesman,  Li  Hung  Chang,  and  the  whole  official  hierarchy 
were  notoriously  corrupt,  the  arrogant  policy  the  Government  still 
pursued  serving  as  a cloak  to  hide  the  real  weakness  that  lay  behind. 
Her  ill-paid  army,  led  by  incompetent  officers,  was  without  training 
of  a modern  kind,  or  discipline  ; while  her  navy  was  a house  divided 
against  itself,  the  southern  squadron  refusing  to  fight  on  the  ground 
that  the  war  was  not  a national  war,  but  one  into  which  the  country 
had  been  drawn  through  the  self-seeking  policy  of  Li  Hung  Chang. 
To  the  Japanese  there  was  nothing  that  savoured  of  audacity  in 
confronting  an  adversary  of  whose  weakness  they  were  well  assured. 
Into  the  policy  of  reform  which  the  Government  had  steadily 
pursued  since  the  Restoration  many  considerations  had  entered. 
The  course  of  recent  events  in  China  had  been  an  object-lesson  by 
which  it  had  profited.  Having  realized  that  a chief  cause  of  China’s 
troubled  relations  with  Western  Powers  lay  in  her  military  ineffi- 
ciency, it  set  to  work  to  reorganize  the  army.  This  work  was  entrusted 
to  Marshal  Prince  Yamagata  (then  a young  officer),  who  had  distin- 
guished himself  in  the  fighting  which  took  place  at  the  time  of  the 
Restoration.  He  and  the  younger  Saigo  (afterwards  created  a 
Marquis)  were  the  chief  members  of  a mission  appointed  to  enquire 
into  military  matters  which  visited  Europe  in  1870.  The  results  of 
this  mission  were  the  engagement  of  foreign  military  instructors 
and  the  establishment  of  conscription,  which  came  into  operation 
for  the  first  time  in  1873.  A few  years  later  the  discipline  and  fight- 
ing qualities  of  the  new  conscript  troops  were  tested  to  the  satis- 
faction of  the  Government  in  the  Satsuma  rebellion.  In  1884  a 
second  military  mission,  at  the  head  of  which  was  the  late  Marshal 
Prince  Oyama,  visited  Europe.  It  was  then  that  the  services  of  a 
Prussian  officer,  the  late  General  Meckel,  were  secured.  The 
improvement  in  the  Japanese  army  which  showed  itself  from  that 
time  is  generally  ascribed  to  the  ability  and  energy  which  that  officer 
brought  to  the  performance  of  his  duties  as  military  adviser.  In 
consequence  of  the  sedulous  attention  thus  paid  for  several  years  to 
military  organization,  Japan,  when  military  operations  against  China 
commenced,  had  at  her  disposal  a conscript  army  of  over  200,000 


Naval  Reform  219 

men,  with  a corresponding  strength  of  artillery  and  a supply  of 
efficient  officers.  Against  an  army  of  this  quality,  and  of  these 
dimensions,  China,  who  was  content  to  rely  on  troops  recruited  on 
the  voluntary  system,  could  do  little,  even  had  she  not  laboured 
under  other  disadvantages  already  mentioned. 

For  obvious  reasons  the  development  of  the  Japanese  navy  had 
lagged  behind  that  of  the  army.  The  finances  of  the  country  did 
not  permit  of  any  large  expenditure  on  both  services.  While  the 
feudal  system  had  kept  alive  the  warlike  spirit  of  the  nation  in  spite 
of  a prolonged  period  of  peace,  the  closing  of  the  country  to  foreign 
intercourse,  accompanied  as  it  was  by  the  rigid  limitations  imposed 
on  the  size  of  vessels,  had  stifled  maritime  enterprise.  Japanese  naval 
training,  therefore,  had  to  begin  with  the  rudiments  of  a sailor’s 
education.  Service  at  sea  did  not  at  first  appeal  to  a people  whose 
military  class,  before  it  disappeared  with  the  abolition  of  feudalism, 
had  been  brought  up  mainly  in  traditions  of  land  fighting.  There 
was  another  reason.  Partly  by  design,  partly,  also,  as  the  result  of 
circumstances,  the  military  control  exercised  by  the  two  clans  which 
virtually  governed  the  country  soon  after  the  Restoration  had  from 
the  first  been  arranged  so  as  to  give  ChSshiu  clansmen  the  larger 
share  of  army  administration,  the  direction  of  the  navy,  on  the  other 
hand,  being  left  chiefly  to  Satsuma  clansmen,  whose  intelligence  and 
energy  fell  short  of  the  standard  of  their  colleagues  in  the  Govern- 
ment. 

The  same  year  (1872)  in  which  the  reorganization  of  the  army 
began  saw  the  first  steps  taken  in  the  direction  of  naval  reform. 
In  that  year  the  single  department  which  had  hitherto  been  respon- 
sible for  the  administration  of  both  army  and  navy  was  replaced  by 
separate  departments  for  each  of  the  two  services.  It  was,  as  already 
noted,  to  Great  Britain  that  Japan  turned  for  assistance  in  the 
measures  subsequently  taken  for  the  building  up  of  a navy. 
British  naval  advisers  and  instructors,  amongst  whom  were  the 
late  Admiral  Sir  Archibald  Douglas  and  Admiral  Ingles  were 
engaged,  and  the  first  vessels  of  the  new  Japanese  navy  were  con- 
structed in  England.  In  1892  the  determination  of  the  Government 
to  persevere  in  the  task  of  creating  a navy  was  shown  by  the  Emperor’s 
decision  to  contribute  £30,000  annually  for  eight  years  towards  naval 
construction,  the  funds  required  for  this  purpose  being  obtained  by 
proportionate  reductions  in  the  expenditure  of  the  Court.  When 


220 


Defeat  of  China 

war  was  declared,  it  was  the  Japanese  navy  that  struck  the  first  blow. 
It  then  consisted  of  twenty-eight  ships,  aggregating  roughly  some 
57,000  tons,  besides  twenty-four  torpedo-boats.  The  day  of  de- 
stroyers had  not  yet  come.  The  Chinese  fleet  at  this  time  was 
stronger  numerically  than  that  of  Japan,  and  had  also  an  advantage 
in  the  fact  that  it  included  one  or  two  ships  of  a more  powerful  class 
than  any  Japanese  vessel.  But  this  superiority  was  counter-balanced 
by  the  refusal  of  the  Chinese  Southern  Squadron,  for  the  reason 
already  given,  to  take  any  part  in  hostilities ; and  early  in  the  war 
the  portion  of  the  Chinese  fleet  which  came  into  action  showed  that 
it  had  little  stomach  for  fighting. 

Though  the  war  lasted  for  eight  months — from  August  1st,  1894, 
till  the  conclusion  of  an  armistice  on  the  30th  March  in  the  following 
year — its  result  was  never  in  doubt.  The  Chinese  troops  in  the 
south  of  Korea  had,  as  we  have  seen,  been  withdrawn  to  China  after 
their  defeat  at  Asan.  Further  north  the  Japanese  at  once  made  the 
port  of  Chemulpo  the  base  of  preliminary  operations,  and  having, 
on  the  strength  of  a treaty  of  alliance,  concluded  at  the  outset  of 
hostilities  with  the  Korean  Government,  occupied  the  Korean 
capital,  compelled  the  Chinese  forces  remaining  in  Korea  to  retire 
towards  the  frontier.  The  only  engagement  of  any  consequence  in 
this  early  stage  of  the  campaign  occurred  at  Pingyang,  a town 
occupying  a position  of  some  strategic  value  in  the  north-west  of 
the  peninsula  sixty  miles  from  the  Yalu  river,  which  formed  for 
some  distance  the  boundary  between  China  and  Korea.  This  place 
was  held  in  strength  by  the  Chinese  forces,  and  its  capture  by  the 
Japanese  on  the  17th  September  involved  some  severe  fighting,  in 
the  course  of  which  a Chinese  Mohammedan  regiment  distinguished 
itself  by  a stubborn  resistance,  which  was  in  marked  contrast  to  the 
behaviour  of  other  Chinese  troops.  On  the  same  day  the  Chinese 
northern  fleet  was  beaten  in  the  only  important  naval  action  of  the 
war.  In  this  engagement  the  two  Chinese  battleships,  each  more 
than  a match  for  any  Japanese  vessel,  suffered  little  damage,  but  the 
Chinese  lost  several  smaller  vessels,  while  no  Japanese  ships  were 
damaged  beyond  repair.  The  beaten  Chinese  fleet  made  its  way  to 
Ta-lien-Wan,  which  lies  at  the  neck  of  the  Kwantung  peninsula. 
There  it  stayed  for  some  weeks  until  the  landing  of  a Japanese  army 
close  to  that  port,  which  the  Chinese  made  no  attempt  to  defend, 
obliged  it  to  take  refuge  in  Weihaiwei.  Thence  it  never  again 


Treaty  of  Shimonoseki  221 

emerged,  thus  leaving  to  the  Japanese  until  the  end  of  the  war  the 
undisputed  command  of  the  sea. 

The  further  course  of  the  war  is  well  known,  the  general  control 
of  operations  remaining,  as  before,  in  the  hands  of  Marshal  Prince 
Yamagata.  Nowhere  were  the  Chinese  forces  able  to  offer  any 
effective  resistance  to  the  Japanese  advance,  their  experience,  when- 
ever they  tried  to  make  a stand,  being  a repetition  of  what  occurred 
at  Ping-yang,  where  their  losses,  as  compared  with  those  of  the  enemy 
(6000  to  200),  told  their  own  tale.  Towards  the  end  of  October  the 
two  Japanese  divisions  operating  on  parallel  lines  in  Korea  crossed 
the  Chinese  frontier,  driving  before  them  the  Chinese  forces,  which 
made  but  a feeble  resistance.  The  Japanese  divisions  (some  40,000 
strong),  which  had  early  in  November  driven  the  Chinese  from 
Ta-lien-wan  and  occupied  the  isthmus  of  Chinchou,  thus  severing 
communications  between  the  Kwantung  peninsula  and  the  northern 
portion  of  the  Feng-t’ien  province,  proceeded  to  invest  Port  Arthur. 
Later  on  in  the  month  a Chinese  army  moving  from  the  north  was 
completely  defeated  in  an  attempt  to  relieve  the  fortress.  On  the 
2 1 st  November,  Port  Arthur  was  stormed  with  small  loss  to  the 
Japanese,  considering  the  natural  strength  of  the  position,  and  its 
powerful  fortifications.  Early  in  December  the  Japanese  forces 
operating  from  Korea,  assisted  by  a third  division  detached  for  the 
purpose,  continued  their  advance,  occupying  successively  the  towns 
of  Kaiping  and  Haicheng.  In  the  course  of  February  and  March, 
1895,  this  army,  now  under  the  command  of  General  (afterwards 
Prince)  Katsura,  pushed  still  further  west,  defeated  the  Chinese  in 
three  successive  engagements  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Newchwang 
and  occupied  that  port,  the  Chinese  retreating  northwards  along  the 
course  of  the  Liao  river.  Meanwhile  an  expeditionary  force  de- 
spatched from  Ta-lien-wan  in  January  had  landed  in  Yung-cheng  bay 
to  the  east  of  Weihaiwei,  and,  acting  in  co-operation  with  the 
Japanese  fleet,  had  laid  siege  to  that  place.  Its  gallant  defence  by 
Admiral  Ting  was  for  China  the  only  redeeming  feature  of  the  war. 
On  1 6th  March  it  surrendered,  after  a siege  of  three  months,  its 
gallant  defender  dying  by  his  own  hand.  The  fall  of  Weihaiwei, 
and  the  uninterrupted  success  of  the  Japanese  armies  on  the  Liao 
river,  convinced  China  of  the  hopelessness  of  further  resistance, 
though  she  had  still  large  military  reserves  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
Capital.  An  armistice  was  accordingly  concluded  on  the  30th  March. 


222 


Peace  Terms 

The  Chinese  Government  had  previously  made  informal  overtures 
for  peace  through  a foreign  adviser  in  the  Chinese  Customs  service, 
but  these  had  come  to  nothing  owing  to  Japan’s  insistence  upon 
treating  directly  with  the  responsible  Chinese  authoiities.  The  peace 
negotiations  which  followed  the  armistice  resulted  in  the  signature 
of  the  Treaty  of  Shimonoseki  on  the  17th  April.  In  the  course  of 
these  negotiations  a slight  modification  in  its  demands  was  granted 
by  the  Japanese  Government  as  reparation  for  a fanatical  attack 
made  on  the  Chinese  Plenipotentiary,  Li  Hung  Chang,  who  fortu- 
nately escaped  without  serious  injury. 

The  main  provisions  of  this  Treaty,  some  of  which  were  altered 
by  the  subsequent  intervention  of  Russia,  France  and  Germany,  were 
the  recognition  by  China  of  Korea’s  independence  ; the  cession  to 
Japan  of  the  southern  portion  of  the  province  of  Feng-t’ien,  Formosa 
and  the  Pescadores  ; the  payment  by  China  of  an  indemnity  of 
200,000,000  Kuping  taels — equivalent,  roughly,  at  the  then  rate  of 
exchange,  to  .£40,000,000  ; and  the  opening  to  foreign  trade  of  four 
new  towns  in  China.  These  were  Shasi,  Chungking,  Soochow  and 
Hangchow.  The  Treaty  also  established  the  right  of  foreigners  to 
engage  in  manufacturing  enterprises  in  China,  and  provided  for  the 
subsequent  conclusion  of  a Commercial  Convention,  and  of  arrange- 
ments regarding  frontier  intercourse  and  trade.  And  it  was  agreed 
that  Weihaiwei  should  be  occupied  by  Japan  until  the  indemnity 
had  been  paid.  Under  the  Commercial  Convention,  duly  concluded 
three  months  later,  Japan  secured  for  her  subjects  extra-territorial 
rights  in  China,  but  these  were  withheld  from  Chinese  subjects  in 
Japan.  In  the  following  October  a supplementary  Protocol  of  four 
articles  was  added  to  this  Commercial  Convention. 

It  will  be  seen  that  Japan  in  making  with  China  this  one-sided 
arrangement  regarding  extra-territorial  rights,  which  limited  their 
enjoyment  expressly  to  the  subjects  of  one  of  the  contracting  parties, 
followed  the  example  of  Western  Powers  in  their  early  treaties  with 
Japan,  which  were  still  in  existence,  the  revised  Treaty  with  Great 
Britain  not  coming  into  operation  until  1899.  Apart  from  the 
question  whether  this  caution  on  her  part  was  justified  or  not  by 
the  conditions  of  Chinese  jurisdiction,  it  is  not  easy  to  reconcile  her 
action  in  this  respect  with  her  repeated  protests  against  the  extra- 
territorial stipulations  of  her  own  treaties  with  Western  Powers  and 
with  the  national  agitation  for  their  revision  which  resulted  therefrom. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 


Militarist  Policy — Liaotung  Peninsula — Intervention  of  Three  Powers — 
Leases  of  Chinese  Territory  by  Germany,  Russia,  Great  Britain  and 
France — Spheres  of  Interest. 

THE  origin  of  the  activity  displayed  by  Japan  in  the  reorgan- 
ization of  her  army  and  navy,  the  efficiency  of  which  was 
so  strikingly  demonstrated  in  the  war  with  China,  may  be 
traced  to  the  military  tendencies  of  the  two  clans  which  had  practi- 
cally governed  the  country  since  the  Restoration.  It  was  the  military 
strength  of  these  clans  which  was,  as  we  have  seen,  the  determining 
factor  in  the  struggle  preceding  the  Restoration  ; it  was  this,  again, 
that  carried  the  new  Government  safely  through  the  earlier  internal 
troubles,  and  enabled  it  to  pursue  successfully  in  the  face  of  many 
difficulties  its  policy  of  gradual  reform.  In  the  process  of  sur- 
mounting these  difficulties,  and  even  more,  perhaps,  in  the  very 
work  of  reconstruction,  in  so  far  as  this  related  to  naval  and  military 
reorganization,  it  was  only  natural  that  the  tendencies  in  question 
should  be  developed.  Other  influences  which  worked  in  the  same 
direction  were  the  desire  to  attain  equality  with  Western  Powers, 
to  assert  the  independence  of  the  nation,  still  impaired,  in  public 
opinion,  by  offensive  Treaty  stipulations,  and  the  wish  to  be  in  a 
position  to  act  vigorously  in  matters  concerning  the  nation’s  inter- 
course with  its  neighbours  on  the  continent  of  Asia.  Even,  therefore, 
before  the  war  with  China  something  very  near  to  a militarist  spirit 
had  become  apparent  in  administrative  circles.  The  signal  success 
achieved  by  both  army  and  navy  in  the  course  of  the  campaign 
favoured  the  growth  of  this  feeling.  It  became  clear  to  all  attentive 
observers  that  henceforth  the  existence  of  a militarist  party  in  the 
country  was  a factor  to  be  reckoned  with  in  any  estimate  of  the 
future  course  of  Japanese  policy.  The  leading  exponents  of  this 
militarist  policy  were,  of  course,  to  be  found  amongst  naval  and 

223 


224  Militarist  Policy 

military  officers,  but  their  views  were  shared  by  the  Japanese  states- 
men who  had  taken  a prominent  part  in  military  reforms ; by  others, 
whose  declarations  on  foreign  policy  from  time  to  time  were  tinged 
with  a Chauvinism  that  deepened  with  the  increase  of  Japan’s 
position  in  the  world ; and  by  a section  of  the  Japanese  Press. 

During  the  Shimonoseki  negotiations  the  influence  of  the  military 
party,  fresh  from  its  success  in  the  war,  had  been  exerted  to  secure 
an  even  larger  cession  of  territory  on  the  mainland  than  that  eventu- 
ally agreed  upon.  The  discussions  which  took  place  on  this  point 
between  the  military  leaders  and  the  Japanese  plenipotentiary,  the 
late  Prince  Ito,  whose  enemies  could  never  accuse  him  of  any  leaning 
towards  Chauvinism,  resembled  those  which  took  place  between 
Bismarck  and  von  Moltke  at  the  close  of  the  Franco-German  war  of 
1870.  In  this  instance  Prince  Ito’s  more  moderate  views  prevailed, 
with  the  result  recorded  in  the  Treaty. 

Had  the  Japanese  Government  been  gifted  with  a prescience 
enabling  it  to  anticipate  the  series  of  aggressive  acts  on  the  part  of 
European  Powers  for  which  its  attempt  to  annex  territory  on  the 
Chinese  mainland  gave  the  signal,  the  attempt  might,  possibly,  never 
have  been  made.  Had  it  even  foreseen  the  determined  opposition 
of  certain  European  Powers  to  the  cession  of  even  this  extent  of 
Chinese  territory  on  the  mainland,  it  is  probable  that  its  demands 
would  have  undergone  still  further  modification.  The  ambition  of 
the  German  Emperor  to  play  a more  active  part  in  foreign  questions, 
and  to  secure  for  Germany  an  influence  abroad  commensurate,  as  it 
seemed  to  him,  with  its  dignity  as  an  Empire,  not  to  mention  the 
steps  he  was  taking  about  this  time  to  give  effect  to  his  intentions 
by  commencing  the  construction  of  what  was  soon  to  become  a 
powerful  navy,  had  not  escaped  the  attention  of  Japanese  Ministers. 
Nor  had  his  warning  in  regard  to  what  he  described  as  the  Yellow 
Peril  passed  unnoticed.  Of  the  general  trend  of  European  diplomacy 
they  were  not  ignorant,  but  of  its  special  bearing  on  Far  Eastern 
matters  they  were,  apparently,  not  fully  aware,  in  spite  of  the  indica- 
tion of  Russia’s  interest  in  Manchuria  furnished  by  her  Circular  Note 
to  the  Great  Powers  in  February,  1895,  and  the  warning  of  impending 
trouble  said  to  have  been  given  by  Germany  to  Japan  in  the  following 
month  before  the  armistice  was  concluded.  The  possible  extension 
to  the  Far  East  of  the  mischievous  activity  of  the  Kaiser,  the  designs 
of  Russia,  and  the  results  which  might  be  expected  to  follow  the 


Liaotung  Peninsula  225 

conclusion  of  the  recent  Entente  between  that  Power  and  France, 
were  points  that  seem  to  have  been  insufficiently  realized. 

The  Treaty  of  Shimonoscki  was  signed,  as  we  have  seen,  on  the 
17th  April.  Eight  days  later  the  Russian  and  French  Ministers  in 
Tokio  presented  to  the  Japanese  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  (the 
late  Count  Mutsu)  identical  Notes  advising  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment “ to  renounce  the  definite  possession  of  the  Liaotung  penin- 
sula,” on  the  ground  that  “ its  possession  by  Japan  would  be  a menace 
to  Peking,  and  render  illusory  the  independence  of  Korea.”  On  the 
same  day  a similar  Note  was  presented  by  the  German  Minister. 
For  the  sudden  intervention  of  these  three  Powers  the  Japanese 
Government  was  unprepared.  The  quickness  with  which  it  followed 
the  signature  of  the  Treaty,  no  less  than  the  form  of  procedure 
adopted,  left  no  doubt  as  to  the  serious  intentions  of  the  Powers 
concerned  ; while  the  association  of  Germany  in  the  matter  lent  an 
ominous  weight  to  the  protest.  Convinced  that  this  was  no  idle 
threat,  and  realizing  the  futility  of  opposing  a demand  made  by  the 
three  chief  military  Powers  of  Europe,  the  Japanese  Government  at 
once  gave  way,  and  consented  to  relinquish  this  portion  of  Chinese 
territory  in  return  for  an  additional  indemnity  of  30,000,000  Kuping 
taels,  equivalent  to  about  ^6,000,000.  A Convention  to  this  effect 
was  signed  at  Peking  on  November  8th,  1895.  It  provided  for  the 
payment  of  the  additional  indemnity  by  the  25th  of  that  month, 
and  for  the  evacuation  of  the  Liaotung  peninsula  to  be  completed 
within  three  months  from  that  date. 

The  mention  of  “ the  Liaotung  peninsula  ” in  the  protest  of  the 
three  Powers  L the  first  we  hear  of  the  term.  It  was  not  used  by 
the  Chinese,  nor  did  it  occur  in  the  Shimonoseki  Treaty.  There  the 
ceded  territory  is  called  “ the  southern  portion  of  the  province  of 
Feng-t’ien  ” (otherwise  known  as  Shengking,  and  Moukden,  though 
the  latter  is  really  the  name  of  the  provincial  Capital),  the  Treaty 
frontier  (never  delimited)  running  roughly  from  Yingkow  on  the 
river  Liao  to  the  Yalu  river,  and  to  the  north  of  the  towns  of  Feng- 
hwangcheng  and  Haicheng.  But  the  Chinese  used  the  term  Liaotung, 
which  means  “ East  of  the  river  Liao,”  in  a vague  way  to  signify  the 
territory  which  lies  to  the  left  of  that  river  ; and  foreign  geographers, 
in  ignorance  of  the  meaning  of  the  term,  had  applied  it  to  the  bay 
into  which  the  river  flows,  which  appears  in  atlases  as  the  “ Liaotung 
Gulf.”  When  the  intervention  took  place,  it  was  probably  found 

p 


2 2 6 Intervention  of  Three  Powers 

convenient  to  make  use  in  the  Notes  of  protest  of  a term  already 
given  in  foreign  atlases  to  the  bay  that  forms  the  western  boundary 
of  the  territory  in  question.  Hence  the  adoption  of  the  term  “ the 
Liaotung  peninsula,”  which  was  an  error  in  geographical  nomen- 
clature. Once  adopted,  or,  as  may  be  said,  invented,  the  convenience 
of  the  term  led  to  its  employment  again  when  the  Russo-Chinese 
Agreement  for  the  lease  of  Port  Arthur  was  made  in  1898,  though 
the  territory  then  leased  was  limited  to  what  is  now  known  as  the 
peninsula  of  Kwantung.  It  reappears  in  the  additional  Russo- 
Chinese  Agreement  of  the  same  year.  From  that  time  the  term 
seems  to  have  passed  into  general  use,  for  we  find  it  in  the  Portsmouth 
Treaty  of  1905. 

The  intervention  of  the  three  Powers  had  far-reaching  conse- 
quences, none  of  which,  in  all  probability,  were  foreseen  at  the  time 
by  any  of  the  Governments  concerned,  though  each  may  have  felt 
that  it  had  established  a claim  to  the  goodwill  of  China.  Four 
months  after  Japan  had  agreed  to  the  retrocession  of  the  territory 
ceded  to  her  by  the  Shimonoseki  Treaty  Russia,  who  had  been  the 
prime  mover  in  the  matter,  proceeded  to  lay  China  under  further 
obligations  by  rendering  her  financial  assistance  which  facilitated  the 
liberation  of  her  territory.  This  took  the  form  of  a Chinese  loan  of 
£15,000,000,  floated  in  Paris  under  Russia’s  guarantee. 

In  January,  1896,  one  of  the  consequences  above-mentioned  was 
seen  in  the  settlement  of  various  questions  which  the  French  Govern- 
ment had  been  pressing  on  the  attention  of  the  Government  of  China 
for  some  time.  These  questions  related  to  the  rectification  of  the 
Tonkin  frontier,  and  to  railway  and  mining  concessions  in  the 
provinces  of  Yunnan,  Kwangsi  and  Kwantung.  This  was  only  an 
instalment  of  the  recompense  for  her  services  which  France  was  to 
obtain.  The  arrangement  with  France  regarding  the  Tonkin  frontier 
constituted  a breach  of  the  Burma  Convention  of  1886,  and  of  a later 
Convention  of  1894,  regulating  the  boundaiies  separating  British 
and  Chinese  territories,  which  provided,  inter  alia,  that  no  portion 
of  two  small  States  assigned  to  China  should  be  alienated  to  any 
other  Power  without  previous  agreement  with  Great  Britain.  The 
dispute  which  arose  over  this  question  was  eventually  settled — as 
between  Great  Britain  and  France — by  the  joint  Declaration  of 
January  15th,  1896,  fixing  the  boundary  between  the  possessions,  or 
spheres  of  influence,  of  the  two  Powers  as  far  as  the  Chinese  frontier. 


Leases  of  Chinese  Territory  227 

and  arranging  for  all  privileges  conceded  by  China  in  the  provinces 
of  Yunnan  and  Szechwan  to  the  two  Powers,  respectively,  under 
their  Agreements  with  China  of  1894  and  1895  to  be  made  common 
to  both  Powers  and  their  nationals  ; and — as  between  Great  Britain 
and  China — by  an  Agreement  signed  on  February  4th,  1897,  modify- 
ing the  previous  boundary  in  favour  of  Great  Britain,  and  opening 
the  West  river,  which  flows  into  the  sea  at  Canton,  to  foreign  trade. 

Russia  was  the  next  to  profit.  She  had  already  decided  in  1892 
to  construct  what  is  now  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway  with  the  object 
of  linking  up  the  eastern  and  western  extremities  of  the  Empire, 
and  thus  aiding  the  development  of  Siberia,  as  well  as  strengthening 
her  position  on  the  Pacific  coast.  The  line,  as  then  projected,  was 
to  run  from  Chiliabinsk  in  the  Ural  Mountains  to  the  south-western 
shore  of  Lake  Baikal,  and  from  the  south-eastern  shore  of  the  lake 
to  Vladivostok,  following  for  some  distance  the  course  of  the  Amur 
river ; communication  across  the  lake  to  be  maintained  by  vessels 
specially  constructed  for  the  purpose.  Work  was  commenced  at  both 
ends  of  the  railway,  and  when  the  Shimonoseki  Treaty  was  signed 
the  line  had  been  finished  as  far  east  as  Chita,  a town  south-east  of 
Lake  Baikal,  and  within  two  hundred  miles  of  the  Chinese  frontier. 

The  war  between  China  and  Japan  had  served  a useful  purpose 
for  Russia  in  revealing  both  the  weakness  of  China  and  the  strength 
and  ambitions  of  Japan.  To  check  these  ambitions  in  the  direction 
of  Manchuria,  and  forestall  Japan  by  establishing  herself  in  the 
coveted  territory,  was  the  task  to  which  she  now  directed  her  energies. 
In  the  preliminary  step  by  which  the  retrocession  of  the  Liaotung 
peninsula  was  effected  she  was,  as  we  have  seen,  aided  by  both 
France  and  Germany.  Between  the  latter  and  herself  some  sort  of 
roughly  formulated  understanding  seems  to  have  been  arrived  at, 
described  by  Reventlow  in  his  Deutschland’s  Auswartige  Politik  as  a 
secret  agreement  between  the  Kaiser  and  the  Tsar,  the  results  of 
which  were  to  be  seen  later.  With  France  she  worked  throughout 
in  the  closest  accord  in  the  development  of  the  new  line  of  policy 
she  had  marked  out  for  herself  in  the  Far  East,  to  which  Belgian 
financiers  also  lent  their  co-operation.  In  return  for  Russia’s  support 
in  European  affairs,  as  arranged  by  the  Entente  concluded  between 
the  two  countries,  France,  for  her  part,  was  only  too  willing  to 
encourage  Russian  aims  in  the  Far  East ; and  she  was  the  more  ready 
to  do  so,  since  this  course  assured  her  of  reciprocal  help  in  the 


228  Leases  of  Chinese  Territory 

prosecution  of  her  own  interests  in  China.  Russia  had  been  the 
connecting  link  between  the  three  Powers  whose  intervention  had 
restored  the  Liaotung  peninsula  to  China.  It  was  the  relations  she 
continued  to  maintain  with  her  two  associates  after  that  incident — 
in  the  one  case  an  informal  understanding,  in  the  other  definite 
concerted  action — which  shaped  the  course  of  subsequent  events  in 
the  Far  East. 

In  Ma  Mission  en  Chine,  M.  Gerard,  who  was  French  Minister  in 
Peking  during  the  period  1893-7,  gives  an  account  of  the  secret 
negotiations  with  China  by  means  of  which  Russia  succeeded  in 
forestalling  Japan  in  Manchuria.  His  book  supplies  the  key  to  a 
correct  understanding  of  the  course  of  events,  and  throws  much  light 
on  the  political  situation  at  the  time  of  which  he  speaks.  We  learn 
how  close  was  the  accord  then  maintained  between  France  and 
Russia  ; how  skilfully  Russia  made  use  of  the  complaisant  attitude 
of  her  two  associates ; and  with  what  unscrupulous  determination 
to  compass  her  ends  she  traded  on  the  weakness  of  China,  on  the 
claims  she  had  established  on  the  latter’s  goodwill,  and  on  the  vanity 
and  corruption  of  Chinese  officials. 

In  May,  1896,  according  to  M.  Gerard,  a secret  Treaty  was  signed 
at  St.  Petersburg  by  Prince  Lobanoff,  then  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  Li  Hung  Chang,  Viceroy  of  Chihli,  who  had  been  sent 
to  Russia  as  China’s  representative  at  the  Coronation  of  the  late 
Tsar  Nicholas  II.  The  full  text  of  this  Treaty  has  never  been  pub- 
lished, but  it  promised  to  China  Russian  protection  against  Japan  ; 
China,  in  return  for  this  guarantee  of  assistance,  granting  to  Russia 
the  privilege  of  using,  in  time  of  war,  the  harbours  of  Ta-lien  Wan, 
in  the  Kwantung  peninsula,  and  Kiaochow,  in  the  province  of  Shan- 
tung, as  bases  for  her  fleet.  Three  months  later  (August  27th)  a 
secret  Railway  Agreement  was  signed  at  St.  Petersburg  by  Li  Hung 
Chang  and  the  representatives  of  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank.  This 
institution,  half  the  capital  of  which  was  French,  had  been  created 
at  the  end  of  the  previous  year.  M.  Gerard  explains  that,  in  conse- 
quence of  so  large  a portion  of  the  bank’s  capital  being  furnished 
by  a French  syndicate,  the  French  Government  insisted  on  receiving 
definite  information  regarding  the  negotiations  in  question.  His 
statements  regarding  the  French  financial  interest  in  the  Russo- 
Chinese  Bank  are  confirmed  by  other  writers  : by  Cheradame, 
in  his  interesting  book,  Le  Monde  et  La  Guerre  Russo-Japonaise, 


Leases  of  Chinese  Territory  229 

and  by  Debidour  in  Histoire  Diplomatique  de  V Europe.  We  learn  also 
from  M.  Gerard  that  the  Chinese  Government  had  contributed, 
under  the  title  of  a deposit,  5,000,000  taels  to  the  capital  of  the 
bank,  explaining  at  the  time,  in  answer  to  enquiries,  that  this  sum 
represented  China’s  share  of  the  cost  of  construction  of  the  Chinese 
Eastern  Railway  ; that  for  the  building  of  this  line  a company  called 
the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  Company  was  formed,  which,  although 
Rus'so-Chinese  in  name,  was  a purely  Russian  concern  ; and  that  it 
was  agreed  that  on  the  completion  of  the  line  in  question  the  sum 
“ deposited  ” by  China  should  be  returned  to  her.  He  adds  that  the 
President  of  the  bank  was  Prince  Ouchtomsky,  who  afterwards  visited 
Peking  at  the  head  of  a Russian  Mission. 

Both  the  Treaty  and  the  Railway  Agreement  were  ratified  by  the 
Chinese  Government  on  the  18th  September,  and  came  into  force 
on  that  date.  The  popular  rumour  which  credited  the  Russian 
Minister  in  Peking  with  the  negotiation  of  these  two  instruments 
was,  it  appears,  due  to  the  presence  of  M.  Cassini  at  the  Chinese 
Capital,  where  it  was  considered  necessary  for  him  to  remain  in  order 
to  secure  their  ratification  by  China.  As  a glance  at  a map  of  North- 
Eastern  Asia  will  show,  the  Railway  Agreement  constituted  a con- 
cession of  the  greatest  importance  to  Russia.  The  Chinese  Eastern 
Railway,  the  name  of  the  new  line  which  Russia  obtained  leave  to 
construct,  became  the  eastern  section  of  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway, 
connecting  Lake  Baikal  with  Vladivostok,  Russia’s  outlet  to  the 
Pacific.  The  new  line,  which  would  traverse  Northern  Manchuria 
via  Kharbin,  Tsitsihar  and  Hailar,  would  shorten  the  distance  by 
more  than  300  miles.  Moreover,  the  more  level  country  through 
which  the  line  was  to  pass  presented  few  engineering  difficulties,  as 
compared  with  the  Amur  route,  a fact  which  would  greatly  diminish 
the  period  and  the  cost  of  construction.  The  Agreement  was  subse- 
quently rendered  complete  in  every  detail  by  the  elaboration  of  what 
were  termed  the  Statutes  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway.  These 
were  confirmed  by  the  Tsar  on  the  4th  December  in  the  same  year. 
Although  these  Statutes  (given  in  Rockhill’s  Treaties  and  Conventions) 
provided  that  the  President  of  this  railway  company  should  be 
Chinese,  the  stipulation  was  purely  nominal.  The  Chinese  Eastern 
Railway,  like  the  Russo- Chinese  Bank,  was  an  exclusively  Russian 
undertaking,  the  raising  of  the  capital  required,  as  well  as  the  con- 
struction of  the  line,  being  entirely  in  Russian  hands. 


230  Leases  of  Chinese  Territory 

Meanwhile  the  Kaiser,  who  personally  directed  the  foreign  policy 
of  Germany,  was  forming  plans  for  claiming  his  share  of  reward  for 
the  triple  intervention,  and  he  had,  it  appears,  already  approached 
the  Peking  Government  on  this  subject,  though  without  any  success. 
What,  assuming  its  existence,  was  the  nature  of  the  understanding 
arrived  at  between  the  Courts  of  St.  Petersburg  and  Berlin  in  regard 
to  Far  Eastern  affairs  will  probably  remain  for  ever  a State  secret. 
In  any  case,  however,  it  is  clear,  from  his  own  repeated  declarations 
as  to  Germany’s  need  for  “ a place  in  the  sun,”  and  from  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  German  Minister  at  Peking,  that  he  was  bent  on 
obtaining  a foothold  of  some  sort  in  China,  whence  Germany’s 
future  expansion  in  the  Far  East  might  be  conveniently  developed. 
His  opportunity  came  in  1897.  In  the  autumn  of  that  year  twTo 
German  missionaries  were  murdered  in  the  province  of  Shantung. 
A few  weeks  later  a German  force  landed  in  that  province  at  Kiao- 
chow,  one  of  the  two  harbours  the  use  of  which  in  time  of  war 
Russia  had  acquired  eighteen  months  before  under  her  secret  Treaty 
with  China.  M.  Gerard  in  his  book  above  mentioned  states  that  the 
German  Emperor  had  before  the  departure  of  the  German  ships 
on  this  errand  informed  the  Tsar  by  telegraph  of  his  intentions,  and, 
receiving  no  reply  objecting  to  the  proposed  step,  took  the  Tsar’s 
silence  for  consent.  Germany’s  occupation  of  this  strategic  position, 
which  had  the  further  advantage  of  being  in  a region  of  the  Chinese 
mainland  sufficiently  distant  from  points  where  other  foreign 
interests  were  centred  to  obviate  objections  on  the  part  of  other 
Powers,  and,  at  the  same  time,  ensure  an  ample  and  undisturbed 
field  for  German  enterprise,  was  confirmed  by  a Treaty  concluded 
with  China  on  March  6th,  1898.  By  this  Treaty  China  granted  to 
Germany  a lease  for  ninety-nine  years  of  the  port  of  Kiaochow  and 
a considerable  stretch  of  “ hinterland.”  Germany  also  acquired 
under  it  certain  rights  of  railway  construction  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  the  port. 

The  author  of  Japan  : The  Rise  of  a Modern  Power,  tells  us,  on 
the  authority  of  a statement  said  to  have  been  made  by  Prince  Henry 
of  Hohenzollern,  that  the  Kaiser’s  next  step  was  to  invite  the  Tsar 
to  take  Port  Arthur  and  Ta-lien  Wan.  Whatever  truth  there  may 
be  in  the  statement  attributed  to  Prince  Henry — M.  Gerard  thinks 
the  suggestion  may  have  been  made  in  the  telegram  announcing  his 
own  intentions — the  fact  remains  that  Germany’s  abrupt  action 


Leases  of  Chinese  Territory  231 

resulted  in  an  immediate  scramble  on  the  part  of  several  European 
Powers  for  various  portions  of  Chinese  territory.  Russia  led  the 
way  in  these  undignified  proceedings,  for  which  a harsher  word  might 
with  justice  be  substituted.  Two  months  after  the  occupation  of 
Kiaochow  by  Germany,  Russian  men-of-war  anchored  in  Port 
Arthur.  Thither  they  were  followed  by  British  cruisers,  and  for  a 
moment  it  looked  as  if  history  would  repeat  itself,  and  that  Russia 
might  have  to  reckon  with  British  interference  in  her  designs. 
Other  counsels,  however,  prevailed.  The  British  ships  were  with- 
drawn, and  on  March  27th,  three  weeks  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
Kiaochow  Agreement,  a similar  Treaty  was  signed  at  Peking  by 
Li  Hung  Chang  and  the  Russian  Charge  d’Affaires.  This  Treaty, 
the  text  of  which  was  not  published  by  the  Russian  Government, 
provided  for  the  lease  to  Russia  of  Port  Arthur,  Ta-lien  Wan  and 
adjacent  waters  for  a period  of  twenty-five  years,  renewable  by 
arrangement  at  the  expiration  of  the  term.  It  was  further  agreed 
that  the  right  to  construct  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  across 
Northern  Manchuria,  secured  by  Russia  under  the  secret  Railway 
Agreement  of  August  27th,  1896,  should  be  extended  so  as  to  include 
the  construction  of  branch  lines  from  a point  on  that  railway  to 
Ta-lien  Wan  and  other  places  in  the  Liaotung  peninsula.  The 
Treaty  also  provided  for  a subsequent  definition  of  the  boundaries 
of  the  leased  area  and — a point  of  some  importance  in  the  light  of 
after  events — of  a neutral  strip  of  territory  separating  the  Chinese 
and  Russian  spheres.  Port  Arthur,  moreover,  was  declared  to  be  a 
naval  port,  and  as  such  closed  to  all  vessels  save  those  of  the  two 
contracting  parties.  Subsequently,  on  May  7th,  a supplementary 
Agreement,  signed  at  St.  Petersburg,  defined  the  boundaries  of  the 
leased  area,  and  arranged  for  their  delimitation. 

It  was  not  long  before  France,  whose  services  to  China  at  the 
time  of  the  triple  intervention  had,  as  we  have  seen,  already  met 
with  recognition  in  the  shape  of  the  prompt  settlement  of  various 
outstanding  questions,  obtained,  in  her  turn,  a territorial  concession 
of  the  same  nature — though,  perhaps,  not  so  important — as  those 
granted  to  Germany  and  Russia.  By  a Convention  signed  at  Peking 
on  May  27th,  1898,  China  granted  to  her  a ninety-nine  years’  lease 
for  the  purpose  of  a naval  station  and  coaling  depot  of  the  Bay  of 
Kwang-chow  and  adjacent  territory  in  the  peninsula  of  Leichow, 
together  with  the  right  to  construct  a railway  connecting  the  bay 


232  Spheres  of  Interest 

with  the  peninsula.  The  area  of  this  concession  was  in  the  province 
of  Kwangsi,  which  adjoins  the  French  territory  of  Tonkin. 

Unlike  the  three  Powers  associated  in  the  triple  intervention, 
whose  subsequent  action  justifies  the  supposition  that  they  regarded 
themselves  as  brokers  entitled  to  a commission  for  services  rendered, 
Great  Britain  had  no  special  claim  on  the  goodwill  of  China.  Never- 
theless, she  joined  in  the  scramble  for  Chinese  territory.  A Con- 
vention, signed  at  Peking  on  June  9th,  1898,  gave  her  an  extension 
of  territory  at  Hongkong  under  lease  for  a period  of  ninety-nine 
years,  the  reason  assigned  for  the  concession  being  that  this  extension 
was  necessary  for  the  proper  protection  and  defence  of  that  colony. 
Three  weeks  later  (July  1st),  by  another  Convention,  signed  also  at 
Peking,  it  was  agreed  that  the  Chinese  Government,  “ in  order  to 
provide  Great  Britain  with  a suitable  naval  harbour  and  for  the 
protection  of  British  commerce  in  the  neighbouring  seas,”  should 
lease  to  her  Weihaiwei  and  the  adjacent  waters  “ for  so  long  a period 
as  Port  Arthur  shall  remain  in  the  occupation  of  Russia.”  The  area 
thus  leased  comprised  the  island  of  Liu-kung,  and  all  other  islands 
in  the  bay  of  Weihaiwei. 

In  defence  of  Great  Britain’s  action  it  may  fairly  be  pleaded  that 
her  interests  in  China,  and  in  the  Far  East  generally,  which  were 
more  extensive  than  those  of  any  other  Power,  with  the  possible 
exception  of  Japan,  made  it  necessary  for  her  Government  to  take 
prompt  measures  to  counteract  the  effect  of  any  proceedings  on  the 
part  of  other  Powers  which  might  be  prejudicial  to  those  interests. 
The  political  situation  created  in  the  Far  East  by  the  actions  of  the 
three  Powers  associated  in  the  triple  intervention  was  the  reverse 
of  reassuring.  Russia’s  occupation  of  Port  Arthur  was  in  direct 
contradiction  to  the  grounds  of  the  joint  protest  against  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  Liaotung  peninsula  by  Japan.  Neither  with  France  nor 
with  Russia  at  that  time  were  our  relations  what  they  afterwards 
became.  Between  British  and  Russian  policy  there  was  a scarcely 
veiled  antagonism,  while  the  French  and  ourselves  had  long  been 
rivals  in  China,  as  elsewhere.  The  concerted  action  of  these  two 
Powers,  not  to  speak  of  their  support  by  a third,  whose  exact  relation 
to  her  associates  was  dubious,  was  thus  calculated  to  give  rise  to 
apprehensions  which  would  doubtless  have  been  increased  had 
British  Ministers  then  known  all  that  has  since  come  to  light.  Addi- 
tional gravity  was  given  to  Germany’s  sudden  appearance  on  the 


Spheres  of  Interest  233 

scene  in  a new  role  by,  to  use  M.  Gerard’s  words,  her  “ occupation 
by  force  and  at  a moment  of  complete  peace  of  a port  belonging 
to  the  Empire  the  integrity  of  whose  territory  she  claimed  to  have 
safeguarded  against  Japan.”  Under  these  circumstances  the  British 
Government  may  well  have  felt  that  it  was  justified  in  regarding 
these  proceedings  as  fraught  with  possibilities  of  injury  to  British 
interests  and  prestige,  and  in  adopting  what  in  the  light  of  these 
occurrences  might  reasonably  be  held  to  assume  the  character  of 
precautionary  measures.  Such,  beyond  a doubt,  was  the  general 
interpretation  given  by  impartial  observers  to  Great  Britain’s  action 
in  arranging  for  her  occupation  of  Weihaiwei.  It  was,  as  the  terms 
of  the  Agreement  clearly  indicated,  a direct  counter-move  to  Russia’s 
occupation  of  Port  Arthur.  As  such  it  was  welcomed  by  Japan,  who, 
when  the  time  for  the  evacuation  of  Weihaiwei  arrived,  willingly 
handed  it  over  to  the  Power  who  was  shortly  to  become  her  ally. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 


American  Protest  against  Foreign  Aggression  in  China — Principle  of  “ Open 
Door  and  Equal  Opportunity  ” — Financial  Reform — Operation  of  Re- 
vised Treaties — The  Boxer  Outbreak — Russia  and  Manchuria. 

IN  addition  to  the  various  Agreements  for  the  occupation  of 
Chinese  territory  mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter,  nego- 
tiations were  conducted  with  the  Chinese  Government  about 
the  same  time  by  the  European  Powers  concerned,  and  also  by 
Japan,  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  Declarations  regarding  the  non- 
alienation by  China  of  certain  territories  which  were  regarded  by 
them  as  coming,  respectively,  within  their  special  spheres  of  interest. 
As  a result  of  these  negotiations  the  French  Minister  at  Peking 
received  in  March,  1897,  a verbal  assurance,  confirmed  later  in 
writing,  that  the  Chinese  Government  would  “ in  no  case,  nor  under 
any  form,  alienate  to  another  Power  the  island  of  Hainan  off  the 
coast  of  the  province  of  Kwantung.”  In  February,  1898,  a similar 
Declaration  concerning  the  riverain  provinces  of  the  Yangtse  was 
made  to  Great  Britain.  In  the  following  April  the  assurance  pre- 
viously given  to  France  was  extended  so  as  to  include  the  three 
southern  provinces  of  Yunnan,  Kwangsi  and  Kwantung  bordering 
on  Tonkin  ; while  Japan  in  the  same  month  received  an  assurance 
of  a corresponding  nature  regarding  the  province  of  Fukien,  the 
Chinese  Government  signifying  its  intention  “ never  to  cede  or  lease 
it  to  any  Power  whatsoever.”  In  thus  obtaining  from  China  a 
Declaration  of  non-alienation  respecting  the  province  of  Fukien, 
similar  to  those  given  to  Great  Britain  and  France  regarding  other 
portions  of  Chinese  territory,  Japan  established  her  claim  to  rank 
as  one  of  the  leading  Powers  in  the  Far  East,  a position  which,  as 
will  be  seen,  received  further  recognition  in  the  following  year.  Her 
success  in  this  respect — 'due  to  her  victory  in  the  war  with  China, 
and  to  the  alteration  in  her  status  as  a nation  which  resulted  from 
the  conclusion  of  revised  treaties  with  several  foreign  Powers — was 


234 


Foreign  Aggression  in  China  235 

rendered  the  more  noticeable  by  the  failure  of  Italy,  after  prolonged 
negotiations,  to  gain  China’s  consent  to  a territorial  concession 
similar  to  those  granted  to  other  European  Powers. 

The  years  1898  and  1899  witnessed  the  negotiation  by  European 
Powers  with  each  other  of  two  other  arrangements  relating  to  China 
of  a somewhat  different  character.  One  of  these  was  the  Declaration 
made  by  Great  Britain  to  Germany  on  April  19th,  1898,  binding 
herself  not  to  construct  any  railway  connecting  VVeihaiwei,  and  the 
adjoining  leased  territory,  with  the  interior  of  the  province  of 
Shantung.  The  other  was  the  Agreement,  effected  through  an 
exchange  of  Notes  at  St.  Petersburg  on  April  28th,  1899,  by  which 
the  British  and  Russian  Governments  recorded  their  intention  to 
regard,  for  the  purpose  of  railway  concessions,  the  basin  of  the 
Yangtse  and  the  region  north  of  the  Great  Wall  as  the  special  spheres 
of  interest  of  the  two  Powers,  respectively,  confirming,  at  the  same 
time,  the  understanding  arrived  at  between  them  in  regard  to  the 
railway  between  Shanhaikwan  and  Newchwang. 

The  outbreak  of  war  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  in  the 
spring  of  1898  led  to  the  introduction  of  a new  factor  into  the 
situation  created  in  the  Far  East  by  the  events  above  described. 
One  of  the  results  of  the  war  was  the  cession  of  the  Philippine  Islands 
to  America,  who  had  already,  by  annexing  Hawaii,  secured  a stepping- 
stone  across  the  Pacific.  By  the  acquisition  of  these  former  Spanish 
possessions,  which  provided  her  with  a naval  base  in  the  Eastern 
Pacific  for  the  protection  of  her  commerce  in  Far  Eastern  waters, 
America’s  attitude  towards  Far  Eastern  questions  was  at  once 
affected.  Hitherto  in  her  relations  with  the  Far  East — with  China, 
Japan  and  Korea — she  had  maintained  a detached  attitude  in  keeping 
with  her  traditional  policy  of  non-interference  in  foreign  questions. 
In  China,  where  she  came  late  into  the  field,  she  had  been  content 
to  follow,  at  a distance,  in  the  wake  of  other  Powers  ; sharing  in 
whatever  commercial  or  extra-territorial  privileges  might  be  obtained, 
but  never  breaking  the  ice  for  herself,  nor — to  her  credit,  be  it  said — 
betraying  any  aggressive  tendencies.  As  the  pioneer  of  Western 
nations  in  putting  an  end  to  the  seclusion  of  Japan  and  Korea,  she 
had  opportunities  for  exercising  a powerful  influence,  of  which  her 
traditional  policy  forbade  her  to  make  full  use.  Regarding  both 
countries  somewhat  in  the  light  of  proteges,  her  policy  in  respect  to 
each  soon  settled  down  into  one  of  benevolent  inaction,  varied  only 


236  Foreign  Aggression  in  China 

by  occasional  half-hearted  opposition  to  the  less  complaisant  policy 
of  other  Governments,  whenever  the  duty  of  a patron,  so  to  speak, 
seemed  to  call  for  her  interposition.  We  have  seen  how  she  was 
thus  led  on  two  occasions  in  the  matter  of  Treaty  revision  into  a 
premature  encouragement  of  Japanese  ambitions,  which  was  the 
cause  of  embarrassment  both  to  herself,  and  to  the  nation  whose 
wishes  she  was  willing  to  further.  The  course  thus  pursued  by 
America,  which  precluded  concerted  action  with  other  Powers,  was 
in  some  respects  simply  an  extension  to  the  Far  East  of  the  policy 
she  had  previously  adopted  in  regard  to  European  questions.  Well 
as  the  traditional  principle  of  holding  aloof  from  affairs  outside  of 
the  American  continent,  through  fear  of  political  entanglements, 
may  have  suited  the  conditions  of  her  earlier  existence  as  a nation, 
a too  rigid  adherence  to  this  principle,  when  those  conditions  were 
fast  disappearing,  might  lead  to  consequences  more  unpleasant  than 
those  she  sought  to  avoid.  An  attitude  of  detachment  carried  too 
far  might  result  in  her  exclusion  from  a voice  in  the  regulation  of 
matters  of  international  interest.  Towards  some  such  position 
America  appeared  to  be  drifting,  when,  to  borrow  the  phrase  used 
by  Mr.  Hornbeck  in  Contemporary  Politics  oj  the  Far  East , she 
suddenly  “ stumbled  into  World  Politics  ” through  her  occupation 
of  the  Philippines.  From  that  moment  her  political  isolation  was 
ended.  She  began  to  take  a more  active  and  intelligent  interest  in 
Far  Eastern  questions,  though  the  reluctance  to  abandon  her  tra- 
ditional policy,  which  was  still  noticeable  in  her  action  when  she  did 
move,  was  liable  to  be  mistaken  for  timidity. 

The  territorial  concessions  obtained,  one  after  the  other,  by 
Germany,  Russia,  France  and  Great  Britain,  and  the  ear-marking  of 
other  Chinese  territory  by  arrangements  made  either  by  the  Powers 
concerned,  as  well  as  by  Japan,  with  China,  or  by  certain  of  those 
European  Powers  between  themselves,  caused  uneasiness  in  Wash- 
ington. There  was  a fear  lest  the  new  activity  displayed  by  various 
Governments  might  result  in  the  closure,  or  restriction,  of  Chinese 
markets  hitherto  open  to  all  countries,  in  which  case  serious  injury 
might  accrue  to  American  commerce  and  enterprise.  The  appre- 
hension was  not  unfounded,  even  so  far  as  the  Declarations  regarding 
the  non-alienation  of  Chinese  territory  were  concerned.  Although 
the  actual  wording  of  these  Declarations  did  not  of  itself  justify  an 
inference  of  this  nature,  from  the  fact  that  they  were  made  at  all 


Principle  of  “ Open  Door”  237 

it  was  generally  held  that  their  effect  was  to  establish,  in  each  in- 
stance, a sort  of  priority  of  right — a position  of  exceptional  advantage 
in  favour  of  the  Power  to  whom  the  Declaration  was  made.  The 
inference  derived  support  from  the  vagueness  of  the  term  “ spheres 
of  interest  ” applied  to  the  regions  affected  by  the  Declarations  in 
question,  and  was  also  strengthened  by  the  common  impression 
formed  at  the  time  that  this  ear-marking  of  Chinese  territory  por- 
tended an  eventual  partition  of  China.  This  seems  to  have  been  the 
view  taken  by  the  United  States  Government. 

In  September,  1899,  the  American  Secretary  of  State  addressed 
Circular  Notes  to  the  British,  French,  German  and  Russian  Govern- 
ments, expressing  the  hope  that  they  would  “ make  a formal  declara- 
tion of  an  * open  door  ’ policy  in  the  territories  held  by  them  in 
China.”  An  assurance  was  sought  from  each  Power  : that  it  would 
“ in  no  way  interfere  with  any  treaty  port  or  any  vested  interest 
within  any  so-called  sphere  of  interest,  or  leased  territory,  it  might 
have  in  China  ” ; “ that  the  Chinese  Treaty  tariff  of  the  time  being 
should  apply  to  all  merchandise  landed  or  shipped  to  all  such  ports 
as  are  within  the  said  ‘ sphere  of  interest  * ” . . . and  “ that  duties 
so  leviable  should  be  collected  by  the  Chinese  Government  ” ; and 
that  it  “ would  levy  no  higher  harbour  dues  on  vessels  of  another 
nationality  frequenting  any  port  in  such  ‘ sphere  ’ than  should  be 
levied  on  vessels  of  its  own  nationality,  and  no  higher  railroad  charges 
over  lines  built,  controlled  or  operated  within  its  ‘ sphere  ’ on  mer- 
chandise belonging  to  citizens  or  subjects  of  other  nationalities 
transported  through  such  ‘ sphere  ’ than  should  be  levied  on  similar 
merchandise  belonging  to  its  own  nationals  transported  over  like 
distances.”  In  the  following  November  similar,  though  not 
identical,  Notes  were  addressed  to  the  Governments  of  France, 
Italy  and  Japan,  asking  them  to  join  in  these  formal  declarations  of 
policy. 

The  reason  for  the  distinction  thus  made  both  in  the  dates  and 
tenor  of  the  two  series  of  communications  may,  perhaps,  be  found 
in  the  fact  that  the  territories  leased  by  the  three  first-named  Powers, 
besides  their  greater  strategic  importance,  were  situated  in  a part  of 
China  where  American  interests  were  more  closely  concerned  than 
in  the  region  further  south  affected  by  French  action,  and  that 
Japan,  though  interested  in  the  Declaration  regarding  Fukien,  had 
neither  sought  nor  obtained  any  cession  of  territory ; while  Italy 


V 

238  Equal  Opportunity 

had  failed  in  her  endeavour  to  emulate  the  example  of  her  nearest 
continental  neighbours. 

The  assurance  received  from  China  by  Japan  regarding  the  non- 
alienation of  the  province  of  Fukien  was,  as  we  have  seen,  in  effect, 
an  admission  of  the  position  of  power  and  influence  she  had  by  this 
time  acquired.  Her  inclusion  in  the  list  of  States  consulted  by 
America  on  this  occasion  was  indirectly  an  endorsement  of  this 
admission,  and  is  the  first  public  recognition  of  her  new  status  as  a 
leading  Power  in  the  Far  East. 

Favourable  replies  were  received  from  all  the  Powers  consulted  ; 
each,  however,  with  the  exception  of  Italy,  making  the  reservation 
that  assent  to  the  proposals  was  subject  to  the  condition  that  all  the 
Powers  interested  should  participate  in  the  Declarations.  There- 
upon, in  March,  1900,  the  American  Secretary  of  State  sent  instruc- 
tions to  the  American  representative  at  each  of  the  capitals  of  the 
Powers  consulted  to  inform  the  Government  to  which  he  was 
accredited  that,  in  his  opinion,  the  six  Powers  in  question  and  the 
United  States  were  mutually  pledged  to  the  policy  of  maintaining 
the  commercial  status  quo  in  China,  and  of  refraining,  each  within 
what  might  be  considered  its  sphere  of  influence,  “ from  measures 
calculated  to  destroy  equality  of  opportunity.” 

The  Notes  thus  exchanged  between  the  United  States  and  the  six 
other  Powers  above  mentioned  explain  the  origin,  as  they  also  con- 
stitute “ the  formal  basis  ” (to  use  Mr.  Hornbeck’s  words)  of  what 
has  ever  since  been  known  as  the  policy  of  the  “ Open  door  and  equal 
opportunity  ” in  China.  The  latter  part  of  the  phrase  was  after- 
wards used  in  the  Anglo- Japanese  Treaty  of  Alliance  to  designate  the 
policy  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan  in  Korea  as  well  as  in  China.  To 
the  former  country,  now  annexed  to  Japan,  it  no  longer  applies ; but 
the  policy  has  theoretically,  if  not  always  practically,  been  in  force 
as  regards  China,  for  the  last  twenty-one  years,  and  there  is  reason 
to  think  that  more  may  yet  be  heard  both  of  the  phrase,  and  of  the 
policy  it  represents,  in  connection  with  affairs  in  China,  and  possibly 
in  other  parts  of  Eastern  Asia. 

In  touching  on  the  subject  of  financial  reform  in  a previous 
chapter  attention  was  called  to  the  monetary  confusion  which  existed 
after  the  abolition  of  the  feudal  system,  when  the  new  Government 
which  had  come  into  power  found  itself  saddled  with  clan  debts 


Financial  Reform  239 

and  with  clan  paper-money,  mostly  depreciated  and  of  many  different 
kinds.  It  was  pointed  out  how,  as  a natural  consequence  of  this 
monetary  confusion  and  of  financial  embarrassments  due  to  other 
causes,  the  monetary  transactions  of  the  country  were  for  many  years 
conducted  on  the  basis  of  an  inconvertible  paper  currency  ; and 
how  by  successive  steps,  taken  as  opportunity  offered,  to  remedy 
this  state  of  things,  specie  resumption  on  a silver  basis  was  at  length 
effected  in  1886. 

It  was  not  till  eleven  years  later,  in  1897,  that  Japan  adopted  her 
present  gold  standard.  The  reasons  for  this  step  are  given  in  the 
chapter  on  Finance  contributed  to  Marquis  Okuma’s  book,  already 
mentioned,  by  Marquis  Matsugata,  who  also  explains  the  means  by 
which  it  was  accomplished. 

“ When,”  says  this  authority  on  Japanese  financial  matters,  “ the 
Government  opened  places  for  the  redemption  of  paper-money  in 
1886,  silver  coins  only  were  offered  in  exchange.  Such  being  the 
case,  the  currency  of  Japan  at  that  time  was  based  practically  on  a 
silver  standard,  although  legally  the  system  was  bimetallic.  The 
price  of  silver,  however,  owing  to  various  reasons,  gradually  fell,  and 
artificial  checks  to  its  fall  were  effective  only  for  a short  time. 
Fluctuation  after  fluctuation  in  foreign  exchange  seemed  to  follow 
each  other  in  endless  succession.  In  the  meantime  Western  countries 
commenced  to  adopt  gold  monometallism.  Our  authorities  knew 
very  well  that,  to  insure  a healthy  growth  of  finance,  Japan  must 
adopt,  sooner  or  later,  a monometallic  gold  standard,  and  this  was 
impressed  on  the  minds  of  financiers  so  keenly  that  the  Govern- 
ment determined  to  effect  the  reform  as  soon  as  possible.  The 
desired  opportunity  came  with  the  Peace  Treaty  of  1895,  when 
China  began  to  pay  to  our  country  an  indemnity  of  200,000,000 
taels  ” [ sic  the  amount  was  really  230,000,000  taels].  “ Further 
negotiations  between  our  Government  and  the  Chinese  authori- 
ties resulted  in  the  payment  of  the  indemnity,  not  in  Chinese 
money,  but  in  pounds  sterling.  This  was  important,  since  a large 
gold  reserve  was  indispensable  for  the  establishment  of  gold  mono- 
metallism.” 

The  experience  of  1886,  referred  to  by  Marquis  Matsugata,  proved 
that  confidence  in  the  Government’s  ability  to  meet  its  obligations 
in  paper  money  was  all  that  was  needed.  This  confidence  once 
established,  no  further  difficulty  presented  itself  in  the  passage  from 


240  Operation  of  Revised  Treaties 

an  inconvertible  to  a convertible  paper  currency.  Prepared  for 
heavy  calls  on  the  specie  resources  of  the  Treasury,  the  Government 
had  on  that  occasion  accumulated  a reserve  of  £5,000,000.  When, 
at  the  end  of  a few  days  after  the  date  fixed  for  the  resumption  of 
specie  payments,  the  demand  for  specie  ceased,  it  was  found  that 
the  total  value  of  notes  presented  for  conversion  did  not  exceed 
£30,000.  The  change  from  a silver  to  a gold  standard  in  1897  was 
conducted  with  equal  facility,  a large  portion  of  the  Chinese  in- 
demnity being  transferred  abroad.  There  it  served  a useful  purpose 
in  maintaining  Japan’s  financial  credit,  and,  as  a natural  consequence, 
the  market  price  of  the  Bonds  of  her  numerous  foreign  loans,  which 
for  several  years,  to  the  surprise  of  private  investors,  were  quoted  at 
higher  rates  abroad  than  at  home. 

The  year  1899,  when  the  revised  treaties  came  into  operation, 
marked  a fresh  stage  in  the  progress  of  Japan  towards  attaining  a 
footing  of  equality  with  Western  Powers — the  aim  which  her  states- 
men had  set  before  themselves  ever  since  the  Restoration,  and  which 
had  in  so  many  ways  been  the  guiding  principle  of  both  domestic 
and  foreign  policy.  With  the  object  of  allowing  time  for  the  nego- 
tiation of  similar  treaties  with  other  foreign  Powers,  the  revised 
British  Treaty,  signed  in  London  in  1894,  had,  as  already  mentioned, 
provided  that  it  should  not  come  into  force  until  five  years  after 
the  date  of  signature.  Before  the  expiration  of  the  period  named 
similar  treaties  had  been  concluded  with  all  the  other  Powers  con- 
cerned, those  with  France  and  Germany  containing  a few  modifica- 
tions of  minor  importance.  In  the  meantime,  moreover,  the 
conditions  specified  in  the  Treaty  regarding  the  new  Japanese  Codes 
and  Japan’s  adhesion  to  the  International  Conventions  concerning 
Copyright  and  Industrial  Property  had  been  fulfilled.  The  way  was 
thus  cleared  for  the  operation  of  the  new  revised  treaties,  which, 
accordingly,  came  into  force  on  the  17th  July,  1899,  the  earliest 
date  possible.  Though  in  these  new  treaties,  recognizing  the  terri- 
torial jurisdiction  of  Japan,  the  stipulation  of  previous  conventions 
which  chiefly  offended  Japanese  susceptibilities  found  no  place,  she 
still  remained  bound  for  a further  period  of  twelve  years — the  term 
of  the  revised  treaties — by  a tariff  of  a unilateral  character.  Only 
when  that  period  expired  would  she  recover  full  tariff  autonomy  and 
be  free  to  negotiate  reciprocal  treaties  with  the  various  Powers  con- 


The  Boxer  Outbreak  241 

cerned  on  a footing  of  complete  equality.  This  opportunity  came 
to  her  in  1911,  and  she  at  once  availed  herself  of  it. 

In  the  spring  of  the  following  year  (1900)  what  is  known  as  the 
Boxer  Rising  took  place.  In  its  inception  it  was  a protest  against 
missionary  enterprise.  As  it  developed,  it  became  the  expression  of 
a feeling  of  exasperation  among  the  official  and  lettered  classes  of 
Northern  China  engendered  by  the  action  of  European  Powers  in 
occupying  under  the  guise  of  leases  various  portions  of  Chinese  terri- 
tory in  that  region.  During  the  previous  autumn  a society  called 
I-Ho-C’uan  (Patriot  Harmony  Fists)  had  been  formed  in  the  province 
of  Shantung.  Its  formation  was  encouraged  by  the  reactionary  ten- 
dencies which  made  their  appearance  about  this  time  at  Peking, 
where  the  Empress  Dowager,  after  the  successful  coup  d'etat  by  which 
she  had  crushed  the  ill-conducted  reform  movement  in  1898,  was 
again  in  power.  The  magical  powers  claimed  by  its  members 
produced  on  the  ignorant  masses  an  impression  that  was  heightened 
by  the  incantations  they  performed.  As  the  movement  grew,  it 
attracted  the  attention  of  the  Governor  of  the  province,  who 
supported  it  with,  apparently,  the  twofold  idea  of  utilizing  it  against 
foreign  aggression,  and  gaining  favour  at  Court.  As  a result  of  his 
outspoken  sympathy  the  Boxer  movement  assumed  formidable 
dimensions.  Though  eventually,  through  the  energy  of  Yuan 
Shih-k’ai,  who  was  at  one  time,  as  we  have  seen,  Chinese  Resident 
in  Korea,  order  was  restored  in  Shantung,  the  movement  spread 
northwards  towards  Peking.  There,  as  Mr.  Campbell  explains  in 
the  China  Handbook  prepared  under  the  direction  of  the  Foreign 
Office,  it  gained  the  powerful  support  of  the  ignorant  and  reactionary 
statesman  Prince  Tuan,  the  selection  of  whose  son  as  Heir-Apparent 
to  the  Throne  gave  him  a commanding  influence  in  the  councils  of 
the  Empire.  In  April,  1900,  bands  of  Boxers  were  drilling  in  the 
outskirts  of  the  Capital,  their  appearance  in  every  district  they 
invaded  being  accompanied  by  murders  of  missionaries  and  massacres 
of  native  converts.  Some  weeks  later  the  situation  became  so 
threatening  that  arrangements  were  made  for  bringing  up  to  Peking 
small  contingents  of  foreign  troops  for  the  protection  of  the  Lega- 
tions and  such  portion  of  the  foreign  community  as  still  remained. 
These  guards  arrived  opportunely  at  the  end  of  May,  by  which  time 
swarms  of  Boxers  infested  the  Capital,  and  the  Legations  were 
Q 


2\2  The  Boxer  Outbreak 

practically  isolated.  Prince  Tuan  chose  this  moment  for  openly 
espousing  the  Boxer  cause.  This  step  on  his  part  was  followed  by 
the  murders  of  the  Chancellor  of  the  Japanese  Legation  and  the 
German  Minister,  the  two  outrages  occurring  within  a few  days  of 
each  other.  The  subsequent  course  of  events  is  well  known  : the 
storming  of  the  Taku  forts  (June  16th)  ; the  siege  of  the  Legations 
by  Chinese  troops  and  Boxers  ; the  failure  of  Admiral  Seymour’s 
attempt  to  re-establish  communications  with  the  Capital ; the  equip- 
ment of  foreign  expeditionary  forces  to  operate  against  Peking  ; the 
issue  of  an  Imperial  Decree  ordering  a general  massacre  of  foreigners 
in  the  Chinese  dominions ; the  attack  on  the  foreign  settlements  at 
Tientsin  ; the  arrival  of  Russian  and  British  reinforcements,  and 
the  taking  of  Tientsin  city  (July  14th)  ; the  relief  of  the  Legations, 
and  occupation  of  the  Chinese  capital  on  the  13th  and  14th  August 
by  the  allied  forces ; and  the  flight  of  the  Chinese  Court  to  Sian-fu, 
the  ancient  capital  in  the  province  of  Shensi.  With  the  flight  of  the 
Court  from  the  capital  Chinese  resistance  collapsed,  and  when  Count 
Waldersee  arrived  in  September  with  several  thousand  German  troops 
to  take  supreme  command  of  the  allied  expeditionary  forces,  there 
was  no  enemy  to  fight.  Hostilities  gave  place  to  negotiations  between 
the  foreign  Governments  concerned  and  China  for  the  settlement  of 
the  various  issues  raised  by  the  Boxer  outbreak.  The  negotiations 
resulted  in  two  preliminary  exchanges  of  Notes,  dated,  respectively, 
December  22nd,  1900,  and  January  16th,  1901,  embodying  the  con- 
ditions for  the  re-establishment  of  normal  relations  with  China,  and 
in  the  signature  of  a final  Protocol  on  September  7th,  1901.  Three 
days  before  its  signature  Prince  Ch’un,  who  had  proceeded  on  a 
mission  to  Berlin  to  apologize  for  the  murder  of  the  German  Minister, 
was  received  in  audience  by  the  Kaiser. 

The  chief  conditions  imposed  on  China  by  these  arrangements 
were  the  payment  of  an  indemnity  of  450,000,000  Haikwan  taels 
(equivalent  at  the  rate  fixed — 3s.  per  tael — to  £67,500,000)  ; the 
permanent  occupation  of  certain  places,  including  Tientsin  and 
Shanhaikwan,  for  the  purpose  of  preserving  free  communications 
between  Peking  and  the  sea  ; the  razing  of  the  Taku  and  other  forts 
which  threatened  those  communications  ; and  the  construction  of 
a separate  fortified  quarter  in  the  Capital  for  the  foreign  Legations, 
for  the  further  protection  of  which  permanent  foreign  guards  were 
to  be  retained.  Other  terms  included  special  reparation  for  the 


Russia  & Manchuria  243 

murders  of  the  German  Minister  and  the  Chancellor  of  the  Japanese 
Legation  and  the  desecration  of  cemeteries ; the  punishment  of 
Prince  Tuan,  as  well  as  other  personages  and  officials  responsible  for 
the  attacks  on  foreigners ; and  the  prohibition  of  the  import  of 
arms. 

Thanks,  as  we  learn  from  the  Handbook  already  quoted,  to  the 
good  sense  of  the  leading  provincial  authorities,  such  as  the  Viceroys 
of  Nanking  and  Wuchang  and  the  new  Governor  of  Shantung,  who 
had  the  courage  to  disobey  the  Imperial  Decree,  the  Boxer  move- 
ment was  stifled  in  the  central  and  southern  regions  of  China.  There, 
in  spite  of  considerable  unrest,  order  was  preserved.  But  further 
north  in  Manchuria  the  Governors  were  not  so  judicious.  In 
obedience  to  instructions  from  the  Court  they  declared  war  on  the 
Russians.  The  sudden  attacks  made  by  Chinese  forces  created  a 
panic  on  the  Amur,  and  brought  about  the  savage  reprisals  which 
occurred  at  Blagovestchensk  on  that  river,  and  the  occupation  of  the 
whole  of  Manchuria  by  Russian  troops.  The  folly  of  the  Empress 
Dowager  and  of  the  ignorant  clique  by  whose  counsels  she  was  guided 
gave  Russia  the  opportunity  she  desired  for  pursuing  her  designs  of 
aggression  in  the  Far  East.  Her  subsequent  conduct  throughout  the 
negotiations,  and  after  their  conclusion,  destroyed  the  good  effect 
produced  by  her  valuable  co-operation  in  the  fighting  at  Tientsin, 
where  the  Russian  reinforcements  were,  undoubtedly,  the  chief 
factor  in  saving  the  foreign  settlements  from  destruction. 

In  the  military  operations  against  Peking,  and  in  the  protracted 
negotiations  which  succeeded  them,  Japan  played  a conspicuous  part. 
She  had  suffered  injury  similar  to  that  sustained  by  other  foreign 
Powers  in  connection  with  the  Boxer  Rising,  and  she  had  a common 
interest  with  them  in  adopting  whatever  measures  might  be  neces- 
sary in  the  international  emergency  which  had  arisen.  Her  proximity 
to  China  and  her  military  resources  enabled  her  to  strike  quickly,  and 
with  effect.  To  the  invitation  to  take  part  in  the  expeditionary  force 
in  process  of  organization,  which  was  addressed  to  her  by  the  other 
interested  Powers,  with  the  exception  of  Russia,  she  responded  with 
alacrity  ; and  in  a short  space  of  time  a well-equipped  Japanese  force 
took  its  place  with  the  troops  of  other  Powers,  and  joined  in  the  march 
on  Peking  for  the  relief  of  the  besieged  Legations.  The  discipline 
and  efficiency  of  the  Japanese  contingent  won  well-deserved  praise 
from  those  best  qualified  to  judge.  In  the  subsequent  negotiations 


244  Russia  & Manchuria 

the  readiness  shown  by  Japan  to  act  in  harmony  with  other  Powers, 
whose  attitude  was  influenced  by  consideration  for  the  general 
interests  of  all  concerned,  facilitated  the  solution  of  many  difficulties ; 
and,  when  the  question  of  claims  for  indemnity  came  to  be  discussed, 
the  moderation  of  her  demands  was  equalled  only  by  that  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States. 


CHAPTER  XXV 


Agreement  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany — The  Anglo-Japanese 

Alliance. 

SOON  after  the  opening  of  negotiations  for  the  re-establish- 
ment  of  friendly  relations  with  China  the  Governments  of 
Great  Britain  and  Germany  concluded  an  Agreement  of  a 
self-denying  character  which  confirmed,  though  in  different  words 
and  with  special  application  to  the  situation  then  existing  in  China, 
the  principle  of  the  “ open  door  and  equal  opportunity,”  as  set  forth 
by  the  United  States,  and  accepted  by  the  Powers  consulted,  in  the 
autumn  of  1899  and  the  spring  of  the  year  following.  By  this 
Agreement,  signed  in  London  on  October  16th,  1900,  the  two 
Powers  bound  themselves  to  support  the  principle  above  mentioned  ; 
to  abstain  from  making  use  of  the  existing  troubles  in  China  to 
“ obtain  for  themselves  any  territorial  advantages  ” ; and  to  co- 
operate for  the  protection  of  their  interests  in  the  event  of  any 
attempt  on  the  part  of  another  Power  to  obtain  such  advantages 
under  existing  conditions.  The  Agreement  was,  as  prearranged, 
communicated  to  other  interested  Powers,  who  were  invited  “ to 
accept  the  principles  recorded  in  it.”  Replies  more  or  less  favour- 
able were  received  from  the  Powers  addressed.  The  French  Govern- 
ment referred  to  its  prompt  adhesion  to  the  proposals  of  the  United 
States  in  the  previous  year  as  a proof  of  its  long-entertained  wishes 
in  the  direction  indicated  ; while  the  Russian  reply,  which,  like  the 
French,  took  the  form  of  a Memorandum,  went  so  far  as  to  say  that 
Russia  had  been  “ the  first  to  lay  down  the  maintenance  of  the 
integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  as  a fundamental  principle  of  her 
policy  in  China.”  The  Japanese  Government,  in  its  answer,  stated 
that,  in  view  of  the  assurance  received  that  in  adhering  to  the  Agree- 
ment Japan  would  be  placed  in  the  same  position  as  she  would  have 
occupied  had  she  been  a signatory  instead  of  an  adhering  State,  it 
had  no  hesitation  in  adhering  to  the  Agreement,  and  accepting  the 
principles  embodied  therein. 


245 


246  The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance 

Subsequently,  when  it  became  apparent  that  Russia  had  no  idea 
of  evacuating  the  territory  she  occupied  in  Manchuria,  the  German 
Government  explained  that  the  Agreement  was  never  intended  to 
apply  to  that  territory. 

The  course  pursued  by  Russia  from  the  outset  of  the  negotiations 
in  Peking  was  in  marked  contrast  to  the  attitude  adopted  by  the 
other  Powers  concerned,  and  in  direct  contradiction  to  the  principles 
embodied  in  the  Anglo-German  Agreement  in  which  she  professed 
to  acquiesce.  From  some  of  the  demands  made  by  the  other  Powers 
conjointly  she  dissociated  herself,  while  her  conduct  in  keeping  her 
troops  stationed  in  the  furthest  positions  to  which  they  had  pene- 
trated during  the  Boxer  outbreak  indicated  an  intention  to  give  a 
permanent  character  to  her  occupation  of  Manchuria.  Her  attitude 
in  this  latter  respect  was  doubtless  encouraged  by  the  fact  that, 
whereas  the  Final  Protocol  provided  for  the  withdrawal  of  foreign 
troops,  under  certain  conditions,  from  Peking,  and  the  province  of 
Chihli,  it  contained  no  reference  to  the  evacuation  of  Manchuria. 
Further  proof  of  her  designs  was  furnished  by  the  conclusion  in 
January,  1901  (subject  to  confirmation  by  the  Peking  Government), 
of  an  Agreement  between  Admiral  Alexeieff  and  the  Tartar  General 
at  Moukden,  placing  the  province  of  Feng-t’ien  (Shenking)  under 
Russian  control,  and  by  the  subsequent  opening  of  negotiations  at 
St.  Petersburg  for  a formal  Convention,  which  would  have  estab- 
lished a Russian  Protectorate  over  the  whole  of  Manchuria,  besides 
giving  her  exclusive,  or  preferential,  rights  in  Mongolia  and  Chinese 
Turkestan.  These  attempts  to  obtain  China’s  consent  to  her  occu- 
pation of  Manchuria,  and  to  secure  for  herself  a position  of  excep- 
tional advantage  elsewhere,  were  frustrated  by  the  vigilance  of 
Great  Britain,  the  United  States  and  Japan,  and  by  the  general 
indignation  they  aroused  in  China.  The  Government  at  Peking, 
yielding  to  the  pressure  thus  brought  to  bear  upon  it,  withheld  its 
confirmation  of  the  Moukden  Agreement  ; the  Chinese  Minister  at 
the  Russian  capital  was  forbidden  to  sign  the  Convention  under 
negotiation  ; and  eventually,  in  August,  1901,  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment issued  an  official  communique  announcing  the  shelving  of  the 
proposed  Convention  owing,  as  it  was  explained,  to  the  misrepresen- 
tation of  Russia’s  intentions.  Russian  troops,  nevertheless,  remained 
in  Manchuria,  and  it  was  not  until  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  that  Russia  at  length  made  an  Agreement 


The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  247 

with  China  for  the  evacuation  of  the  territory  she  had  occupied,  an 
Agreement  which,  as  M.  Witte  afterwards  explained  to  the  British 
Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg,  she  never  intended  to  observe. 

On  the  30th  January,  1902,  the  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty  of  Alliance 
was  signed  in  London  by  the  Marquess  of  Lansdowne  and  the 
Japanese  Minister  there,  the  late  Count  (then  Baron)  Hayashi,  who 
was  afterwards  Japanese  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  The  Treaty 
related  to  affairs  in  “ the  Extreme  East,”  and  came  into  effect  imme- 
diately after  signature.  It  was  terminable  after  five  years’  duration, 
at  one  year’s  notice  on  either  side,  subject  to  the  condition  that 
should  either  of  the  contracting  parties  be  at  war  when  the  period 
of  the  Treaty  came  to  an  end  it  should  remain  in  force  until  peace 
was  concluded.  By  this  Agreement  the  contracting  parties  recognized 
the  independence  of  China  and  Korea,  and  the  special  interests 
therein  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan  respectively.  They  bound  them- 
selves to  maintain  strict  neutrality  in  the  event  of  either  of  them 
being  involved  in  war,  and  to  come  to  one  another’s  assistance  in  the 
event  of  either  being  confronted  by  the  opposition  of  more  than  one 
hostile  Power.  The  Treaty  also,  as  we  have  seen,  affirmed  the 
principle  of  “ equal  opportunity.” 

In  his  despatch  to  the  British  Minister  in  Tokio  notifying  the 
signature  of  the  Agreement  the  Marquess  of  Lansdowne  observed 
that  it  might  be  regarded  as  the  outcome  of  the  events  which  had 
taken  place  during  the  last  two  years  in  the  Far  East,  and  of  the 
part  taken  by  Great  Britain  and  Japan  in  dealing  with  them.  Count 
Hayashi,  in  his  Secret  Memoirs,  published  in  London  in  1915  after 
his  death,  confirms  this  statement,  but  puts  the  date  at  which 
tendencies  began  to  take  shape  in  this  direction  somewhat  further 
back.  The  idea  of  an  alliance  between  the  two  countries  first  came, 
he  says,  into  the  minds  of  Japanese  statesmen  soon  after  the  triple 
intervention  of  1895,  and  was  favoured  by  Count  Mutsu,  who  w?as 
at  the  time  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  The  effect  of  that  inter- 
vention, he  explains,  was  to  cause  a regrouping  of  Powers  in  the 
Far  East  : France,  Russia  and  Germany  forming  one  group,  while 
Great  Britain,  Japan  and  the  United  States  represented  another. 
Having  this  regrouping  in  view,  he  himself,  in  the  summer  of  that 
year,  suggested  the  desirability  of  such  an  alliance,  should  the  un- 
friendly attitude  of  certain  Powers  towards  Japan  be  continued. 
The  suggestion  was  made  in  articles  contributed  to  a leading  Tokio 


248  The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance 

journal  after  he  had  ceased  to  be  Vice-Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
and  on  the  eve  of  his  appointment  as  Japanese  Minister  to  China. 

The  following  extracts  from  a summary  of  these  articles,  which 
is  given  in  the  Memoirs,  show  how,  undismayed  by  the  retrocession 
of  the  Liaotung  peninsula,  Japanese  statesmen  still  held  firmly  to 
their  settled  policy  of  attaining  for  the  nation  a footing  of  equality 
with  Western  Powers,  realizing  perhaps  more  clearly  than  before  that 
the  increase  of  Japan’s  naval  and  military  strength  was  the  only 
means  of  attaining  their  object. 

“ We  must,”  the  writer  of  the  articles  says,  “ continue  to  study 
according  to  Western  methods,  for  the  application  of  science  is  the 
most  important  item  of  warlike  preparations  that  civilized  nations 
regard.  If  new  ships  of  war  are  considered  necessary,  we  must  build 
them  at  any  cost.  If  the  organization  of  the  army  is  found  to  be 
wrong  . . . the  whole  military  system  must  be  entirely  changed. 
We  must  build  docks  to  be  able  to  repair  our  ships.  We  must  estab- 
lish a steel  factory  to  supply  guns  and  ammunition.  Our  railways 
must  be  extended  so  that  we  can  mobilize  our  troops  rapidly.  Our 
oversea  shipping  must  be  developed  so  that  we  can  provide  trans- 
ports to  carry  our  armies  abroad.  This  is  the  programme  that  we 
have  to  keep  always  in  view.  . . . What  Japan  has  now  to  do  is  to 
keep  perfectly  quiet,  to  lull  the  suspicions  that  have  arisen  against 
her,  and  to  wait,  meanwhile  strengthening  the  foundations  of  her 
national  power,  watching  and  waiting  for  the  opportunity  which 
must  one  day  surely  come  in  the  Orient.  When  that  day  comes, 
she  will  be  able  to  follow  her  own  course.” 

How  sedulously  all  the  steps  indicated  were  subsequently  carried 
out  is  now  common  knowledge.  Preparations  on  a scale  so  extended 
could  mean  only  one  thing — provision  against  the  possible  eventuality 
of  war  with  the  Power  that  might  stand  in  the  way  of  Japan’s 
“ following  her  own  course.” 

The  idea  of  an  alliance,  or  some  sort  of  understanding,  between 
the  two  countries  thus  put  forward  in  1895  seems  to  have  gradually 
made  way  both  in  Japan  and  in  Great  Britain.  We  learn  from  the 
same  Memoirs  that  in  1898  Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain,  then  Colonial 
Minister,  expressed  to  Viscount  (then  Mr.)  Kato,  who  was  at  that 
time  Japanese  Minister  in  London,  the  readiness  of  Great  Britain 
to  enter  into  an  agreement  with  Japan  for  the  settlement  of  affairs 
in  the  Far  East,  and  that  the  latter,  in  reporting  the  conversation 


Descended  from  an  ancient  family  of  Court  Nobles.  A prominent  Rendered  distinguished  services  in  the  war  with  China  and  Russia; 

figure  in  diplomacy  and  parliamentary  life.  He  was  chief  delegate  for  he  was  conspicuous  both  as  solde  r and  statesman. 

Japan  at  the  Versailles  Conference. 


The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  249 

to  the  Foreign  Minister  in  Tokio,  strongly  supported  the  suggestion. 
The  subject,  it  appears,  was  again  discussed  in  the  course  of  a con- 
versation which  Count  Hayashi  had  with  the  late  Marquis  ltd  and 
with  Marquis  (then  Count)  Inouye  in  Tokio  in  1899,  prior  to  his 
(Count  Hayashi’s)  appointment  as  Minister  in  London.  His  account 
of  what  passed  on  this  occasion  shows  that  the  Japanese  Government 
was  at  that  time  hesitating  between  two  opposite  courses — an  agree- 
ment, or  alliance,  with  Great  Britain,  and  an  understanding  with 
Russia  ; and  it  seems  to  have  been  thought  that  the  latter  Power 
was  in  a position  to  offer  better  terms.  Soon  after  his  arrival,  early 
in  January,  1900,  to  take  up  his  post  in  London  the  new  Minister 
met  the  late  Dr.  Morrison,  then  Times  correspondent  in  Peking,  with 
whom  he  discussed  the  question  of  an  alliance  between  the  two 
countries.  He  seems  then  to  have  formed  the  impression  that  most 
British  journalists  were  in  favour  of  an  Anglo-Japanese  alliance. 

It  was  not,  however,  until  the  following  year  that  the  question 
began  to  assume  a practical  aspect.  The  first  move  came  from  an 
unexpected  quarter,  the  German  Embassy  in  London.  In  March, 
1901,  Freiherr  von  Eckhardstein,  who  was  then,  owing  to  the  illness 
of  the  German  Ambassador,  in  the  position  of  Charge  d’Affaires, 
called  on  Count  Hayashi  and  expressed  the  opinion  that  a triple 
alliance  between  Germany,  Great  Britain  and  Japan  was  the  best 
means  of  maintaining  peace  in  the  Far  East.  He  suggested  that  he 
(Count  Hayashi)  should  take  the  initiative  in  proposing  this  alliance. 
The  latter,  who  had,  as  we  know,  been  one  of  the  first  to  advocate 
an  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  reported  the  suggestion  to  his  Govern- 
ment, and  was  instructed  to  sound  the  British  Government  un- 
officially on  the  subject.  Much  light  is  thrown  on  the  subsequent 
course  of  negotiations  by  the  Memoirs  already  mentioned,  and 
Freiherr  von  Eckhardstein’s  “ Reminiscences  ” ( Lebens  Erinnerungen 
und  Politische  Denkzuiirdigkeiten),  published  in  Leipzig  in  1920.  The 
ball  thus  set  rolling,  the  question  was,  we  learn,  discussed  informally 
from  time  to  time,  on  the  one  hand  between  the  Japanese  Minister 
and  Lord  Lansdowne,  and,  on  the  other,  between  the  latter  and  the 
German  Charge  d’Affaires  ; but  it  was  never  reopened  by  the 
German  Embassy  with  the  Japanese  Minister. 

There  seems  to  have  been  little  enthusiasm  for  the  project  of  a 
triple  alliance  on  the  part  of  any  of  the  foreign  Ministries  con- 
cerned. Great  Britain  appears  to  have  shown  more  inclination  in 


250  The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance 

this  direction  than  the  other  two  Powers,  for  until  a late  stage  in 
the  negotiations  with  Japan  the  point  would  seem  to  have  been  kept 
in  view  bp  the  British  Cabinet.  If  the  German  Government  ever 
seriously  entertained  the  idea — which  is  very  doubtful — it  was  merely 
for  the  reasons  mentioned  by  the  Foreign  Office  in  Berlin,  that  the 
inclusion  of  Japan  might  be  acceptable  to  her  on  general  grounds, 
since  she  would  “ find  herself  in  good  company,”  and  might  make 
negotiations  with  Great  Britain  easier,  “ as  Japan  was  popular  in 
Germany.”  The  alliance  with  Great  Britain  was  regarded  as  the 
main  consideration  ; and  even  in  this  matter  there  is  no  reason  to 
think  that  the  German  overtures  were  sincere,  for  Berlin’s  insistence 
on  Austria’s  being  brought  into  the  business,  though  not  as  a con- 
tracting party,  added  to  the  difficulties  already  in  existence.  Nor,  on 
the  side  of  Japan,  where  the  part  played  by  Germany  in  the  Liaotung 
incident  was  not  forgotten,  does  there  seem  to  have  been  any  marked 
desire  for  the  inclusion  of  that  Power  in  any  understanding  between 
herself  and  Great  Britain.  This  explains  the  separate  character  of 
the  negotiations  carried  on  in  London.  As  between  Great  Britain 
and  Germany,  they  lasted  no  longer  than  a few  weeks,  during  which 
time  they  appear  to  have  been  kept  alive  only  by  the  efforts  of  the 
German  Charge  d’Affaires,  to  whose  initiative  the  project  was  due. 
After  the  resumption  of  his  duties  by  the  German  Ambassador  the 
negotiations  were  transferred  to  Berlin,  where  they  soon  came  to 
an  end.  Their  failure  is  described  by  the  author  of  the  Reminis- 
cences as  “the  starting-point  of  the  encirclement  [Einkreisung]  of 
Germany,  and  of  the  world-war  which  was  the  mathematical 
consequence.” 

The  parallel  negotiations  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan  were 
not  interrupted  by  the  inability  of  the  British  and  German  Govern- 
ments to  arrive  at  an  understanding.  No  obstacles  of  the  kind  that 
stood  in  the  way  of  an  agreement  between  the  two  other  Powers 
existed.  The  cordial  relations  which  had  been  established  as  a result 
of  the  settlement  of  the  long-pending  question  of  Treaty  revision 
had  been  improved  by  the  close  co-operation  of  the  two  countries 
in  the  international  measures  in  which  both  had  joined  at  the  time 
of  the  Boxer  outbreak,  and  by  the  harmony  of  views  that  was  de- 
veloped during  the  Peking  negotiations.  The  only  difficulty  which 
presented  itself  lay  in  the  fact,  already  referred  to,  that  the  Japanese 
Government  was  hesitating  between  two  opposite  courses — an  under- 


The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  251 

standing  with  Russia  and  an  agreement  with  Great  Britain.  The 
decision  rested  with  the  leading  statesmen,  who  on  this  point  were 
divided  into  two  parties,  one  led  by  the  late  Prince  ltd  and  the  late 
Marquis  Inouye,  the  other  by  Prince  (then  Marquis)  Yamagata  and 
the  late  Prince  Katsura.  Ito,  whose  pro-German  tendencies  were 
well  known,  was  in  favour  of  coming  to  an  understanding,  if  possible, 
with  Russia,  and  his  opinion  was  shared  by  Inouye.  Yamagata  and 
Katsura,  on  the  other  hand,  were  inclined  towards  an  alliance  with 
Great  Britain.  Fortunately  for  the  London  negotiations,  the 
cleavage  of  opinion  did  not  follow  clan  lines.  The  Choshiu  party, 
to  which  the  four  statesmen  in  question  all  belonged,  was  itself 
divided.  Fortunately,  also,  Katsura  was  then  Premier.  His  and 
Yamagata’s  policy  was  adopted  by  the  Cabinet,  and  finally  prevailed. 
In  his  opposition  to  the  Cabinet’s  policy  Ito  went  so  far  as  to  arrange 
that  a visit  he  was  about  to  make  to  America  in  connection  with 
celebrations  at  the  University  of  Yale  should  be  extended  to  Russia, 
where  he  seems  to  have  exchanged  views  with  Russian  statesmen. 
His  action  threatened  at  one  moment  to  imperil  the  success  of  the 
London  negotiations,  and  it  became  necessary  for  the  Japanese 
Government  to  explain  that  his  visit  to  Russia  had  no  official  cha- 
racter. In  the  face  of  this  disavowal  he  could  do  little.  Whatever 
plans  he  and  those  who  supported  him  may  have  formed  came  to 
nothing,  and  in  the  end  he  was  forced  to  content  himself  with 
criticizing  unfavourably  the  draft  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty 
which  embodied  the  final  amendments  proposed  by  Japan.  The 
strength  of  his  position  in  the  country  at  the  time,  as  well  as  his 
influence  with  the  late  Japanese  Emperor,  may  be  gathered  from  the 
fact  that  these  last  amendments  were  transmitted  by  the  Govern- 
ment to  him  in  Russia  by  special  messenger,  with  a request  for  his 
opinion. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  emphasize  the  importance  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance.  Count  Hayashi,  in  speaking  of  it  as  “ an  epoch- 
making  event,”  does  not  overstate  the  case.  For  both  countries  it 
was  a new  and  grave  departure  in  policy,  ending  an  isolation  which 
was  a source  of  weakness  to  each  in  the  quarter  of  the  world  to 
which  it  applied.  For  Japan  it  had  a treble  value.  It  practically 
assured  her  against  a repetition  of  the  Liaotung  incident,  while  the 
mere  fact  of  her  becoming  the  ally  of  one  of  the  leading  Powers  of 
the  world  added  greatly  to  her  prestige,  and  it  facilitated  the  floating 


252  The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance 

of  loans  on  the  London  market.  If  the  benefit  accruing  to  Great 
Britain  may  seem  to  have  been  less,  the  alliance  was  nevertheless 
opportune  in  view  of  the  close  understanding  between  Russia  and 
France  in  the  Far  East,  the  open  menace  to  her  interests  offered  by 
Russian  designs  in  Manchuria  and  the  danger  to  be  apprehended 
from  their  further  extension.  The  fact  that  the  alliance  was  re- 
newed in  an  extended  form  three  years  later,  was  again  renewed  in 
1911,  and  is  still  in  force,  shows  that  both  Governments  have  reason 
to  be  satisfied  with  its  results. 

The  conclusion  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  drew  from  the 
Russian  and  French  Governments  a Declaration,  signed  in  St.  Peters- 
burg on  March  3rd,  1902,  which  left  no  doubt  as  to  the  interpretation 
placed  on  it  in  St.  Petersburg  and  Paris.  In  this  Declaration  the 
two  Governments,  while  approving  of  the  fundamental  principles 
affirmed  in  the  Anglo-Japanese  Agreement,  reserved  to  themselves 
the  right  to  consult  each  other,  if  necessary,  regarding  the  protection 
of  their  interests.  The  comment  of  the  author  of  Le  Monde  et  la 
Guerre  Russo-  Japonaise  on  this  counter-move  was  that  “ it  had  almost 
no  value  as  an  answer  to  the  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty.” 

The  action  of  Russia  in  prolonging  indefinitely  her  occupation  of 
Manchuria,  in  spite  of  the  protests  of  other  Powers,  and  her  attempts 
to  strengthen  her  position  there  by  secret  arrangements  with  China, 
in  defiance  of  the  principle  of  “ the  open  door  and  equal  oppor- 
tunity ” which  she  had  united  with  other  Powers  in  accepting,  caused 
fresh  uneasiness  in  Washington.  On  February  1st,  1901,  almost 
simultaneously  with  the  signature  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty,  the 
American  Secretary  of  State,  to  whose  initiative  in  1899  the  accept- 
ance of  this  principle  had  been  due,  addressed  Circular  Notes  to  the 
Governments  of  China,  Russia  and  nine  other  Powers  on  the  subject 
of  the  situation  created  in  Manchuria  by  the  Russian  occupation. 
Any  agreement,  he  pointed  out,  by  which  China  ceded  to  corpora- 
tions, or  companies,  exclusive  industrial  rights  and  privileges  in 
connection  with  the  development  of  Manchuria  constituted  a 
monopoly,  and,  being  a distinct  breach  of  the  stipulations  of  treaties 
between  China  and  foreign  Powers,  seriously  affected  the  rights  of 
American  citizens.  Such  concessions  would  be  followed  by  demands 
from  other  Powers  for  similar  exclusive  advantages  in  other  parts 
of  the  Chinese  Empire,  and  would  result  in  “ the  complete  wreck 
of  the  policy  of  absolute  equality  of  treatment  of  all  nations  in 


The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  253 

regard  to  trade,  navigation  and  commerce  within  the  confines  of 
the  Empire.” 

Influenced,  perhaps,  by  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  and  the 
written  protest  of  the  United  States,  Russia  at  length,  on  the  8th 
April,  1902,  concluded  at  Peking  an  Agreement  for  the  evacuation 
of  Manchuria.  The  Agreement  was  to  come  into  force  from  the 
date  of  signature,  and  was  to  be  ratified  within  a period  of  three 
months,  but  this  latter  stipulation  was  never  observed.  It  provided 
for  the  evacuation  to  be  conducted  in  three  stages,  and  to  be  com- 
pleted in  eighteen  months — that  is  to  say,  by  October,  1903.  The 
evacuation  was,  however,  made  dependent  on  two  conditions  : the 
absence,  meanwhile,  of  disturbances  in  the  province,  and  the  absten- 
tion of  other  Powers  from  any  action  prejudicial  to  Russian  interests 
therein.  The  first  stage  fixed  by  the  Agreement,  the  withdrawal  of 
Russian  troops  from  the  south-western  portion  of  the  province  of 
Moukden  (Feng-t’ien),  was  duly  carried  out  by  the  date  agreed  upon, 
the  8th  October,  1902.  Before,  however,  the  date  fixed  for  the 
completion  of  the  next  stage  of  evacuation  (March,  1903),  the  with- 
drawal of  Russian  troops  from  the  remainder  of  the  province  of 
Moukden  and  from  the  province  of  Kirin,  other  and  quite  new 
conditions  were  formulated  by  the  Russian  Government,  one  being 
that  no  “ treaty  ports  ” should  be  opened  in  the  evacuated  territory. 
In  the  face  of  the  well-known  fact  that  the  fresh  commercial  treaties 
which  America  and  Japan  were  negotiating  with  China  contemplated 
the  opening  of  additional  places  for  foreign  trade  in  Manchuria, 
these  sudden  demands  indicated  no  intention  on  Russia’s  part  to 
abide  by  the  Agreement.  If  any  doubt  in  this  respect  existed,  it  was 
removed  by  her  action  in  reoccupying  early  in  1903  districts  she  had 
already  evacuated,  this  step  being  followed  by  the  issue  in  July  of 
the  same  year  of  an  Imperial  Ukase  appointing  Admiral  Alexeieff 
Viceroy  of  the  Amur  and  Kwantung  territories — the  latter  being,  as 
already  mentioned,  the  name  of  the  small  peninsula  in  which  Port 
Arthur  is  situated. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 


War  with  Russia — Success  of  Japan — President  Roosevelt’s  Mediation — 
Treaty  of  Portsmouth — Peace  Terms. 

THE  threatening  attitude  of  Russia,  who  no  longer  made  any 
pretence  of  masking  her  designs  in  China,  was  regarded 
with  increasing  anxiety  in  Japan,  where  the  necessity  of 
preparing  to  meet  force  with  force  had  already  been  foreseen.  But 
the  high-handed  proceedings  of  the  Russians  in  Manchuria  were 
not  the  only  cause  of  the  tension  that  from  this  moment  began  to 
appear  in  the  relations  between  the  two  countries.  Mischief  of  a 
kind  which  had  already  led  to  war  between  China  and  Japan  was 
also  brewing  in  Korea.  By  the  Treaty  of  Shimonoseki,  which  ended 
the  war,  the  independence  of  that  country  was  recognized.  China 
in  relinquishing  her  claim  to  suzerainty  no  longer  maintained  Chinese 
guards  for  her  Legation  in  Seoul,  and  ceased  from  all  political 
activity  in  the  peninsula,  where  the  influence  of  Japan  for  a time 
became  predominant.  But  history  was  about  to  repeat  itself.  Into 
the  place  vacated  by  China,  Russia  at  once  stepped,  and  Japan  found 
herself  confronted  by  another  and  far  more  dangerous  competitor. 
The  positions  of  the  two  new  rivals  in  Korea  were  very  different. 
The  alliance  forced  by  Japan  on  the  Korean  Government  at  the 
outset  of  the  war  with  China  had  enabled  her  to  strengthen  her 
political  influence,  while  the  energy  she  threw  into  the  development 
of  business  projects  of  various  kinds  had  increased  her  material 
interests  in  the  peninsula.  The  lion’s  share  of  Korea’s  foreign  trade 
and  maritime  transport  was  in  the  hands  of  Japan.  She  had  also 
constructed  and  was  in  charge  of  the  working  of  telegraphic  com- 
munications in  that  country ; she  had  secured  a concession  for  the 
construction  of  railways ; and  she  had  her  own  postal  service. 
Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  took  no  part  in  business  enterprise,  and 
her  trade  with  Korea  was  insignificant.  She  could  not,  like  China, 

254 


War  with  Russia 


255 

point  to  traditions  of  old-established  intercourse,  nor  had  she  the 
latter’s  plea  of  suzerainty  to  justify  interference  in  Korean  affairs. 
Her  position  in  the  peninsula  was,  nevertheless,  not  without  some 
advantages.  As  in  the  case  of  China,  her  territory  was  co-terminous 
for  a considerable  distance  with  that  of  Korea.  This  supplied  a 
reason  for  regarding  with  disfavour  the  extension  of  Japanese  in- 
fluence on  the  mainland,  as  well  as  a pretext  for  the  activity  she  soon 
began  to  display  in  political  matters.  Moreover,  having  gained  the 
ear  of  the  formerly  pro-Chinese  Court  party  and — which  was  more 
important — the  favour  of  the  masterful  Queen,  she  acquired  valu- 
able support  in  the  campaign  of  political  intrigue  upon  which  both 
Powers  embarked. 

The  situation  in  Korea  thus  became  in  many  ways  similar  to  what 
it  had  been  before,  when  China  and  Japan  were  contending  for 
supremacy  in  the  peninsula.  We  have  seen  in  the  former  instance 
the  attempts  that  were  made  from  time  to  time  by  the  Chinese  and 
Japanese  Governments  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  with  regard  to 
their  respective  interests  which  should  introduce  more  stable  con- 
ditions into  Korean  administration,  and  put  an  end  to  the  dangerous 
outbreaks  which  disturbed  the  country  and  threatened  at  any 
moment  to  produce  a collision  between  the  two  Powers  concerned. 
The  process  was  now  repeated,  Russia  occupying  the  position  held 
by  China  before.  In  1896  an  arrangement  was  effected  between 
the  Russian  and  Japanese  representatives  in  Korea.  This  tided  over 
the  first  difficulties  that  had  arisen,  and  later  in  the  same  year  was 
confirmed  by  a Convention  signed  at  St.  Petersburg  by  Prince 
Lobanoff,  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  Prince  (then 
Marquis)  Yamagata,  who  had  gone  to  the  Russian  capital  to  attend 
the  late  Tsar’s  coronation.  Count  de  Witte,  in  his  recently  pub- 
lished Memoirs,  referring  to  this  Convention,  says  that  Prince 
Lobanoff  “ knew  no  more  about  the  Far  East  than  the  average 
schoolboy.”  Two  years  later  a more  detailed  Agreement  in  the 
form  of  a Protocol  was  concluded  at  Tokio  between  Viscount  (then 
Baron)  Nishi,  the  Japanese  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  the 
Russian  Minister  to  Japan,  Baron  Rosen.  This  Agreement  resembled 
closely  the  Convention  negotiated  at  Tientsin  in  1889  between  China 
and  Japan. 

The  conclusion  of  the  above-mentioned  Agreements  did  not  pre- 
vent the  occurrence  of  disputes  between  the  two  rival  Powers. 


256 


War  with  Russia 


These  differences  were  aggravated  by  the  mischievous  influence  of 
Korean  political  factions,  which  lost  no  opportunity  of  fomenting 
trouble  between  the  two  Powers  whose  protection  was  sought.  The 
harmony  of  relations  was  also  impaired  by  the  presence  of  Russian 
and  Japanese  guards  in  the  capital ; by  the  Russian  efforts  to  obtain 
control  of  the  Korean  army  and  finances ; by  the  unfortunate 
implication  of  the  Japanese  Minister  in  Seoul  in  the  murder  of  the 
Queen  ; by  the  virtual  imprisonment  of  the  King  in  one  of  the 
royal  palaces  ; and  by  his  subsequent  escape  from  confinement  to 
the  Russian  Legation,  where  he  remained  for  some  time  under 
Russian  protection.  Matters  were  at  length  brought  to  a crisis  by 
the  refusal  of  Russia  in  the  spring  of  1903  to  evacuate  Manchuria 
in  pursuance  of  her  Agreement  with  China  concluded  in  the  previous 
October.  This  refusal  was  followed  by  the  appointment  of  Admiral 
Alexeieff  as  Viceroy  of  the  Russian  Far  Eastern  Territories,  and  an 
increase  of  activity  in  Korea,  where  large  timber  concessions  were 
obtained,  and  other  Russian  enterprises  set  on  foot.  For  this  re- 
newal of  aggressive  action  on  the  part  of  Russia  the  way  had  been 
prepared  by  the  construction  of  railways  in  Siberia  and  Manchuria — 
a work  of  many  years ; and  it  is  significant  that  Russia  should  have 
timed  her  refusal  to  carry  out  the  Agreement  for  evacuation  so  as 
to  coincide  with  the  completion  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway, 
which  practically  established  direct  railway  communication  between 
Moscow  and  Port  Arthur.  There  could  no  longer  be  any  doubt  that 
the  Russian  Government  had  not  abandoned  the  far-reaching  designs 
which  her  lease  of  Port  Arthur  had  heralded,  and  was  bent  on 
pursuing  a provocative  policy.  Count  de  Witte,  in  the  Memoirs 
already  quoted,  holds  the  late  Tsar  directly  responsible  for  the 
course  adopted,  which  he  describes  as  “ the  Far  Eastern  adventure.” 
The  Tsar,  he  says,  had  no  definite  programme  of  conquest,  but  was 
anxious  to  spread  Russian  influence  in  the  Far  East  by  acquiring 
fresh  territory,  and  he  speaks  of  him  as  having  a thirst  for  military 
glory  and  conquests.  He  further  explains  that  the  Tsar  at  this 
time  came  under  the  influence  of  Bezobrazov,  Plehve  and  other 
unscrupulous  officials,  who  encouraged  him  to  defy  Japan.  Had 
Russia  at  this  stage  of  affairs  been  content  to  limit  her  activity  to 
Manchuria,  leaving  Japan  a clear  field  in  Korea,  the  Russo-Japanese 
war  would  probably  not  have  taken  place,  or  it  might,  at  least,  have 
been  postponed.  A proposal  to  this  effect  was,  indeed,  made  by 


War  with  Russia  257 

Japan  in  the  course  of  the  negotiations  between  the  two  Powers, 
which  were  commenced  at  the  Russian  capital  about  the  time  of 
Alcxeieff’s  appointment,  and  continued  until  early  in  the  following 
year.  Russia,  however,  refused  to  entertain  it.  The  uncompro- 
mising and  obdurate  attitude  she  displayed  was  in  marked  contrast 
to  the  conciliatory  disposition  evinced  by  Japan.  For  the  deadlock 
thus  created  Russia  alone  was  responsible.  The  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, recognizing  the  futility  of  any  further  attempt  to  arrive  at  a 
satisfactory  understanding  with  her,  decided  to  take  the  bull  by  the 
horns,  and  terminate  negotiations.  Accordingly,  in  two  Notes 
addressed  to  the  Russian  Government  on  the  5th  February,  1904, 
it  announced  its  intention  to  break  off  diplomatic  relations,  reserving 
to  itself  the  right  to  take  what  independent  action  might  be  necessary 
to  defend  its  threatened  interests.  At  the  same  time  the  Japanese 
Government  sent  a circular  despatch  to  the  same  effect  to  its  diplo- 
matic representatives  abroad  for  the  information  of  the  Governments 
to  which  they  were  accredited. 

Hostilities  were  commenced  by  Japan  at  Port  Arthur  and 
Chemulpo  two  days  before  her  formal  declaration  of  war,  which 
was  not  made  until  the  10th  February.  This  action  on  her  part 
evoked  some  unfavourable  criticism,  though  many  precedents  for 
this  step  existed.  Her  declaration  of  war  was  followed  a fortnight 
later  by  the  signature  at  Seoul  of  a Protocol  by  which  Japan  guaran- 
teed the  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  Korea,  who  in 
return  granted  to  her  all  facilities  in  the  peninsula  which  might  be 
necessary  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  a similar  step  was  taken  by  Japan  at  the  outset  of  her  war  with 
China. 

When  the  latter  conflict  took  place  the  world  in  general,  for  the 
most  part  ignorant  of  the  conditions  existing  in  the  two  countries, 
anticipated  the  defeat  of  Japan,  an  opinion  governed  to  a great 
extent  by  considerations  of  geography,  population  and  visible  re- 
sources. On  the  same  grounds  a similar  view,  adverse  to  Japan’s 
chances  of  success  in  a struggle  with  Russia,  prevailed  in  most 
quarters.  For  a nation  far  inferior  in  extent  of  territory,  population, 
military  organization,  and  resources,  to  challenge  a leading  European 
Power  seemed,  on  the  face  of  things,  a proceeding  which  could  only 
invite  disaster.  The  two  countries  were,  nevertheless,  not  so  un- 
evenly matched  as  was  supposed  to  be  the  case.  Without  doubt 

R 


258  War  with  Russia 

Russia  was  an  adversary  with  whom  the  strongest  military  state 
would  have  preferred  to  keep  on  good  terms.  Her  extensive  terri- 
tories and  large  population,  her  apparently  inexhaustible  resources, 
gave  her  great  advantages  over  Japan.  These  advantages  were, 
however,  counterbalanced  by  certain  patent  weaknesses.  The  war 
was  unpopular.  The  policy  of  adventure  which  provoked  it  was 
condemned  by  her  own  wisest  statesmen.  There  was  much  political 
unrest.  She  was  fighting  not  in  Europe,  but  on  a remote  fringe  of 
her  vast  empire.  The  Amur  Railway,  projected  with  a view  to 
consolidate  her  widely  separated  dominions,  was  not  completed  east 
of  Lake  Baikal ; nor  had  the  railway  authorities  yet  finished  the 
portion  round  the  southern  end  of  that  lake,  communication  across 
which  was  still  maintained  by  specially  built  steamers.  It  was 
doubtful,  therefore,  if  the  recently  built  Chinese  Eastern  Railway, 
which  served  as  a temporary  substitute,  would  prove  to  be  a reliable 
line  of  communications  for  war  purposes.  In  Japan,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  war  was  not  only  popular,  but  eagerly  welcomed.  The 
efficiency  of  the  army,  no  less  than  the  fighting  capacity  and  endur- 
ance of  the  Japanese  soldier,  had  been  tested  in  the  war  with  China, 
and  in  the  course  of  the  eight  years  that  had  since  elapsed  the 
Government  had  spared  no  effort  to  bring  it  to  the  level  of  European 
standards.  Though  Japanese  statesmen,  conscious  of  Russia’s 
strength,  might  share  the  apprehensions  felt  abroad  as  to  the  issue 
of  the  struggle,  they  derived  encouragement  from  the  whole- 
hearted support  given  to  the  Government  by  the  people.  All  classes 
realized  that  the  stake  at  issue  for  Russia  was  very  different  from 
what  it  was  for  Japan.  The  former  was  fighting  to  acquire  fresh 
territory ; the  latter  was  fighting  for  her  life.  Under  these  circum- 
stances a warlike  nation,  fighting  at  its  own  doors,  might  conceivably 
accomplish  great  things  against  a foe  whose  heart  was  not  in  the 
struggle.  The  spirit  which  animated  her  people  and  her  army  was 
one  of  the  factors  in  Japan’s  success. 

No  time  was  lost  by  the  Japanese  in  the  conduct  of  military 
operations.  On  the  8th  February  a Japanese  squadron,  escorting 
transports,  arrived  off  Chemulpo,  where  two  Russian  vessels  were 
lying  at  anchor  unprepared  for  hostilities.  Given  the  choice  of  being 
attacked  in  the  harbour  or  fighting  outside,  the  Russian  commander 
chose  the  latter  alternative.  His  two  vessels  were  no  match  for  the 
squadron  they  encountered.  Driven  back  into  port  badly  damaged, 


Success  of  Japan  259 

one  was  sunk  and  the  other  blown  up  by  its  crew.  The  same  night 
Admiral  Togo,  the  Japanese  naval  Commander-in-Chicf,  delivered  a 
torpedo  attack  on  the  Russian  fleet  at  Port  Arthur.  In  this  action 
two  Russian  battleships  and  a cruiser  sustained  severe  damage.  On 
the  following  day  the  Japanese  troops  (some  four  battalions)  which 
had  arrived  under  naval  escort  at  Chemulpo  landed,  and  occupied 
the  Korean  capital.  The  first  actions  of  the  war  thus  resulted  in 
favour  of  Japan. 

At  this  early  stage  it  became  apparent  that  Russia’s  superiority  at 
sea  was  greatly  nullified  by  the  faulty  disposition  of  her  squadrons. 
While  her  main  fleet  in  Far  Eastern  waters  was  stationed  at  Port 
Arthur,  a powerful  squadron  remained  isolated  at  Vladivostok.  A 
large  portion  of  her  navy,  moreover,  was  kept  at  home,  whence  it 
only  emerged  late  in  the  war  to  be  destroyed  in  the  battle  of  Tsushima. 
Two  other  obstacles  the  Russian  commanders  had  to  contend  with  : 
the  ice-bound  condition  of  Vladivostok  for  several  months  in  the 
year,  and  the  almost  insurmountable  difficulty  of  repairing  vessels 
owing  to  the  absence  of  adequate  dockyard  facilities.  In  all  these 
respects  Japan  had  an  advantage.  Her  harbours  were  free  from  ice. 
She  was  well  provided  with  naval  arsenals,  and  with  dockyards  for 
the  repair  of  her  ships.  On  the  outbreak  of  war,  too,  her  fleet  was 
at  once  concentrated  at  Sasebo,  the  naval  arsenal  near  Nagasaki,  a 
detached  squadron  being  posted  in  the  Korean  scraits,  whence  it 
could  watch  Vladivostok.  From  the  first,  therefore,  the  Russian 
naval  forces  in  the  Far  East  were  separated,  nor  throughout  the  war 
were  they  ever  able  to  effect  a junction.  Moreover,  whereas  the 
Russian  home  fleet  took  no  part  in  the  war  until  it  was  drawing  to 
a close,  the  Japanese  navy  early  in  the  struggle  received  a welcome 
reinforcement  in  the  shape  of  two  new  battleships  acquired  in 
Europe  from  a neutral  Power. 

In  the  naval  operations  which  ensued  at  Port  Arthur  the  Japanese, 
besides  resorting  to  vigorous  bombardments,  delivered  repeated 
torpedo  attacks,  and  attempted  on  several  occasions  to  seal  up  the 
harbour  by  sinking  vessels  at  the  entrance.  Neither  of  these  courses 
was  attended  with  the  success  hoped  for  ; nor  had  they  the  effect 
of  inducing  the  Russian  fleet  to  come  out  and  fight.  Greater  success 
resulted  from  the  laying  of  mines  in  front  of  Port  Arthur.  In  April 
the  Russian  flagship  Petropavlosk  struck  one  of  these  mines  and  was 
blown  up,  the  new  Russian  admiral,  Makharoff,  who  had  just  taken 


260 


Success  of  Japan 

over  command  of  the  fleet,  being  killed  in  the  explosion.  Another 
battleship  was  at  the  same  time  seriously  damaged.  A little  later 
the  Japanese  also  laid  mines  at  the  entrance  of  Vladivostok,  thus 
restricting  the  movements  of  the  Russian  squadron  at  that  port, 
which  had  previously  shown  mischievous  activity  in  attacks  on 
Japanese  transports.  When  the  Russians,  copying  the  methods  of 
the  enemy,  took  to  laying  mines  themselves,  the  results  were  disas- 
trous for  the  Japanese,  two  of  their  best  battleships  and  a despatch- 
boat  being  destroyed  by  this  means  in  the  month  of  May.  These 
losses  were,  however,  so  carefully  concealed  that  the  Russians  knew 
nothing  of  their  occurrence  till  it  was  too  late  to  take  advantage 
of  them. 

The  excessive  caution  displayed  by  the  Russian  naval  commanders 
in  the  opening  stages  of  the  war  was  no  effective  answer  to  the  bold 
tactics  of  their  opponents.  The  inaction  of  the  main  fleet  at  Port 
Arthur,  its  refusal  for  several  months  to  accept  the  risks  of  a general 
engagement,  gave  the  Japanese  navy  thus  early  in  the  struggle  a 
moral  superiority  that  was  never  lost.  Furthermore,  it  enabled 
Japan  to  gain  practically  the  command  of  the  sea,  so  essential  to  the 
prosecution  of  military  operations  on  the  mainland. 

The  Japanese  operations  on  land  began  with  the  disembarkation 
of  the  1st  Army  of  three  divisions  under  General  Kuroki  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Ta-tong  river  and  the  occupation  of  the  important 
town  of  Ping-yang,  where  the  Chinese  army  had  made  its  first  stand 
in  the  war  of  1894-5.  The  few  Russian  troops  in  the  neighbourhood 
fell  back  on  the  Yalu  river,  the  boundary  at  this  point  between 
Korea  and  China.  Here  in  a strong  position  on  the  Chinese  side 
of  that  river,  and  at  its  junction  with  a tributary  stream,  the  Ai-ho, 
a Russian  army  of  some  20,000  men  under  General  Zasulich  awaited 
attack.  This  was  delivered  by  the  Japanese  after  some  preliminary 
skirmishing  on  the  30th  April,  and  resulted  in  the  defeat  of  the 
Russians  with  the  loss  of  over  twenty  guns,  their  casualties  being 
far  greater  than  those  of  the  victors.  A few  days  later  the  2nd 
Japanese  army  under  General  Oku  landed  at  Pitzuwo,  a place  on 
the  east  coast  of  the  Liaotung  peninsula  some  sixty  miles  from  Port 
Arthur,  and  cut  the  railway  line  connecting  that  fortress  with  Liao- 
yang,  the  town  chosen  by  General  Kuropatkin,  the  Russian  Com- 
mander-in-Chief,  for  the  concentration  of  his  forces.  The  dis- 
embarkation of  this  army  was  covered  by  the  Japanese  fleet,  which 


Success  of  Japan  261 

had  made  the  Elliot  islands  its  advanced  base.  In  the  middle  of 
May  another  Japanese  force,  which  afterwards  formed  part  of  the 
4th  Army  led  by  General  Nodzu,  landed  at  Takushan,  midway 
between  Pitzuwo  and  the  mouth  of  the  Yalu.  At  the  end  of  that 
month  the  2nd  Army,  after  a severe  struggle,  defeated  a Russian 
force  entrenched  in  a formidable  position  at  Nanshan,  on  the 
isthmus  of  Chin-chou,  which  connects  the  two  peninsulas  of  Liao- 
tung and  Kawn-tung.  The  position  captured  was  of  importance,  as 
guarding  the  approaches  to  Port  Arthur.  On  this  occasion  the 
Japanese  took  many  siege  guns,  but  their  casualties  were  much 
heavier  than  those  of  the  Russians.  The  landing  of  Oku’s  army  was 
followed  early  in  June  by  that  of  the  3rd  Army  under  General  Nogi, 
to  whom  was  assigned  the  role  of  besieging  Port  Arthur.  Soon  after- 
wards the  repulse  by  General  Oku  of  a Russian  force  sent  to  relieve 
the  fortress  enabled  the  3rd  Army  to  begin  the  execution  of  its 
task.  Meanwhile  further  Japanese  reinforcements  had  reached 
Takushan,  and  in  July  General  Nodzu  arrived  and  took  command 
of  the  4th  Army,  the  formation  of  which  was  by  this  time  complete. 
This,  and  the  1st  Army  under  Kuroki,  then  moved  westwards  on 
parallel  lines  through  the  mountain  passes  of  Southern  Manchuria, 
driving  before  them  the  Russian  forces  which  they  encountered  ; 
while  General  Oku  with  the  2nd  Army  moving  from  the  south-west 
struck  northwards,  the  objective  in  each  case  being^Liao-yang,  where 
General  Kuropatkin  had  established  his  head- quarters.  At  this  stage 
the  campaign  in  Manchuria  divided  itself  into  two  distinct  and 
independent  operations  : the  advance  north  and  west  of  the  three 
Japanese  armies  under  Generals  Oku,  Kuroki  and  Nodzu  in  a con- 
verging movement  towards  Liao-yang  ; and  the  investment  of  Port 
Arthur  by  the  3rd  Army  under  General  Nogi. 

As  the  result  of  the  converging  movement  of  the  northern  armies, 
in  the  course  of  which  the  treaty  port  of  Newchwang  was  occupied, 
their  total  length  of  front  had  in  the  beginning  of  August  been 
reduced  from  150  to  45  miles.  This  success  was  not  gained  without 
severe  fighting  at  different  points,  in  which,  however,  the  Japanese 
losses  compared,  on  the  whole,  favourably  with  those  of  the  enemy. 
On  the  10th  of  the  same  month  the  Russian  fleet  at  Port  Arthur 
made  its  first  and  only  sortie  in  full  strength,  its  object  being  to 
join  forces  with  the  squadron  at  Vladivostok.  The  attempt  failed. 
In  the  general  engagement  that  ensued  four  Russian  ships  succeeded 


262  Success  of  Japan 

in  running  the  gauntlet  of  the  Japanese  fleet  and  reaching  neutral 
ports,  but  the  other  vessels  were  driven  back  into  harbour  severely 
damaged.  Of  those  which  escaped,  three  were  interned  at  the  ports 
where  they  arrived  ; while  the  fourth,  the  Novik,  which  had  put 
into  Kiaochow,  was  subsequently  intercepted  and  sunk  on  her  way 
to  Vladivostok.  A similar  sortie  made  about  the  same  time  by  the 
Vladivostok  squadron  was  equally  unsuccessful.  These  two  engage- 
ments put  an  end  to  the  activity  of  the  Russian  naval  forces  in  the 
Far  East. 

The  battle  of  Liao-yang,  the  first  big  battle  of  the  war,  was  fought 
under  the  immediate  direction  of  Marshal  Oyama,  the  Japanese 
Commander-in-Chief,  who  had  accompanied  the  2nd  Army  on  its 
march  north.  There  was  little  disparity  in  point  of  numbers  between 
the  forces  engaged  on  each  side,  but  the  Russians  had  an  advantage 
in  cavalry  over  the  Japanese,  and  were  also  much  stronger  in  artillery. 
Beginning  on  the  23rd  of  August,  it  lasted  until  the  morning  of  the 
3rd  September,  when  Kuropatkin  gave  orders  for  the  retirement  of 
the  whole  army  towards  Mukden.  The  losses  on  each  side  were 
about  equal,  a fact  which,  considering  the  strength  of  the  Russian 
position,  was  very  creditable  to  the  Japanese.  In  the  beginning  of 
October  the  second  big  battle,  that  of  the  Shaho,  so  called  from  the 
name  of  a river  in  the  vicinity,  took  place.  On  this  occasion  it  was 
Kuropatkin  who  took  the  offensive.  Again  the  Japanese  were 
successful,  the  Russians  being  driven  back  with  twice  the  loss  sustained 
by  their  opponents. 

On  the  2nd  January  Port  Arthur  fell.  After  the  investment  of 
the  fortress  had  become  complete,  three  successive  general  assaults 
made  in  August,  October  and  November  had  failed.  Eventually,  on 
the  5th  of  December,  the  Japanese  succeeded  in  storming  the 
position  known  as  203  Metre  Hill,  which  commanded  the  remaining 
defences,  as  well  as  the  harbour  in  which  was  contained  what  was 
left  of  the  Russian  main  fleet.  A month  later  the  commander  of 
the  fortress,  General  Stoessel,  surrendered.  The  siege  had  cost  the 
Japanese  between  thirty  and  forty  thousand  casualties,  but  the  prize 
was  well  worth  this  cost.  The  Russian  main  fleet  had  ceased  to  exist, 
and  Nogi’s  troops  were  free  to  march  north  to  reinforce  the  Japanese 
armies  threatening  Mukden.  During  the  short  interval  separating 
the  fall  of  Port  Arthur  from  the  final  battle  of  the  war  Kuropatkin 
again  assumed  the  offensive.  But  the  attack  was  not  pushed  vigor- 


Success  of  Japan  263 

ously,  and  after  a few  days  of  fighting  the  Russians  at  the  end  of 
January  retired,  having  sustained  heavy  losses.  It  was  now  mid- 
winter, but,  in  spite  of  the  intense  cold,  the  Japanese  Commander- 
in-Chief  decided  to  continue  his  advance  on  Mukden.  In  this 
decision  he  was  influenced  by  the  successful  working  of  the  single 
line  of  railway  by  which  the  communications  of  the  Russian  armies 
were  maintained.  The  utility  of  this  line  had  exceeded  all  expecta- 
tions. By  this  means  constant  reinforcements  were  reaching  Kuro- 
patkin.  Delay  until  spring,  moreover,  would  help  the  Russians  in 
several  ways  : it  would  give  time  for  the  arrival  of  fresh  troops  ; it 
would  enable  them  to  strengthen  their  entrenchments  at  Mukden  ; 
and  the  break-up  of  winter  would  render  military  operations  difficult. 
A further  consideration,  which  doubtless  had  some  weight  in  the 
resolution  formed  by  Oyama,  lay  in  the  fact  that  his  armies  would 
shortly  be  strengthened  by  the  addition  of  Nogi’s  troops  from  Port 
Arthur. 

The  battle  of  Mukden  resolved  itself  into  a series  of  engagements 
lasting  from  the  last  day  of  February  until  the  16th  of  March,  when 
Kuropatkin,  acknowledging  defeat,  retreated  up  the  railway  to 
Tiehling  with  an  estimated  loss  of  140,000  men  and  a vast  quantity 
of  war  material.  The  Japanese  losses  were  well  under  50,000  killed 
and  wounded. 

The  final  episode  of  the  war  took  place  at  sea  some  two  months 
later.  The  fierce  assaults  delivered  by  the  Japanese  army  besieging 
Port  Arthur  in  the  previous  autumn  had  been  hastened  by  the  news 
that  the  Russian  Baltic  fleet  was  on  its  way  to  the  Far  East,  having 
sailed  on  the  15th  October,  1904.  Delayed  by  coaling  difficulties 
and  the  necessity  of  maintaining  a uniform  rate  of  progress,  this 
fleet  did  not  reach  Japanese  waters  until  May,  1905.  On  the  27th 
of  that  month  it  was  met  in  the  Tsushima  straits  by  a Japanese  fleet 
under  Admiral  Togo  and  completely  defeated,  only  two  vessels 
escaping  to  tell  the  tale  of  disaster. 

The  exhaustion  of  both  combatants  in  the  long  and  arduous 
struggle  prepared  the  way  for  the  termination  of  hostilities.  Though 
she  had  been  successful  on  land  as  well  as  at  sea,  the  military  reserves 
at  the  disposal  of  Japan  were  seriously  depleted,  and  the  people  were 
tired  of  war.  Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  though  free  from  anxiety 
on  this  score,  was  beset  by  internal  difficulties  of  a kind  which 
threatened  grave  trouble  were  the  war  to  be  prolonged.  In  these 


264  Peace  Terms 

circumstances  the  overtures  set  on  foot  in  the  following  June  by 
President  Roosevelt,  acting  of  his  own  accord  as  peacemaker,  were 
welcomed  by  both  Powers.  The  negotiations,  conducted  at  Ports- 
mouth in  the  United  States,  resulted  in  the  conclusion  of  peace  on 
the  5th  day  of  September,  1905.  By  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth, 
Russia  acknowledged  the  preponderating  interests  of  Japan  in  Korea, 
ceded  to  Japan  the  southern  half  of  Saghalien,  which  the  latter  had 
exchanged  in  1875  for  the  Kurile  islands,  and  transferred  to  her  the 
larger  and  more  valuable  portion  of  the  rights  in  Manchuria  acquired 
from  China  in  connection  with  the  lease  of  Port  Arthur  in  1898. 
No  war  indemnity,  however,  was  paid  by  Russia,  though  she  under- 
took to  reimburse  Japan  for  the  cost  of  maintenance  of  the  large 
number  of  Russian  prisoners  taken  during  the  war.  The  absence  of 
any  provision  for  an  indemnity  caused  considerable  dissatisfaction  in 
Japan,  some  slight  disturbances  occurring  in  the  Capital.  Japan  had, 
indeed,  no  reason  to  be  dissatisfied  with  the  results  of  her  success  in 
the  war,  for  it  placed  her  at  once  in  the  position  of  a first-class  Power 
in  the  Far  East. 

The  conclusion  of  peace  was  followed  by  the  signature  in  the 
Korean  capital  on  the  17th  of  November  of  a Convention  establish- 
ing a Japanese  protectorate  over  Korea.  The  formal  consent  of 
China  to  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth,  ceding  to 
Japan  the  lease  of  Port  Arthur,  and  transferring  to  her  the  southern 
portion  of  the  Manchurian  Railway,  was  also  obtained  by  a Treaty 
between  China  and  Japan,  which  was  signed  in  Peking  on  the  22nd 
of  December.  And  in  the  following  June  a Japanese  Imperial 
Ordinance  was  issued  establishing  the  South  Manchurian  Railway 
Company,  by  which,  thenceforth,  the  administration  of  the  line, 
and  of  the  strip  of  territory  through  which  it  passed,  was  conducted. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 


Weakening  of  Cordiality  with  America — Causes  of  Friction — Expansion  and 
Emigration — Annexation  of  Korea — New  Treaties. 

ATTENTION  has  already  been  called  to  the  very  friendly 
L % relations  existing  for  many  years  between  Japan  and  the 
A.  -A.  United  States,  relations  so  cordial  as  to  be  responsible  for 
the  distinction  made  between  the  British  and  American  nations  by 
the  Japanese  Press,  which  spoke  of  the  former  as  “ Our  Allies,”  and 
of  the  latter  as  “ Our  best  friends.”  The  reasons  for  the  friendly 
feeling  of  the  Japanese  people  for  America  are  not  far  to  seek. 
It  was  from  America  that  the  first  ideas  of  Western  civilization 
came  ; it  was  her  influence  which  was  most  felt  in  the  earlier  years 
of  reopened  intercourse  with  foreign  nations  ; and  her  policy  of 
diplomatic  independence  and  isolation,  illustrated  strikingly  by  her 
behaviour  in  the  crucial  question  of  Treaty  Revision,  gave  to  her 
dealings  with  Japan  an  air  of  disinterested  benevolence  that  con- 
trasted favourably  with  the  less  complaisant  attitude  of  other 
Powers. 

The  cordiality  of  American  feeling  towards  Japan  had  of  late 
years  diminished  in  some  degree  owing  to  various  causes.  Amongst 
them  were  the  unexpected  disclosure  of  Japan’s  military  strength  in 
the  war  with  China  ; her  apparent  willingness  to  associate  herself 
with  other  Powers  in  the  aggressive  policy  in  regard  to  China,  which 
was  one  of  the  causes  of  the  Boxer  Rising,  and  drew  forth  the  remon- 
strances addressed  by  the  United  States  to  the  Governments  con- 
cerned ; her  territorial  expansion  in  Manchuria  at  the  expense  of 
Russia  ; and  the  protectorate  she  had  assumed  in  Korea,  which  the 
United  States  Government  had  been  inclined  to  regard  in  the  light 
of  a protege.  The  Japanese  people  were  seemingly  unconscious  of 
any  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  American  public  ; and  no  serious 
differences  had  occurred  to  disturb  the  harmony  of  relations.  In 

265 


266  Causes  of  Friction 

1906,  however,  what  is  known  as  the  School  Question  of  California 
gave  rise  to  a troublesome  controversy. 

In  the  autumn  of  that  year  the  San  Francisco  Board  of  Education 
issued  an  order  excluding  Japanese  children  from  the  ordinary  public 
schools  which  they  had  hitherto  attended,  and  providing  for  their 
segregation  in  the  common  Asiatic  school  established  in  1872  in  the 
Chinese  quarter  in  pursuance  of  a State  Law  setting  up  separate 
schools  for  children  of  Mongolian  or  Chinese  descent.  The  law  had 
been  enacted  in  consequence  of  the  great  increase  of  Chinese  immi- 
gration. Welcomed  at  first  owing  to  the  demand  for  labour  on  the 
Pacific  coast,  this  influx  of  Chinese  was  attended  by  obvious  draw- 
backs, both  social  and  moral,  which  were  regarded  by  the  people  of 
California  as  detrimental  to  the  interests  of  the  community.  In 
considerations  of  this  kind  Labour  Unions  in  the  State  found  their 
opportunity,  and  an  agitation  was  fomented  against  “ Chinese  cheap 
labour,”  with  the  result  that  steps  were  taken  by  the  United  States 
Government  to  reduce  this  immigration  to  comparatively  small 
proportions. 

Behind  the  question  raised  by  the  school  authorities  of  San 
Francisco — which  was  a mere  pretext — the  same  forces  were  at  work. 
The  segregation  of  Japanese  school  children  produced  serious  resent- 
ment in  Japan,  the  ill-feeling  evoked  thereby  being  aggravated  by 
misunderstanding  on  the  part  of  the  public  in  both  countries  and 
by  intemperate  writing  in  the  Press.  The  incident,  which  led  to 
some  diplomatic  correspondence  between  the  Governments  con- 
cerned, was  eventually  closed  through  the  intervention  of  President 
Roosevelt  early  in  1907.  Apart  from  its  international  aspect,  the 
difficulty  had  involved  the  troublesome  issue  of  Federal  and  State 
rights.  By  a compromise  arrived  at  between  the  President  and  the 
School  Board  it  was  agreed  that  all  alien  children — no  mention  being 
made  of  Japanese — above  a certain  age  who,  after  examination, 
should  be  found  to  be  deficient  in  the  elements  of  English,  might 
be  sent  to  special  schools ; the  President,  at  the  same  time,  under- 
taking to  secure  some  limitation  of  Japanese  immigration.  In 
accordance  with  this  undertaking  a clause,  providing  for  the  exclusion 
of  certain  classes  of  immigrants,  was  inserted  in  the  Immigration  Act 
of  February,  1907,  the  right  to  legislate  in  such  matters  having  been 
expressly  reserved  by  the  United  States  in  the  revised  Treaty  with 
Japan  of  1894.  Further  negotiations  between  the  two  countries 


Causes  of  Friction  267 

resulted  in  the  conclusion  in  1908  of  what  is  known  as  the  “Gentle- 
men’s Agreement  ” — effected  by  an  exchange  of  confidential  Notes 
— by  which  the  Japanese  Government  consented  to  co-operate  in 
carrying  out  the  purpose  of  the  Act  by  taking  measures  to  restrict 
labour  immigration  from  Japan  to  the  United  States.  When,  there- 
fore, in  1911  a new  Treaty  of  commerce  and  navigation  between 
America  and  Japan  was  negotiated  at  Washington  there  was  good 
reason  to  regard  it  as  putting  an  end  to  the  controversy.  The 
United  States  Senate  in  ratifying  it  recorded  the  understanding 
“ that  the  Treaty  should  not  be  deemed  to  repeal  or  affect  any  of 
the  provisions  of  the  Immigration  Act  of  1907  ” ; and  the  under- 
standing was  confirmed  by  a Declaration — appended  to  the  Treaty — 
stating  the  intention  of  the  Japanese  Government  to  maintain  with 
equal  effectiveness  the  limitation  and  control  which  it  had  exercised 
for  the  past  three  years  in  regulating  the  emigration  of  labourers  to 
the  United  States. 

The  hope  that  nothing  more  would  be  heard  of  the  difficulty  was 
frustrated  by  the  action  of  the  Californian  Legislature.  In  May, 
1913,  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the  Federal  Authorities,  it  passed 
a law  giving  the  right  of  owning  land  only  to  “ aliens  eligible  to 
citizenship.”  The  passing  of  this  law  caused  renewed  resentment 
in  Japan,  where,  notwithstanding  the  form  in  which  it  was  worded, 
it  was  correctly  interpreted  as  being  aimed  at  Japanese  residents. 
The  Japanese  Government  at  once  protested  on  the  ground  that 
Japanese  subjects  being  debarred  from  naturalization  in  America 
the  law  in  question  discriminated  unfairly  against  them,  and  was  in 
effect  a violation  of  Japan’s  treaty  rights.  This  view  the  American 
Government  declined  to  accept,  supporting  the  action  of  the  State 
by  the  argument  that  every  nation  had  the  right  to  determine  such 
questions  for  itself.  The  correspondence  between  the  two  Govern- 
ments continued  for  some  time  without  any  settlement  being 
reached.  It  was  published  at  the  request  of  Japan  in  1914.  This 
discrimination  between  the  Japanese  and  other  aliens,  who,  unlike 
them,  are  eligible  for  naturalization  as  American  citizens,  remains  a 
sore  point  with  the  Japanese  people,  and  is  a stumbling-block  in  the 
relations  between  Japan  and  America. 

Opposition  to  Japanese  labour  immigration  was  not  confined  to 
the  United  States.  Similar  anti-Japanese  feeling  arose  in  Canada. 
In  consequence  of  the  outbreak  of  disturbances  due  to  this  cause  a 


268  Expansion  & Emigration 

Canadian  Mission  was  sent  to  Japan  in  November,  1907,  for  the 
purpose  of  restricting  this  emigration  within  what  were  described  as 
proper  limits,  and  thus  averting  any  renewal  of  the  trouble  that 
had  occurred.  The  object  of  the  mission  was  attained  by  an  exchange 
of  Notes  between  the  head  of  the  mission,  Mr.  Lemieux,  and  the 
Japanese  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  By  the  arrangement  arrived 
at — which  may  have  facilitated  that  concluded,  as  we  have  seen,  in 
the  following  year  between  America  and  Japan — the  Japanese 
Government  undertook  to  adopt  effective  measures  for  restricting 
this  immigration. 

Of  late  years  there  has  been  a tendency,  both  in  the  Press  and  in 
books  about  Japan,  to  associate  closely  two  things  which  are  not 
necessarily  connected — Japanese  expansion  and  emigration.  For 
instance,  the  author  of  Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far  East , speak- 
ing of  Japanese  emigration  to  the  United  States,  observes  that 
“ Japan  required  room  for  her  excess  \sic\  population,  and  outlets 
for  her  expanding  commerce,”  thus  linking  the  two  questions  to- 
gether. And  other  writers  have  used  similar  language.  The  tendency 
referred  to  is  probably  due  to  the  fact  that,  different  as  the  two 
things  are — one  being  simply  a movement  of  population,  the  other 
an  enlargement  of  territory — there  has  in  some  countries  been  a 
direct  connection  between  them.  In  Japan  this  is  not  the  case. 
There,  both  movements  have  taken  place,  but  they  have  remained 
distinct  and  separate. 

Japanese  expansion  stands  in  a category  by  itself.  It  has  attracted 
attention  for  the  reason  that  it  was  unexpected,  the  tendency  of 
Oriental  countries  in  modern  times  being  to  contract  rather  than 
extend  their  frontiers  ; from  its  rapidity  and  wide  extent  ; and  also 
because  it  has  been  the  result  either  of  successful  wars  or  of  a 
policy  of  aggrandisement  justified,  in  Japanese  opinion,  by  State 
necessity. 

Far  otherwise  is  it  with  Japanese  emigration.  What  importance 
it  possesses  is  derived  not  from  the  scale  on  which  it  has  hitherto 
been  conducted — which  by  comparison  with  other  movements  of 
the  kind  elsewhere  is  insignificant — but  from  the  international 
difficulties  it  has  produced,  from  its  association  in  people’s  minds 
with  national  expansion,  and  from  fear  of  the  dimensions  it  may 
assume  in  the  future.  Into  the  many  considerations  involved  in 
Japanese  emigration  it  is  unnecessary  to  enter,  the  question  being 


Expansion  & Emigration  269 

too  wide  to  be  discussed  with  advantage  within  the  limits  of  these 
pages.  A few  remarks  on  the  subject  may,  however,  not  be  out  of 
place. 

The  movement  is  usually  held  to  be  due  to  an  excess  of  population. 
This,  at  least,  is  the  view  held  by  many  writers.  The  increase  of 
population  in  Japan  has  certainly  been  rapid.  In  1872  the  popula- 
tion was  thirty-three  millions.  In  1916  it  had  risen  to  nearly  fifty-six 
millions.  Assuming  the  rate  of  increase  to  be  maintained,  the  total 
population  ten  years  hence  should  be  well  over  sixty  millions.  In 
the  course  of  sixty  years,  therefore,  the  population  will  have  very 
nearly  doubled  itself.  Striking  as  these  figures  are,  the  inference  to 
be  drawn  from  them  is  not  necessarily  that  Japan  is  no  longer  able 
to  support  her  people  in  their  present  numbers,  and  that  some 
further  outlet  for  her  surplus  population  is,  therefore,  a necessity. 
While  the  rapid  increase  of  population  in  a country  may  serve  as  a 
stimulus  to  emigration,  it  is  not  the  sole  or  even  the  governing  factor 
in  the  question.  That  other  influences  count  for  much  is  shown  by 
what  has  taken  place  in  Germany.  Fifty  years  ago  German  states- 
men had  good  ground  for  anxiety  in  the  growing  statistics  of  German 
emigration  to  the  United  States.  Before  the  end  of  the  century  the 
movement  was  arrested,  and  soon  afterwards  ceased  altogether.  The 
two  chief  causes  of  this  change  were  the  increase  of  wealth  and 
industrial  development.  Japanese  emigration  to  certain  countries 
may  before  long,  for  the  same  reasons,  show  a similar  decline.  The 
industrial  development  of  Japan  has  kept  pace  with  her  progress  in 
other  respects.  Her  financial  position  has  also  changed.  Instead  of 
being  a debtor  to  the  world,  as  she  was  before  the  Great  War,  she 
has  now  become  to  an  appreciable  extent  its  creditor.  Although, 
moreover,  parts  of  Japan  may  be  overcrowded,  there  still  remain 
large  areas  in  the  northern  islands,  and  in  her  newly  acquired  terri- 
tories on  the  mainland,  which  are  still  sparsely  populated.  The 
pressure  of  increasing  population  alone  does  not  seem  likely  to  affect 
emigration  in  any  marked  degree  in  the  near  future.  A cause  more 
powerful,  and  in  its  operation  more  constant,  may  be  found  in  the 
natural  energy  and  enterprise  of  the  people,  stimulated,  perhaps,  by 
their  release  from  the  enforced  isolation  of  the  past.  This  supposition 
is  supported  by  the  wide  distribution  of  Japanese  emigration,  and 
by  the  varied  nature  of  the  pursuits  in  which  Japanese  emigrants 
engage  abroad.  Though,  as  has  already  been  observed,  the  Japanese 


2 jo  Annexation  of  Korea 

have  not,  as  yet,  disclosed  any  special  aptitude  for  colonization  of 
the  pioneering  type,  they  are  to  be  met  with  to-day  in  South  America 
and  elsewhere  as  workers  on  the  land,  and  traders  ; in  Australasia 
as  pearl-fishers ; in  China,  the  Straits  Settlements  and  Java,  as  well 
as  in  India  and  Australia,  as  traders  and  shopkeepers  ; in  Manchuria 
as  agricultural  labourers  and  farmers,  the  Korean  immigrants  there 
having  since  the  annexation  of  Korea  become  Japanese  subjects  ; on 
the  coasts  of  the  northern  and  southern  Pacific  as  fishermen  ; in 
America  and  Canada  as  traders,  farmers,  shopkeepers,  market- 
gardeners  and  labourers  ; and  in  the  Malay  States  as  planters. 

In  its  inception,  it  may  be  added,  Japanese  emigration  took  the 
form  of  indentured  labour.  The  first  labour  emigrants  went  to 
Hawaii — not  then  annexed  to  America — under  conditions  regulated 
by  the  Japanese  and  Hawaiian  Governments  ; and  it  was  the  sur- 
reptitious entry  of  many  of  these  labourers  into  California  from 
Hawaii  that  first  aroused  American  hostility.  The  development  of 
this  branch  of  emigration — encouraged  by  agencies  established  for 
the  purpose,  but  still  subject,  as  before,  to  a certain  measure  of 
official  supervision — would  seem  to  be  a mere  question  of  supply  and 
demand.  The  future  of  other  emigration  will  depend  on  the  degree 
of  opposition,  or  competition,  it  encounters.  So  far,  however,  as 
the  United  States  and  Canada  are  concerned,  the  hostility  it  has 
evoked,  and  the  willingness  of  the  Japanese  Government  to  co- 
operate in  its  restriction,  suggest  that  the  number  of  emigrants  to 
those  countries  will  gradually  decline. 

The  immediate  results  of  Japan’s  success  in  the  Russo-Japanese 
war  were,  as  we  have  seen,  the  establishment  of  a protectorate  over 
Korea  and  the  negotiation  of  a Treaty  with  China,  confirming 
certain  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  concerning  the 
transfer  to  her  of  the  Russian  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  of  the  southern 
portion  of  the  Manchurian  railway.  Anxious  to  devote  herself  to 
the  task  of  consolidating  her  new  position  in  the  Far  East,  Japan 
during  the  next  few  years  was  as  busily  engaged  in  negotiating 
treaties  and  agreements  with  other  Powers  as  she  had  been  in  the 
fifteen  years  of  treaty  making  which  followed  the  signature  of  Perry’s 
Treaty.  In  1907  she  concluded  an  arrangement  for  safeguarding 
peace  in  the  Far  East  with  France  ; a similar  Agreement  with  Russia 
(in  the  form  of  a Convention),  which,  however,  included  a mutual 


New  Treaties 


271 

pledge  to  respect  the  territorial  integrity  and  the  rights  of  each 
accruing  from  arrangements  in  force  between  it  and  China  ; a 
Commercial  Treaty,  a Fisheries  Treaty  and  a Consular  Protocol  with 
the  same  country  ; an  Agreement  with  China  regarding  the  Sim- 
mintun,  Mukden  and  Kirin  Railway  ; and  a fresh  Treaty  with  Korea, 
which  placed  all  administrative  authority  in  the  peninsula  in  the 
hands  of  the  Japanese  Resident-General.  The  following  year  wit- 
nessed the  negotiation  of  an  Arbitration  Treaty  with  the  United 
States,  as  well  as  an  exchange  of  Notes  between  the  same  two  Govern- 
ments for  the  declared  purpose  of  preserving  the  independence  and 
territorial  integrity  of  China.  Two  other  arrangements  testified  to 
her  treaty-making  activity.  One  of  these  was  another  railway  Agree- 
ment, made  in  1907,  with  China.  On  this  occasion  the  railway  in 
question  was  the  line  now  connecting  Mukden  with  the  port  of 
Antung.  It  was  presumably  this  fresh  railway  Agreement  which 
induced  the  American  Government  to  submit  to  other  Powers 
interested  in  the  Far  East  in  the  autumn  of  the  same  year  a proposal 
for  the  neutralization  of  Manchurian  railways.  Far  from  being 
accepted  by  Russia  and  Japan — the  two  Powers  chiefly  concerned — 
the  proposal  only  resulted  in  the  conclusion  in  the  following  year  of 
an  Agreement  by  which  each  undertook  to  maintain,  by  joint  action, 
if  necessary,  the  existing  status  quo  in  Manchuria. 

The  other,  of  a very  different  character,  was  a Treaty  with  Korea 
annexing  that  country  to  Japan,  which  was  signed  at  Seoul  in  August, 
1910,  by  the  Japanese  Resident-General  and  the  Korean  Minister- 
Resident.  The  annexation  of  a country  by  Treaty  in  the  absence 
of  prior  hostilities  was  an  unusual  procedure  for  which  no  precedent 
existed.  No  less  remarkable  than  the  method  adopted  was  the  fact 
that  Article  8 of  the  instrument  recorded  with  unconscious  irony 
the  consent  of  the  Sovereign  of  the  annexed  State  to  the  loss  of  its 
independence.  This  independence  Japan  had  on  several  occasions 
announced  her  intention  to  respect  in  engagements  entered  into  with 
other  Powers — with  China,  with  Russia  and  with  Great  Britain,  as 
well  as  with  Korea  herself.  Her  annexation  of  Korea,  being  for  this 
reason  unexpected,  met  with  much  unfavourable  criticism  abroad. 
The  course,  however,  that  she  had  adopted  at  the  outset  of  her 
wars  with  China  and  Russia  of  making  free  use  of  Korean  territory 
showed  that  she  was  not  disposed  to  let  the  wishes,  or  convenience, 
of  the  Korean  people  stand  in  the  way  of  military  operations.  The 


New  Treaties 


272 

protectorate  she  had  already  established  over  Korea  in  1905,  and  her 
assumption  of  the  control  of  administration  in  that  country  two 
years  later,  were  also  ominous  indications  of  what  might  happen 
later.  Some  justification  of  the  final  act  of  annexation,  singular  as 
the  method  employed  may  have  been,  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
the  chronic  disturbances  in  Korea,  for  which  Japan  was  by  no  means 
solely  responsible,  had  led  to  two  wars,  and  that  there  was  some 
blunt  truth  in  the  statement  in  the  preamble  to  the  Treaty,  which 
declared  one  of  the  objects  of  annexation  to  be  the  preservation  of 
peace  in  the  Far  East.  It  may  even  be  said  that  an  unprejudiced 
observer  of  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Korea  in  the  years  previous 
to  the  establishment  of  the  protectorate  would  have  no  hesitation 
in  holding  the  view  that  Japanese  administration  of  that  country  is 
preferable,  even  in  the  interests  of  the  Koreans  themselves,  to  the 
shocking  misgovernment  of  the  past. 

The  signature  of  the  Treaty  of  Annexation  was  accompanied  by 
a Declaration  on  the  part  of  the  Japanese  Government  announcing 
certain  arrangements  designed  to  lessen  any  irritation  which  the 
abrupt  and  arbitrary  annulment  of  Korea’s  treaties  with  other 
countries  might  occasion.  These  concessions  to  foreign  feeling  in- 
cluded matters  relating  to  jurisdiction,  Customs,  tonnage  duties  and 
the  coasting  trade.  Four  years  later  the  foreign  settlements  in  Korea 
were  abolished  with  the  consent  of  the  Powers  concerned. 

Her  Revised  Treaties  with  foreign  Powers,  which  came  into 
operation  in  1899  for  a term  of  twelve  years,  gave  Japan  the  right 
to  denounce  them  at  the  end  of  that  period — in  other  words,  to 
announce  her  intention  to  terminate  them  by  giving  the  twelve 
months’  notice  required.  This  notice  was  given  by  Japan  to  all  the 
Treaty  Powers  in  July,  1910.  The  liberty  to  conclude  new  treaties 
when  the  term  of  notice  expired  involved  a point  of  essential  import- 
ance, the  recovery  of  tariff  autonomy — the  right,  that  is  to  say,  to 
control  her  own  tariff.  Negotiations  for  the  conclusion  of  new 
treaties  were  at  once  set  on  foot,  the  first  to  be  concluded  being  that 
with  the  United  States,  which  was  signed  in  February  of  the  follow- 
ing year  ; the  second,  the  Treaty  with  Great  Britain,  which  followed 
a few  months  later.  The  new  treaties  came  into  force  in  July  of 
the  same  year,  the  period  of  operation  being  twelve  years.  The 
first  public  recognition  of  the  increasing  importance  of  Japan  in  the 
Far  East  occurred,  as  we  have  seen,  when  she  was  included  in  the 


New  Treaties 


273 

list  of  Powers  consulted  by  the  American  Government  in  1899  in 
regard  to  the  observance  of  the  principle  of  the  “ open  door  ” and 
“ equal  opportunity  ” in  China.  By  her  success  in  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war  six  years  later  she  established  her  claim  to  be  regarded 
as  a leading  Power  in  the  Far  East.  Her  position,  nevertheless,  was 
inferior  in  one  respect  to  that  of  the  Western  States,  for  she  had 
not  the  entire  control  of  her  tariff.  With  the  conclusion  of  the  new 
treaties,  by  which  this  last  disability  was  removed,  she  took  rank  on 
a footing  of  complete  equality  with  the  great  Powers  of  the  world. 


s 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 


Rise  of  Japan  and  Germany  Compared — Renewal  of  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance 
— Japan  and  the  Great  War — Military  and  Naval  Expansion — Japan  and 
China — The  Twenty-one  Demands — Agreement  with  Russia  regarding 
China — Lansing-Ishii  Agreement — Effects  of  Great  War  on  Situation 
in  Far  East. 

THE  rise  of  Japan  finds  a parallel  in  that  of  Germany.  There 
are,  indeed,  in  the  circumstances  attending  the  develop- 
ment of  the  two  countries  not  a few  points  of  resemblance. 
In  each  case  the  direct  cause  was  military  success,  and  in  each  the 
long  existence  of  feudalism  had  the  effect  of  rendering  a naturally 
warlike  people  submissive  to  the  will  of  its  rulers  and  responsive  to 
the  teaching  of  tradition.  In  each  loyalty  to  the  Throne  was  accom- 
panied by  an  exaggerated  form  of  patriotism,  which  needed  only 
opportunity  to  become  aggressive.  In  each,  again,  autocratic  in- 
stincts, the  centralization  of  authority,  and  the  pressure  of  a powerful 
bureaucracy,  combined  to  exalt  the  State  at  the  expense  of  the 
individual.  And  though  the  personal  rule  of  the  Sovereign,  so  con- 
spicuous in  German  history,  was  lacking  in  Japan,  its  absence  was 
more  than  compensated  for  by  the  popular  belief  in  the  divine 
descent  of  the  monarch. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  is  not  surprising  that  Germany 
should  have  been  chosen  as  the  model  for  so  many  of  the  new  insti- 
tutions established  in  the  course  of  the  Meiji  era,  or  that  the  modern 
Japan  which  ultimately  took  shape  should  in  many  of  its  character- 
istics come  to  bear  a still  closer  resemblance  to  the  country  whence 
so  much  had  been  borrowed.  A nation  that  in  the  process  of  its 
evolution  draws  upon  others  so  freely  as  Japan  has  done  inevitably 
imbibes  ideas  which  affect  its  whole  outlook  on  the  world.  What 
happened  in  early  days,  when  Japan  adopted  the  written  language, 
ethics,  and  administrative  system  of  China,  occurred  again,  though  in 
a lesser  degree,  when  she  became  the  pupil  of  Germany  in  matters 

274 


Rise  of  japan  & Germany  Compared  275 

relating  to  administration,  law  and  military  science.  Thus  the 
Constitution  itself,  framed,  as  we  have  seen,  on  a German  model, 
reserved  all  real  power  in  important  matters  of  State  to  the  Crown  ; 
while  the  adoption  of  the  German  system  of  military  organization 
and  training  increased  the  influence  of  the  army  and  encouraged  the 
growth  of  militarism. 

Describing  the  position  acquired  by  Germany  at  the  time  when 
William  II  succeeded  to  the  Throne  as  King  of  Prussia  and  German 
Emperor,  Mr.  S.  J.  Hill,  at  one  time  U.S.  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  in 
his  Impressions  oj  the  Kaiser , says:  “The  unity  of  the  German 
States  was  secure  . . . and  the  work  of  Bismarck  was  complete. 
That  the  Empire  was  an  achievement  of  superior  military  force  on 
the  part  of  Prussia,  and  in  no  sense  a creation  of  the  German  people, 
was  universally  understood.”  His  statement  is  confirmed  by  an 
article  which  appeared  in  August,  1918,  in  a German  newspaper,  the 
Arbeiter  Zeitung.  “ It  is,”  it  says,  “ to  the  Monarchy,  the  Junkerdom 
and  the  Army  that  the  German  bourgeoisie  owes  the  establishment 
of  the  new  Empire,  which  was  followed  by  so  tremendous  a develop- 
ment of  economic  strength,  wealth  and  power.” 

Japan  at  the  moment  of  which  we  are  speaking  had,  in  like  manner, 
achieved  a unity  of  a kind  unknown  before.  In  the  realization  of 
her  ambition  to  become  a great  Power  she  had  triumphantly  over- 
come all  the  difficulties  inherent  in  the  process  of  transition  from 
conditions  imposed  by  centuries  of  isolation  to  the  new  circum- 
stances of  a modern  State.  The  work  of  the  group  of  statesmen 
successively  engaged  in  the  task  of  reconstruction  was,  like  that  of 
Bismarck,  complete.  And  it  was  generally  acknowledged  that  all 
that  had  been  accomplished  had  been  done  by  the  Government,  and 
not  by  the  Japanese  people. 

The  Government  clothed  with  this  prestige  was  still  a Govern- 
ment of  two  clans,  which  had  gained  their  predominance  by  military 
strength,  and  retained  it  for  the  same  reason  ; the  portfolios  of  War 
and  the  Navy,  and,  with  these,  the  control  of  the  forces  of  the  State, 
having  become,  so  to  speak,  a monopoly  of  Satsuma  and  Choshiu 
clansmen,  who,  as  heads  of  these  departments,  were  virtually  inde- 
pendent of  the  Ministry  of  the  day.  The  results  of  the  dominating 
influence  of  the  two  clans  in  the  administration,  and  the  supremacy 
of  German  ideas  in  the  army,  had  already  shown  themselves  in  the 
growth  of  a strong  military  party  ; in  a cry  for  national  expansion 


276  JaPan  & the  Great  War 

beyond  existing  frontiers,  which  seemed  to  have  less  reason  behind 
it  than  the  Pan-Slavist  and  Pan-German  racial  aspirations  in  Europe  ; 
in  the  development  of  the  simple  feudal  maxims  of  Bushido  into  what 
came  near  to  being  a national  creed  ; and  in  the  increase  of  Chauvin- 
istic writing  in  a section  of  the  Press.  Under  these  circumstances  it 
was  not  surprising  if  from  this  time  forward  a louder  note  should 
be  heard  in  diplomatic  utterances,  and  a more  aggressive  tone  appear 
in  foreign  policy. 

This  change  of  attitude  in  matters  of  foreign  policy  may  be 
traced  in  the  successive  alterations  that  took  place  in  the  terms  of 
the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance.  The  original  Agreement  of  1902 
related  only  to  China  and  Korea,  the  contracting  parties  recognizing 
the  independence  of  both  States  and  declaring  themselves  “ to  be 
entirely  uninfluenced  by  any  aggressive  tendencies  in  either  country.” 
When  the  Agreement  was  renewed  in  August,  1905,  its  application 
was  extended  so  as  to  include  Eastern  Asia  and  India.  No  more  is 
heard  of  the  independence  of  Korea,  but  Japan’s  paramount  rights 
in  that  country  are  recognized,  subject  only  to  the  maintenance  of 
the  principle  of  “ equal  opportunity,”  this  recognition  being  followed 
three  months  later  by  the  establishment  of  a Japanese  protectorate. 

In  the  Agreement  when  renewed  again  in  1911  all  reference  to  Korea 
disappears,  that  country  having  the  year  before  been  annexed  to 
Japan. 

Nor  was  this  change  of  attitude  due  entirely  to  a consciousness  of 
new  power  and  increased  prestige.  In  copying  other  countries  as 
closely  as  was  done  the  process  of  imitation  had  been  carried  so  far 
as  to  extend  to  the  adoption  of  principles  which  were  not  regarded 
with  unqualified  approval  even  in  the  countries  where  they  origi- 
nated. An  instance  in  point  is  the  enforcement  by  the  Japanese  < 
Government  in  China  of  extra-territoriality,  against  which,  when 
applied  to  Japan  by  Western  Governments,  it  had  constantly  pro-  j 
tested  on  the  ground  that  the  principle  was  incompatible  with  the 
sovereignty  of  a State. 

The  action  of  Japan  on  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  in  August, 
1914,  at  once  dispelled  all  doubt  which  may  have  existed  as  to  her 
participation  in  it.  It  also  showed  that  she  had  no  intention  of  ' 
playing  a purely  passive  role.  Within  a fortnight  after  the  com- 
mencement of  hostilities  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany  the 
Japanese  Government  presented  an  ultimatum  to  the  latter  Power 


Japan  China  277 

demanding  the  immediate  withdrawal  from  Japanese  and  Chinese 
waters  of  all  German  vessels  of  war,  and  the  evacuation  by  a given 
date  of  the  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow,  with  a view  to  its  eventual 
restoration  to  China.  The  ultimatum  was  followed  a week  later  by 
a declaration  of  war.  It  has  been  suggested  that  this  swift^action 
frustrated  a design  on  the  part  of  Germany  to  remove  the  leased 
territory  from  the  field  of  hostilities  by  handing  it  back  to  China 
for  the  period  of  the  war.  Both  in  the  ultimatum  and  in  the  declara- 
tion of  war  reference  was  made  to  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  which 
had  been  renewed  in  1905  during  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  and  again 
in  1911,  when  an  Arbitration  Treaty  was  in  process  of  negotiation 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.  This  marked  allusion 
to  the  alliance  pointed  to  the  conclusion  that  Japan’s  entry  into  the 
war  was  in  pursuance  of  a special  understanding  between  the  Govern- 
ments concerned.  It  was,  however,  no  secret  that  the  acquisition 
of  Kiaochow  by  Germany  had  been  as  displeasing  to  Japan  as  the 
Russian  occupation  of  Port  Arthur,  nor  was  it  unreasonable  to  suppose 
that  she  would  welcome  the  first  occasion  that  might  come  to  get 
rid  of  the  obnoxious  intruder.  The  opportunity  furnished  by  her 
entry  into  the  war  wras  promptly  seized.  A strong  expeditionary 
force,  which  included  a contingent  of  British  troops,  was  organized, 
and  by  the  first  week  of  November  the  German  flag  had  ceased  to 
float  at  Kiaochow.  The  Japanese  occupation  in  the  previous  month 
of  the  Caroline,  Marshall  and  Marianne,  or  Ladrone,  groups  of 
islands  contributed  to  the  elimination  of  Germany  from  the  Pacific. 

The  war  that  gave  Japan  the  excuse  she  needed  to  destroy  the 
German  foothold  in  China  presented  her  with  other  opportunities 
of  strengthening  her  position  in  the  Far  East.  The  magnitude  of 
the  military  operations  in  Europe  absorbed  all  the  energies  of  the 
belligerent  States  which  had  interests  in  Eastern  Asia.  They  were 
unable  to  devote  much  attention  to  Far  Eastern  affairs.  Japan  thus 
acquired  a liberty  of  action  which  under  other  circumstances  might 
possibly  have  been  denied  to  her. 

In  an  article  contributed  in  1914  to  the  November  number  of  the 
Shin  Nippon,  or  “ New  Japan,”  a magazine  published  in  Tokio, 
Marquis  Okuma,  who  was  then  Premier,  pointed  out  that  the  ten- 
dency of  the  times  was  such  as  to  justify  the  assumption  that  in  the 
distant  future  a few  strong  nations  would  govern  the  rest  of  the 
world,  and  that  Japan  must  prepare  herself  to  become  one  of  these 


278  The  Twenty-one  Demands 

governing  nations.  And  when  addressing  the  Diet  in  the  following 
month  he  stated,  in  explanation  of  the  programme  of  naval  and 
military  expansion  submitted  to  Parliament,  that  in  order  to  make 
Japanese  diplomatic  dealings  more  effective  an  increase  of  force  was 
needed.  The  lengths  to  which  the  Japanese  Government  was  pre- 
pared to  go  in  order  to  render  its  diplomacy  more  effective  were 
disclosed  when  in  January,  1915,  the  Japanese  Minister  in  Peking 
presented  directly  to  the  President  of  the  Chinese  Republic  the 
well-known  twenty-one  Demands. 

Divided  into  several  groups,  the  Demands  in  the  first  four  included 
the  assent  of  China  to  whatever  might  afterwards  be  agreed  upon 
between  Japan  and  Germany  in  regard  to  the  German  leased  territory 
in  Shantung  taken  by  the  Japanese  in  the  previous  November  ; the 
non-alienation  by  China  to  a third  Power  of  any  territory  in  that 
province  or  any  island  along  its  coast ; concessions  for  railway  con- 
struction, and  the  opening  of  further  places  for  foreign  trade  in  the 
same  province  ; the  extension  from  twenty-five  to  ninety-nine  years 
— the  term  of  the  German  lease  of  Kiaochow — of  the  terms  of  the 
former  Russian  leases  of  Port  Arthur,  Dalny  and  the  South  Man- 
churian Railway,  and  of  the  subsequent  Japanese  lease  of  the  Antun- 
Mukden  Railway ; the  control  and  management  of  the  Kirin- 
Changchun  Railway,  when  completed,  to  be  granted  to  Japan  for 
the  same  term  of  ninety-nine  years ; the  grant  of  mining  rights  to 
Japan  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  ; the  consent 
of  Japan  to  be  obtained  prior  to  permission  being  given  to  other 
foreigners  to  build  railways,  or  make  loans  for  railway  construction 
in  the  territories  in  question,  or  prior  to  the  pledging  of  local  taxes 
in  those  territories  as  security  for  loans  made  to  China  by  a third 
Power  ; Japan  to  be  consulted  before  the  employment  by  China  in 
the  same  territories  of  any  political,  financial,  or  military  advisers  ; 
concessions  giving  Japan  practical  control  over  the  valuable  coal  and 
iron  mines  near  Hankow  belonging  to  the  Hanyeiping  Company, 
which  had  borrowed  money  from  Japanese  firms  ; and  non-alienation 
to  a third  Power  of  any  harbour,  bay,  or  island  on  the  coast  of  China. 
A further  fifth  group  of  Demands  included  an  undertaking  on  the 
part  of  China  to  employ  “ influential  Japanese  as  advisers  in  political, 
financial  and  military  affairs  ” ; to  grant  to  Japanese  hospitals, 
churches  and  schools  in  the  interior  of  China  the  right  of  owning 
land — a right  still  withheld  from  foreigners  in  Japan  ; to  place  the 


The  Twenty-one  Demands  279 

police  administration  of  all  important  places  in  China  under  joint 
Japanese  and  Chinese  control,  or,  in  lieu  of  this  concession,  to  employ 
a large  number  of  Japanese  in  the  police  departments  of  those  places  ; 
to  purchase  from  Japan  50  per  cent,  or  more,  of  all  munitions  of 
war  needed  by  China,  or,  in  lieu  of  this  concession,  to  arrange  for 
the  establishment  in  China  of  an  arsenal  under  the  joint  manage- 
ment of  Japanese  and  Chinese,  the  material  required  to  be  purchased 
from  Japan  ; to  grant  further  concessions  for  railway  construction 
in  the  interior  of  China  ; to  consult  Japan  before  employing  foreign 
capital  for  the  working  of  mines,  and  the  construction  of  railways, 
harbours  and  dockyards  in  the  province  of  Fuhkien  ; and  to  grant 
to  Japanese  subjects  the  right  to  propagate  religious  doctrines  in 
China.  This  last  point  concerned,  of  course,  only  Buddhist  mis- 
sionary propaganda,  since  the  propagation  of  Shintd  doctrine  in  a 
foreign  country  was  obviously  impossible.  Its  inclusion  in  the  list 
of  demands  may  seem  strange  in  view  of  the  religious  indifference 
of  the  Japanese  people.  The  reasons  for  it  may  be  found  in  the 
desire  of  the  Japanese  Government  to  overlook  no  point  which  might 
serve  to  place  Japan  on  a footing  of  equality  in  all  respects  with 
Western  countries,  and  its  wish  to  utilize  the  services  of  Buddhist 
missionaries  to  obtain  information  about  matters  in  the  interior  of 
China. 

The  startling  character  of  these  Demands,  no  less  than  the  peremp- 
tory manner  in  which  they  were  made,  provoked  some  public 
criticism  even  in  Japan,  and  led  to  enquiries  from  more  than  one 
foreign  Government.  In  the  course  of  the  negotiations  which 
ensued  at  Peking  the  Chinese  raised  objections  to  several  points. 
Eventually  the  last-mentioned  group  of  Demands  was  withdrawn  for 
the  time  being,  the  Japanese  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  explaining 
that  they  were  never  points  on  which  his  Government  had  intended 
to  insist.  Some  modifications,  moreover,  were  made  in  the  other 
groups  in  order  to  meet  Chinese  objections.  The  Demands  thus 
revised  were  presented  afresh  in  April,  a time  limit  being  named  for 
their  acceptance,  and  on  the  9th  May  the  Chinese  Government 
yielded  to  the  pressure  and  signified  its  consent.  The  various  points 
on  which  the  Japanese  Government  insisted  were  finally  settled  on 
the  25th  May  by  the  conclusion  of  Treaties,  the  exchange  of  Notes 
and  the  making  of  Declarations,  all  bearing  that  date,  as  suited  the 
convenience  of  Japan. 


280 


Agreement  with  Russia 

It  is  difficult  to  reconcile  the  assurances  repeatedly  given  by 
Japanese  statesmen  as  to  the  absence  of  any  aggressive  intentions  in 
regard  to  China  with  the  policy  represented  by  the  Demands  above- 
mentioned.  Nor  is  it  possible  to  deny  that  the  pressure  thus  put 
upon  China  constituted  just  such  an  interference  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  a neighbouring  State  as  the  Press  of  Japan  had  been  the 
first  to  denounce. 

The  various  engagements  entered  into  between  Japan  and  Russia 
in  the  years  shortly  following  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth,  more 
especially  the  Agreement  of  1907,  to  which  reference  has  already 
been  made,  were  in  themselves  signs  of  a relaxation  of  the  tension 
created  by  the  Russo-Japanese  war.  And  when  in  1910  the  two 
Powers  concluded  the  Agreement  for  maintaining  the  status  quo  in 
Manchuria,  which  blocked  the  Knox  proposal  for  neutralizing  all 
railways  in  that  region,  it  became  clear  that  they  discerned  the 
mutual  advantage  to  be  gained  by  working  together  in  the  Far  East. 
This  common  policy,  if  it  may  be  so  called,  was  strengthened  after 
the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  by  the  conclusion  of  a secret  Treaty 
in  the  summer  of  1916,  a moment  when  the  war  was  not  progressing 
very  favourably  for  the  Allies.  By  this  Treaty,  signed  in  the  Russian 
capital,  the  contracting  parties  recognized  that  “ the  vital  interests  ” 
of  both  required  “ the  safeguarding  of  China  from  the  political 
domination  of  any  third  Power  whatsoever  having  hostile  designs 
against  Russia  or  Japan.”  Whatever  hopes  may  have  been  enter- 
tained in  either  country  from  the  closer  co-operation  in  China 
established  by  this  Treaty  were  put  an  end  to  by  the  Russian  revolu- 
tion in  the  spring  of  1917.  It  is  unnecessary  to  emphasize  the 
important  bearing  on  Far  Eastern  affairs  of  this  event,  and  of  its 
sequel — the  military  collapse  of  Russia.  The  mere  fact  that  China 
was  thus  freed  from  the  danger  of  a combined  aggression  which  she 
was  powerless  to  resist  speaks  for  itself. 

In  the  autumn  of  the  same  year,  by  which  time  America  had  been 
drawn  into  the  war,  Japan,  still  intent  on  consolidating  her  position 
in  the  Far  East,  entered  into  negotiations  at  Washington  with  the 
United  States  in  regard  to  the  policy  to  be  pursued  by  the  two 
countries  in  China.  The  Japanese  negotiator  designated  as  special 
ambassador  for  this  purpose  was  Viscount  Ishii,  who  had  recently 
been  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  had  previously  visited  America 
in  an  official  capacity.  By  the  understanding  arrived  at  in  November 


Eftects  of  Great  War  281 

of  that  year,  known  as  the  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement,  the  United 
States  Government  formally  recognized,  though  without  defining 
them,  the  special  interests  of  Japan  in  China  arising  out  of  geogra- 
phical propinquity — a concession  which  tended  to  extend  the  liberty 
of  action  which  Japan  had  already  acquired  as  a result  of  the  war. 
The  reason  for  the  conclusion  of  this  Agreement,  as  stated  in  the 
Notes  exchanged  on  this  occasion,  “ was  in  order  to  silence  mis- 
chievous reports  ” that  had  from  time  to  time  been  circulated. 
Another  reason  may  well  have  been  the  wish  to  clear  the  ground  for 
American  and  Japanese  business  co-operation  in  China,  which  had 
been  advocated  for  some  time  in  the  Japanese  Press,  and  received 
some  measure  of  support  from  capitalists  in  both  countries.  The 
idea  was  not  welcomed  by  the  American  community  in  China,  and 
the  efforts  made  in  this  direction  do  not  appear  to  have  been  attended 
with  any  striking  success  during  the  continuance  of  the  wrar. 

In  the  military  intervention  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers 
in  Siberia  Japan  took  a prominent  part.  The  course  of  events  in 
Russia  after  the  revolution  caused  uneasiness  in  Great  Britain  and 
France.  When  the  Bolsheviks  gained  control  of  affairs,  the  German 
and  Austro-Hungarian  prisoners  of  war,  who,  owing  to  the  disinte- 
gration of  the  former  Russian  armies  had  regained  their  liberty,  and 
were  free  to  uphold  German  ambitions,  made  common  cause  with 
them  ; and  it  was  felt  that  there  was  danger  of  these  combined 
forces  spreading  through  Central  and  Eastern  Siberia.  How  best  to 
meet  this  danger,  and  at  the  same  time  to  relieve  the  Czecho-Slovak 
troops,  composed  of  ex-prisoners  of  war,  who  had  refused  to  join 
the  Bolsheviks  and  were  retreating  along  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway, 
was  a question  which  forced  itself  on  the  attention  of  the  Govern- 
ments concerned.  The  idea  of  sending  an  expeditionary  force  for 
this  double  purpose  was  first  mooted  in  the  summer  of  1917,  but  it 
was  not  until  a year  later  that  an  understanding  was  effected.  In 
this  military  intervention  six  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers 
were  represented,  Japan,  owing  to  her  nearness  to  the  scene  of  action, 
being  the  first  to  place  troops  on  the  spot. 

Meanwhile,  in  view  of  the  same  danger  and  for  the  same  objects, 
the  Japanese  and  Chinese  Governments  had  some  months  before 
(in  May,  1918)  concluded  a secret  military  Agreement  for  Common 
Defence  for  the  duration  of  the  war,  by  which  arrangements  were 
made  for  the  co-operation  of  Japanese  and  Chinese  troops  both  in 


282  Situation  in  Far  East 

Chinese  and  Russian  territory.  In  the  following  September  “ detailed 
stipulations  ” were  attached  to  the  Agreement.  One  of  these  pro- 
vided that  Chinese  troops  when  operating  in  Russian  territory  should 
be  under  the  control  of  a Japanese  commander.  A similar  Naval 
Agreement  was  concluded  at  the  same  time.  In  pursuance  of  the 
Military  Agreement  considerable  Japanese  and  Chinese  forces  were 
mobilized  and  employed  in  operations  in  Chinese  territory  and  across 
the  Russian  border. 

The  conspicuous  services  rendered  by  the  navy  of  Japan  through- 
out the  war  earned  the  warm  appreciation  of  her  allies ; the  work 
done  in  clearing  the  seas  of  predatory  enemy  craft,  convoying 
troopships  from  the  British  dominions  to  Europe  and  combating  the 
submarine  menace,  deserving,  as  indeed  it  received,  the  highest  praise. 
If  at  times  there  may  have  appeared  to  be  a disposition  in  certain 
Japanese  circles  to  anticipate  the  success  of  German  arms,  and  if  the 
pro-German  sympathies  of  a section  of  the  public  may  have  seemed 
to  assert  themselves  too  loudly,  allowance  should  be  made  for  the 
large  extent  to  which  German  ideas  had  been  utilized  in  the  making 
of  modern  Japan,  and  for  the  natural  tendency  of  army  officers  to 
believe  in  the  invincibility  of  the  nation  in  whose  military  methods 
they  had  been  trained. 

The  Peace  Conference  which  assembled  in  Paris  in  January,  1919, 
set  the  seal  on  Japanese  ambitions.  The  representatives  of  Japan 
took  part  in  all  important  deliberations  on  a footing  of  recognized 
equality  with  those  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy  and  the  United 
States,  while,  as  one  of  the  Great  Powers  composing  the  Supreme 
Council,  Japan  has  had  a voice  in  the  decisions  that  have  guided  the 
destinies  of  the  world. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 


The  Japanese  Family  System. 

MORE  than  once  in  the  course  of  this  narrative  has  refer- 
ence been  made  to  the  Japanese  family  system,  the 
influence  of  which  is  responsible  for  so  much  that  is 
distinctive  in  the  political  and  social  life  of  the  people.  A short 
sketch  of  this  system,  as  it  works  to-day,  may  therefore  be  not 
without  interest  for  the  reader. 

Prior  to  July,  1898,  when  the  present  Civil  Code  came  into  force, 
matters  concerning  family  law  were  governed  by  local  custom,  which 
varied  not  only  in  each  province,  but  often  in  different  districts  of 
the  same  province.  All  such  matters  are  now  dealt  with  in  accord- 
ance with  the  provisions  of  Books  IV  and  V of  this  Code,  and  in 
accordance  with  the  complementary  Law  of  Registration,  which 
came  into  operation  in  a revised  form  on  the  same  date  as  the  Code. 
The  working  of  the  family  system  since  then  has,  therefore,  been 
uniform  throughout  the  country. 

Before  going  further  it  may  be  well  to  explain  what  is  meant  by 
the  word  “ family  ” in  Japanese  law.  It  denotes  something  to  which 
we  have  nothing  analogous.  It  means  a grouping  of  persons  bearing 
the  same  surname  and  subject  to  the  authority  of  one  who  is  the 
head  of  the  family,  and  who  may  or  may  not  be  the  common  parent, 
or  ancestor  ; and  it  is  in  this  sense  that  the  term  “ member  of  a 
family  ” is  used  in  the  Code,  and  in  the  complementary  law  above 
mentioned.  This  family,  which  may  be  comprised  in  one  household, 
or  may  embrace  several,  may  be  the  main  branch  of  the  parent  stock, 
or  only  a cadet  branch.  In  either  case  it  constitutes  what  is  known 
to  the  law  as  a family ; succession  to  the  headship  of  it  is  regulated 
by  strict  provisions ; and  the  person  who  is  its  head  is  invested  with 
certain  well-defined  authority.  Kinship  is  not  essential  to  member- 
ship in  this  family  group,  for  the  law  provides  that  a relative  of  an 

283 


284  The  Japanese  Family  System 

adopted  person  may  under  certain  circumstances  become  a member 
of  the  family  which  the  latter  has  entered. 

There  is,  however,  another  and  larger  family  group  which  consists 
of  all  those  who  stand  towards  each  other  in  the  position  of  kindred 
as  defined  in  Article  725  of  the  Code.  In  this  latter  group,  which 
finds  its  embodiment,  so  to  speak,  in  family  councils,  lies  to  a great 
extent  the  key  to  the  real  position  of  the  individual  in  Japan. 

The  Japanese  family  system  is  thus  a combination  of  relatives  into 
two  groups,  and  every  Japanese,  therefore,  is  to  be  regarded  in  two 
capacities  : first  as  a member  of  the  smaller  family  group — the  legal 
family — and,  as  such,  unless  he  is  head  of  the  family  himself,  subject 
to  the  authority  of  its  head  ; and,  secondly,  as  a member  of  the 
wider  group  of  kindred,  with  whom  he  is  closely  connected  by  rights 
and  duties,  and  as  such,  whatever  his  position  in  the  family  may  be, 
subject  in  certain  matters  to  the  control  of  family  councils.  But  the 
position  of  a Japanese  in  his  dual  capacity  as  a member  of  both  the 
smaller  and  larger  family  groups  has  little  in  it  of  the  permanency 
and  stability  which  are  found  in  our  family  life.  It  is  affected  not 
only,  as  with  us,  by  marriage  and  divorce,  but  is  also  liable  to  constant 
change  by  separation  from  the  family  through  adoption,  and  its 
dissolution,  through  abdication  or  other  causes  mentioned  in  the 
Code,  and  by  the  conditional  liberty  given  to  a person  to  change 
his  family  allegiance,  so  to  speak,  and  transfer  himself  from  the 
authority  of  one  head  of  a family  to  that  of  another.  The  artificial 
character  of  both  groups  is  likewise  heightened  by  the  frequency  of 
adoption,  which  so  closely  resembles  kinship  that  no  material  differ- 
ence exists  between  the  two. 

In  noting  briefly  the  main  features  of  the  Japanese  family  system 
it  will  be  convenient  to  begin  with  those  which  have  their  counter- 
part in  Roman  Law,  namely,  parental  authority,  the  position  of 
women,  the  custom  of  adoption,  and  the  religious  rites  of  the 
family. 

Parental  Authority. — It  is  doubtful  if  at  any  time  parental 
authority  in  Japan  ever  approached  the  rigour  of  the  Roman  patria 
potestas,  although  in  the  now  obsolete  Codes  offences  were  punished 
more  severely  when  committed  by  children  against  parents  than  when 
the  reverse  was  the  case.  The  doctrine  of  filial  piety,  however,  which 
inspired  this  discrimination,  never  in  practice  excluded  the  duties  of 
parents  to  children.  In  Japan,  moreover,  parental  authority  has 


The  Japanese  Family  System  285 

always  been  subject  to  two  weakening  influences — the  intervention 
of  family  councils,  and  the  custom  of  abdication.  It  now  includes 
both  paternal  authority,  and,  in  certain  cases,  maternal  authority,  a 
thing  unknown  to  Roman  law.  This  authority,  never  of  a joint 
nature,  is  exercised  over  children  who  are  “ members  of  the  family  ” 
of  the  parent  in  question  during  their  minority,  and  even  afterwards 
so  long  as  they  do  not  earn  an  independent  living.  Japanese  law 
speaks  of  a person  as  a child,  irrespective  of  age,  as  long  as  either  of 
the  parents  is  alive,  and  a parent’s  right  to  maintenance  by  a son,  or 
daughter,  has  precedence  over  the  rights  in  that  respect  of  the 
latter’s  children  and  spouse. 

Position  of  Women. — The  legal  position  of  women  in  Japan 
before  modern  legislative  changes  is  well  illustrated  by  the  fact  that 
offences  came  under  different  categories  according  to  their  com- 
mission by  the  wife  against  the  husband,  or  by  the  husband  against 
the  wife,  and  by  the  curious  anomaly  that,  while  the  husband  stood 
in  the  first  degree  of  relationship  to  his  wife,  the  latter  stood  to  him 
only  in  the  second.  The  disabilities  under  which  a woman  formerly 
laboured  shut  her  out  from  the  exercise  of  almost  all  rights.  The 
maxim  Mulier  est  finis  jamili ce  (“  The  family  ends  with  a woman  ”) 
was  as  true  in  Japan  as  in  Rome,  though  the  observance  may  have 
been  less  strict  owing  to  the  greater  frequency  of  adoption.  All  this 
has  been  greatly  changed.  In  no  respect  has  greater  progress  been 
made  than  in  the  improvement  of  the  position  of  women.  Though, 
like  those  of  her  sex  in  other  lands,  she  still  labours  under  certain 
disabilities,  a woman  can  now  become  the  head  of  a family  ; she  can 
inherit  and  own  property,  and  manage  it  herself ; she  can  exercise 
parental  authority  ; if  single  or  a widow,  she  can  adopt  ; she  can 
act  as  guardian,  or  curator  ; and  she  has  a voice  in  family  councils. 

Adoption. — The  desire  to  preserve  the  continuity  of  a family  is 
usually  the  motive  of  adoption  wherever  the  custom  is  found  ; and 
in  countries  like  Japan,  where  ancestor  worship  has  survived  in  the 
practice  of  family  rites,  the  anxiety  to  make  due  provision  for  the 
performance  of  these  rites  has  acted  as  an  additional  incentive.  But 
nowhere  else,  probably,  has  adoption  been  conducted  on  so  large  a 
scale,  or  played  so  important  a part  in  the  social  life  of  the  com- 
munity that  has  practised  it.  It  is  not  limited,  as  with  us,  to  the 
adoption  of  minors,  for  the  adoption  of  adults  is  as  common  as  that 
of  children.  Nor  is  it  confined  to  the  adoption  at  any  one  time  of  a 


286  The  Japanese  Family  System 

single  individual,  the  adoption  of  a married  couple,  though  somewhat 
rare,  being  a recognized  custom.  Nor  does  any  character  of  finality 
attach  to  the  act,  for  a person  may  adopt,  or  be  adopted,  more  than 
once,  and  adoption  may  be  dissolved  or  annulled. 

The  elaborate  treatment  given  to  the  custom  in  the  Civil  Code 
testifies  to  its  importance  in  Japanese  social  life,  and  at  the  same  time 
shows  the  extent  to  which  the  interests  of  the  individual  in  this 
respect  are  subordinated  to  those  of  the  family. 

Before  leaving  the  subject  it  may  be  well  to  remind  the  reader 
that  in  the  case  of  the  Imperial  Family  the  custom  of  adoption  was, 
as  already  mentioned,  abolished  some  years  ago. 

Family  Rites. — 'The  characteristic  attitude  of  mind  towards  re- 
ligious matters,  referred  to  in  an  earlier  chapter,  which  enables  a 
Japanese  writer  to  describe  his  countrymen  as  being  dualist  in 
respect  of  religion,  is  reflected  in  Japanese  family,  or  household,  rites. 
Before  the  introduction  of  Buddhism  in  the  sixth  century  each 
household  had  its  kamidana,  or  Shinto  altar,  which  is  a plain  wooden 
shelf.  On  this  the  cenotaphs  of  deceased  members  of  the  family 
were  placed.  The  adoption  of  Buddhism  led  to  the  introduction  of 
a butsudan,  or  Buddhist  altar,  which  is  a miniature  shrine  of  wood, 
and  to  this  the  ancestral  cenotaphs  were  transferred.  But  the  Shinto 
altar  remained,  and  served  as  the  depository  of  charms  from  the 
chief  Shinto  shrine,  the  Daijingu  of  Ise,  as  well  as  of  charms  from 
the  shrines  dedicated  to  the  various  tutelary  deities  of  members  of 
the  family,  and,  in  spite  of  the  Shinto  revival  that  accompanied  the 
Restoration  of  1868-9,  t^ie  tw0  ahars»  with  their  respective  uses, 
have  remained  unchanged. 

The  performance  of  family  rites  in  the  strictest  manner  is  usually 
confined  to  the  upper  classes  and  well-to-do  farmers.  In  the  worship 
of  Shinto  deities  these  rites  consist  of  reverential  obeisances  made 
every  morning  before  the  Shinto  altar,  the  lighting  of  a small  lamp 
on  it  every  evening  and  the  presentation  of  offerings  of  rice  and  sake 
on  certain  days  of  each  month.  From  time  to  time  also  branches  of 
the  Cleyera  japonica  are  laid  on  the  altar.  The  ancestral  rites  con- 
ducted before  the  Buddhist  altar  differ  in  some  points  of  detail 
according  to  the  professed  religion,  Shinto  or  Buddhist,  of  the 
family.  In  each  case,  however,  the  cenotaph  of  the  deceased  person, 
which  is  a small  wooden  tablet  bearing  the  posthumous  name  or 
date  of  death,  is  placed  on,  or  in  front  of,  the  Buddhist  altar.  When 


The  Japanese  Family  System  287 

these  cenotaphs  become  too  numerous,  one  or  two  are  made  to  serve 
for  all.  Offerings  of  food  are  made,  and  religious  services  held  on 
various  anniversaries  of  the  death.  On  these  occasions  a feast  is  also 
provided.  In  Buddhist  households  the  Buddhist  altar  is  never  with- 
out flowers,  while  offerings  of  tea  and  rice  are  made,  and  incense 
sticks  lighted,  every  morning.  During  the  annual  “ Festival  of  the 
Dead,”  which  is  not  recognized  by  the  Shin,  or  Monto,  sect  of 
Buddhists,  more  elaborate  rites  are  performed. 

The  other  features  of  the  family  system  which  remain  to  be 
noticed  are  the  position  occupied  by  the  head  of  a family,  succession 
thereto,  abdication,  family  councils,  marriage  and  registration. 

Headship  of  Family. — In  Japan  the  parental  authority  and  the 
authority  exercised  by  the  head  of  a family  are  quite  distinct,  but 
the  two  may  be  vested  in  the  same  individual,  who  may  be  a woman. 
When  vested  in  different  individuals,  they  represent  a sort  of  con- 
dominium, as,  for  instance,  in  cases  where  the  consent  not  only  of 
the  parent,  but  of  the  head  of  the  family,  is  required. 

The  head  of  a family  exercises  authority  over  all  its  members 
whom  the  law  recognizes  as  such.  It  is  not  necessary  that  these 
should  form  part  of  his  or  her  household,  for,  as  has  already  been 
explained,  the  group  represented  by  the  word  family  may  embrace 
several  households.  Nor  need  they  be  relatives,  though  usually  some 
tie  of  kinship  exists.  This  authority  includes  the  right  of  consent 
to  the  marriage  and  divorce,  the  adoption,  and  the  dissolution  of 
adoption,  of  each  member  of  the  family  ; the  right  of  determining 
his  or  her  place  of  residence  ; and  the  right  of  expelling  such  person 
from  the  family,  and  of  forbidding  his  or  her  return  to  it.  The 
head  of  a family  has  also  the  right  of  succession  to  property  in  default 
of  other  heirs.  But  the  headship  of  a family  carries  with  it  also 
duties  and  responsibilities  ; the  duty  of  supporting  indigent  members 
of  it  ; the  duty,  under  certain  circumstances,  of  guardianship,  and 
responsibility  for  the  debts  of  all. 

Save  in  exceptional  cases,  succession  to  the  headship  of  a family 
is  limited  to  persons  who  are  “ members  of  the  family,”  in  the  legal 
sense  of  the  term.  These  rank  according  to  the  degree  of  relation- 
ship. Failing  lineal  descendants,  an  heir  may  be  appointed  in  other 
ways  defined  by  the  Code. 

Abdication. — What  for  want  of  a better  word  is  generally  known 
to  foreigners  by  the  term  abdication  is  the  retirement  of  a person 


288  The  Japanese  Family  System 

from  the  position  of  head  of  a family.  As  women  can  under  the 
Civil  Code  become  heads  of  families,  it  follows  that  abdication  is 
no  prerogative  of  the  male  sex. 

Japanese  scholars  who  have  investigated  the  subject,  notably 
Professors  Hozumi  and  Shigeno,  agree  in  tracing  the  origin  of  the 
present  custom  to  the  abdication  of  sovereigns,  instances  of  which 
occur  at  an  early  period  of  Japanese  history.  These  earlier  abdica- 
tions were  independent  of  religious  influences,  but  with  the  advent 
of  Buddhism  abdication  entered  upon  a new  phase.  In  imitation, 
it  would  seem,  of  the  retirement  of  head  priests  of  Buddhist  monas- 
teries, abdicating  monarchs  shaved  their  heads  and  entered  the 
priesthood  ; and  when,  later  on,  the  custom  came  to  be  employed 
for  political  purposes  the  cloak  of  religion  was  retained.  From  the 
Throne  the  custom  spread  to  regents  and  high  officers  of  State  ; 
and  so  universal  had  its  observance,  amongst  officials  of  the  higher 
ranks,  become  in  the  twelfth  century  that,  as  Professor  Shigeno 
states,  it  was  almost  the  rule  for  such  persons  to  retire  from  the 
world  at  the  age  of  forty  or  fifty,  and  nominally  enter  the  priest- 
hood, both  the  act  and  the  person  performing  it  being  termed  niudo. 
In  the  course  of  time  the  custom  of  abdication  ceased  to  be  confined 
to  officials,  and  extended  to  the  feudal  nobility,  and  the  military 
class  generally,  whence  it  spread  through  the  nation.  At  this  stage 
of  its  transition  its  connection  with  the  phase  it  finally  assumed 
becomes  clear.  But  with  its  extension  beyond  the  circle  of  official 
dignitaries,  and  its  consequent  severance  from  tradition  and  religious 
associations,  whether  real  or  nominal,  abdication  changed  its  name. 
It  was  no  longer  termed  niudo  (entrance  into  religion),  but  inkio 
(retirement),  the  old  word  being  retained  only  in  its  strictly  religious 
meaning  ; and  inkio  is  the  term  in  use  to-day. 

The  connection  of  the  custom  with  religion  having  long  since 
vanished,  the  Japanese  of  the  present  day  who  abdicates  is  in  no 
way  actuated  by  the  feeling  that  impelled  European  monarchs  in 
past  time  to  end  their  days  in  the  seclusion  of  the  cloister,  and  which 
finds  expression  in  the  phrase  “ to  make  one’s  soul.”  Apart  from 
the  influence  of  traditional  convention,  which  explains  the  great  hold 
upon  the  nation  acquired  by  the  custom,  the  motive  seems  to  be 
somewhat  akin  to  that  which  leads  people  in  other  countries  to 
retire  from  active  life  at  an  age  when  bodily  infirmity  cannot  be 
adduced  as  the  reason.  In  the  one  case,  however,  it  is  the  business, 


The  Japanese  Family  System  289 

or  profession,  the  active  work  of  life,  which  is  relinquished,  while 
in  Japan  it  is  the  position  of  head  of  a family  which  is  given  up,  the 
result  being  the  effacement  of  the  individual  so  far  as  the  family  is 
concerned.  Moreover,  although  abdication  usually  implies  the 
abandonment  of  business,  this  does  not  necessarily  follow.  That  in 
many  cases  the  reason  for  abdication  lies  in  the  wish  to  escape  from 
the  tyrannical  calls  of  family  life,  encumbered  as  it  is  with  legal 
duties  and  responsibilities,  as  well  as  tedious  ceremonies,  is  shown  by 
the  fact  that  the  period  of  a person’s  greatest  activity  not  infre- 
quently dates  from  the  time  of  his  withdrawal  from  the  headship 
of  the  family. 

As  in  the  case  of  adoption,  abdication  is  now  more  strictly  regu- 
lated than  formerly.  Women  are  permitted  to  abdicate  irrespective 
of  age  ; but  a man  is  not  allowed  to  abdicate  until  he  has  attained 
sixty  years  of  age,  except  under  certain  conditions  imposed  by  law. 

Family  Councils. — Family  councils  represent,  as  has  already  been 
explained,  the  larger  of  the  two  groups  into  which  Japanese  society 
may  be  regarded  as  divided.  They  usurp  many  of  the  functions 
which  we  are  accustomed  to  associate  with  Courts  of  Law,  and, 
though  an  appeal  may  always  be  made  to  the  latter  from  the  decision 
of  a council,  apart  from  the  reluctance  of  most  people  to  take  this 
step,  the  chances  of  success  are  too  remote  to  favour  its  frequent 
adoption. 

Family  councils  are  of  two  kinds : those  convened  for  the  deter- 
mination of  some  particular  question;  and  those  which  are  established 
for  the  purpose  of  taking  charge  of  the  affairs  of  persons  without 
legal  capacity.  The  former  are  dissolved  when  the  question  at  issue 
has  been  settled  ; the  latter  continue  until  the  legal  incapacity 
ceases.  The  summoning  of  a council  and  the  selection  of  its  members 
rest  with  a court  of  law,  but  in  certain  cases  the  members  may  be 
appointed  by  will.  The  functions  of  family  councils  cover  a wide 
field,  ranging  from  giving  consent  to  marriage  and  adoption  to  pro- 
tecting the  interests  of  a minor  in  cases  where  the  interests  of  parent 
and  child  conflict.  Their  authority  in  no  way  diminishes  the  in- 
fluence brought  to  bear  upon  an  individual  by  the  wide  circle  of 
relations  from  whom  they  are  chosen,  but  rather  serves  to  increase 
it  ; nor  does  their  existence  as  a species  of  family  tribunal  preclude 
the  settlement  of  family  matters  in  an  informal  manner  without 
recourse  to  the  elaborate  machinery  provided  by  the  law. 


T 


290  The  Japanese  Family  System 

Marriage. — Before  the  present  Civil  Code  came  into  operation 
the  question  of  marriage  was  regulated  by  fragmentary  enactments 
issued  from  time  to  time,  which  dealt  with  various  points  connected 
with  marriage  and  divorce,  but  never  with  the  subject  as  a whole. 
Validity  of  marriage  is  quite  independent  of  the  marriage  ceremony, 
which  is  a purely  social  function.  Marriage  is  effected  simply  by 
registration.  Notice  is  given  to  a registrar  by  both  parties  and  two 
witnesses  who  are  of  age.  This  notice  may  be  either  verbal  or 
written.  When  the  registrar  has  satisfied  himself  that  the  marriage 
is  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  law,  the  name  of  the 
person  entering  the  other’s  family  is  inscribed  in  the  register  of  that 
family  and  is  expunged  from  the  register  of  the  family  to  which  he, 
or  she,  previously  belonged.  The  marriageable  age  for  men  is  seven- 
teen years ; that  for  women  fifteen.  No  one  who  is  not  the  head 
of  a family  can  marry  without  the  consent  of  the  head  of  the  family. 
In  many  cases,  also,  the  consent  of  parents,  or  of  a guardian,  or  of  a 
family  council,  is  necessary.  Japanese  law  recognizes  two  kinds  of 
divorce  : judicial  divorce  ; and  divorce  by  arrangement  between  the 
parties. 

Family  Registration. — If  proof  were  needed  that  society  in 
Japan  centres  round  the  family,  and  not  the  individual,  it  would  be 
supplied  by  the  institution  known  as  Family  Registration.  The 
subject  is  too  complicated  to  justify  any  detailed  reference  to  it  in 
these  pages.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  mention  that  in  every  district 
a separate  register  is  kept  for  each  house  in  which  the  head  of  a 
household  is  also  the  head  of  a family ; those  whose  names  appear 
therein  being  regarded  as  having  what  is  called  their  “ permanent 
register  ” ( honseki ) in  the  place  in  question.  Persons  who  are  heads 
of  households,  but  not  of  families,  are  borne  on  other  family  registers. 
Thus  the  names  entered  in  a family  register  at  the  time  it  is  pre- 
pared under  the  address  of  a certain  house  are  not  necessarily  those 
of  persons  who  are  members  of  the  particular  household  indicated. 
Nor  are  they  necessarily  those  of  persons  who  were,  or  are,  resident 
in  the  district.  They  are  simply  those  of  all  persons  who,  irrespective 
of  their  place  of  residence,  are  members  of  the  family  of  which  the 
occupant  of  the  house  in  question  is  the  head  at  the  time  when  the 
family  register  is  -prepared.  The  family,  therefore,  and  not  the 
household,  is  the  basis  of  this  registration,  the  house  merely  supply- 
ing the  address  where  the  permanent  register  is  established.  Family 


The  Japanese  Family  System  291 

registers  are  prepared  (i)  when  a person  establishes  a new  family, 
or  (2)  when  the  head  of  a family  chooses  to  transfer  his  permanent 
register  to  another  place,  in  which  case  the  previous  register  is  called 
“ original  permanent  register  ” (genseki ).  Except  in  these  cases, 
family  registration  and  residence  are  quite  independent  of  one 
another. 

As  in  the  case  of  Status  and  Residential  Registration,  matters 
concerning  family  registration  are  dealt  with  by  the  registrar  of  a 
district.  It  is  notice  to  this  official  that  gives  validity  to  marriage 
and  divorce,  to  adoption  and  its  dissolution,  to  abdication  and  to 
succession  to  the  headship  of  a family. 


CHAPTER  XXX 


Education. 

BEFORE  the  Restoration  the  State  concerned  itself  little  with 
education.  There  were,  indeed,  in  Yedo,  as  Tokio  was  then 
called,  two  or  three  Government  schools  open  to  youths  of 
the  military  class,  and  similar  institutions  existed  in  the  provinces, 
both  in  clan  territories  and  in  those  of  the  Shogun.  In  these  in- 
struction was  given  in  the  Chinese' classics  and  in  military  accom- 
plishments. Except  for  this  slender  provision  for  educational  needs, 
the  matter  was  left,  to  a great  extent,  in  the  hands  of  the  people 
themselves.  Such  education  as  was  thought  to  be  necessary  for 
children  other  than  those  of  the  military  class  was  obtained  in 
Buddhist  temple  schools  ( terakoya ).  In  the  case  of  the  military 
class  private  tuition  took  the  place  of  these  schools,  both  for  elemen- 
tary instruction,  and  for  such  further  education  as  might  be  desired  ; 
it  being  customary  for  students  above  a certain  age  to  become  pupils 
of  some  scholar  of  repute,  in  whose  house  they  often  resided  during 
their  course  of  study.  From  the  absence  of  any  regular  official 
control  of  education  it  must  not  be  inferred  that  learning  was  dis- 
couraged in  Japan.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  encouraged  from  early 
times,  both  by  the  Court  in  pre-feudal  days  and  by  the  later  Toku- 
gawa  rulers,  with  the  result  that  the  Japanese  nation  had,  as  is  well 
known,  attained  a high  degree  of  culture  of  an  Oriental  kind  before 
the  reopening  of  the  country  to  foreign  intercourse.  But  the 
interest  taken  in  education  was  only  spasmodic.  No  attempt  was 
made  to  systematize  it,  and  make  it  a branch  of  the  general  adminis- 
tration of  the  country. 

In  the  programme  of  the  men  who  effected  the  Restoration 
educational  reform  occupied  a prominent  place  ; but  while  feudalism 
lasted  not  much  could  be  done.  Neither  the  control  of  education 
by  one  central  authority,  nor  the  defiance  of  class  prejudice  by 

292 


Education  293 

throwing  education  open  equally  to  all,  was  possible.  The  enlarge- 
ment of  the  few  existing  colleges,  the  opening  of  a few  more  in 
places  where  they  were  most  needed,  the  engagement  of  foreign 
teachers,  and  the  selection  of  students  represented  all  that  was  attain- 
able for  the  moment.  The  desired  opportunity  came  with  the 
abolition  of  feudalism,  and  the  disappearance  of  the  military  class. 
It  was  in  the  summer  of  1871  that  the  Decree  which  swept  away  the 
feudal  system  was  issued ; a week  or  two  later  the  Department  of 
Education  was  established  ; and  in  the  following  year  (1872)  the 
first  Educational  Code  was  drawn  up  and  promulgated.  Compulsory 
education  for  both  sexes  dates  from  this  time. 

To  the  frankly  utilitarian  spirit  disclosed  in  the  preamble  to  the 
Code  the  late  Baron  Kikuchi,  at  one  time  Minister  of  Education, 
drew  attention  in  his  London  lectures  on  the  subject  delivered  in 
1909.  In  it  there  is  no  mention  of  religion,  nor  is  anything  said 
about  moral  instruction.  The  Code  provided  for  the  creation  of  no 
less  than  eight  universities  and  a corresponding  number  of  elementary 
and  middle  schools,  both  being  far  in  excess  of  the  requirements  of 
the  country  at  that  time.  No  surprise,  therefore,  was  felt  when  in 
1879  t^s  plan  was  abahdoned,  and  a scheme  better  suited  to  existing 
conditions  adopted  in  its  place.  Nevertheless,  in  these  seven  years 
a good  beginning  had  been  made.  The  principle  of  compulsory 
education  for  all  children  between  six  and  fourteen  years  of  age  had 
been  introduced.  The  Tokio  University  had  been  established,  and 
though  expectations  regarding  the  growth  of  middle  schools  had  not 
been  realized,  in  the  creation  and  working  of  elementary  schools 
satisfactory  progress  had  been  made. 

The  Code  of  1879,  by  which  a simpler  and  more  practical  form 
was  given  to  elementary  education,  was  in  its  turn  replaced  by  the 
educational  law  of  1886.  Under  the  new  measure  elementary  educa- 
tion was  divided  into  two  courses ; more  attention  was  given  to  normal 
education  ; new  features  in  the  shape  of  moral  and  physical  training 
were  introduced  ; and  the  method  of  regulating  educational  affairs 
by  means  of  Codes  was  discontinued.  Various  changes  were  made  in 
subsequent  years,  but  the  system  then  established  is,  in  its  main 
outlines,  in  force  to-day. 

At  the  threshold  of  the  present  system  lies  the  kindergarten, 
formed  on  the  European  model. 

The  actual  system  begins  with  elementary  schools.  These  are  of 


294  Education 

two  kinds,  the  ordinary,  and  the  higher,  elementary  schools.  In  the 
first  the  course  extends  over  six  years,  and  is  compulsory  for  all 
children  who  have  completed  their  sixth  year.  At  thirteen  years  of 
age,  therefore,  compulsory  education  ceases.  Ordinary  elementary 
education  is  free,  the  cost  being  met  by  local  taxation. 

From  the  ordinary  elementary  school  the  child,  boy  or  girl,  whose 
education  does  not  stop  there,  passes  on  to  the  higher  elementary 
school.  Here  the  course  lasts  for  two  years,  a supplementary  course 
being  provided,  as  in  the  case  of  ordinary  elementary  schools,  for 
those  desiring  it  whose  education  ceases  at  this  stage. 

In  elementary  schools  of  both  kinds  boys  and  girls  receive  practi- 
cally the  same  education.  They  are  taught  in  the  same  schools,  and 
often  in  the  same  classes.  It  is  after  this  stage  that  the  education 
of  boys  and  girls  becomes  distinct,  both  as  regards  the  schools  and 
the  subjects  taught  in  them.  Elementary  schools  established  by  the 
State  are  open  to  the  children  of  all  classes ; but  there  are  also 
private  elementary  schools  of  the  same  grades,  which  are  recognized 
by  law  and  are  subject  to  official  supervision. 

At  the  age  of  fourteen  or  fifteen  a boy  enters  what  is  known  as 
a middle  school,  where  he  remains  for  five  years.  With  the  termina- 
tion of  this  course,  by  which  time  he  is  about  nineteen  years  of  age, 
a Japanese  youth  has  completed  his  general  education.  If  he  elects 
to  go  further,  he  must  specialize,  passing  to  a higher  school  in 
preparation  for  the  University,  to  a technical  school,  to  the  higher 
normal  school,  or  to  what  is  termed  a “ special  ” ( semvion ) school, 
as  the  case  may  be. 

The  educational  training  open  to  girls  on  leaving  the  higher 
elementary  schools  is  less  extensive.  They  may  enter  a high  school 
for  girls,  which  corresponds  more  or  less  to  the  middle  school  for 
boys.  Here  the  course  is  from  four  to  five  years,  with  a supple- 
mentary course  spread  over  another  two.  Or  they  may  enter  a 
normal,  or  technical  school.  With  the  exception  of  some  higher 
normal  schools,  no  further  provision  for  the  more  advanced  education 
of  women  is  made  by  the  State. 

Private  enterprise  and  munificence  have  done  much  to  supplement 
the  educational  work  of  the  State.  Besides  the  private  elementary 
schools  already  mentioned,  a certain  proportion  of  the  middle  schools 
are  also  in  private  hands,  whilst  educational  facilities  of  a more 
advanced  standard  are  supplied  by  the  flourishing  colleges  founded 


Education  295 

by  Mr.  Fukuzawa  and  Marquis  Okuma.  There  are  also  Buddhist 
schools,  and  educational  establishments  of  various  kinds  wholly  or 
partly  maintained  by  foreign  missionary  societies.  Nor  is  the  aid 
thus  directed  by  private  initiative  confined  to  pupils  of  one  sex.  To 
what  extent  the  education  of  women  has  profited  is  shown  by  the 
existence  in  the  Capital  of  institutions  so  well  known — to  mention 
only  a few — as  the  Women’s  University  founded  by  Mr.  Naruse ; 
the  Girls’  College,  which  owes  its  creation  to  Mrs.  Shimoda  ; and  the 
schools  for  girls  of  the  nobility,  in  which  the  late  Empress,  its  founder, 
took  special  interest. 

Let  us  now  see  what  is  taught  under  the  present  system  of  edu- 
cation. 

The  course  of  instruction  in  elementary  schools  comprises  morals ; 
reading,  writing  and  letter  writing,  which  are  grouped  together  as 
one  subject  called  “ the  Japanese  language  ” ; arithmetic  and  the 
use  of  the  abacus,  the  counting-board  of  the  ancients  ; gymnastics, 
drawing  and  singing  ; and  (for  girls)  needlework.  In  the  higher 
elementary  course  three  additional  subjects — history,  geography  and 
science — are  included. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  is  meant  by  instruction  in  “ morals,”  the 
first  subject  mentioned  in  this  curriculum  ? It  is  based  on  the 
principles  laid  down  in  the  Imperial  Rescript  on  Education  promul- 
gated in  1890,  a copy  of  which,  besides  a portrait  of  the  Emperor, 
hangs  on  the  walls  of  elementary  schools.  Speaking  of  this,  Baron 
Kikuchi  in  the  lectures  above  mentioned  says  : “ Our  whole  moral 
and  civic  education  consists  in  so  imbuing  our  children  with  the 
spirit  of  the  Rescript  that  it  forms  a part  of  our  national  life.”  No 
excuse  is  needed  for  dwelling  at  some  length  on  a point  to  which 
he  attaches  so  much  importance. 

The  principles  on  which  stress  is  laid  in  the  Imperial  Rescript  are 
mostly  of  a kind  with  which  the  reader  is  more  or  less  familiar, 
showing  in  the  reference  made  to  the  duties  of  a Japanese  subject 
to  the  Imperial  Ancestors,  to  the  Sovereign,  to  the  State,  and  to 
society,  their  Confucian  and  Shinto  origin.  Attention  has  been 
drawn  to  the  absence  of  any  reference  to  moral  teaching  in  the 
preamble  of  the  Code  of  1872.  The  fact  that  a different  note  is 
struck  in  the  Rescript  published  eighteen  years  later  does  not  justify 
the  inference  that  the  Government  had  seen  reason  to  change  its 
mind  on  the  subject.  For,  only  a year  before  the  Rescript  appeared, 


296  Education 

the  Department  of  Education  had  issued  a notification  declaring  it 
to  be  essential  to  keep  religion  and  education  apart,  and  forbidding 
the  teaching  of  any  religious  doctrine,  or  the  conduct  of  any  religious 
ceremonies,  in  schools  licensed  by  the  State.  It  seems  correct,  there- 
fore, to  suppose  that  the  attitude  of  the  Government  in  regard  to 
the  relation  of  religion  to  education  remained  unchanged,  but  that 
the  official  mind  made  a distinction  between  moral  teaching  as 
identified  with  religious  doctrines,  and  moral  teaching  of  a more 
general  kind.  This  supposition  derives  support  from  the  close  resem- 
blance which  the  Rescript  bears  to  a document  entitled  A Short 
Exhortation  to  the  People , which  was,  as  we  have  seen,  published  and 
circulated  widely  by  the  new  Government  in  the  early  days  of  the 
Restoration.  The  object  then  in  view  was  to  divert  to  the  Sovereign 
the  old  feudal  feeling  of  devotion  to  the  clan  chief ; to  make  the 
Throne,  at  a time  when  the  fabric  of  old  Japan  was  crumbling  to 
pieces,  the  centre  round  which  the  nation  could  rally.  The  aim  of 
the  Rescript  was  the  same,  allowing  for  the  change  in  circumstances, 
namely,  to  strengthen  the  framework  of  government  by  encouraging 
a fresh  spirit  of  patriotism  and  loyalty.  That  education  should  be 
chosen  as  the  medium  for  impressing  upon  the  nation  the  spirit  of 
precepts  appealing  with  the  force  of  tradition  to  national  sentiment 
was  very  natural. 

For  the  teaching  of  morals  in  elementary  schools  text-books  are 
provided.  These  contain  a series  of  illustrated  homilies  designed  to 
inculcate  the  virtues  to  which  prominence  is  given  in  Confucian 
ethics.  The  children  are  also  taught  in  conversations  with  the 
teachers  matters  concerning  the  Emperor  and  the  Court.  They  are 
brought  to  realize  the  extent  of  the  Imperial  solicitude  for  the 
people  ; these  lessons  leading  up  to  the  inevitable  conclusion  that  the 
illustrious  virtues  of  the  Sovereign  must  be  reverenced.  Similar 
lessons  are  given  on  the  subject  of  the  national  flag,  with  the  object 
of  promoting  patriotism.  In  this  respect  the  Japanese  are  fortunate 
in  possessing  a word  of  Chinese  origin,  which  means  literally  “ re- 
quiting the  country  for  favours  received,”  and  thus  conveys  the 
sense  of  duty  on  which  the  virtue  rests.  In  their  third  school  year 
the  children  learn  about  the  Empress,  and  acquire  some  general 
knowledge  of  her  position  and  responsibilities.  And  so  they  pass  on 
to  learn  in  succeeding  courses,  and  always  in  the  same  sequence  of 
moral  ideas,  what  is  meant  by  “ the  fundamental  character  of  the 


Education  297 

Japanese  Empire  ” — the  relation,  that  is  to  say,  of  the  Imperial 
House  to  the  people — and  something  of  the  nature  of  government 
and  civic  duties. 

It  is  not  till  the  middle  schools  are  reached  that  the  influence  of 
Western  thought  is  noticeable  in  any  marked  degree.  There  the 
curriculum  embraces  morals,  the  Japanese  language  and  Chinese 
literature,  foreign  languages,  history,  geography  and  mathematics. 
Moral  instruction  is  continued  on  the  lines  on  which  it  was  begun 
in  the  elementary  schools.  It  is  not  the  fault  of  the  teacher,  nor  of 
the  system,  if  at  the  end  of  this  stage  of  his  education  the  pupil 
has  not  acquired  a general  perception  of  what  is  required  of  him 
in  the  way  of  his  duty  to  ancestor,  parent  and  neighbour,  of  his 
obligations  to  himself,  to  the  family,  to  society  and  to  the  State, 
and  if  he  is  not  also  imbued  with  a deep  sense  of  the  fortunate  privi- 
lege of  Japanese  nationality.  It  will  be  at  once  apparent  how  wide 
a field  is  covered  by  the  subject  of  morals,  and  how  practical  is  the 
end  it  is  designed  to  subserve.  The  teaching  of  foreign  languages 
in  middle  schools  amounts  practically  to  the  teaching  of  English, 
this  being  in  most  of  such  schools  the  only  foreign  language  taught. 
If,  in  spite  of  the  prominence  given  to  it,  progress  in  the  study  of 
English  is  disappointing,  the  result  is  due  to  the  false  economy 
which  substitutes  for  competent  foreign  teachers  Japanese,  whose 
knowledge  and  pronunciation  are  often  defective. 

The  curriculum  of  the  higher  schools,  the  preparatory  stage  for 
the  University,  varies  according  to  the  three  sections — Law  and 
Literature,  Science,  and  Medicine — into  which  they  are  divided. 
Four  subjects,  however,  are  common  to  all  three.  These  are  Morals, 
the  Japanese  language,  Foreign  Languages,  and  Gymnastics.  Two 
of  three  foreign  languages — English,  French,  and  German — are  taught 
in  each  section.  In  the  Medical  section  German,  and  in  the  Science 
section  English,  is  compulsory. 

The  course  of  University  instruction  does  not  call  for  any 
special  notice.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  it  is  modelled  on  Western 
lines. 

Of  late  years  the  Government  has  given  special  attention  to  the 
establishment  of  Technical  and  Normal  Schools.  The  fact  that  the 
pupils  in  these  latter  schools  receive  disciplinary  training  similar  to 
that  of  military  schools  shows  the  anxiety  of  the  authorities  to  foster 
a military  spirit  in  the  nation. 


298  Education 

It  will  be  seen  that  at  every  stage  in  the  present  system  of  educa- 
tion the  Japanese  language  is  one  of  the  subjects  of  study.  This  is 
due  not  less  to  its  complicated  character  than  to  the  high  degree 
of  skill  required  in  its  writing,  for  which  brushes  and  not  pens  are 
employed.  In  alluding  to  this  point  in  a previous  chapter  attention 
was  drawn  to  the  difficulty  created  by  the  adoption  of  the  Chinese 
written  language  by  a people  who  had  a spoken  language  of  their 
own,  and  to  the  confusion  that  afterwards  supervened  when  the 
borrowing  nation  devised  written  scripts  for  itself.  The  final  result 
of  this  process  of  linguistic  growth  was  the  division  of  Japanese 
writing  into  three  main  branches — the  Chinese  style,  in  which 
Chinese  hieroglyphs  are  used  much  as  the  Chinese  use  them  ; the 
native  scripts,  or  syllabaries ; and  a third  which  is  a mixture  of  the 
other  two,  and  in  varying  forms  is  the  one  most  in  use  to-day.  Of 
the  two  elements  that  thus  form  the  Japanese  language  of  the 
present  time — Chinese  characters  and  the  Japanese  syllabaries — the 
former  has  so  far  proved  itself  the  stronger  and,  in  a sense,  the 
more  useful  : stronger  because  of  its  having  been  the  means  by 
which  Chinese  civilization  was  introduced,  and  of  its  connection 
with  the  foundation  upon  which  education  has  always  rested  ; more 
useful  because  its  effect  on  national  culture  has  not  only  survived 
the  reopening  of  Japan  to  foreign  intercourse,  but,  owing  to  the 
fact  that  the  native  scripts  are  adapted  for  the  writing  only  of 
native  words,  has  increased  twenty- fold.  Just  as  we  go  to  Latin 
and  Greek  to  coin  new  words  when  we  want  them,  so  to  Chinese 
the  Japanese  have  always  gone  on  the  same  quest  ; and  for  the  better 
part  of  a century  they  have  been  busily  engaged  in  coining  new 
words  for  all  the  new  things  that  have  come  to  them  in  the  train 
of  Western  learning.  Thus  the  language  which  served  to  introduce 
Chinese  institutions  and  culture  many  centuries  ago  is  performing 
the  same  duty  to-day  for  institutions  and  culture  of  quite  another 
order.  In  this  Japan  seems  to  have  been  the  sport  of  fate.  She 
started  with  Chinese  as  the  chief  factor  in  her  culture.  The  exigen- 
cies of  language  and  circumstance  drove  her  in  later  years,  when  her 
civilization  was  tending  in  an  opposite  direction,  to  draw  again 
under  altered  conditions  on  the  same  resources  as  before,  and  thus 
expose  herself  afresh  to  the  operation  of  the  very  influences  from 
which  in  the  first  flush  of  her  ardour  for  Western  reforms  she  was 
striving  to  emancipate  herself. 


Education  299 

How  greatly  education  is  hampered  by  the  difficulty  of  the 
language  will  be  understood  when  it  is  mentioned  that  a Japanese 
youth  who  goes  through  the  whole  educational  course  provided  by 
the  State  is  still  studying  it  when  on  the  threshold  of  the  University  ; 
and  that  if  he  desires  to  attain  any  real  literary  scholarship  he  must 
continue  this  study  for  some  time  after  his  education  is  completed. 
To  show  that  the  difficulty  has  not  been  exaggerated  it  may  be  well 
to  quote  two  independent  authorities,  both  Japanese.  Baron  Kikuchi 
tells  us  that  “ to  those  who  are  engaged  in  education,  especially 
elementary  education,  the  difficulty  that  a child  has  to  encounter 
in  learning  Chinese  characters  is  an  ever-present  and  pressing  ques- 
tion ; with  so  many  subjects  to  be  learnt  it  is  impossible  to  spend 
the  enormous  time  that  would  be  necessary  in  the  mere  learning  of 
ideographs.”  . . . “When  we  come  to  secondary  education,” he  adds, 
“ the  difficulty  is  increased  still  further.”  Marquis  Okuma,  who  has 
held  the  same  portfolio,  and  speaks  with  the  authority  of  a leading 
educationalist,  is  still  more  emphatic.  “ The  greatest  difficulty  of 
all  connected  with  education  is,”  he  says,  “ the  extreme  complexity 
of  the  Japanese  language.  Japanese  students  to-day  are  attempting 
what  is  possible  only  to  the  strongest  and  cleverest  of  them,  that  is 
to  say,  two  or  three  in  every  hundred.  They  are  trying  to  learn 
their  own  language,  which  is  in  reality  tw’o  languages  . . . while 
attempting  to  learn  English  and  German,  and,  in  addition,  studying 
technical  subjects  like  law,  medicine,  engineering  or  science.” 

It  is  a mistake  to  suppose  that  because  foreign  influences  enter  so 
largely  into  the  educational  course  Japan  must  necessarily  end  by 
becoming  Europeanized.  The  foundation  of  her  culture  is  too 
deeply  laid  for  that.  So  long  as  elementary  education  remains,  as 
it  is  now,  practically  untouched  by  Western  influences,  no  great 
change  of  the  kind  in  question  is  likely  to  happen.  All  that  educa- 
tional reform,  as  illustrated  in  the  present  system,  implies  is  the 
making  of  education  one  of  the  chief  concerns  of  the  State  and  the 
diffusion  of  Western  knowledge.  The  first  has  affected  the  whole 
nation  ; the  latter  chiefly  the  upper  classes. 


CHAPTER  XXXI 


The  Makers  of  Modern  Japan — How  Japan  is  Governed. 

IN  preceding  pages  some  account  has  been  given  of  the  steps 
by  which  a Far  Eastern  nation  has  risen  to  its  present  position 
of  a Great  Power.  The  period  occupied  by  this  transformation 
is  less  than  half  a century.  For  during  the  first  two  decades  that 
followed  the  reopening  of  Japan  to  foreign  intercourse  reactionary 
influences  supported  by  anti-foreign  feeling  were,  as  we  have  seen, 
in  the  ascendant  ; and  it  was  not  till  after  the  Restoration  that  the 
work  of  remoulding  all  branches  of  administration  commenced. 
While  giving  full  credit  to  the  Japanese  people  for  the  possession 
of  the  qualities  that  made  this  great  change  possible,  the  genius  of 
the  statesmen  by  whom  they  were  guided  should  not  be  overlooked. 

Although  the  new  direction  given  to  national  policy,  the  con- 
summation of  which  is  seen  to-day,  did  not  take  place  until  after 
the  Restoration,  the  services  rendered  by  some  of  the  statesmen 
whose  names  are  associated  with  it  date  from  before  that  time.  The 
Restoration  was  not  the  work  of  a day,  the  effect  of  a sudden  impulse. 
Weak  as  the  Shogun’s  Government  was,  it  was  too  firmly  rooted  by 
the  mere  length  of  its  duration,  by  the  weight  of  time  and  usage, 
to  be  easily  overthrown.  Before  this  could  be  done  something  in 
the  nature  of  a united  movement,  a combination  of  forces,  was 
essential.  And  in  the  feudal  conditions  then  prevailing  it  was  just 
this  point  which  presented  the  greatest  difficulty.  The  military 
strength,  as  after  events  showed,  was  there,  but  clan  jealousies  stood 
in  the  way  of  united  effort.  The  first  attempt  at  rebellion  made 
by  the  Choshiu  clan  failed,  it  will  be  remembered,  for  this  reason, 
the  Satsuma  clan  siding  with  the  Yedo  Government.  Only  when 
these  two  clans  were  persuaded  to  work  together,  and  were  joined  by 
two  others,  as  well  as  by  disaffected  members  of  the  military  class 
who  flocked  to  the  Imperialist  standard  from  all  parts  of  the  country, 
did  it  become  possible  to  organize  insurrection  on  a scale  that  en- 

300 


The  Makers  of  Modern  Japan  301 

dangercd  the  continuance  of  Tokugawa  rule.  It  was  in  the  formation 
of  this  alliance  that  the  men  who  subsequently  filled  the  chief  offices 
under  the  new  Government  first  came  into  prominence.  They  form, 
as  it  were,  a group  by  themselves  as  the  pioneers  of  the  Imperialist 
movement.  It  was  another  and  later  set  of  men  who  took  up 
the  work  thus  begun,  and  accomplished  the  task  of  modernizing 
Japan. 

What  Japanese  writers  tell  us  of  the  relations  subsisting  between 
the  Court  at  Kioto  and  the  Yedo  administration  brings  out  very 
clearly  the  fact  that  the  Kuge,  or  Court  nobles,  who  had  in  former 
days  governed  the  country,  never  ceased  to  regard  the  Shoguns  as 
usurpers,  the  Capital  serving  as  the  focus  of  constant  intrigues 
directed  against  the  Government  of  the  day.  It  was  only  natural, 
therefore,  that  the  Imperialist  movement  should  find  strong  support 
at  Kioto,  and  that  the  men  who  undertook  the  delicate  and  dangerous 
project  of  uniting  the  southern  clans  in  organized  resistance  to  the 
Shogunate  should  be  in  a position  to  vouch  for  the  secret  approval 
of"  the  Throne,  whose  formal  sanction  recorded  in  State  edicts 
remained  to  the  last  days  of  Tokugawa  rule  one  of  the  few  shreds 
of  prestige  still  left  to  the  Sovereign.  Though  the  Kuge , as  a body, 
having  long  been  excluded  from  active  participation  in  public  affairs, 
were  at  the  time  in  question  little  better  than  nonentities,  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  the  movement  in  contemplation  had  for  its  avowed 
object  the  restoration  of  direct  Imperial  rule,  it  seems  to  have  been 
regarded  as  essential  to  establish  a close  connection  with  the  Court. 
This  explains  the  inclusion  of  two  Court  nobles,  Sanjo  and  Iwakura, 
each  of  whom  afterwards  received  the  title  of  Prince.  The  former, 
it  is  said,  owed  his  selection  mainly  to  the  accident  of  birth.  As 
representative  of  one  of  the  oldest  Kuge  families,  his  name  alone 
gave  weight  to  the  Imperialist  cause.  Of  him  we  hear  little  subse- 
quently, as  the  political  situation  developed,  apart  from  his  filling 
the  post  of  Prime  Minister.  Iwakura  stood  on  a different  footing. 
His  commanding  abilities  and  natural  talent  for  affairs  made  his 
services  indispensable,  and  for  several  years  he  was  a dominant  figure 
in  the  Ministry.  Two  of  the  most  notable  clansmen  who  were 
associated  with  Iwakura  in  this  early  period  were  Okubo  (father  of 
the  present  Marquis),  a native  of  Satsuma,  whose  death  by  the 
hands  of  assassins  in  1878  has  already  been  mentioned,  and  Kido 
(father  of  the  present  Marquis),  a native  of  Choshiu,  who  died  of 


302  The  Makers  of  Modern  Japan 

illness  not  long  after  the  new  Government  had  been  established. 
Both  combined  great  capacity  with  very  liberal  views,  the  adoption 
of  Western  ideas  in  the  reconstruction  of  the  administrative  system 
being  largely  due  to  their  initiative.  Of  the  elder  Saigo,  at  first  the 
most  influential  member  of  this  group,  the  reader  has  already  heard 
in  connection  with  the  Satsuma  rebellion.  All  three,  it  will  be  seen, 
belonged  either  to  the  Satsuma  or  to  the  Choshiu  clan.  The  Minis- 
terial dissensions  which  caused  the  withdrawal  from  the  Government 
of  leading  men  of  the  two  other  clans  which  had  taken  part  in  the 
Restoration  led,  as  has  already  been  explained,  to  the  disappearance 
from  the  scene  of  the  Tosa  and  Hizen  clans  at  an  early  stage  of  the 
new  regime , and  to  the  direction  of  affairs  being  assumed  and  con- 
tinued till  to-day  by  Satsuma  and  Choshiu  statesmen.  The  list, 
however,  of  those  who  came  into  notice  during  this  critical  period 
would  be  incomplete  without  the  addition  of  the  names  of  Itagaki 
and  Goto  of  Tosa,  and  Soyeshima  and  Oki  of  Hizen. 

The  most  conspicuous  of  the  statesmen  who  have  been  mentioned 
as  composing  the  second  and  later  set — a description  not  quite 
accurate,  since  the  careers  of  some  overlapped  those  of  their  pre- 
decessors— are  Princes  Yamagata,  ltd,  Oyama  and  Katsura,  and 
Marquises  Inouye,  Matsugata,  Okuma  and  Saionji.  Their  names 
have  long  been  familiar  to  the  public  abroad,  for  all  at  one  time  or 
another  have  been  recognized  as  entitled  to  the  popular  appellation 
of  Genro,  or  Elders,  a term  never  applied  to  the  earlier  statesmen. 
To  the  part  played  by  each  in  the  rise  of  Japan  attention  has  already 
been  drawn  in  the  course  of  this  narrative.  With  the  exception  of 
the  two  last  named,  all  of  these  so-called  Genro  were  Satsuma  or 
Choshiu  clansmen. 

In  an  undertaking  so  vast  as  the  recasting  of  a nation’s  institutions 
on  lines  quite  new,  and  in  their  nature  so  opposed  to  traditional 
usages,  many  minds  of  necessity  co-operated.  The  selection  for  the 
present  purpose  only  of  the  few  whose  names  will  always  be  house- 
hold words  in  Japan  implies  no  lack  of  recognition  of  what  was  done 
by  many  others,  less  conspicuous  in  their  time,  who  rendered  signal 
service  to  the  country.  In  estimating  the  difficulties  encountered 
by  the  statesmen  who  undertook  the  task  of  introducing  Western 
reforms,  and  successfully  maintained  and  carried  through  the  Liberal 
policy  adopted  after  the  Restoration,  regard  should  be  paid  to  the 
dangerous  conditions  amidst  which  much  of  this  work  was  done. 


The  Makers  of  Modern  Japan  303 

The  opposition  they  met  with  came,  as  we  have  seen,  from  two 
quarters — reactionaries,  who  for  a time  were  very  hostile  to  foreigners, 
and  those  who  were  more  advanced  in  their  views  than  Ministers 
themselves.  The  old  ideas  associated  with  vendettas,  which,  so  long 
as  feudalism  lasted,  could  be  prosecuted  under  official  sanction,  had 
produced  an  atmosphere  of  insecurity  to  life  that  survived  well  into 
the  Meiji  era.  The  frequency  of  political  assassinations,  and  the 
precautions  taken  even  in  recent  times  to  protect  members  of  the 
Government  from  attack,  show  how  real  were  the  risks  to  which 
prominent  statesmen  were  exposed. 

The  influence  in  public  affairs  of  the  Genro,  and  of  the  earlier 
leaders  of  the  Restoration  movement  who  never  received  that 
appellation,  has  never  been  questioned.  The  columns  of  the  Japanese 
Press  have  constantly  borne  witness  to  the  position  they  have  held 
in  public  estimation.  They  seem  to  have  assumed  from  the  first  the 
functions  formerly  exercised  by  the  Council  of  State  in  Tokugawa 
times,  with  this  difference,  that,  as  a body,  no  official  recognition 
was  ever  accorded  to  them.  The  Japanese  family  system  gave  oppor- 
tunities to  the  Genro  of  strengthening  their  position  by  the  tie  of 
adoption  as  well  as  by  that  of  marriage  ; and  in  availing  themselves 
of  these  they  followed  the  example  of  the  feudal  nobility  and 
courtiers  of  earlier  days.  Several  were  thus  connected  with  each 
other  by  one,  or  both,  of  these  ties,  the  support  thus  obtained  being 
independent  of  that  which  came  from  their  purely  political  followers. 
When  in  the  course  of  administrative  reconstruction  the  Ministry 
was  reorganized  on  European  models,  the  exact  position  they  occu- 
pied was  not  inaccurately  represented  in  popular  parlance  by  the 
expression  Kuromaku-daijin,  which,  freely  rendered,  means  “ unseen 
Ministers  of  State.”  The  anomalous  and  singular  situation  thus 
created  will  be  understood  when  it  is  explained  that  the  Ministry 
of  the  day  might,  according  to  circumstances,  be  composed  entirely 
of  Genro,  though  latterly  this  became  unusual,  or  might  include 
several  Genro,  or  even  none.  In  the  last-mentioned  case  the  Ministry 
without  Genro  had  very  little  to  do  with  decisions  on  important 
questions.  Of  recent  years  the  number  of  surviving  Genro  has 
gradually  decreased.  Other  causes,  too,  than  that  of  death — namely, 
increasing  age,  the  lesser  prestige  of  later  statesmen  and  the  con- 
stitutional changes  which  resulted  in  the  creation  of  two  consultative 
bodies,  the  Privy  Council  and  Court  Councillors — have  tended  to 


304  How  Japan  is  Governed 

diminish  the  influence  of  the  Genro  who  still  remain.  The  institution 
of  these  two  consultative  bodies  has  had  an  important  bearing  on 
the  direction  of  affairs.  The  idea  prevailing  at  one  time  in  political 
circles  that  the  ranks  of  the  Genro  would  be  reinforced  from  time 
to  time,  as  occasion  served,  by  the  introduction  of  younger  and  rising 
statesmen,  as  actually  took  place  in  one  or  two  instances,  does  not 
appear  to  have  met  with  general  approval.  The  present  tendency 
seems  rather  to  lie  in  the  direction  of  enlarging  the  circle  of  in- 
fluential statesmen  so  as  to  include  those  members  of  the  Privy 
Council  and  House  of  Peers  as  well  as  Court  Councillors,  whose  age 
(to  which  much  respect  is  still  paid),  experience,  and  clan  connections 
mark  them  out  for  selection.  This  tendency,  if  continued,  will  have 
the  effect  of  perpetuating  a state  of  things  under  which  the  Cabinet 
will,  as  hitherto,  be  kept  in  a position  of  subordination  to  higher 
though  veiled  authority  ; for  the  Constitution  works  without  ex- 
cessive friction,  and  neither  the  Lower  House  nor  the  political  parties 
it  represents  have  much  real  power. 

There  are  in  the  modern  development  of  Japan  a few  salient 
points  which  invite  attention.  The  opening  episode  itself  is  one  of 
these.  Beyond  the  fact  that  the  Government  which  was  overthrown 
had  outlasted  its  time,  the  Restoration  bears  no  close  resemblance 
to  other  revolutions.  The  impulse  that  produced  it  did  not  come 
from  the  body  of  the  people.  It  was  in  no  sense  a popular  uprising — 
due  to  class  grievances,  and  aimed  against  oppression  which  had 
become  unbearable.  The  discontent  that  existed  was  of  a kind  that 
is  found  everywhere  when  the  machinery  of  administration  shows 
signs  of  breaking  down.  Nor  was  it  altogether  a movement  from 
above  of  the  nature  of  those  which  elsewhere  have  put  an  end  to 
feudalism  by  a concentration  of  authority  in  the  hands  of  a monarch. 
In  its  inception  it  was  simply  a movement  directed  against  the 
Shogun’s  Government  by  a section  of  the  military  class  belonging 
to  the  Southern  (or,  as  the  Japanese  would  say,  Western)  clans.  The 
cry  of  “ Honour  the  Sovereign  ” derived  much  of  its  efficacy  from 
the  appeal  to  drive  out  foreigners  which  accompanied  it.  The 
abolition  of  feudalism  was  mainly  an  afterthought. 

Other  outstanding  features,  taken  in  the  order  of  events,  are  the 
Satsuma  rebellion  (in  which  the  progressive  element  in  the  clan 
supported  the  Government) ; the  establishment  of  parliamentary 
government ; treaty  revision,  in  which  Great  Britain  took  the  lead  ; 


How  Japan  is  Governed  305 

the  war  with  China  and  that  with  Russia  ; the  annexation  of  Korea  ; 
and,  more  recently,  the  Great  War. 

Had  the  Satsuma  insurgents  triumphed  when  they  rose  in  rebellion, 
the  new  direction  given  to  Japanese  policy  would  have  been  arrested, 
with  results  very  different  from  anything  we  see  to-day.  With  the 
establishment  of  parliamentary  government,  which  came  into  force 
together  with  the  Constitution,  Japan  broke  finally  with  her  past 
traditions  and  came  into  line  with  Western  countries.  The  con- 
clusion of  the  new  Treaty  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  which 
was  followed  by  the  conclusion  of  similar  treaties  with  other  foreign 
Powers,  put  a stop  to  the  mischievous  agitation  concerning  Treaty 
revision  which  had  long  troubled  the  Government.  The  war  with 
China,  which  increased  Japanese  territory  and  material  resources, 
revealed  a military  strength  unsuspected  abroad,  and  gave  Japan  a 
new  and  commanding  position  in  the  Far  East.  Of  still  greater 
importance  were  the  results  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war.  It  changed 
the  whole  face  of  Far  Eastern  affairs,  and  won  for  Japan  admission 
to  the  ranks  of  Great  Powers.  By  the  annexation  of  Korea  Japan 
added  to  her  military  security,  and  removed  what  in  past  years  had 
been  a constant  source  of  disturbance  in  Far  Eastern  affairs.  How 
the  financial  position  of  Japan  has  been  affected  by  the  Great  War, 
and  the  expansion  of  territory  she  has  acquired,  we  have  seen.  As 
to  what  further  consequences  for  her  may  result  from  the  defeat  of 
Germany,  the  collapse  of  Russia  and  the  newly  awakened  interest  of 
the  United  States  in  foreign  questions,  all  that  can  safely  be  said  is 
that  indulgence  in  speculations  on  this  point  will  find  little  assistance 
from  analogies  looked  for  in  the  past. 

To  the  question,  How  much  in  Japan  has  been  changed  ? an 
answer  is  difficult.  Outwardly,  of  course,  the  effects  of  the  whole- 
sale adoption  of  much  of  the  material  civilization  of  the  West  are 
very  plain.  Whether  these  effects  extend  much  deeper  is  another 
matter.  Japan,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind,  is  in  a state  of  transition. 
The  new  ideas  imported  from  abroad  exist  side  by  side  with  the 
old,  so  that  the  former  balance  of  things  has  disappeared.  Two 
instances  taken  from  the  highest  and  lowest  circles  will  serve  to 
illustrate  the  conflict  still  going  on  between  the  old  and  new  cultures. 
The  Gregorian  Calendar  adopted  in  1873  for  official  purposes  counts 
for  little  in  agricultural  operations,  and  in  the  pilgrimages  and 
religious  festivals  which  play  so  important  a part  in  Japanese  life, 
u 


306  How  Japan  is  Governed 

These  are  still  conducted  according  to  the  old  calendar.  This  is 
not  surprising,  for  the  interior  of  Japan  has  only  been  open  to 
foreign  residence  and  trade  since  1899,  the  date  when  the  revised 
treaties  came  into  operation.  Since  then,  moreover,  foreign  trade 
has  continued  to  move  in  the  grooves  first  created,  the  so-called 
Treaty  ports,  the  rest  of  the  country  having  been  affected  but  little 
by  foreign  intercourse.  A similar  contrast  is  noticeable  in  ceremonial 
procedure.  On  certain  State  occasions  the  Sovereign  performs  the 
functions  of  a European  monarch  in  accordance  with  the  formalities 
of  European  Courts.  On  others,  acting  as  high  priest  in  the  shrine 
attached  to  the  palace,  he  conducts  a Shinto  service  according  to  a 
ritual  so  ancient  as  to  be  almost  unintelligible,  and  quite  out  of 
keeping  with  the  modern  ideas  which  the  nation  has  adopted.  It 
would  be  in  no  way  surprising  to  those  who  have  studied  Japanese 
progress  in  the  last  fifty  years  of  foreign  intercourse  if  in  the  not 
distant  future  the  present  Civil  Code,  based  on  that  of  Saxony,  were 
to  be  revised  with  the  object  of  bringing  it  more  into  harmony  with 
Japanese  tradition  and  sentiment. 


INDEX 


Abdication,  22,  287 
Adams,  Sir  F.,  History  of 
Japan,  80,  92 
Administration,  Toku- 
gawa  ( see  Tokugawa 
Shogunate) 

Administrative  changes, 
74  ; system,  reorgani- 
zation of,  174 
Adoption,  22,  285  ; com- 
plications caused  by, 
39 

Adviser  to  Shogunate, 
position  held  by  Head 
of  Mito  family,  34 
Agreement,  secret,  be- 
tween China  and  Japan 
for  Common  Defence, 
281 

Agreements  (pre-Restor- 
ation  Treaties)  con- 
cluded by  Japan  with 
Foreign  Powers,  46,  47, 
48,  49 

Agricultural  class,  the,  97 
Aidzu  clansmen  as 
fighters,  131 
Aidzu,  daimid  of,  77 
Ainu  aborigines,  19,  20 
Aki,  daimio  of,  33 
Alcock,  Sir  Rutherford, 


54.  57 


Alexeieff,  Admiral,  246, 
253.  256 

Alliance  of  four  clans,  71, 
72,  80 

Altars,  family,  151,  286 
America  and  Japan, 
early  relations,  45 ; 
first  treaty,  46  ; other 
treaties,  54,  205,  207, 
240 ; foreign  aggres- 
sion in  China  and 
Declarations  protest  of 
U.S.  Government,  237 ; 
friendly  relations,  265  ; 
friction,  causes  of,  266 
American  annexation  of 
Philippines,  235  ; in- 


terests in  China,  237  ; 
missionary  enterprise, 
149  ; policy  in  regard 
to  Restoration,  65 ; 
Treaty  of  1858,  diffi- 
culties of  negotiation, 
51  ; whalers  in  Sea  of 
Okhotsk,  44 

Ancestor  worship,  140, 

151 

Anglo- Japanese  Treaty 
of  Alliance,  247 
Anti-Foreign  feeling,  53, 
54.  55.  75.  194 
Anti-Japanese  feeling  in 
America  and  Canada, 
267 

Anti-Shogunate  move- 
ment, 50 

Arbeiter  Zeitung,  the,  275 
Arisugawa,  Prince,  74 
Armistice  concluded  with 
China,  221 

Army  of  the  Shogunate, 
82 

Art  and  literature,  18,  26, 
112,  113 

Asan,  conflict  at,  217 
Ashikaga  Shoguns,  26 
Assassinations,  political, 
302 

Assimilation  of  foreign 
ideas,  115 

**  Association  of  men 
with  a definite  pur- 
pose ” (Risshi-sha) , 136 
" Association  of  Pat- 
riots ” ( Aikoku-to ),  136 
Aston,  Mr.,  143 
Attack  on  Shimonosdki 
forts  by  four  Powers, 
58 

Awa,  daimio  of,  35 
Awakening  of  Japan,  The, 
73 

Ballot,  secret,  185 
Bank  of  Japan,  177 
Banks  and  banking,  177 

307 


Bavarian  Constitution 
adopted  as  model,  188 
” Benevolent " govern- 
ment, 1 15 
Bezobrazov,  256 
Biddle,  Commodore,  at 
Yedo,  45 

Bimetallic  standard,  a, 
176 

Bismarck,  1 72 
Biwa,  L.,  32,  50 
Blagovestchensk,  repri- 
sals at,  243 
Brinkley,  Capt.,  124 
British  Legation,  attacks 
on  the,  55 
Boissonade,  M.,  158 
Bolsheviks,  the,  281 
Boxer  Rising,  the,  241- 
243 

Buckle’s  History  of 
Civilization,  195 
Buddhism,  17,  139,  141, 
145,  147,  292 
Budget,  the,  190,  198 
Buki  or  military  class,  20 
Bureaucratic  system  of 
pre-feudal  days,  73 
Burma  Convention,  the, 
226 

Bushido,  149 
Butsudan  or  Buddhist 
altar,  286 

Calendar,  changes  in  the, 
7i 

Campbell,  Mr.,  241 
Canada,  anti- Japanese 
feeling  in,  267 
Capital,  transference  of, 
from  Kioto  to  Yedo,  79 
Capital  of  the  Tycoon, 
the,  54 

“ Cash,”  176 
Cassini,  M.,  229 
Cenotaphs,  ancestral,  286 
Centralized  bureaucracy, 
33.  35 

Cha-no-yu,  150 


3°8 


Index 


Chamberlain,  Professor, 
143 

Chamberlain,  Mr.  J.,  248 
“ Charter  Oath,”  the,  75, 
192 

Chemulpo,  216,  257  ; 

naval  engagement  off, 
258 

Ch6radame,  M.,  228,  252 
Chihanji,  89 

Ghikuzen  province,  25  ; 

daimio  of,  72 
China,  relations  with, 
21 1 ; war  with,  217  ; 
Japan’s  aggressive  in- 
tentions in,  280  ; 

Handbook,  241 
Chinda,  Viscount,  210 
Chinese  culture,  influ- 
ence of,  17,  18,  298  ; 
Eastern  Railway,  229, 
231  ; influence  on 
Japanese  Buddhism, 
143  ; influx  of,  in  Cali- 
fornia, 266 ; Navy,  the, 
220  ; suzerainty  over 
neighbouring  states, 
214  ; sexagenary  cycle, 
69,  70 ; written  lan- 
guage, the,  1 12,  X13 
Choshiu  clan,  the,  71,  72 
Choshiu  clansmen  ex- 
pelled from  Kioto,  59 
Choshiu,  daimio  of,  33, 
35.5°.'  ex-daimio  of,  1 86 
Choshiu,  disorders  in, 
129  ; and  Higo,  risings 
in,  127  ; forts,  action 
by.  57  ; leaders,  ideals 
of  the,  73  ; mission  of 
conciliation  to,  82 ; 
raids  and  attacks,  72  ; 
rebellion,  59 
Choteki,  or  rebels,  77 
Christian  persecutions, 
28,  30  ; after-effect  of, 
55  ; political  character 
of,  120  ; renewal  of,  91 
Christianity,  edicts 
against,  28,  30  ; with- 
drawal of,  91  ; first  in- 
troduction of,  27 ; 
future  of,  in  Japan, 
149 ; later  encourage- 
ment of,  as  a means  of 
learning  English,  148  ; 
official  recognition  of, 
147 


Chronology,  Japanese,  69 
Ch'un,  Prince,  242 
Civil  Code,  the,  283 
Civil  Service  examina- 
tions, 175 

Civil  war  and  fall  of 
Shogunate,  63 
Clan  guilds,  94 
Clan  jealousies,  81,  129 
Clans,  independent  spirit 
of,  72 

Class  distinctions,  feudal, 
195 

Classes,  effects  of  aboli- 
tion of  feudalism  on, 
94  ; fusion  of,  195  ; 
rearrangement  of,  90 
Coalition  Cabinet  of  Lib- 
erals,resignation  of, 200 
Coast  defence  before  Re- 
storation, 44 
Code  of  Criminal  Proce- 
dure, 158 
Coinage,  176 
Colonization  of  Yezo, 
failure  of,  118 
Commercial  Convention 
with  China,  222 
Compulsory  education, 
293 

Conferences  of  Prefects, 
annual,  157 

Conferences  on  Treaty 
Revision  at  Tokio,  178 
Confiscation  of  territories 
of  Tokugawa  adher- 
ents, 77 

Confucianism,  144,  149, 

151 

Congratulatory  missions, 

25 

Conscript  army,  efficiency 
of  the  new,  132 
Conscription,  establish- 
ment of,  218 
Conservative  Party,  for- 
mation of,  197 
Constitution,  Prince  Ito’s 
commentaries  on,  182, 
188  ; framing  of,  172  ; 
the  granting  of  a,  162  ; 
promulgation  of,  186  ; 
Constitutional  Imperial- 
ist Party,  166 ; Liber- 
als, 197 ; Reform 
Party,  165 

Consuls,  or  " adminis- 
trators ” in  China,  212 


Copyright,  Protection  of, 
207 

Corvde,  the,  170,  185 
Council  of  State,  upper 
and  lower,  35,  74 
Court,  isolation  of,  37 
Court  Councillors,  175 
Court  and  feudal  nobility, 
relations  between,  37; 
amalgamation  of,  89 
Court  nobles,  ideals  of,  73 
Court  and  Shogunate, 
33.  56,  59 

“ Credit  notes,”  176 
Creed  of  Half  Japan,  The, 
141 

Currency,  confusion  in 
the  state  of,  81,  176 
Customs  Import  Tariff, 
207 

Czecho-Slovak  troops  in 
Asia,  the,  281 


Daido  Club,  the,  197 
Daijingu  of  Is6,  the,  286 
Daij5  Daijin,  the,  80 
Daikwan,  or  Governors, 
36 

Dajakwan  or  Central 
Executive,  79 
Dan-no-Ura,  sea  fight  of, 
20 

Dazaifu,  25 

de  Witte,  Count,  255,  256 
Debidour’s  Histoire  Dip- 
lomatique de  I'Europe, 
229 

Declarations  regarding 
the  non-alienation  of 
Chinese  territory,  234 
Deliberative  Assemblies, 
75 

Democratic  feeling, 
growth  of,  196 
Departments  of  new  post- 
Restoration  adminis- 
tration, 73 

D6shima,  the  Dutch  in, 
31,  121 

Development  of  Japan, 
outstanding  features 
in,  304 

Diet  and  Government, 
conflicts  between,  199 ; 
composition  of,  189 ; 
first  session  of,  198  ; 
first  dissolution  of,  198 


Discord  between  politi- 
cal parties,  169 
Districts,  rural  and 
urban,  184 
Divorce,  290 
Douglas,  Admiral  Sir  A., 
naval  adviser,  219 
Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  M.,108 
Dual  system  of  govern- 
ment, 21,  38  ; end  of, 
63.  64.  85 

Duarchy,  consolidation 
of,  33,  34.  35.  36.  37  : 
working  of,  38,  39,  40 
Duplication  of  offices,  36, 
37 

Dummy  editors,  the 
Press  Law  and,  155 
Dutch  traders,  30,  31  ; 
treaties  with  the,  46, 
47,  240  ; language  as  a 
medium  of  communi- 
cation, hi  ; and 
" Western  Learning,” 
84 

Duties,  import  and  ex- 
port, foreign  Powers’ 
demand  for  modifica- 
tion of,  60 

East  India  Company,  30 
£chizen,  daimio  of,  33, 
50,  53  ; ex-Prince,  56 
Eckhardstein,  von.  Re- 
miniscences, 249 
Education,  292  ; Depart- 
ment of,  293 
Educational  Code,  293  ; 

influences,  154,  160 
Eisai  Zenshi,  founder  of 
Zen  sect  of  Buddhists, 
142 

Election,  system  of,  for 
local  assemblies,  etc., 

184  ; for  Diet,  189 
Elections,  first,  for  Diet, 

194 

Electoral  Law,  revised, 
190 

Electors,  qualifications 
of,  for  local  assemblies, 

185  ; for  Diet,  189 
Elementary  Schools,  293 
Elgin  and  Kincardine, 

Lord,  37 

Elliot  Islands,  Japanese 
naval  base  at,  in  war 
with  Russia,  261 


Index 

Emigration,  Japanese, 
269 

Emperor  and  Court, 
teaching  in  schools 
concerning,  296 
Emperor’s  name,  re- 
moval of  interdict  re- 
garding use  of,  1 17 
Empress  Dowager  of 
China,  243 

English  language  re- 
places Dutch  as 
medium  of  communi- 
cation, 1 12;  teaching 
of,  in  schools,  175,  297 
English  traders,  30 
“ Equal  opportunity,” 
principle  of,  276 ; 

“ open  door  ” and,  238 
“ Era  of  Enlightened 
Government,”  the,  69 
Era  of  Great  Peace,  42 
Eta  and  Htnin,  or  social 
outcasts,  90 

Europe,  early  intercourse 
with, 27  ; renewal  of,  45 
Ex-samurai  (Shieoku),  95, 
96;  discontent  of,  123; 
restlessness  of,  152, 
1 60,  170 

Ex-regent  or  Kwambaku, 
18 

Expansion,  Japanese, 
268 

Extra-territoriality,  109, 
204,  207 

Fall  of  ShSgunate,  63,  64 
“ Family,”  the,  in 
Japanese  law,  283 
Family  councils,  289 ; 
registration,  290 ; rites, 

286 

Family  System,  Japan- 
ese, 283 

Fanaticism,  75,  135,  165, 
193.  194 
Farmers,  97 
Fernandez,  27 
“ Festival  of  the  Dead,” 

287 

Feudal  fiefs,  surrender  of, 
87 

Feudal  nobles,  three 
classes  of,  33,  34 ; 

early  training,  92  ; sub- 
jection of,  under  Sh5- 
gunate  rule,  34 


309 

Feudal  System,  aboli- 
tion of,  89 ; classifica- 
tion of  society,  20  ; 
compared  with  Scot- 
tish, 43 ; establishment 
of,  20  ; hereditary  re- 
tainers, 22  ; provincial 
administration,  30  ; 
tenure  of  land,  97 ; 
territories  and  nobility 
under Iy6yasu,  33 
Fief,  a daimio’s,  43 
Fiefs  under  Shogunate 
rule,  33 

Fifty  Years  of  New  Japan, 
137,  140,  148,  175,  177 
Figure-head  system  of 
government,  22,  88 
Financial  reform,  175,239 
Flower  fairs,  151 
Foreign  experts,  engage- 
ment of,  123 
Foreign  intercourse,  re- 
opening of,  44 ; opposi- 
tion to,  51 

Foreign  judges,  the  ques- 
tion of,  206 ; Powers, 
attitude  of,  65,  114; 
regrouping  of,  247 
Foreign  troops  in  Yoko- 
hama, 58 

Formosa,  acquisition  of, 
222 ; difficulty  with 
China  respecting,  125  ; 
resources  of,  118,  119 
France  and  Russia,  close 
accord  between,  228 
French  legal  models 
adopted  for  Criminal 
law,  158 

Fudai  daimios,  34,  35,  94 
Fujiwara  family,  the,  18, 
19,  20 

Fukien,  non-alienation 
of,  238 

Fukuchi,  editor  of  Nichi 
Nichi  Shimbun,  166 
Fukuzawa  Yukichi,  154, 
155.  295 

General  Agreement 
Union,  179 

“ Gentlemen’s  Agree- 
ment,” the,  267 
Genre,  or  Elders,  302,  303 
Genro-in,  or  Senate,  crea- 
tion of,  133  ; Tosa  clans- 
men’s dissatisfaction 


3X° 

with  constitution  of, 
137 

Gerard.M ,,Ma  Mission  en 
Chine,  228, 229, 230, 233 
German  Emperor,  mis- 
chievous activityof,224 
German  influence  in  Paci- 
fic, elimination  of,  277 
German  Minister  in 
China,  murder  of,  by 
Boxers,  242 

German  models  adopted 
in  constitutional  and 
administrative  mat- 
ters, 172,  174 
Germany  and  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance,  249 
Germany  and  Japan,  pro- 
gress of,  compared,  274 
Girls,  education  of,  294 
Gokenin,  or  landed  gen- 
try, 34,  78,  93 
Gold  standard,  adoption 
of,  239 

Gosanki,  the,  34,  35 
Goto  Shojird,  Count,  74, 
121,  164,  169,  174,  194, 
302 

Governors  and  governed, 
Japanese  idea  of  re- 
lationship between,  115 
Grant,  General,  126 
Great  Britain,  first  treaty 
with,  46 ; Treaty  of 
1858,  47  ; revised 

Treaty  with,  207,  208, 
209,  210 

Great  Reform,  the,  18, 
69,  142 

Great  War,  Japan’s  part 
in  the,  276 

Gregorian  Calendar, adop- 
tion of,  71,  1 1 7,  305 
Guizot’s  History  of  the 
Civilization  of  Europe, 
42 

Gunchd,  or  district  ad- 
ministrators, 185 

Haga,  Prof.,  175 
Hague  Tribunal,  the,  208 
Haicheng,  221 
Hakodate,  opening  of,  46 
Hambatsu  Siifu,  or  clan 
government,  43 
Han,  or  clan,  43 
Harris,  Mr.  Townsend, 
47,  in 


Index 

Hatamoto,  or  Bannermen, 
34.  35.  78.  93 
Hawaii,  Japanese  labour 
in,  270 

Hayashi,  Count,  247,  249 
Headmen  of  household 
groups,  36 

Headship  of  family,  287 
Heimin,  or  common 
people,  90 

Hereditary  retainers,  22 
Hideyori,  32 
Hideyoshi,  26,  28  ; am- 
bition of,  29 
High  Court  of  Justice 
( Daishinin ) , 1 33 
Higher  Schools,  curri- 
culum of,  297 
Higo,  province  of,  131 
Hikond,  50 

Hill,  S.  J.,  Impressions  of 
the  Kaiser,  275 
Hio-jo-sho,  35 
Hiogo,  port  of,  54,  107 
Hirado  Islands,  30 
History  of  Japan  (1542- 
61),  A,  28,  124 
History  of  the  Currency,  A, 
175.  176 

" History  of  the  Restora- 
tion,” 72 

Hitachi  (Mito),  province 
of,  33,  34  . . [51 

Hitotsubashi  family,  the, 
Hizen,  province  of,  25 ; 
daimid  of,  33,  35  ; clan, 
71  ; insurrection,  125. 
Hoben,  Ho-an  Jorei,  180, 
181  ; (or  pious  fraud), 
M3 

Hohenzollern,  Prince 
Henry  of,  230 
Hojo  Regents,  the,  24, 

25.  142 

Hokkaido  ( Yezo ),  the,  or 
Northern  Sea  Circuit, 
104,  118,  159 
Honda,  Rev.  Y.,  148 
Hongkong,  232 
Hornbeck,  Mr.,  Contem- 
porary Politics  of  the 
Far  East,  236 
Hostility  to  foreigners, 
53.  54.  55.  75.  107.  x79. 
194 

House  of  Peers,  173 
House  of  Representa- 
tives, 189 


Hozumi,  Professor,  288 
“ Hundred  Articles, 

The,”  33,  37,  93 

I-Ho-Ch’uan  (Patriot 

Harmony  Fists),  241 
li  Kamon  no  Kami 
(Tairo  or  Regent),  50, 
52,  53,  55.  63 
Iki  Islands,  25 
Immigration  Act,  Ameri- 
can, 266 

Imperial  " progresses,” 
37 ; domains,  67 ; 
Houshold,  Minister  of, 
173  ; House  Law,  190  ; 
Oaths,  135,  187 ; 

“ Ordinances,"  188  ; 
prerogatives,  188 
Impersonality,  atmo- 
sphere of,  pervading 
everything  Japanese, 2 1 
Indemnities,  58,  222,  225 
Independents  in  Diet, 
194 

Ingles,  Admiral,  naval 
adviser,  219 
Inkio,  288 

Inouye,  Marquis,  74,  99, 
126,  174,  179,  249,  251, 
302 

Instruction  in  Ele- 
mentary Schools,  295 
Insurrectionary  move- 
ments, 124,  127,  130, 
171 

Interests  of  Treaty 
Powers,  65 

Invasions  by  Mongols,  25 
“ Invention  of  a New 
Religion,  The,”  150 
Ise,  Great  Shrine  at,  54, 
x5i 

Ishii,  Viscount,  280 
" Ishin  Shi  ” (“  History 
of  the  Restoration  ”), 
72 

Itagaki,  79,  121,  136,  137, 
164,  169,  174,  194,  200, 
302 

Ito,  Prince,  74,  163,  172, 
174,  201,  224,  249,  251, 

302 

Ito  Shimpei,  121,  124 
Iwakura,  Prince,  74,  79, 
80,  87,  90,  122,  301 
Iwakura  Mission,  objects 
of  the,  122,  178,  205 


Index  3 1 1 


Iyemitsu,  Shogun,  re- 
pressive edicts  of,  30 
Iy6mochi,  Shogun,  56 
Iydsada,  52 

Iydyasu,  the  rule  of,  33, 
34.  35.  36.  37.  38 

Japan,  bridging  the  gulf 
between  old  and  new, 
1 86  ; contrast  between 
old  and  new,  305,  306 
Japan : the  Rise  of  a 
Modern  Power,  230 
Japan  Year  Book,  the, 
140 

Japanese  Cabinets,  in- 
dependent of  Diet,  200 
Japanese  language  an 
obstacle  to  progress, 
112 

Japanese,  origin  of  the,  17 
Japanese  subjects,  rights 
and  duties  of,  189 
Japanese  writing,  three 
branches  of,  298 
Jesuit  missionaries,  28,29 
Jiji  Shimpii,  the,  155 
Jimmu  Tenno,  the  mythi- 
cal founder  of  Japan, 
69 

Jingikwan,  146 
Jisha-bugid,  35,  145 
JiyiUti,  or  Liberal  Party, 
164 ; dissolution  of, 
167  ; revival  of,  194 
Jddai,  or  Governor  (of 
Osaka),  37 
Jodo  sect,  the,  142 

Kaga,  daimio  of,  33 
Kagoshima,  27 ; bom- 
bardment of,  57 ; Shim- 
adzu’s  retirement  to, 
130;  Saigo’s  death  in, 
132 

Kaiping,  221 
Kaishinto,  or  Progres- 
sives, 197 
Kamakura,  21,  26 
Kamakura  Shoguns,  the, 

24 

Kami,  or  natural  deities, 
40,  140 

Kamidana,  or  Shinto 
altar,  286 

Kanagawa,  Perry  at,  46 
Kanda,  Baron,  99 
Kataoka  Kenkichi,  155 


Kato,  Viscount,  21 1,  248 
Katsura,  General,  221, 
251,  302 

Kawamura,  Admiral,  129 
K6iki,  51,  56,  60,  62,  88, 
186 

Ketsudan-sho,  or  Court  of 
Decisions,  35 
Kiaochow,  228  ; leased 
to  Germany,  230 ; 
evacuated  by  Germany, 
277 

Kido,  74,  79,  80,  82,  87, 
88,  137,  301 

Kii  (or  Kishiu),  prov.  of, 

33  ; princely  House  of, 

34  ; Prince  of,  51,  64, 
88 

Kikuchi,  Baron,  293,  299 
Kidbushd,  or  Department 
of  Religion,  147 
Kioto,  21  and  Yedo,  38  ; 
intrigues  at  the  Court 
of,  49  ; Shogun  sum- 
moned to,  56  ; raid  on, 
59.  62 

Kishiu,  prov.  of  (see  Kii) 
Kiushiu,  prov.  of,  25 
Knox  proposal  regarding 
Manchurian  railways, 
280 

Kogisho,  or  Parliament, 
77.  87 

Komei,  Emperor,  death 
of,  62 

Konishi,  Christian  dai- 
mio, 29 

Korea,  17 ; and  China, 
126  ; annexation  of, 
by  Japan,  271,  272  ; 
Chinese  conquest  of, 
24,  25  ; Chinese  suze- 
rainty over,  25,  214  ; 
condition  of,  215  ; diffi- 
culties with  China  con- 
cerning, 120  ; invasion 
by  Hideyoshi,  29 ; 
Japan’s  interests  in, 
254 ; Japanese  pro- 
tectorate over,  264  ; 
missions  of  courtesy  to 
Japan,  121  ; rivalry 
between  Russia  and 
Japan  concerning,  255; 
written  language  of,  1 9 
Kublai  Khan,  24,  27 
Kugi,  or  Court  aristoc- 
racy, 20,  37,  49,  301 


Kumamoto,  siege  of  the 
castle  of,  1 31 
Kurile  Islands,  acquisi- 
tion of,  126 

Kuroda,  General,  1x8, 
126,  129,  174 
Kuroki,  General,  260 
Kuromakn  - daijin,  or 
“ Unseen  Ministers  of 
State,”  303 

Kuropatkin, General,  260, 
262 

Kwang-chow,  Bay  of, 
leased  to  France,  231 
Kwanto,  32 

Kwazoku,  name  of  new 
class,  including  all 
nobles,  89 

Land,  feudal  tenure  of, 
97  ; reform,  98  ; official 
survey  of,  100  ; assess- 
ment of  value,  103, 
105  ; ownership  of,  by 
foreigners,  208 
Land-tax,  revision  of,  99, 
104 

Language  difficulties  in 
way  of  progress,  111  ; 
in  education,  298 
Languages,  written  and 
spoken,  Japanese,  112, 
IX3 

Lansdowne,  Marquess  of, 
247 

Lansing-Ishii  Agreement, 
the,  281 

Law  of  Cities,  Towns  and 
Villages  (Shi-chd-som- 
po),  184  ; of  the  Court 
and  Shogunate,  37  ; of 
the  Imperial  Court, 
37 ; of  Libel,  168  ; of 
Public  Meetings,  the, 
156,  164 

Laws  accessory  to  the 
Constitution,  188 
" Le  Monde  et  la  Guerre 
Russo-  Japonaise"  (Che- 
radame),  228,  252 
Leases  of  Chinese  Terri- 
tory, 227,  230,  231,  232 
Legal  and  Judicial  Re- 
form, 158,  193,  240 
Legations  at  Peking, 
siege  of,  241 
Legislative  Chamber  or 
Senate  (Genro-in),  133 


312  Index 


Lemieux,  Mr.,  268 
Li  Hung  Chang,  218,  228 
Liaotung  Peninsula,  the, 
225 

Liaoyang,  260  ; battle  of, 
262 

Liberal  Party,  pro- 
gramme of  the,  164 
Lloyd,  Rev.  Arthur,  141, 
142 

Lobanoff,  Prince,  228, 
255 

Local  government,  old 
system  of,  36  ; revised 
system  of,  156,  184 
London  Protocol  of  1862, 
107 

Loochoo,  annexation  of, 

1 26  ; difficulties  in  con- 
nection with,  125,  213  ; 
Local  Government  Act 
inoperative  in,  184 
Lord  Keeper  of  the  Seals 
(Naidaijiri),  175 
Lower  and  Upper  Houses 
of  Diet,  the,  203 

" Mahayana  Vehicle,” 
the,  141 

Makers  of  Modern  Japan, 
the,  300 

Makharoff,  Admiral,  259 
Manchuria,  Russian  in- 
tentions in,  246  ; occu- 
pation of,  252  ; Ameri- 
can protest,  252 
Marco  Polo,  27 
Marriage,  290 
Matsudaira  (Tokugawa 
family  name),  35 
Matsugata,  Marquis,  129, 
174 ; financial  mea- 
sures introduced  by, 

177.  239.  302 

Meckel,  General,  military 
adviser,  218 
Meiji  Era,  the,  42,  69 
Members  of  Parliament, 
qualifications  of,  190 
Memorials  to  the  Throne, 
87 

Mdtayage  system,  the,  97 
Mitsuki,  36 

Middle  schools,  curricu- 
lum of,  297 

Mikado  (one  of  terms  for 
Emperor  of  Japan), 
meaning  of,  40 


Mikado,  attempt  to  ab- 
duct, 59  ; first  audi- 
ence granted  by,  220 
Mikados,  Shoguns  mis- 
taken for,  23 
Militarist  policy,  223 
Military  College  in  Sat- 
suma,  Saigo’s,  130 
Military  strength  of  Rus- 
sia and  Japan,  com- 
parison of,  258 
Min  Party,  the,  in  Korea, 
217 

Minamoto  family,  the, 
20 

Minister  President  of  the 
Cabinet,  174 
Ministers  of  State,  chief, 
174 

Minki,  or  general  public, 
outside  military  class, 
20 

Missionaries,  early,  27  ; 

expulsion  of,  28,  30 
Missions  to  Europe  and 
United  States,  and  ob- 
jects of,  107,  108,  109 
Missions  from  Yedo  to 
Kioto,  53 

Mito,  ex- Prince  of,  50,  51, 
53.  55.  64 

Mito,  disorders  in,  129 
Mito,  Princely  House  of, 
72 

Mitsu  Bishi,  first  s.s. 

company,  the,  133 
Moderation  in  politics, 
increasing  tendency  to- 
wards, 202 

Moderation  towards 
rebels,  77 

Monarch,  personality  of, 
the,  196 

Monetary  system,  con- 
fused state  of,  175 
Mongol  invasions,  24,  25 
Monopoly  of  foreign 
trade  by  Shogunate,  62 
Morals,  instruction  in, 
295 

Mori.daimio,  43  ; murder 
of  Viscount,  193 
Morrison,  Dr.,  249 
" Most  favoured  nation  ’’ 
treatment,  108 
Mukden  Agreement,  the, 
246,  253 ; battle  of, 
263 


Murder  of  Secretary  of 
American  Legation  in 
Tokio,  55  ; of  German 
Minister  and  Chancel- 
lor of  Japanese : Lega- 
tion at  Peking,  242 
Murders  of  British  sub- 
jects and  indemnities, 
55 

Mutsu,  daimi5  of,  33,  247 
Mutsuhito,  Emperor, 
succession  of,  62 ; 
message  to  foreign  re- 
presentatives, 1 18 

Nagasaki,  Christianity 
at,  91 

Naidaijin,  175 
Nanshan,  Russian  defeat 
at,  261 

Naruse,  Mr.,  295 
National  army,  nucleus 
of,  82,  83 

National  banks,  176 
National  calendar,  71 
National  pride,  19 
Naval  reform,  219 
Navy,  conspicuous  ser- 
vices of  Japanese,  dur- 
ing Great  War,  282 
Navy,  state  of,  82,  219 
Nengo,  or  year-periods, 
69,  70 

New  Government,  form 
chosen  for,  73  ; first 
rupture  in  ministry, 

122 

Newchwang,  occupation 
of,  221,  261 

Newspaper  editors  and 
proprietors,  responsi- 
bility of,  168 
Nichi  Nielli  Shimbuti, 
the,  166 

Nichiren,  Buddhist 

priest,  143 

Nichiren  sect,  the,  142 
Nihonbashi,  the,  or 
Bridge  of  Japan,  182 
Niigata,  107 
Nitob6,  Professor,  175 
Nishi,  Viscount,  255 
N in  do,  288 

Nobunaga,  26-28,  145 
Nodzu,  General,  261 
Nogi,  General,  261 
Normal  schools,  297 
Noto,  province  of,  166 


Oaths  taken  by  the  Em- 
peror, 135,  187 
Oishi,  leader  of  Forty- 
_ seven  ronin,  149 
Oki,  302 

Oku,  General,  260 
Okubo,  74,  79,  80,  87, 
_ 129,  157,  301 
Okuma,  74,  79,  99,  118, 
140,  159,  165,  167,  174, 
180,  182,  191,  193,  200, 
206,  239,  277,  299, 

302 

" Open  door  and  equal 
opportunity,”  prin- 
ciple of,  238,  245,  247, 
252 

" Open,”  or  “ treaty,” 
*'  ports,”  48 

Opposition,  the,  in  first 
session  of  Diet,  194 ; 
tactics  of,  198 
Origin  of  the  Japanese, 

_ 17 

Osaka  Mint,  the,  176 
“ Osaka  summer  cam- 
_ paign,”  the,  32 
Osaka  combined  squad- 
ron at,  61  ; conference 
in,  137  ; Governor  of, 
37 ; postponed  opening 
of,  107 ; Shogun's  with- 
drawal to,  63 
Ouchtomsky,  Prince,  229 
Outstanding  features  in 
development  of  Japan, 

304 

Owari,  Prince  of,  50,  53, 
64 

Owari,  province  of,  33 ; 
princely  House  of,  34, 

Oyama,  Field-Marshal 
Prince,  218,  262,  302 
Ozaki  Yukio,  165 

Paper  money,  81,  175, 
176,  177 

Parental  authority,  284 
Parkes,  Sir  Harry,  60, 
77 

Parliament,  decree  to 
establish  a,  162 
Party  government,  desire 
for,  and  failure  of, 
attempt  to  establish, 
200 

Party  manifestos,  197 


Index 

Peace  Conference  in 
Paris,  Japan  at  the, 
282 

Peace  Preservation  Regu- 
lations (HJ-an  Jorei), 
180,  181 

Peerage,  creation  of  new, 
173 

Penal  Code,  158 
Pensions,  Feudal,  93 ; 
commutation  of,  96, 
127 

” Permanent  Register,” 
the,  290 

Perry,  Commodore,  45, 
49,  61,  62,  72 
Persecutions,  early  Chris- 
tian, 28,  30 ; after- 

effect of,  55  ; political 
character  of,  120  ; re- 
crudescence of,  91 
Philippine  Islands,  the, 
235 

Piggott,  Sir  Francis,  193 
Pilgrims  and  Pilgrim- 
ages, 151 

Ping-yang,  Chinese  de- 
feat at,  220  ; occupa- 
tion of,  in  Russian  war, 
260 

Pioneer  colonization, 
Japanese  failure  in,  119 
Plehve,  256 

Political  agitation,  155, 
156,  178,  180,  194 
Political  Associations 
and  Clubs,  formation 
of,  155,  164 

Political  parties,  forma- 
tion of,  164  ; collapse 
of  first,  167 ; recon- 
struction of,  194 
Political  rowdyism,  180 
Political  Development  of 
Japan,  The,  153 
Pope,  pretensions  of  the, 
55 

Pope  Alexander  VI,  27 
Population,  increase  of, 
269 

Port  Arthur,  capture  of, 
in  Chinese  war,  221  ; 
investment  of,  261  ; in 
Russian  war  and  fall 
of,  262 ; leased  to 
Russia,  231 

Portsmouth  Treaty,  the, 
264 


3i3 

Portugal,  27 

Portuguese  adventurers, 
27 

Powers,  Foreign,  attitude 
of,  65,  1 19;  regroup- 
ing of,  247 

Prefects,  annual  confer- 
ence of,  133,  156,  184 
Prefectural  assemblies, 
134.  184 

Prefectures, creation  of,  89 
Press,  the,  154 
Press  law,  153,  180 
“Prison  Editors,"  167 
Privy  Council,  the  (Sm- 
mttsu-in),  182,183 
Pro-foreign  tendencies, 
123,  124,  179 
Progressive  opinion,  77  ; 

and  tendencies,  175 
Provincial  administra- 
tion, feudal,  20,  36 ; 
revision  of,  134,  184 
Public  meetings  and  ad- 
dresses, novelty  of,  164 

Radical  Party,  begin- 
nings of  a,  137 
Reactionaries  and  Re- 
formers, aims  of,  84, 
135 

Rebels,  moderate  treat- 
ment of,  77 

Reclassification  of  land, 
i°5 

Reconstruction,  work  of, 
134 

Regent  (Ii  Kamon  no 
Kami) , assassination 
of,  55 

Regent,  or  Sesshd,  18 
Regents,  or  Shikken,  24 
Registration  of  land,  105 
Registration,  Law  of,  283 
Registration,  status  and 
residential,  291 
Religion,  Japanese  atti- 
tude towards,  120,  140, 

150 

Religion,  connection  of, 
with  reforms,  121,  139 
Religions  of  Japan  before 
Restoration,  the  four, 
139 

Religious  festivals  and 
pilgrimages,  305 
Repression  and  reform, 
158,  159 


3M 


Index 


Residential  and  commer- 
cial rights  of  foreign- 
ers, limitations  of,  48, 
204 

Restoration,  the,  accom- 
plishment of,  64 ; 
movement  for,  49,  50, 
55,  61,  62,  63 ; the 
work  of  four  clans,  71, 
83  ; unique  character 

of,  304 

Restriction  of  public 
meeting  and  speech, 
167 

Resumption  of  specie 
payments,  175 
Revantlow’s  Deutsch- 
land's Auswartige  Poli- 
tik,  227 

Revenues,  feudal,  ac 
quired  by  Government, 
93 

Revised  treaties  put  into 
force,  240 
"Revival  of  Pure  Shinto,  ’’ 
the,  145 
Rice  notes,  176 
Richardson,  Mr.,  murder 
of,  55 

Rikken-Kwai  shinto,  or 
Constitutional  Reform 
Party,  165 
Rikken  Teisei-to,  or  Con- 
stitutional Imperialist 
Party,  166 
Riobu  Shinto,  fushion  of 
Shinto  and  Buddhism, 
143  ; processions,  38 
Rise  of  Japan  and  Ger- 
many compared,  274 
Risings  of  ex-Samurai, 
170 

Rites  and  Ceremonies, 
Bureau  of,  147 
Rival  Emperors,  26 
Rockhill’s  Treaties  and 
Conventions,  229 
Rdnin,  50,  60,  81 
Roosevelt,  President, 
mediation  by,  264 ; 
and  school  question, 
266 

Rosen,  Baron,  255 
Russia,  activity  of,  in 
Siberia,  44  ; attitude 
of,  65,  1 14  ; war  with, 
257 

Russian  aims  in  Far 


East,  227  ; Baltic  fleet 
263 ; loan  to  China 
226 ; revolution,  effect 
of,  in  Far  East,  280 
Russo-Chinese  Bank,  the, 
228 


Sadaijin,  80 
Saga,  124 
" Sage  of  Mita,  The,”  155 
Saghalien,  arrangement 
with  Russia  concern- 
ing, 126  ; southern  half 
ceded  to  Japan,  264 
Saigo,  the  elder,  78,  79, 
90,  121,  129,  132,  302 
Saigo,  the  younger 
(General  Marquis),  78, 
125,  129,  174,  218 
Sa-in,  the,  80 
Saionji,  Marquis,  302 
Salisbury,  Lord,  207 
Samurai,  extinction  of, 
as  class,  89  ; im 
poverished  condition 
of,  95  ; mischievous 
influence  of  disbanded, 
152  ; privileged  posi- 
tion of,  195 
Samurai,  clanless  (see 
Ronin 

San  Francisco  Board  of 
Education,  266 
San-kin  Kd-tai,  or  sys- 
tem of  alternate  resi- 
dence of  daimios  in 
Yedo  and  their  fiefs, 
34  ; cessation  of,  81 
Sanjikwai  or  Local  Ex- 
ecutive Councils,  185 
Sanjo,  Prince,  74,  79,  80, 
90,  301 
Sasfibo,  naval  arsenal, 
259 

Satow,  Feodor,  Mr.,  193 
Satsuma  and  Choshiu 
clans,  alliance  of,  172  ; 
Japan  ruled  by,  133  ; 
naval  and  military 
control  vested  in,  200 
Satsuma  clan,  co-opera- 
tion against  Choshiu, 
59  ; discontent  in,  78, 
79  ; divided  feeling  in, 
78 ; federalists,  73 ; 
mission  of  conciliation 
to,  82 ; rebellion,  78, 
130 


Satsuma,  daimio  of,  33  ; 

ex-daimio,  186 
Satsuma  faience,  30 
" Satcho  Government,” 
the,  153 

School  Question  of  Cali- 
fornia, the,  266 
Schools,  pre-Restoration, 
Buddhist,  Government 
and  private,  292 
Schools, normal, "special” 
and  technical,  294 
Secret  Memoirs,  the,  of 
Count  Hayashi,  247 
" Security  of  the 
Throne,  The,”  181 
Sei-in,  or  Council  of 
State,  79,  101 
Sei-i-Tai-Shogun,  20 
Seki-ga-hara,  battle  of, 
32 

Senate  (Genrd-in),i^'j 
Sendai,  daimio  of,  30,  33 
Seoul,  2x5 

Shaho,  River,  battle  of 
the,  262 
Shibusawa,  Baron,  177 
Shigeno,  Professor,  288 
Shimabara,  insurrection 
of,  30 
Shimada  Saburo,  165 
Shimadzu  Saburo,  55,  78, 
79,  80,  127,  129,  130, 
186 

Shimoda,  Mrs.,  295 
Shimoda,  opening  of,  46 
Shimonoseki,  Straits  of, 
closing  of,  57  ; destruc- 
tion of  forts  at,  58  ; 
French  arrangement 
regarding,  108 
Shimonoseki,  Treaty  of, 
222 

Shimpei,  or  11  New  Sol- 
diers,” 82 
Shin  Nippon,  the,  277 
Shin  sect,  the,  142,  287 
Shingon  sect,  the,  143 
Shinran  Shonin,  Budd- 
hist priest,  142 
Shinto,  Department  of, 
73 ; Court  religion, 
147  ; form  of  nature- 
worship,  139,  140 ; 

funerals,  146 
Shizoku,  or  gentry,  90  ; 

discontent  of,  126 
Shogun,  the,  creation  of, 


20 ; absence  of  per- 
sonal rule  of,  21,  22,  23 
Shogunate,  Tokugawa, 
authority  of,  32,  33, 
34.  35.  36,  37.  38  ; de- 
cline of,  50  ; fall  of,  63, 
64 

Shoguns,  mentioned,  Yo- 
ritomo,  24  ; Iy6mit- 
su,  30  ; Iyeyasu,  32  ; 
Hidetada,  38  ; Iy6sada, 
51  ; Iy6mochi,  56 ; 
K6iki,  62 

Shoguns  and  Mikados.  23 
Shoguns  and  Court 
nobles,  relations  be- 
tween, 301 

Shogun’s  domains,  the, 
extent  of,  36  ; revenue 
from,  84 

Short  Exhortation  to  the 
People,  A,  296 
Shoshidai , or  Shoguns, 
Resident  in  Kioto,  37 
ShStoku  Taishi,  Prince, 
142 

Sian-fu,  flight  of  Chinese 
Court  to,  242 
Siberia,  intervention  of 
Allies  in,  in  Great  War, 
281 

Society,  before  Restora- 
tion, classification  of, 20 
" Society  of  Political 
Friends  " (Seiyukai), 
201 

Soga  family,  the,  18 
Sashi,  or  political  row- 
dies, 160,  202 
Sovereign,  impersonality 
of  Japanese,  21 
Sovereign,  terms  used  to 
designate  Japanese,  40 
Soyeshima,  Count,  12 1, 
302 

Spanish  missionaries,  28 
Specie  payments,  re- 
sumption of,  175 
“ Spheres  of  interest,” 
237 

State  services,  feudal 
( Kokuyeki ),  34 
Statutes  of  the  Chinese 
Eastern  Railway,  229 
Stirling,  Admiral,  46 
Stoessel,  General,  262 
Succession  to  the  throne, 
190 


Index 

iSuiko,  Empress,  142 
Sung  school  of  Confu- 
cianism, 150 
Supreme  administration, 
department  of,  73 
Surplus  population,  out- 
let for,  120 

Swords,  the  wearing  of, 
in  Satsuma,  128 

Ta-lien-Wan  leased  to 
Russia,  231  ; retreat 
of  Chinese  fleet  to,  220, 
228 

Taikun  ( see  Tycoon) 
Tai-won-kun,  the,  Re- 
gent of  Korea,  215 
Taigiosho,  or  ex-Shogun, 
39 

Taira  family,  the,  20 
Tairo,  the,  or  Regent,  50, 
52,  55 

Taisho,  or  era  of  “ Great 
Righteousness,”  70 
Taku  Forts,  storming  of 
the,  242 
Takushan,  261 
Tan6gashima,  27 
T’ang  dynasty,  the,  18 
Taoism,  144 

Tariff,  amendment  of,  61 
Tariff  autonomy,  272 
Taxation,  land,  revision 
of,  99,  101,  104  ; made 
uniform,  105 
Technical  schools,  297 
Tendai  and  Shingon,  sects 
of  Buddhism,  142,  143 
Terashima,  Count,  74 
Territorial  jurisdiction, 
the  question  of,  207 
Things  Japanese,  143 
" Three  Great  Laws," 
the,  156,  184 
Throne,  the,  18,  19 ; 

constitutional  preroga- 
tives of,  188  ; exalted 
respect  for,  182 ; in- 
effective authority  of,  ' 
181  ; intervention  of, 
201  ; restricted  rights 
of,  38 ; subservience 
of,  under  Iyeyasu  and 
his  successors,  37 
Tientsin  Convention,  the, 
216 

Tientsin,  taking  of,  in 
Boxer  campaign,  242 


315 

Time,  methods  of  reckon- 
ing, 69,  70,  71 
Ting,  Admiral,  221 
Title,  to  land,  how  deter- 
mined, 105 

Title-deeds,  100,  101,  105 
Titles,  in  feudal  times, 
territorial  and  official, 
40,  42  ; modern,  173 
Togo,  Admiral,  217,  259 
Tokimun6  (Hojo  Re- 
gent), 24 

Tokio,  or  " Eastern 
Capital,"  new  name 
for  i edo,  79 ; centre 
for  political  parties,  168 
Tokio  University,  293 
Tokugawa  Iyeyasu,  first 
Tokugawa  Shogun,  32 
Tokugawa  Shogunate, 
the,  32,  33,  34,  35,  36, 
37  ; decline  of,  50,  60  ; 
fall  of,  63,  64 
Tonkin  Frontier,  rectifi- 
cation of  the,  226 
Torres,  27 
Tosa  clan,  the,  71 
Tosa,  daimio  of,  33,  35, 
50,  53.  63 

Tosa  and  Hizen,  political 
union  of,  137 
Tozama,  daimios,  34 
Trade,  effect  of,  abolition 
of  feudalism  on,  94 ; 
hampered  state  of,  82 
Trade  quarters  in  towns, 
195 

“ Tranquillity  of  the 
People,  The,”  181 
Trans-Siberian  Railway, 
the,  227 

Transition,  Japan  in 
state  of,  305 
Treaties,  first  with 
Foreign  Powers,  46 ; 
revised  treaties,  61  ; 
new  treaties,  209,  240, 
272 

Treaties,  early  working 
of,  108 

" Treaty  limits,”  48,  182 
Treaty  Ports,  for  foreign 
residence  and  trade, 
48,  61 

Treaty  of  Portsmouth, 
264 

Treaty  Powers,  sym- 
pathy of,  with  diffi- 


316  Index 


culties  of  Japanese 
Government,  114 

Treaty  revision,  agita- 
tion for,  no,  179; 
early  desire  for,  48 ; 
Conferences,  178  ; 
course  of  negotiations, 
204,  205,  206 ; Great 
Britain  takes  initia- 
tive, 207,  209  ; other 
Powers  fall  into  line, 
240 

"Tribute,”  exaction  of, 
by  new  Government, 

83 

Tsarevitch,  attempt  on 
life  of,  194 

Tsushima  Islands,  25 

Tsushima  Straits,  naval 
battle  in,  263 

Tuan,  Prince,  241 

Twenty  - one  Demands, 
the,  278 

Two-clan  government, 
133,  275 

Tycoon,  the  ( Taikun ),  23, 
46,  54,  64,  66 


U-in,  80 
Udajin,  80 

“ Union  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  a parlia- 
ment,” 156 


United  States  and 
Japan,  friendly  rela- 
tions between,  265  ; 
later  friction,  causes 
of,  265,  266 

Universities,  instruction 
in,  297 

Uraga, Commodore  Perry, 
at,  45 

Uwajima,  daimio  of,  50, 
53 

Uyehara,  Mr.,  157 

Vendettas,  303 
Vladivostok,  Russian 
squadron  at,  259,  262 

Waldersee,  Count,  242 
War  taxes,  imposed  after 
Russian  war,  105 
Waseda  College,  the,  160 
Weekly  holiday,  the,  71 
Weihaiwei,  retreat  of 
Chinese  fleet  to,  220  ; 
Japanese  capture  of, 
221  ; leased  to  Great 
Britain,  232 
Western  innovations, 
adoption  of,  124 
Western  political  litera- 
ture, study  of,  160 
Western  thought,  the 
influence  of,  297 


Women,  position  of,  285  ; 

education  of,  294,  295 
Women’s  University,  the, 
295 

Worship  of  animals,  the, 
141 

Written  language,  Japan- 
ese, 18,  1 1 3,  268 

Xavier,  27  ; his  warning 
to  Spain,  31 

Y.M.C.A.  in  Japan,  148 
Yalu  River,  Russian  de- 
feat at  the,  260 
Yamaga  Soko,  149 
Yamagata,  Field-Mar- 
shal Prince,  174,  218, 
22i,  251,  255,  302 
Yamaji,  Mr.  Y.,  148 
Yamato  Damashii,  or 
Japanese  spirit,  150 
Yano  Fumio,  165 
Yashikis,  or  feudal  resi- 
dences, 53,  99 
Yedo,  seat  of  authority, 
19,  66 ; renamed 

Tokio,  79  ; postponed 
opening  of,  107 
Yokohama,  46,  55,  58 
Yoritomo,  20 
Yuan  Shih-kai,  Chinese 
Resident  in  Seoul,  215, 
241 


Printed  in  Great  Britain  at 

The  Mayflower  Press,  Plymouth.  William  Brcndon  & Son,  Ltd. 
1922 


DATE  DUE 


GAYLORD 


#3523PI  Printed  in  USA 


